CITY OF GREENUP v. PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION; SOUTH SHORE WATER WORKS CO.
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RENDERED:
JULY 1, 2005; 2:00 P.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2004-CA-001325-MR
CITY OF GREENUP
APPELLANT
v.
APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM L. GRAHAM, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 02-CI-01190
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION;
SOUTH SHORE WATER WORKS CO.
APPELLEES
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; GUIDUGLI, JUDGE; MILLER, SENIOR
JUDGE.1
MILLER, SENIOR JUDGE:
The City of Greenup (Greenup) appeals
from an order of the Franklin Circuit Court which affirmed an
order of the Public Service Commission (PSC) determining (1)
that the agency had authority to determine its own jurisdiction,
and (2) that a valid contract had been formed between Greenup
and South Shore under which Greenup was to provide wholesale
1
Senior Judge John D. Miller sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the
Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and
KRS 21.580.
water to South Shore.
own jurisdiction.
We agree that the PSC may determine its
However, because the PSC erred in its
determination that a valid contract had been formed between
Greenup and South Shore, we reverse and remand the matter to the
circuit court for entry of an order reversing the decision of
the PSC.
BACKGROUND
Greenup is a city of the fifth class located in
Greenup County, Kentucky.
81.010(5).
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS)
It owns and operates a water treatment and
distribution system which provides municipal water service to
approximately 2,900 customers within the city and in certain of
the unincorporated areas of Greenup County.
As a municipal
water system, Greenup’s water system is not, in the absence of a
contract to provide utility services to a regulated utility
(e.g., South Shore), subject to regulation by the PSC.
Simpson
County Water District v. City of Franklin, 872 S.W.2d 460, 463
(Ky. 1994).
South Shore is a corporation organized under the laws
of the Commonwealth of Kentucky.
KRS Chapter 271.
South Shore
owns and operates water facilities in the vicinity of South
Shore, Kentucky.
customers.
It distributes water to approximately 2,264
South Shore is a utility subject to PSC
jurisdiction.
KRS 278.010(3)(c); KRS 278.040(1).
2
Historically, South Shore has obtained its entire
water supply from a “wellfield” situated in Greenup County.
Beginning in the late 1980s, South Shore began experiencing
problems with the quality and quantity of water from this field.
Following a study of the problem, South Shore concluded that the
most feasible remedy for the problem was to purchase wholesale
water from Greenup by connecting with its municipal water
system.
South Shore provided copies of its study to, among
others, Greenup.
Thereafter, Greenup’s Mayor, Charles Veach,
requested that representatives of South Shore attend a regularly
scheduled City Council meeting to discuss the matter.
On April
7, 1998, South Shore President, Joe Hannah, appeared before the
Greenup City Council and presented an “Application for Wholesale
Water Service.”
The application presented a reasonably
comprehensive proposal for the provisioning of water by Greenup
to South Shore.
The minutes of the April 7, 1998, Council meeting
included the following:
Joe Hannah from South Shore Water Works
presented an application to Mayor and
council for wholesale water service. Water
to the north side of Plum Fork Hill.
A motion was made by Neil Wright and
seconded by Paul Judkins to accept the
application for wholesale water service from
South Shore Water Works subject to
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engineering approval from the Division of
Water and funding of Phase 6 water line
extension.
. . . . .
Motion Carried: 6-0
Subsequent to the April 7 meeting, Greenup modified
its proposed Phase VI project (an expansion program under
contemplation prior to the April 7 meeting) to accommodate the
increase in demand which would result from the South Shore
proposal.
Similarly, South Shore asserts that it implemented
changes in its facilities at significant cost to accommodate the
expected interconnection.
As the Phase VI project neared completion, South Shore
and Greenup entered into discussions regarding a water user
agreement.
In November 2001 the discussions reached an impasse
over the provisions of a minimum monthly bill for wholesale
service.
On November 28, 2001, South Shore tendered a check for
$5,000.00 to Greenup as payment for all “tapping fees” related
to the interconnection.
Greenup refused to accept the payment.
On December 4, 2001, South Shore filed a Complaint
with the PSC alleging that its April 7, 1998, Application for
Wholesale Water Service and the corresponding vote of acceptance
by the Greenup City Council constituted a contract for wholesale
water and requested that the agency enter an order directing
Greenup to provide water pursuant to its terms.
4
On January 11, 2002, the PSC issued an order
dismissing the Complaint on the basis that South Shore had
failed to present a prima facie case of the existence of a
contract and, consequently, that it had no jurisdiction.
On January 28, 2002, South Shore filed an “Amended and
Substituted Complaint.”
answer.
The PSC ordered the City to file an
Following discovery, several procedural motions, and a
brief procedural hearing, the matter was submitted for decision.
On July 24, 2002, the PSC changed its position and
entered an order determining that it had authority to decide
whether a contract had been formed between Greenup and South
Shore.
On the merits, the PSC determined that a contract had in
fact been formed, thus giving the agency jurisdiction pursuant
to KRS 278.200.
