SONNY T. POOLE v. DOLLAR GENERAL CORPORATION, INC.; 1 DOLLAR GENERAL STORES, LTD.; RUTH ANN CONRAD; CHARLOTTE HOWARD
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RENDERED:
SEPTEMBER 23, 2005; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2004-CA-001334-MR
SONNY T. POOLE
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM McLEAN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DAVID H. JERNIGAN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 02-CI-00065
DOLLAR GENERAL CORPORATION, INC.; 1
DOLLAR GENERAL STORES, LTD.;
RUTH ANN CONRAD; CHARLOTTE
HOWARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: HENRY AND VANMETER, JUDGES; MILLER, SENIOR JUDGE. 2
MILLER, SENIOR JUDGE:
Sonny T. Poole appeals from an Opinion
and Order of the McLean Circuit Court granting judgment
notwithstanding the verdict (jnov) to appellees Dollar General
Corporation, Inc. and Dollar General Stores, LTD. (collectively
1
Dollar General Corporation, Inc. also identified in the record as Dollar
General Corporation.
2
Senior Judge John D. Miller sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the
Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and
KRS 21.580.
“Dollar General”); Ruth Ann Conrad; and Charlotte Howard.
The
order granting jnov overturned a jury verdict awarding
compensatory damages of $500,000.00 to Poole based upon the
jury’s determination that Conrad and Howard had made defamatory
statements concerning Poole in the course of their employment
with Dollar General.
Adhering to the Kentucky Supreme Court’s holding in
Stringer v. Wal-Mart, 151 S.W.3d 781 (Ky. 2004), which we are
bound to do, we reverse the trial court’s entry of jnov.
We
remand for entry of judgment upon the jury verdict against
Conrad, Howard, and Dollar General, jointly and severally.
BACKGROUND
Dollar General is a discount retail chain which
operates an outlet in Calhoun, McLean County, Kentucky.
On the
afternoon of June 7, 2001, Dollar General employees Viki
Humphrey and Ruth Ann Conrad were on duty at the store.
In
addition to assisting customers and operating the cash
registers, they were stocking shelves.
As Conrad was assisting
a customer at the back of the store, Humphrey was alone as she
shelved merchandise.
Humphrey became aware that a man was
shadowing her movements in the next aisle, which frightened her.
Humphrey then went to the front of the store to check-out a
customer’s purchase.
She completed the transaction, and when
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she looked up, she saw a man standing in the center aisle of the
store.
His penis was exposed and he was masturbating.
Humphrey was shocked by the incident, and fled to an
adjacent aisle.
When she regained her composure, she looked
around the shelf and saw that Conrad had returned to the front
of the store to the cash register area.
Humphrey observed
Conrad checking-out a man purchasing two bottles of juice.
Perhaps because of her emotional state, Humphrey mistook the man
for the perpetrator of the lewd conduct.
When the man left the store Humphrey approached Conrad
and asked her if she knew the person who had just purchased the
juice.
Conrad told Humphrey the man was Sonny Poole.
Humphrey
then told Conrad what had occurred, and that she believed that
the man who purchased the juice was the person who had engaged
in the conduct.
Poole was, in fact, the person who had
purchased the juice, but he was not the perpetrator.
Conrad called the store manager, Sandra DeHart.
After
speaking with Humphrey about what she had seen, DeHart called
the McLean County Sheriff’s Department, which conducted an
investigation of the incident.
Semen was recovered from the
floor of the store.
The matter was presented to the McLean County Grand
Jury, which returned an indictment against Poole charging him
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with the offense of criminal stalking. 3
test was performed on the semen.
At Poole’s expense a DNA
The DNA test exonerated Poole.
The criminal charges were dismissed.
In the meantime, however,
the falsehood that Poole was the perpetrator of the conduct had
been widely circulated throughout the community.
On May 28, 2002, Poole filed a complaint in McLean
Circuit Court alleging, inter alia, defamation of character.
He named as defendants Dollar General; Ruth Ann Conrad; Viki
Humphrey; Sandra DeHart; and Charlotte Howard (also a store
employee).
He sought compensatory and punitive damages against
said defendants jointly and severally.
A jury trial was held on March 23 and 24, 2004.
At
the conclusion of the Plaintiff’s case, defendants Humphrey and
DeHart were awarded directed verdicts on the basis that any
defamatory statements they had made were privileged
communications to law enforcement officers and/or other
employees of Dollar General.
Finally the case was submitted as to the remaining
defendants upon the issues of defamation and compensatory
damages only.
The jury returned the verdict under question.
