MICHELE CRAWFORD v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
OCTOBER 28, 2005; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO.
2004-CA-001304-MR
MICHELE CRAWFORD
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE REBECCA M. OVERSTREET, JUDGE
INDICTMENT NO. 04-CR-00069
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
HENRY, TACKETT, AND VANMETER, JUDGES.
HENRY, JUDGE:
Michele Crawford appeals from the denial of her
Motion for Sentence Modification, filed pursuant to CR 1 60.02.
We affirm.
On January 20, 2004 Crawford was indicted by the
Fayette County Grand Jury on one count of violating KRS 2 194A.505
by making false statements or misrepresentations in order to
receive food stamps in an amount over $300, and one count of
1
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
2
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
violating KRS 194B.505 by making false statements or
misrepresentations in order to receive medical benefits in an
amount over $300, both Class D Felonies.
At the time the
indictment was returned, Crawford was already an inmate at the
Kentucky Correctional Institute for Women at Pewee Valley,
serving a seven-year sentence.
The circuit court appointed
counsel for Crawford and on February 6, 2004 she entered a plea
of guilty to both counts of the indictment.
At the sentencing
hearing held on February 27, 2004 the court considered the
contents of the pre-sentence investigation report and gave
Crawford and her counsel an opportunity to show cause why
judgment should not be pronounced.
No cause being shown,
Crawford was sentenced to two years’ imprisonment to be served
consecutively.
She was also ordered to pay court costs, and
restitution in the amount of $15,388.83.
The Final Judgment and
Sentence of Imprisonment was entered by the Fayette Circuit
Clerk on March 3, 2004.
On April 14, 2004, Crawford, acting pro se, filed a
“Motion for Sentence Modification Pursuant to CR 60.02(f)”.
In
the motion she requested that her sentence be modified to run
concurrently rather than consecutively, noting that she has been
rehabilitated in prison, that she works as a Legal Aide
Representative, that KRS 533.060 does not prohibit concurrent
sentencing in her case, and that her research indicated that the
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proper legal avenue for seeking the relief she wanted was CR
60.02 rather than a petition for habeas corpus.
This motion was
overruled by the circuit court on April 19, 2004.
No appeal was
filed.
On May 24, 2004, Crawford, again pro se, filed a
“Motion for Sentence Modification Pursuant to CR 60.02(c)”.
She
again requested that her sentence be modified to run
concurrently with her previous sentence, but this time she
alleged that several witnesses had knowingly signed false
statements of fact in her welfare fraud case, and she requested
an evidentiary hearing.
She gave no indication as to when she
became aware of this information or why she did not include this
ground in the motion filed a month earlier.
was overruled on May 26, 2004.
This second motion
Crawford’s appeal from the May
26 order was filed on June 18, 2004.
On appeal, Crawford argues
that the trial court should have granted her motion for an
evidentiary hearing, and that no facts in the record support the
order of restitution.
Relief under CR 60.02 is reserved for matters that
could not be presented on direct appeal or under RCr 3 11.42.
Gross v. Commonwealth, 648 S.W.2d 853, 856 (Ky. 1983).
Here,
Crawford has not demonstrated why she is entitled to the
special, extraordinary relief provided by CR 60.02.
3
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
-3-
Id.
Not
only has Crawford not shown why she could not have presented
these issues by RCr 11.42 motion, she has not shown why she
could not have presented the issues in her earlier, unappealed
CR 60.02 motion.
She simply makes no mention of the earlier
motion in her brief.
She is required to make an affirmative
See
showing as to why she is entitled to extraordinary relief.
McQueen v. Commonwealth, 948 S.W.2d 415, 416 (Ky. 1997).
CR
60.02 relief is not available to re-litigate issues which either
were, or could have been raised in an earlier proceeding.
Id.
“Before the movant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing, he
must affirmatively allege facts which, if true, justify vacating
the judgment and further allege special circumstances that
justify CR 60.02 relief”.
856.
Id., citing Gross v. Commonwealth at
No such showing has been made here.
In addition, Crawford
has made no showing that the trial court abused its discretion
in denying an evidentiary hearing.
The Kentucky Supreme Court
has held that “[t]he decision to hold an evidentiary hearing is
within the trial court's discretion and we will not disturb such
absent any abuse of that discretion.”
S.W.2d 440, 442 (Ky. 1999).
Land v. Commonwealth, 986
Further, as we noted in Taylor v.
Commonwealth, 724 S.W.2d 223 (Ky.App. 1986), “[e]ntry of a
voluntary, intelligent plea of guilty has long been held by
Kentucky Courts to preclude a post-judgment challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence.”
Id. at 225.
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There is no
indication here of a lack of voluntariness of the plea, and no
such issue was raised or ruled on below.
Finally, it does not appear that the trial court had
an opportunity to rule on the issue of restitution.
Absent a
showing of palpable error, issues presented for the first time
on appeal will not be considered.
RCr 9.22; Ruppee v
Commonwealth, 821 S.W.2d 484, 487 (Ky. 1991).
The Order of the Fayette Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Christopher Lasch
Louisville, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Clint E. Watson
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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