JUNIS MAURICE DUFFY v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED:
NOVEMBER 18, 2005; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO.
2004-CA-001422-MR
JUNIS MAURICE DUFFY
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MCCRACKEN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE CRAIG Z. CLYMER, JUDGE
INDICTMENT NO. 03-CR-00326
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
HENRY, TACKETT, AND VANMETER, JUDGES.
HENRY, JUDGE:
Junis Duffy appeals from a July 1, 2004 “Final
Judgment/Sentence of Imprisonment” of the McCracken Circuit
Court sentencing him to fifteen years’ imprisonment.
Specifically, he takes issue with certain testimony that was
allowed into evidence by the trial court.
On review, we affirm.
On July 17, 2003, a Paducah Police Department
dispatcher notified police officers patrolling the city that a
person wanted by Tennessee authorities had been seen traveling
in a particular car.
Officer Brian Laird spotted the car and
had the driver, Junis Duffy, pull over at the corner of Kentucky
Avenue and 21st Street.
thereafter.
Other police officers arrived shortly
Two other individuals were in the car with Duffy,
but neither of them was the person wanted by Tennessee
authorities.
Duffy told Officer Laird that he did not have a
driver’s license, so he was immediately arrested and his car was
searched.
Officer Wes Orazine found a bag of marijuana under
the driver’s seat, and Officer William Gilbert found a closed
cigar box containing compact discs and a white substance that
was later confirmed to be crack cocaine.
Duffy admitted that
the cigar box, CDs, and marijuana belonged to him; however,
fingerprinting of the box ultimately proved to be inconclusive.
Officers Laird and Gilbert testified that (after they reviewed
the traffic stop tape that recorded the incident) when Duffy was
questioned about the cigar box, he stated, “I found the box.
There was crack⎯I hope there was no crack in it.”
The bulk of
Duffy’s appeal centers on Laird and Gilbert’s testimony about
this purported statement.
On September 5, 2003, Duffy was indicted by the
McCracken County Grand Jury on one count of first-degree
-2-
possession of a controlled substance (cocaine—second offense), 1
one count of marijuana possession, 2 and one count of operating a
vehicle without an operator’s license. 3
On October 17, 2003,
Duffy appeared in court and entered a “not guilty” plea.
On
February 13, 2004, the indictment was amended to include one
count of being a second-degree persistent felony offender. 4
On
February 20, 2004, Duffy again appeared in court and entered a
“not guilty” plea to the indictment, including the recently
added PFO charge.
The matter then proceeded to trial on April 12, 2004,
where the jury found Duffy guilty of all charges and recommended
sentences of ten years on the cocaine charge, twelve months on
the marijuana charge, and fifteen years on the PFO charge, with
the PFO sentence to run in lieu of the other two charges.
The
Commonwealth voluntarily dismissed the charge of failing to have
an operator’s license.
On July 1, 2004, the trial court entered
a “Final Judgment/Sentence of Imprisonment” finding Duffy guilty
on all charges and sentencing him to a total of fifteen years’
1
A Class C felony pursuant to KRS 218A.1415.
2
A Class A misdemeanor pursuant to KRS 218A.1422.
3
A Class B misdemeanor pursuant to KRS 186.410.
4
A Class B felony pursuant to KRS 532.080. The Commonwealth discovered that
Duffy had previously been convicted by a Missouri court of one count of
unlawful use of a weapon, and that he was consequently sentenced to 2 ½ years
imprisonment.
-3-
imprisonment, in accordance with the jury’s decision.
This
appeal followed.
Duffy’s first argument on appeal concerns the
testimony from Officer Laird as to what he heard Duffy say on
the video tape of the traffic stop when he was asked about the
cigar box.
Specifically, he told the jury that Duffy stated: “I
found the box.
There was crack⎯I hope there was no crack in the
box,” when he was questioned about the box.
On cross-
examination, it was revealed that Officer Laird’s testimony
about the statement was not derived from his own personal
memory, but rather from his multiple viewings of the traffic
stop tape in the week before trial.
In fact, Officer Laird made
no mention of this statement during his testimony before the
grand jury or at the preliminary hearing.
Duffy acknowledges that Officer Laird’s interpretation
of the traffic stop tape was not objected to at trial, and he
therefore asks us to review its inclusion as evidence under a
“palpable error” standard as set forth by RCr 5 10.26.
provision reads as follows:
A palpable error which affects the
substantial rights of a party may be
considered by the court on motion for a new
trial or by an appellate court on appeal,
even though insufficiently raised or
preserved for review, and appropriate relief
may be granted upon a determination that
5
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
-4-
That
manifest injustice has resulted from the
error.
A “palpable error” is one that is easily perceived or
obvious.
2004).
Nichols v. Commonwealth, 142 S.W.3d 683, 691 (Ky.
“Manifest injustice” refers to "[a]n error in the trial
court that is direct, obvious, and observable, such as a
defendant's guilty plea that is involuntary or that is based on
a plea agreement that the prosecution rescinds."
Black’s Law Dictionary 974 (7th ed. 1999).
