JOHN M. LONGMEYER, EXECUTOR AND TRUSTEE OF THE ESTATE OF OLLIE W. SKONBERG v. BANK ONE, KENTUCKY, N.A.
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RENDERED: MARCH 25, 2005; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2004-CA-000458-MR
JOHN M. LONGMEYER,
EXECUTOR AND TRUSTEE OF THE
ESTATE OF OLLIE W. SKONBERG
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE LISABETH HUGHES ABRAMSON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-CI-007052
BANK ONE, KENTUCKY, N.A.
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER AND KNOPF, JUDGES; AND MILLER, SENIOR JUDGE.1
BARBER, JUDGE:
Appellant, John M. Longmeyer, Executor and
Trustee of the Estate of Ollie W. Skonberg (Longmeyer), brings
this appeal from a summary judgment order entered by the
1
Senior Judge John D. Miller, sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the
Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and
KRS 21.580.
Jefferson Circuit Court dismissing his claims against Appellee,
Bank One, Kentucky, N.A. (Bank One), alleging breaches of
fiduciary duties and fraud in its administration and involvement
in the trust belonging to Ollie W. Skonberg (Ollie).
We reverse
and remand.
Ollie was the settlor of a revocable intervivos trust
that identified her as the sole income beneficiary for her life.
The trust was originally created in 1984 with Bank One’s
predecessor as trustee.
In 1987 Ollie changed the terms of the
trust to provide for the distribution of the bulk of the trust’s
assets to a trust to be administered for her sister’s benefit
for her sister’s life and then to a trust established for
several charities.
The charities were identified in her will
along with other distributees of her estate.
The trust remained
a revocable intervivos trust with Ollie as sole beneficiary for
her life and Bank One’s predecessor2 as trustee.
In 1997 Ollie revoked the 1987 trust and executed a
new trust document and will which named John M. Longmeyer, an
attorney, as trustee, and, instead of leaving the bulk of her
estate to her sister for life and then to various charities, she
left it to other members of her family in a family trust.
remained the sole income beneficiary for her life.
Ollie
Other
individuals also received bequests in her will.
2
Bank One eventually became the trustee by virtue of taking over Liberty
National Bank.
-2-
After revocation of the 1987 trust, but before Ollie’s
death, Bank One agreed to, and did, enter into an “Investment
Agency Agreement” with Longmeyer, the new trustee, in which it
agreed to act as Longmeyer’s agent for investment of the trust
property.
Bank One also signed off on the new trust documents.
The Investment Agency Agreement was signed October 2, 1997, soon
after the 1987 trust was revoked.
Shortly after the Investment Agency Agreement was
entered into Ollie passed away.
Longmeyer and Bank One
continued their relationship until November 19, 1997, when
Longmeyer terminated the Investment Agency Agreement and moved
the trust’s funds to Paine Webber.
Within a few weeks of this action by Longmeyer, Bank
One contacted an attorney to receive advice about its duty, if
any, to the charities who were the beneficiaries under the 1987
trust.
Discovery documents show that a Bank One employee
essentially wrote the letter later printed and signed off on by
the attorney as representative of the attorney’s opinion that
the charities under the 1987 trust should be notified.
It is
unclear whether the expression of opinion in the letter was that
of the attorney who simply authorized Bank One’s employee to
redraft it or whether Bank One’s employee was telling the
attorney what the bank wished to receive as advice.
-3-
At any rate, the letter was sent to the charities
identified in the 1987 trust in 1998 and later that year the
charities instituted a will contest against Ollie’s estate.
Our
understanding of the basis of that suit is that the charities
alleged Ollie was unduly influenced in the drafting of the 1997
trust and will.
The suit was not tried but settled for a
substantial sum of money just prior to its trial date.
Thereafter, Longmeyer filed this suit against Bank One
alleging that it had breached its fiduciary duties to Ollie and
had committed fraud by representing that it would act as
Longmeyer’s agent when it, in fact, did not intend to do so.
The trial court granted Bank One’s motion for summary judgment
finding that during the time Bank One owed a duty to Ollie it
did not breach that duty as trustee because it continued to pay
her income and invest her monies properly.
The court also
stated that Bank One owed a duty to the charities and had it not
notified them of the change in the disposition of Ollie’s
assets, it could have been subject to liability.
Finally, the
court found that Bank One had not committed fraud because at the
time it entered into the Investment Agency Agreement with
Longmeyer as trustee the bank did not intend to misrepresent any
material facts, and when it did disclose information to the
charities, it was no longer subject to that contract.
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On appeal Longmeyer makes several arguments for
reversal of the court’s decision.
