BOBBY JOE MCGINNIS v. JAMES MORGAN
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RENDERED: APRIL 22, 2005; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2004-CA-000973-MR
BOBBY JOE MCGINNIS
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BOYLE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DARREN W. PECKLER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 04-CI-00071
v.
JAMES MORGAN
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUIDUGLI AND TAYLOR, JUDGES; EMBERTON, SENIOR JUDGE.1
TAYLOR, JUDGE:
Bobby Joe McGinnis brings this pro se appeal
from a March 29, 2004, order of the Boyle Circuit Court denying
his petition for declaration of rights seeking restoration of
two years good time credit.
We affirm.
Appellant was an inmate at Northpoint Training Center.
In 1997, appellant was found guilty of attempted sexual assault
at a prison disciplinary hearing.
1
On May 8, 1997, he was
Senior Judge Thomas D. Emberton sitting as Special Judge by assignment of
the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution
and Kentucky Revised Statutes 21.580.
penalized with 180 days of segregation and with forfeiture of
two years non-restorable good time credit.
On June 10, 1997,
the warden concurred with the adjustment officer’s decision
because appellant failed to file a written appeal within the 15
day time limit of Kentucky Correction Policies and Procedures
No. 15.6.
Some six years after the warden’s decision, appellant
filed a petition for declaration of rights in the Boyle Circuit
Court.
Therein, he claimed to have been erroneously adjudicated
guilty of attempted sexual assault and that the loss of his good
time credit amounted to a “violation of due process of law and
equal protection rights under . . . the Commonwealth of Kentucky
pursuant to Sections 1, 2, and 3 Kentucky Const., and the
Fourteenth U.S. Constitution.”
By order entered March 29, 2004,
the Boyle Circuit Court dismissed appellant’s petition as being
time barred by Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 413.140(1)(k).
This appeal follows.
Appellant contends the circuit court committed error
by dismissing his petition for declaration of rights as time
barred.
KRS 413.140(1)(k) states as follows:
(1) The following actions shall be commenced
within one (1) year after the cause of
action accrued:
. . . .
-2-
(k) An action arising out of a detention
facility disciplinary proceeding, whether
based upon state or federal law.
Subsection (1)(k) was added by legislative amendment effective
July 15, 2002.
Hence, we harbor grave doubt concerning the
applicability of subsection (1)(k) to the instant case.
We are guided by the recent Supreme Court decision of
Million v. Raymer, 139 S.W.3d 914 (Ky. 2004).
In that case,
Raymer had been found guilty by a prison disciplinary committee
in January 1999.
Raymer subsequently appealed the decision to
the warden, and the warden affirmed the “conviction” on April
15, 1999.
On June 1, 2000, Raymer filed a petition for
declaration of rights in the Morgan Circuit Court claiming that
his due process rights under the 14th Amendment of the United
States Constitution were violated.
In Million, the issue before the Supreme Court was
whether Raymer’s petition for declaration of rights was time
barred.
In answering this question, the Supreme Court noted
that KRS 413.140 was amended in 2002 by adding subsection (1)(k)
so as to specifically include within its ambient prison
disciplinary proceedings.
KRS 413.140(1)(k).
However, the Court declined to apply
Instead, the Court held that a petition for
declaration of rights alleging violation of an inmate’s federal
constitution due process rights in a prison disciplinary
proceeding is governed by a one year limitation period for
-3-
personal injury actions under KRS 413.140(1)(a).
This holding
is necessarily limited to prison disciplinary proceedings
occurring before July 15, 2002; the effective date of the
amendment to KRS 413.140 adding subsection (1)(k).
In dicta,
the court also implied that a petition for declaration of rights
alleging a violation of state created rights or violation of
state law would be subject to five year limitation period of KRS
413.120(2).
Applying the principles of Million to this case, we
hold that appellant’s petition for declaration of rights is time
barred by application of either KRS 413.140(1)(a) or by KRS
413.120(2).
See id.
Hence, the circuit court properly
dismissed appellant’s petition for declaration of rights.
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Boyle
Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Bobby Joe McGinnis, Pro Se
West Liberty, Kentucky
Rebecca Baylous
Justice and Public Safety
Cabinet
Frankfort, Kentucky
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