GREENPOINT CREDIT, L.L.C. v. PENNY MURPHY (NOW BRINKER)
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RENDERED: May 27, 2005; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2004-CA-001308-MR
GREENPOINT CREDIT, L.L.C.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM ROWAN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE BETH LEWIS MAZE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-CI-90332
v.
PENNY MURPHY (NOW BRINKER)
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
DYCHE, SCHRODER, AND VANMETER, JUDGES.
SCHRODER, JUDGE:
A secured creditor of a used mobile home filed
a collection suit against the debtor who quit making payments.
The debtor was represented by an attorney who filed an answer
and counterclaim for a breach of warranties.
The attorney was
also successful in having the prejudgment writ of possession
quashed.
Nevertheless, the creditor used self help to repossess
the mobile home and sold it to a third party after sending the
debtor a notice to the vacant lot.
We agree with the trial
court that the notice was commercially unreasonable under the
circumstances and affirm the court’s summary judgment.
Penny Murphy Brinker purchased a used mobile home from
Lou’s American Home Center on April 12, 2001.
her purchase through Greenpoint Credit, L.L.C.
Brinker financed
perfected its security interest in the home.
Greenpoint
Brinker alleged
that Lou’s damaged the home during its delivery and that the
home contained numerous defects which breached both expressed
and implied warranties.
Brinker complained to both Lou’s and
Greenpoint about the problems and quit making payments.
Greenpoint filed suit on December 26, 2001, for the balance
owed, and for a prejudgment writ of possession as a secured
creditor.
The writ was granted subject to the posting of a bond
in the amount of $55,815.30.
filed on January 28, 2002.
An answer and counterclaim was
On January 30, 2002, Greenpoint
notified the court that a Replevin Bond had been filed, and on
February 11, 2002, the prejudgment writ of possession was refiled.
Brinker argued that she was not in default and that the
home was needed as evidence for her counterclaim.
Brinker filed
a Motion to Quash Prejudgment Writ of Possession on February 27,
2002, and the Order was granted on March 5, 2002.
Subsequently,
Greenpoint exercised self help and repossessed the home after
learning that Brinker had moved out.
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Greenpoint sent Brinker a “Notice of Our Plan to Sell
Property”, postmarked May 24, 2002, to the vacant address where
the home had once stood.
The notice provided the sale would
take place after June 2, 2002.
on June 27, 2002.
The private sale did take place
Brinker did not receive notice of the
proposed sale nor notice of the actual sale.
Upon learning that
the home had been removed, Brinker’s attorney contacted
Greenpoint’s attorney to discover the location of the home.
Greenpoint filed another request for a prejudgment writ of
possession on July 3, 2002.
The trial court denied the motion
on August 2, 2002, and ordered Greenpoint to either return the
home or make it available for inspection and provide proof of
ownership.
Almost a year later, Brinker filed an amended
counterclaim on July 8, 2003, alleging violations of the
Kentucky Uniform Commercial Code.
On June 9, 2004, the trial court issued an Order
Granting Summary Judgment to Brinker, finding that Greenpoint
violated KRS 355.610 [sic] by failing to give “reasonable”
notice of the sale of the home and by failing to act
commercially reasonable in the repossession and sale of the
mobile home.
The court further found Greenpoint disobeyed the
court’s order by repossessing the mobile home after the court’s
order quashing the prejudgment writ of possession.
The court
also found the sale of the home was conducted without giving
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“reasonable notice” to Brinker or her attorney.
The court then
denied Greenpoint a deficiency judgment and awarded statutory
damages to Brinker under KRS 355.9-625, on her counterclaim, for
$16,955.36 plus $2,851.40 for a time differential, for a total
of $19,806.76 plus interest.
On appeal to this Court, Greenpoint argues that the
trial court erred in granting summary judgment because there
were issues of fact and the court improperly concluded that
Greenpoint violated KRS 355.9-610.
Specifically, Greenpoint
argues that Greenpoint’s notice of sale to Brinker was
commercially reasonable.
KRS 355.9-609 allows a secured
creditor (after default) to use self help if it can do so
without a breach of the peace.
KRS 355.9-610 allows the secured
party (after a default) to sell the collateral in a commercially
reasonable manner, after notice to the debtor pursuant to KRS
355.9-611.
KRS 355.9-612 provides the timeliness of the
notification is a question of fact.
fact, summary judgment is premature.
If there is a question of
Steelvest, Inc. v.
Scansteel Service Center, Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476 (Ky. 1991).
We
agree with the trial court that the notice was not reasonable.
On March 5, 2002, the court quashed the prejudgment writ of
possession after an answer and counterclaim were filed.
Brinker
was represented by counsel who argued that she was not in
default, but was withholding payment because of a breach of
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warranties, and that the home was needed as evidence.
Subsequently, the home was repossessed and on May 24, 2002,
Greenpoint sent Brinker a notice of sale at the address where
the home once stood, but not to her attorney, knowing full well
that Brinker was represented by an attorney and that the court
quashed the writ of possession.
Under those circumstances, the
notice was clearly unreasonable.
Greenpoint contends disposition of the mobile home was
carried out in a reasonable manner.
stated above.
We disagree for the reasons
To make matters worse, on August 2, 2002,
Greenpoint was ordered to either return the home or make it
available for inspection and provide proof of ownership.
Greenpoint never complied with that order.
Greenpoint’s final argument is that if Brinker
rejected the home or revoked acceptance, she was not entitled to
the measure of damages that were granted in the order granting
summary judgment.
Below, Greenpoint argued that Brinker was not
entitled to damages, not the measure of damages (under KRS
355.2-711 versus KRS 355.9-625).
This issue is not properly
before the Court because the trial court was not given an
opportunity to rule on that issue.
The law is well-settled that
the trial court must be given the opportunity to rule on issues
before they are presented for appellate review and that issues
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first raised on appeal should not be considered.
Regional Jail
Authority v. Tackett, 770 S.W.2d 225 (Ky. 1989).
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Rowan
Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Glenn Edward Algie
Cincinnati, Ohio
Kelly E. Collinsworth
Morehead, Kentucky
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