He maintains that the court’s
finding that Bank One did not owe a fiduciary duty to Ollie is
incorrect; that any duty the bank owed to the charities ended
when the 1987 trust was revoked; that even if such a duty to the
charities was owed, the bank should be estopped from relying on
that to avoid liability because it accepted the 1997 trust
cutting the charities out.
Further, Longmeyer argues that if a
duty was owed to the charities, then accepting its new role
under the Investment Agency Agreement was a conflict.
Finally,
Longmeyer contends that material issues of fact exist as to
whether Bank One misrepresented its acceptance of the 1997 trust
to Longmeyer’s detriment.
Bank One responds that the court’s judgment that it
owed any duties it had under the 1987 trust solely to the
beneficiaries of the trust is in accord with settled law – that
there is no law to support the contention that a trustee owes a
settlor of a trust any duty.
Bank One further contends that any
information it gave to the charities was not confidential in
nature and/or Longmeyer waived this claim by divulging
information to one of the representatives for the charities
himself.
Moreover, the Bank argues that the charities had a
right to the information that the 1987 trust had been revoked.
Finally, the bank states that it is not estopped from making
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these arguments based on the Investment Agency Agreement because
there is no conflict and Longmeyer has not produced any evidence
that the bank breached that agreement.
Finally, Bank One argues
that Longmeyer has not produced any evidence of fraud.
After reviewing the record and applicable statutes,
case law, and treatises on the subjects involved in this appeal,
we have reached the conclusion that the issues in this case do
involve questions of duty.
However, the trial court’s analysis
of these duties is incorrect.
The 1987 trust was a revocable intervivos trust of
which Ollie was the sole income beneficiary for her life.
The
charities, and anyone else, were not entitled to receive any
disbursements until Ollie’s death at which point the trust was
to become irrevocable.
That being said, a trustee does owe a
duty to both the life income beneficiary and the remainder
beneficiaries to deal impartially with both while the trust is
in effect.
Trustees owe a duty of utmost fidelity to the
beneficiaries of a trust.
Bryan v. Security Trust Co., 296 Ky.
95, 99, 176 S.W.2d 104, 107 (1943); Wiggins v. PNC Bank,
Kentucky, Inc., 988 S.W.2d 498, 501 (Ky.App. 1998).
However, the position that Bank One owed a duty to no
one under that trust except the beneficiaries is clearly
incorrect.
The first duty of any trustee is to faithfully
execute the trust according to the intent of the settlor.
-6-
Clay
v. Crawford, 298 Ky. 654, 667, 183 S.W.2d 797, 804 (1944);
Bogert, Trusts & Trustees § 541 (2d ed.rev. 1993); 76 Am.Jur.2d
Trusts § 380.
Ollie’s express intent under the 1987 trust was
that she was to be the sole beneficiary for her life, and, on
her death, her sister was to be the beneficiary for her sister’s
life and, on her sister’s death, the charities would become the
beneficiaries.
Bank One’s duty under the 1987 trust was to
ensure that Ollie’s intentions be carried out, but Ollie
expressly retained the power to revoke or modify the 1987 trust.
A settlor may retain this power and exercise it during
his or her lifetime.
Siter v. Hall, 220 Ky. 43, 294 S.W. 767,
770 (1927); Bogert, Trust & Trustees, § 1000 (2d ed.rev. 1993);
Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 330(1) (1959).
This includes
the power to change the identity of the beneficiaries.
Siter,
supra; Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 330 comment i (1959)(if
revocation is effective the interests of the beneficiaries are
extinguished).
A trustee has a choice when faced with the exercise of
the power of revocation by a settlor.
If the revocation has
been validly exercised, then the trustee is under a duty to wind
up the trust and surrender its possession to the settlor.
Bogert, Trusts & Trustees, § 1010 (2d ed.rev. 1993); Restatement
(Second) of Trusts § 344 comment a (1959).
-7-
If, however, the trustee has reasonable grounds to
believe that the revocation has been exercised improperly, such
as under undue influence, it has the right and duty to maintain
and defend the trust in its own name.
KRS 386.810(3)(y)
(trustee may prosecute or defend actions to protect the trust
assets); Bogert, Trusts & Trustees, § 1001; 76 Am.Jur.2d Trusts
§ 443 (trustee’s duty to protect and defend trust estate); CJS
Trusts § 361.
Thus, Bank One, when confronted by Ollie’s exercise of
her power of revocation under the 1987 trust, had a choice – it
could either acquiesce, or, it could choose to defend the trust.
It chose to acquiesce in Ollie’s exercise of her power of
revocation.
This is clear from the fact that it entered into
the Investment Agency Agreement with Longmeyer as the new
trustee and continued to operate under that agreement even after
Ollie passed away.