Id., citing
A showing of
“manifest injustice” requires proof that, upon consideration of
the whole case, an error must have prejudiced the substantial
rights of a defendant to such an extent that a substantial
possibility exists that the result of the trial would have been
different.
Castle v. Commonwealth, 44 S.W.3d 790, 793-94
(Ky.App. 2000), citing Schaefer v. Commonwealth, 622 S.W.2d 218
(Ky. 1981); see also Partin v. Commonwealth, 918 S.W.2d 219, 224
(Ky. 1996).
As a general rule, a trial court is vested with broad
discretion in determining whether a tape recording or video tape
is of sufficient quality to permit its introduction into
evidence.
See Woods v. Commonwealth, 793 S.W.2d 809, 815 (Ky.
1990), citing Robert G. Lawson, “The Kentucky Evidence Law
Handbook,” § 7.10 (2nd ed. 1984).
The trial court exercised its
discretion here and found that the traffic stop tape could be
-5-
presented to the jury even though parts of it⎯including the
statement in question⎯are somewhat difficult to understand.
With this said, there is no question that the trial
court erred in allowing Officer Laird to give his personal
interpretation of what Duffy said on the traffic stop tape.
In
Gordon v. Commonwealth, 916 S.W.2d 176 (Ky. 1995), our Supreme
Court held that witnesses should not be permitted to give
testimony interpreting what is said on a tape recording.
Instead, “[i]t is for the jury to determine as best it can what
is revealed in the tape recording without embellishment or
interpretation by a witness.”
Id. at 180, citing Sanborn v.
Commonwealth, 754 S.W.2d 534 (Ky. 1988).
Here, the record
plainly reflects that Officers Laird and Gordon were testifying
based upon their review of the traffic stop tape and not their
personal recollection of what was said by Duffy.
impermissible.
This is simply
Id.; see also Clifford v. Commonwealth, 7 S.W.3d
371, 374 (Ky. 1999).
The question then becomes whether an error of this
nature constitutes a “manifest injustice.”
We believe that
there is no question that the admission of this testimony into
evidence was prejudicial to Duffy’s defense, which was centered
on the position that he was unaware that the crack cocaine was
inside of the cigar box and that it did not belong to him.
Allowing two police officers to tell the jury what they thought
-6-
the video tape said almost certainly carried considerable weight
with the jury and influenced its ultimate decision.
Nevertheless, upon consideration of the entire record,
we cannot say that the error was so prejudicial that a
substantial possibility exists that the result of the trial
would have been different had the testimony not come into
evidence.
See Castle, supra.
Duffy admitted that the marijuana
and cigar box were his, as well as the compact discs inside of
the box.
Consequently, it would not require a tremendous leap
of faith for the jury to conclude that the crack cocaine was his
as well.
Moreover, the jury was able to view the traffic stop
tape in its entirety and to witness the conversation between
Duffy and Officer Laird about the cigar box and its contents,
where Duffy’s references to “crack”⎯while certainly not crystal
clear⎯are discernable.
Given these facts, we cannot say that
Duffy is entitled to relief here under the “palpable error”
standard.
Duffy’s next argument, closely related to his first,
is that the trial court erred in allowing Officer Gilbert to
also give his version of what Duffy said to Officer Laird in the
traffic stop tape.
Given our conclusions above, it is clear
that the trial court did err in this respect.
Nevertheless, we
must conclude that this error was harmless in nature because of
the fact that Officer Gilbert’s testimony in this respect only
-7-
repeated what Officer Laird, without objection, had told the
jury.
See Allgeier v. Commonwealth, 915 S.W.2d 745, 747 (Ky.
1996), citing RCr 9.24.
As to Duffy’s final argument that it was palpable
error for the trial court to allow Officer Laird to offer an
“expert” opinion that it was not uncommon for persons in
possession of more than one controlled substance⎯specifically
marijuana and cocaine⎯to admit to owning the marijuana while
denying ownership of the cocaine, we do not believe that it
merits a reversal here under the standards for palpable error.
We note that our Supreme Court has held that the
opinions of trained police officers in an area in which they
have expertise should be distinguished from the more complex and
extensive knowledge required for experts such as accident
reconstructionists and forensic pathologists.
S.W.2d at 747.
Allgeier, 915
However, it is still necessary for a proper
foundation to be laid before such evidence is admitted.
See
Dixon v. Commonwealth, 149 S.W.3d 426, 431 (Ky. 2004); Evans v.
Commonwealth, 116 S.W.3d 503, 510 (Ky. 2003) (Citation omitted).
We have questions as to whether or not an appropriate foundation
was laid here for Officer Laird’s opinion, but⎯again⎯given the
standard for palpable error and after considering the case as a
whole, we do not believe that a substantial possibility exists
-8-
that the result of the trial would have been different had this
evidence not been introduced, see Castle, supra, particularly
given the trial court’s admonishment to the jury that Officer
Laird’s testimony that this conduct often occurs in other cases
did not necessarily mean that it happened here.
Accordingly, the judgment of the McCracken Circuit
Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Samuel N. Potter
Frankfort, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Office of Attorney General
Perry T. Ryan
Frankfort, Kentucky
-9-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.