The Defendants moved for jnov or, in the alternative,
for a new trial under Ky. R. Civ. P. (CR) 50.02.
On May 10,
2004, the trial court entered an order granting the Defendants
3
Kentucky Revised Statute 508.140.
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jnov.
In granting the motions, the trial court determined that
the only trial testimony relevant to the defamation issue was
that Conrad and Howard made statements to the effect that
“someone exposed themselves [sic] in the Dollar General Store
and masturbated, that Plaintiff had been accused of it by a
store employee, and that Plaintiff was going to be arrested.”
The trial court concluded that these were true statements and,
because truth is an absolute defense to defamation, granted the
defendants jnov.
This appeal followed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In ruling on a jnov motion, the trial court is
required to consider the evidence in a light most favorable to
the party opposing the motion and to give that party every
reasonable inference that can be drawn from the record.
v. Kennedy, 700 S.W.2d 415, 416 (Ky. 1985).
Taylor
The motion is not
to be granted "unless there is a complete absence of proof on a
material issue in the action, or if no disputed issue of fact
exists upon which reasonable men could differ."
Taylor, 700
S.W.2d at 416.
On appeal, we are to consider the evidence in
the same light.
Lovins v. Napier, 814 S.W.2d 921, 922 (Ky.
1991); Brewer v. Hillard, 15 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Ky.App. 1999).
APPLICABLE DEFAMATION LAW
Whether libel or slander, four elements are necessary
to establish a defamation action: (1) defamatory language; (2)
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about the plaintiff; (3) which is published; and (4) which
causes injury to reputation.
Columbia Sussex Corp., Inc. v.
Hay, 627 S.W.2d 270, 273(Ky.App. 1981).
"Defamatory language" is broadly construed as language
that "tends so to harm the reputation of another as to lower him
in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons
from associating or dealing with him."
Torts § 559 (1977).
Restatement (Second) of
See also Ball v. E.W. Scripps Co., 801
S.W.2d 684, 688 (Ky. 1990), and
McCall v. Courier-Journal &
Louisville Times Co., 623 S.W.2d 882 (Ky. 1981).
"It is for the
jury to determine, on the basis of competent evidence, whether a
defamatory meaning was attributed to it by those who received
the communication.
The terms should be construed in their most
natural meaning and should be 'measured by the natural and
probable effect on the mind of the average [person].'"
Yancey
v. Hamilton, 786 S.W.2d 854, 858 (Ky. 1989) (quoting McCall, 623
S.W.2d at 884).
"[W]ords falsely spoken will be defined
according to their popular meaning, and as intended to be meant
by the speaker and understood by the hearers.
And, in arriving
at the sense in which the defamatory language is employed, it is
proper to consider the circumstances surrounding its publication
and the entire language used."
20 S.W.2d 995, 996 (1929).
Abbott v. Vinson, 230 Ky. 786,
"It is a fundamental principle in
the law of libel and slander that the defamatory matter
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complained of should be construed as a whole, and that the
language employed therein should receive its common and ordinary
acceptation in the light of the conditions and circumstances
under which it was published."
Commercial Tribune Pub. Co. v.
Haines, 228 Ky. 483, 15 S.W.2d 306, 307 (1929).
Element two, "about the plaintiff" largely speaks for
itself, but it is worth noting that the plaintiff need not be
specifically identified in the defamatory matter itself so long
as it was so reasonably understood by plaintiff's "friends and
acquaintances ... familiar with the incident."
E.W. Scripps Co.
v. Cholmondelay, 569 S.W.2d 700, 702 (Ky.App. 1978).
Element three, the notion of "publication" is a term
of art, and defamatory language is "published" when it is
intentionally or negligently communicated to someone other than
the party defamed.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 577 (1977).
With regard to element four – regarding injury to
reputation - generally, defamatory words written or spoken of
another are divided into two classes in determining the extent
to which they are actionable.
Words may be actionable per se,
or per quod.
In the case of defamation per se, damages are presumed
and the person defamed may recover without allegation or proof
of special damages.
In other words, "[w]ords are said to be
actionable per se when there is a conclusive presumption of both
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malice and damage[,]" Walker v. Tucker, 220 Ky. 363, 295 S.W.
138, 139 (1927).
Thus, when the defamatory language at issue is
determined to be libelous or slanderous per se, recovery is
permitted without proof of special damages because injury to
reputation is presumed and the words are "actionable on their
face -- without proof of extrinsic facts or explicatory
circumstances."
David A. Elder, Kentucky Tort Law:
and the Right of Privacy, § 1.06 at 37 (1983).
