KEVIN CHILDS v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: April 1, 2005; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2004-CA-000488-MR
KEVIN CHILDS
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM KENTON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE GREGORY M. BARTLETT, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 03-CR-00083
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
TACKETT AND VANMETER, JUDGES; MILLER, SENIOR JUDGE.1
MILLER, SENIOR JUDGE:
Appellant, Kevin Childs (Childs), brings
this appeal from a February 12, 2004, order of the Kenton
Circuit Court overruling his motion to set aside his guilty
1
Senior Judge John D. Miller sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the
Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and
Kentucky Revised Statutes 21.580.
plea.
Before us, Childs argues that the trial court erred in
not allowing withdrawal of the guilty plea.
We affirm.
On September 15, 2003, Childs entered a guilty plea to
one count of second-degree criminal abuse2 for causing injury to
his three-month old son by shaking him, as amended from one
count of first-degree criminal abuse.3
In accepting the plea,
the court conducted a guilty plea colloquy pursuant to Boykin v.
Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969).
Childs admitted facts supporting the elements of the offense and
acknowledged that he was subject to a penalty of up to five
years.
No mention was made in the motion to enter the plea, at
the colloquy, or in the court’s order of guilty plea, of any
agreement with the Commonwealth regarding a diversion of the
sentence.
On November 3, 2003, Childs appeared for sentencing.
The Commonwealth, with the understanding that the victim in the
case was not permanently injured, agreed to felony diversion by
signing off on Childs’s motion for felony pretrial diversion.
Contrary to Childs’s assertions in his brief, this is the first
reference in the proceedings to the issue of diversion.
All
signatures on the motion for pretrial diversion are dated
2
Kentucky Revised Statutes 508.110, a class D felony carrying a penalty of
one to five years.
3
Kentucky Revised Statutes 508.100, a class C felony carrying a penalty of
five to ten years.
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November 3, 2003, the same date as sentencing.
Questioning the
propriety of diversion for an offense of this seriousness, and
indicating a need for a more definite medical diagnosis of the
permanency of the injuries, the court appointed a guardian ad
litem (GAL) to provide “sufficient credible evidence of record”
as to the extent and permanence of injuries before he imposed
sentence.
Back in court for sentencing on February 2, 2004, the
GAL’s report was discussed.
Childs argued that the report was
incomplete and asked for a continuance to present additional
information in mitigation.
The court denied the motion to
continue, indicating that the only germane facts were 1) wanton
conduct (admitted by Childs) which caused 2) serious physical
injury (admitted by Childs).
Despite pleas of leniency on
Childs’s behalf by the child’s mother and grandparents who
presented arguments that the injuries were caused accidentally
in an attempt to save the child’s life, the court sentenced
Childs to the maximum sentence of five years.
In so doing, the
court concluded that there was no plea agreement which left the
court with Childs’s admission during the taking of the plea that
he shook the child, wantonly causing serious physical injury.
Childs’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea and proceed to trial
was overruled.
A later motion to set aside his guilty plea was
overruled and this appeal follows.
-3-
We review questions of fact under the clearly
erroneous standard of Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR)
52.01.
Bronk v. Commonwealth, 58 S.W.3d 482, 486 (Ky. 2001);
Rodriguez v. Commonwealth, 87 S.W.3d 8, 10 (Ky. 2002).
trial court’s application of law is reviewed de novo.
Clayton, 132 S.W.3d 864, 866 (Ky. 2004).
The
Rehm v.
We conclude that the
findings of the trial court are supported by substantial
evidence and there was a correct application of law.
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 8.10
provides the trial court with the discretion to allow the
withdrawal of a guilty plea “at any time before judgment.”
Where the trial court rejects a plea agreement, however, RCr
8.10 directs the court to provide the defendant with the
opportunity to withdraw the plea.
Relying on the provision of RCr 8.10 relating to
rejection of a plea agreement, Childs argues that the trial
court erred by not allowing him the opportunity to withdraw his
plea upon the trial court’s rejection of the plea agreement.
disagree.
We
For this provision of RCr 8.10 to apply, there must
be a plea agreement.
As indicated above, from our review of the
record, when Childs pleaded guilty, there was no plea agreement,
with the apparent exception of the amended charge.
The record
is clear that Childs was informed by the court of the potential
of a five-year sentence, and that he understood that
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possibility.
No mention was made of a diversion agreement.
Instead, the record is clear that the agreed motion for pretrial
diversion was made at sentencing, six weeks after the court’s
acceptance of the guilty plea.
Any argument that Childs relied
to his detriment on the offer of diversion is unsupported by the
record.
The court’s denial of the motion to withdraw the guilty
plea based on a finding that there was no plea agreement is
supported by the record and is not clearly erroneous.
We also disagree with Childs’s contention of
reversible error based on his inability to challenge, beyond the
argument he made before the court at sentencing, the report of
the GAL which spoke to the permanency of the child’s injuries.
During the sentencing hearing, after receiving the requested
report from the GAL, the court effectively discounted the need
for the GAL report in stating that the only relevant facts he
needed for sentencing purposes were admitted by Childs in the
guilty plea.
After being denied the chance to continue
sentencing in order to secure witnesses in “mitigation,” Childs
objected to the “inadequate report” and proceeded to detail its
insufficiency to the court.
The court thereafter sentenced
Childs based on the plea admissions.4
4
We feel it necessary to point out that, contrary to Childs’ assertion, there
is nothing in the record to support his statement that sentencing was
continued at the request of the trial court and the GAL to allow the GAL
adequate time to prepare the report, or that “it was simply stated that [the
GAL] did not have the time to complete the interview of all relevant parties
-5-
While Childs has failed to cite to any authority
requiring us to conclude error by the trial court on this issue,
we note that “(t)he process due at sentencing is less, of
course, than that due at the culpability trial,” and that
specific procedures such as cross-examination of adverse
witnesses is not constitutionally required.
Fields v.
Commonwealth, 123 S.W.3d 914, 917 (Ky.App. 2003).
Childs took
the opportunity to controvert the GAL’s report before the court
at sentencing, and given the trial court’s ultimate non-reliance
on the report, the court’s denial of his motion to present
witnesses in mitigation of the report was not an abuse of
discretion.
Likewise, we disagree with Childs’s allegation that
the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him within
the range of penalty allowed by law.
Childs cites no
controlling authority in support of this claimed error.
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Kenton
Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
. . .” On the contrary, the GAL stated that she felt the report was
adequately based on interviews with the necessary parties.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Jeffrey J. Otis
Covington, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Perry T. Ryan
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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