The PSC ordered Greenup to file tariffs
reflecting the PSC’s interpretation of their agreement.
Greenup subsequently appealed to the Franklin Circuit
Court.
KRS 278.410.
On June 9, 2004, the Franklin Circuit
Court entered an Opinion and Order affirming the decision of the
PSC.
This appeal followed.
PSC JURISDICION
First, Greenup contends that the PSC lacked authority
to determine its own jurisdiction by deciding whether a contract
had been formed between Greenup and South Shore for the
provisioning of wholesale water.
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Greenup contends the existence
of a valid contract is an issue for judicial determination.
Greenup argues that “[b]efore the Public Service Commission can
assert its jurisdiction, there must be a valid contract to
enforce,” and that “[t]he issue presented by South Shore is not
one of rates and service, but of contract law, an issue not
within the scope of the Public Service Commission’s limited
jurisdiction.”
KRS 278.040(2) provides as follows:
The jurisdiction of the commission shall
extend to all utilities in this state. The
commission shall have exclusive jurisdiction
over the regulation of rates and service of
utilities, but with that exception nothing
in this chapter is intended to limit or
restrict the police jurisdiction, contract
rights or powers of cities or political
subdivisions. (Emphasis added).
KRS 278.010(3)(d) exempts from the definition of a
utility a city which distributes or furnishes water to the
public for compensation.
KRS 278.200, however, provides an
exception to this exemption when a city contracts with a
regulated utility (e.g. South Shore) to furnish water.
Specifically, KRS 278.200 sets forth:
The commission may, under the provisions of
this chapter, originate, establish, change,
promulgate and enforce any rate or service
standard of any utility that has been or may
be fixed by any contract, franchise or
agreement between the utility and any city,
and all rights, privileges and obligations
arising out of any such contract, franchise
or agreement, regulating any such rate or
service standard, shall be subject to the
jurisdiction and supervision of the
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commission, but no such rate or service
standard shall be changed, nor any contract,
franchise or agreement affecting it
abrogated or changed, until a hearing has
been had before the commission in the manner
prescribed in this chapter. (Emphasis
added).
In summary, the PSC does not have jurisdiction over
utility services furnished by a municipality except to the
extent that those services are rendered pursuant to a contract
with a utility which is regulated by the PSC.
In such cases the
municipality, in the matters covered under the contract, is
subject to the jurisdiction of the PSC.
In this case, South Shore alleged the existence of a
contract, which, if valid, would have the effect of bringing
matters covered under the contract within the jurisdiction of
the PSC.
Greenup denied the existence of a contract.
Did
Greenup’s summary and manifest denial of the existence of a
contract preemptively divest the PSC of jurisdiction?
Or, was
the PSC authorized to undertake a review of relevant
circumstances and determine if a contract had been formed
between the parties; thus, effectively determining for itself
whether the matter is within its jurisdiction?
It seems the
issue is one of initial impression.
We think it a sound principle of law that a quasijudicial agency such as the PSC, like a Court, has authority, by
implication, to determine its own jurisdiction.
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In 2 Am. Jur.
2d Administrative Law § 284 (2004), the rule applicable to this
situation is stated as follows:
Absent a patent and unambiguous lack of
jurisdiction, a tribunal having general
subject matter jurisdiction of a case
possesses authority to determine its own
jurisdiction, and a party challenging that
jurisdiction has an adequate remedy via
appeal from its holding that it has
jurisdiction. If a statute authorizes an
administrative agency to act in a particular
situation, it necessarily confers upon the
agency authority to determine whether the
situation is one in which the agency is
authorized to determine the coverage of the
statute--a question that cannot be initially
decided by a court. However, an
administrative agency's determination as to
its jurisdiction is not conclusive upon the
courts; it is a judicial function finally to
decide the limits of the statutory power of
an administrative agency. (Citations
omitted).
Under the facts presented, we are of the opinion the
PSC had the authority to review the circumstances at hand and
determine if it had jurisdiction over the matter on the basis a
contract had been formed between Greenup and South Shore.
We
are not confronted with a case where there was manifestly not a
contract and, perforce, the PSC patently and unambiguously
lacked jurisdiction.
An application for wholesale water
services had been filed by South Shore with the Greenup City
Council; the application had been accepted by the City Council;
Greenup had incorporated the anticipated additional volume into
its Phase VI plans; and Greenup had taken measures to
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accommodate the hookup.
Hence, we are of the opinion the PSC
properly undertook an analysis to determine whether a contract
had been formed between Greenup and South Shore.
We are buttressed in so holding by noting that
Greenup, by bringing an appeal from the PSC’s decision, has
invoked the power of the Courts to review de novo the issue of
whether a contract had been formed under the circumstances of
this case, and has thereby obtained the judicial review it would
have obtained had the case been heard in the Courts in the first
instance.
Having concluded that the PSC has authority to
determine its own jurisdiction, we advance to Greenup’s further
argument.