Defamation
Statements
classified as defamatory per se include statements attributing
to someone a criminal offense; a loathsome disease; conduct
incompatible with his business, trade, profession, or office; or
serious sexual misconduct.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 570
(1977).
In the case of negligence per quod, recovery may be
sustained only upon an allegation and proof of special
damages[.]”
Hill v. Evans, 258 S.W.2d 917, 918 (Ky. 1953).
Defamatory statements that are merely libelous or slanderous per
quod require "proof of extrinsic facts or explanatory
circumstances and special damages."
Id.
Because the statements
made by Conrad and Howard, as further discussed below, impute
conduct to Poole in the nature of a criminal offense and serious
sexual misconduct, the type of defamation involved in this case
is slander per se.
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LIABILITY OF EMPLOYEES CONRAD AND HOWARD
Based upon the defamation principles enunciated in
Stringer v. Wal-Mart, 151 S.W.3d 781 (Ky. 2004), a case rendered
subsequent to trial in this matter, we are, as to defendants
Conrad and Howard, required to reverse the entry of jnov and
remand for entry of judgment upon the jury verdict.
Rules of Supreme Court 1.030(8)(a).
Kentucky
We are of the opinion that
the statements made by Conrad and Howard come well within the
orbit of the defamatory utterances made by the Wal-Mart
Assistant Manager in Stringer.
RUTH ANN CONRAD STATEMENTS
With the foregoing in mind, we now turn to the
specific statements made by Conrad and Howard cited by Poole as
supporting the jury verdict in his favor.
statements made by Ruth Ann Conrad.
We first consider the
As previously noted, Conrad
was a Dollar General employee who was present in the store at
the time of the June 7, 2001, incident.
The Conrad statements
were related in trial testimony presented by Lillian Floyd, a
local citizen, and concern a conversation Ms. Floyd had with
Conrad about three days after the incident.
The conversation
occurred at the Calhoun Dollar General outlet on an occasion
when Floyd had entered the store as a customer.
On direct
examination Floyd first testified that she had already heard
about the incident when she entered the store upon this
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occasion.
Then the following exchange occurred between Floyd
and Poole attorney James C. Brantley:
Q.
And while you were in the Dollar General
Store, Ms. Conrad said something to you?
A.
She said, What do you think about what
Sonny – what’s happened to Sonny Poole,
and I said I don’t – and I don’t think
he did what they accused him of doing.
Q.
And what did she say when you said that?
A.
She said, Well, I know Sonny Poole when
I see him, and he was up there when I
come out of the – when I come out front.
Q.
Did Ms. Conrad indicate to you that she
thought Sonny Poole had done that?
A.
Well, she said, I know Sonny Poole when
I see him, so I suppose.
Q.
Did she identify Sonny Poole by name?
A.
I don’t remember. Probably so, but I
know she said Sonny or Sonny Poole.
Probably Sonny Poole because that’s
what -
Q.
But she either said Sonny or Sonny
Poole? Did she make an indication that
– put her hand on her chest and say, I
never want to see anything like that
again?
A.
Yes.
CHARLOTTE HOWARD STATEMENTS
The trial evidence cited by Poole in support of the
jury verdict with respect to statements made by Charlotte Howard
is contained in the trial testimony given by Susan North, also
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an area resident.
Poole was doing remodeling work on Ms.
North’s residence during the time the incident occurred.
In a
phone call made from the store, North was contacted by Dollar
General employee Howard.
At trial, the following direct
examination between Poole counsel Brantley and North summarizes
the contents of the telephone call:
Q.
Did anyone else contact you regarding
this incident?
A.
Yes. After I had talked to Ms.
McCalister sometime – I’m not sure how
long that was – but I got a call from
Charlotte Howard at the Dollar Store.
Q.
Did Mrs. Howard tell you that she was
calling from the Dollar Store?
A.
No, she did not.
Q.
Did you know Mrs. Howard?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Did you know that she worked at the
Dollar Store?
A.
Yes, I did.
Q.
And what did Mrs. Howard say to you?
A.
Mrs. Howard just asked if we were having
any work done on our house and who was
doing it, and I told her that it was Mr.
Poole, and she said, Well, you shouldn’t
be alone in the house with him because
of what’s happened at the Dollar
Store.
Q.
Did she say because of what’s happened
or what he is accused of doing?
Uh-huh.
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A.
I think I believe she said what’s
happened because we didn’t go into any
details with that, about the –
Q.
At that time, did you have an ID on your
telephone, a caller ID?
A.
Yes, I did.
Q.
Okay. Did you know where the call
originated –
A.
Yes. I saw that it was from the Dollar
Store.
APPLICATION OF STRINGER TO CONRAD AND HOWARD
In our review of whether the foregoing testimony is
sufficient to support a jury verdict for defamation, we are
compelled to follow, and are guided largely, by the recent
Kentucky Supreme Court case Stringer v. Wal-Mart, supra.
In
Stringer, four Wal-Mart employees were fired for "unauthorized
removal of company property" and "violation of company policy"
for eating "claims candy," i.e., candy from open or torn bags
removed from the store's shelves that had been taken to the
store's "claims area" to be processed by a claims clerk and then
either discarded or returned.
James Carey, a Wal-Mart Assistant
Manager, when asked by a subordinate employee whether the
employees had been terminated for eating candy from the claims
area, responded "'[t]here was more to it than that' and that he
‘couldn't talk about it’."
This exchange, which seemed to be
but a polite response to a passing inquiry by a fellow employee,
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occurred in the employee lounge and in the presence of at least
three employees.
In light of the context in which the words
were spoken, the Supreme Court upheld the jury’s determination
that the utterance was defamatory.
The Supreme Court determined
that, within context, a jury could conclude that Carey had
attributed theft to the employees above and beyond the taking of
the claims candy.
Hence, in Stringer, what seems to have been a most
trivial and innocuous utterance of the words “there was more to
it than that” and that he “couldn’t talk about it,” in the
context in which they were spoken, was deemed sufficient to
uphold a jury verdict for defamation.
From the holding in
Stringer, we discern that we must examine the utterances of
Conrad and Howard with particular emphasis on the context in
which they were spoken.
In her conversation with Lillian Floyd a few days
after the incident, Conrad unilaterally raised the issue of
Sonny Poole with the customer, asking her “[w]hat do you think
about what Sonny – what’s happened to Sonny Poole[?]”
When
Floyd indicated that she did not believe Sonny was the
perpetrator Conrad responded “Well, I know Sonny Poole when I
see him, and he was up there when I come out of the – when I
come out front.”
Viewed in the light most favorably to Poole, a
jury could conclude that it was Conrad’s intention to
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communicate to Floyd that Floyd was mistaken in her belief that
Poole was not the perpetrator because she, Conrad, had
personally observed him at the front of the store immediately
following the incident and knew from personal knowledge that
Poole was, in fact, the perpetrator.
Conrad followed up this
statement by placing her hand on her chest and stating “I never
want to see anything like that again.”
Because Conrad had
originally brought up the issue, and in so doing had identified
Sonny Poole by name, in context, a jury could conclude that this
was an additional attempt by Conrad to communicate her belief to
Floyd that Poole was the perpetrator of the June 7, 2001,
incident.
The statements made by Conrad go considerably further
than the vague and hazy statements made by the Wal-Mart
Assistant Manager in Stringer (“it was more than that” and “he
couldn’t talk about it”) in communicating a slanderous message
to the recipient of the statement.
Based upon Stringer, the
trial court properly submitted the case to the jury for its
evaluation of whether the statements made by Conrad communicated
a slanderous message to Floyd.
However, the trial court erred
in setting aside the jury’s determination in his jnov order.
Based upon Stringer, we are compelled to reverse the trial
court’s award of jnov to Conrad.
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Similarly, we must also reverse the jnov with respect
to the statements made by Charlotte Howard to Susan North.
Again, Howard, a Dollar General employee, initiated the
conversation by placing a call to North from the store.
After
ascertaining that Poole was doing work for North at her
residence, Howard stated “Well, you shouldn’t be alone in the
house with him because of what’s happened at the Dollar Store.”
Viewing this statement in the light most favorable to
Poole, again, a jury could conclude that Howard was attempting
to communicate to North that Poole was the perpetrator of the
June 7 incident.
Howard specifically referred to “what’s
happened at the Dollar Store,” which the jury could reasonably
have concluded was a reference to the June 7 incident.
By
warning North not to be alone with Poole, a reasonable juror
could also conclude that Howard was directly attributing the
conduct to Poole – there was no other apparent basis for warning
North not to be alone with Poole unless Howard was intending to
communicate to North that Poole was the perpetrator of the June
7 incident.
Further, given her status as a Dollar General
employee, the communication could be perceived not as the mere
repeating of gossip but, rather, a communication from an
“insider.”
Because, in context, a reasonable jury could
conclude that Howard was communicating to North that Poole was
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the perpetrator of the June 7 incident, pursuant to Stringer, we
reverse the trial court’s award of jnov as to Howard.