CONTRACT FORMATION
Greenup contends that the PSC erroneously determined
that a valid contract existed because the alleged agreement with
South Shore failed to comply with the statutory procedures for
cities to follow in executing contracts.
As there are no facts in dispute, we are faced with
but a question of law.
Accordingly, our review is de novo.
Revenue Cabinet v. Comcast Cablevision of the South, 147 S.W.3d
743, 747 (Ky.App. 2003).
In its July 24, 2002, order the PSC stated “[w]e find
no merit in Greenup’s contention that no contract could be
9
entered without the actions of Greenup’s mayor.”
This
conclusion of law, however, diametrically conflicts with KRS
83A.130(8), which provides as follows:
All . . . contracts and written obligations
of the city shall be made and executed by
the mayor or his agent designated by
executive order. (Emphasis added).
KRS 446.080(4) prescribes that in construing statutes
"[a]ll words and phrases shall be construed according to the
common and approved usage of language . . . ."
added).
(Emphasis
"In common or ordinary parlance, and in its ordinary
signification, the term 'shall' is a word of command and . . .
must be given a compulsory meaning." Black's Law Dictionary 1233
(5th ed. 1979).
Shall means shall.
Vandertoll v. Commonwealth,
110 S.W.3d 789, 795-796 (Ky. 2003).
We are of the opinion the PSC erred in concluding that
a contract could be entered into without action by the mayor of
Greenup.
Pursuant to KRS 83A.130(8), a contract can only “be
made” and must be executed by the mayor.
The PSC’s conclusion
that a contract may be formed absent action by the mayor is an
erroneous conclusion of law.
Further, we construe the statute as requiring a
contract entered into by a municipality to be in written format
so that it may be executed by the signature of the mayor.
It is
uncontested that a written contract executed by the mayor does
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not exist in this case.
This being so, it follows that no valid
express contract was formed.
Moreover, KRS 83A.130(8) unambiguously categorizes the
making of a contract as an executive function.
KRS 83A.130(11)
provides that “[t]he council shall not perform any executive
functions except those functions assigned to it by statute.”
The making and execution of contracts is not assigned to the
city council by statute.
The PSC erroneously concluded that the
vote in favor of the application at the April 7, 1998, council
meeting was sufficient to bind Greenup to a contract for the
provisioning of wholesale water to South Shore.
The PSC determined, as a conclusion of law that,
“[t]he resolution of Greenup’s City Council, duly recorded, is
sufficient action to constitute a binding acceptance.”
conclusion of law conflicts with KRS 83A.130(8).
This
Under this
statute all contracts must be “made and executed by the mayor.”
The PSC’s conclusion is in direct contravention of the statute.
The statutory provisions concerning the formation of a
contract by a municipality must be strictly adhered to.
As
stated in City of Princeton v. Princeton Electric Light & Power
Co., 166 Ky. 730, 179 S.W. 1074, 1079 (Ky. 1915):
The laws provide how municipalities may bind
themselves, and the contracts to be
obligatory must be made in the manner the
laws prescribe. A different rule prevails
in regard to municipalities to that which
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governs private persons and private
corporations. The persons who contract with
municipal corporations must, at their peril,
know the rights and powers of the officers
of such municipalities to make contracts and
the manner in which they must make them.
Any other rule would destroy all the
restrictions which are thrown around the
people of municipalities for their
protection by the statute laws and the
Constitution, and would render abortive all
such provisions. The rule in certain
instances may be harsh, but no other is
practical.
The foregoing principle was recognized of late in
Worden v. Louisville and Jefferson County Metropolitan
Sewer District, 847 F.Supp. 75 (W.D.Ky. 1994).
As the statutorily mandated procedure for creating a
contract by a city was not followed, a valid and enforceable
contract for the provisioning of wholesale water was not formed.
The PSC erred in concluding to the contrary.
We accordingly
reverse the agency’s order of July 24, 2002.
The PSC’s conclusion that a contract had been formed
appears to have been based at least to some extent upon the
conduct of the parties, which we construe as invoking the
principles of contract by implication.
However, it is well
established that a municipality may not enter into a contract by
implication.
Louisville Extension Water District v. Sloss, 314
Ky. 500, 236 S.W.2d 265 (1951).
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For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the Franklin
Circuit Court is reversed, and the matter is remanded for entry
of an order reversing the agency’s order of July 24, 2002.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
John N. Hughes
Frankfort, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE SOUTH SHORE
WATER WORKS CO.:
William D. Kirkland
Greenup, Kentucky
Bruce F. Clark
Margaret R. Grant
R. Benjamin Crittenden
Frankfort, Kentucky
R. Stephen McGinnis
Greenup, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE PUBLIC
SERVICE COMMISSION:
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLANT:
R. Stephen McGinnis
Greenup, Kentucky
Gerald E. Wuetcher
John E. B. Pinney
Frankfort, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEE
SOUTH SHORE WATER WORKS CO.:
Margaret R. Grant
Frankfort, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEE
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION:
John E. B. Pinney
Frankfort, Kentucky
13
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