LIABILITY OF DOLLAR GENERAL
The jury instructions permitted the jury to assign
liability to Dollar General for the statements made by Conrad
and Howard if either they made the statements within the scope
of their employment, or if Dollar General failed to exercise
ordinary care in the supervision of its employees.
The
soundness of the instructions has not been raised in this
appeal, and, accordingly, we need not discuss the finding of
liability against Dollar General.
Koplin v. Kelrick, 443 S.W.2d
644, 646 (Ky. 1969) (Court of Appeals would assume that issue
was abandoned where it was not briefed.);
Herrick v. Wills, 333
S.W.2d 275, 276 (Ky. 1959) (Errors not called to the attention
of the appellate court prior to the time a decision is rendered
may be deemed waived).
As we have reversed the award of jnov as to employees
Conrad and Howard, it follows that reversal and reinstatement of
the jury verdict is compelled against Dollar General.
PUNITIVE DAMAGES INSTRUCTION
Poole contends that the trial court erred by failing
to render an instruction on punitive damages.
remand for trial on punitive damages only.
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He asks us to
An instruction on punitive damages is warranted if
there is evidence that the defendant acted with oppression,
fraud, malice, or was grossly negligent by acting with wanton or
reckless disregard for the lives, safety or property of others.
See Phelps v. Louisville Water Co., 103 S.W.3d 46, 51-52 (Ky.
2003); KRS 411.184.
A party is entitled to have the jury
instructed on the issue of punitive damages "if there was any
evidence to support an award of punitive damages."
Thomas v.
Greenview Hosp., Inc., 127 S.W.3d 663 (Ky.App. 2004) (quoting
Shortridge v. Rice, 929 S.W.2d 194, 197 (Ky.App. 1996) (emphasis
in original)).
The slanderous statements made by Conrad and Howard
attributed a criminal offense to Poole and, as such, was slander
per se.
“[W]hen the defamatory publication is actionable per se
there is a conclusive presumption of both malice and damage.”
Baker v. Clark, 186 Ky. 816, 218 S.W. 280 (1920); Tucker v.
Kilgore, 388 S.W.2d 112, 116 (Ky. 1964).
As malice was to be
presumed in this case, and, as such, there was some evidence to
support an award of punitive damages, an instruction on such an
award would have been appropriate.
Pennsylvania Iron Works Co.
v. Henry Voght Mach. Co., 139 Ky. 497, 96 S.W. 551, 553 (1906).
However, under the circumstances with which we are faced, we are
loath to remand for retrial on punitive damages alone.
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We are aware of the long-standing rule authorizing
retrial on damages alone.
(Ky. 1968).
See Nolan v. Spears, 432 S.W.2d 425
We are also aware that the rule in Nolan has been
extended to permit retrial on punitive damages alone.
See
Shortridge v. Rice, supra, and Sand Hill Energy, Inc. v. Smith,
142 S.W.3d 153 (Ky. 2004) (Cases alleging negligence).
For many
reasons, not the least of which being that a retrial on punitive
damages alone greatly enhances the probability of double
recovery, we think the practice of remanding for retrial upon
this single issue bears reexamination by our Supreme Court.
In any event, the case at hand involves an intentional
tort.
Poole was awarded compensatory damages of $500,000.00
based upon a presumption of malice in that the statements at
issue were slanderous per se.
While it may have been
appropriate that the jury be instructed upon punitive damages as
well as compensatory damages, see Pennsylvania Iron Works,
supra., we are not inclined to expand the principle of remanding
for punitive damages alone when an award has already been made
upon the same premise, i.e., when the element of malice has
already been factored into the compensatory damage award.
Perforce we reject the Appellant’s entreaty to remand for
retrial upon punitive damages alone.
OTHER ISSUES
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Poole also contends that the trial court erred because
it excluded evidence concerning a similar incident at the store
which occurred approximately a year after the June 7, 2001,
incident.
Because of our remand for entry of judgment upon the
jury verdict, this issue is moot and we will not discuss same.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the McLean
Circuit Court is reversed, and this cause is remanded for entry
of judgment upon the jury verdict against Ruth Ann Conrad,
Charlotte Howard, and Dollar General, jointly and severally.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
Phillip J. Shepherd
Frankfort, Kentucky
J. Todd P’Pool
Madisonville, Kentucky
James C. Brantley
Dawson Springs, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES RUTH ANN
CONRAND AND CHARLOTTE HOWARD:
Michael D. Hallyburton
Madisonville, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES DOLLAR
GENERAL CORPORATION, INC. AND
DOLLAR GENERAL STORES, LTD:
H. Brent Brennenstuhl
Bowling Green, Kentucky
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