It was not until Longmeyer decided to remove
Bank One from the picture entirely that the bank changed its
tune.
Bank One has pointed to many factors that suggest
Ollie was unduly influenced in changing her 1987 trust in an
effort to excuse its actions.
There are factors pointing to
undue influence, such as Ollie changed the 1987 trust shortly
before she died; she changed the disposition of her assets; and
she did it through an attorney that she found in the yellow
-8-
pages.
However, there are also factors that weigh on the side
that Ollie was more than competent to make the choices she made
such as her estate was distributed to the natural objects of her
bounty (her family), many of the individuals who received
specific bequests in her will remained the same, and Bank One
remained named as first successor trustee to Longmeyer.
In our view, these facts concern whether Ollie validly
exercised her power of revocation.
This is not a disputable
issue in this case because Bank One chose to accept the exercise
of the power as valid.
now irrelevant.
Whether Ollie was unduly influenced is
Bank One, if it intended to question Ollie’s
capacity to exercise the power of revocation in the 1987 trust,
had an obligation to do so when confronted with the settlor’s
expression of intent that the trust be terminated.
This is
similar, though not identical, to the situation found in
Phillips v. Lowe, 639 S.W.2d 782, 783 (Ky. 1982) where the
Supreme Court agreed with the view that once a trustee
acquiesces in a settlor’s demand to terminate the trust, then
there is no one with standing to object.
Bank One clearly chose to accept Ollie’s exercise of
her power of revocation as is evidenced by its entering into the
Investment Agency Agreement with Longmeyer as trustee.
Under
that agreement Bank One became the agent of Longmeyer.
An agent
is a fiduciary and owes his principal the duty of loyalty and
-9-
good faith.
Deaton v. Hale, 592 S.W.2d 127, 130 (1979); Bogert,
Trusts & Trustees, § 543 (2d ed.rev. 1993).
Those duties do not
end at the termination of the agent’s employment and an agent
may not use information gained during the relationship to the
expense of his former employer.
Aero Drapery of Kentucky, Inc.
v. Engdahl, 507 S.W.2d 166, 169-170 (1974).
Here, Bank One supplied information to the charities
named under the 1987 trust when that trust, and the charities’
interests, had been terminated.3
The validity of the termination
is not at issue since Bank One chose to accept Ollie’s exercise
of her power and enter into an agreement whereby it took on
fiduciary duties to her new trustee.
Bank One subsequently
disclosed information that was clearly confidential (the
disposition of Ollie’s estate) to parties who had no legal
interest in it.
We think, at the very least, there are issues
of material fact on Longmeyer’s claims against Bank One.
Therefore, the decision of the Jefferson Circuit Court is
reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings.
MILLER, SENIOR JUDGE, CONCURS.
KNOPF, JUDGE, CONCURS AND FILES SEPARATE OPINION.
3
Bank One’s argument that Longmeyer waived this complaint by his own
conversation with a representative of one of the charities is without merit.
Bank One’s duties are independent of any duties owed by Longmeyer. Further,
Longmeyer did not send a letter to each one of the charities advising them of
the circumstances under which Ollie exercised her right of revocation.
-10-
KNOPF, JUDGE, CONCURRING:
Although I agree with the
reasoning and the result of the majority opinion, I write
separately to clarify the issues before the trial court upon
remand of this case.
The majority correctly holds that Bank One
had a fiduciary duty to faithfully execute the 1987 trust
according to the intention of Ollie Skonberg, the settlor.
When
Ollie revoked the trust in 1997, Bank One could have either
defended the 1987 trust or it could acquiesce to Ollie’s
exercise of her power of revocation.
Having chosen the latter,
Bank One could not subsequently seek shelter in its duties to
the charities, which had only an expectancy in being
beneficiaries of Ollie’s trust.
The existence of a fiduciary duty is a question of law
for the courts to decide as it essentially involves a policy
determination.
Mullins v. Commonwealth Life Ins. Co., 839
S.W.2d 245, 248 (Ky. 1992).
However, whether Bank One breached
its fiduciary duties by notifying the charities regarding the
revocation of the trust is an issue of fact.
Priestley, 949 S.W.2d 594 (Ky. 1997).
See Priestley v.
Furthermore, it is not
clear that Bank One disclosed any confidential information to
the charities.
The charities were informed only that they had
been beneficiaries under the 1987 trust but had been removed
under circumstances that Bank One regarded as questionable.
Longmeyer himself provided most of this information to one of
-11-
the charities and he referred the charity to Bank One for more
information.
Therefore, I would disagree with any
interpretation of the majority opinion suggesting that, as a
matter of law, Bank One breached its fiduciary duties to the
estate.
Ultimately, this is the central question which the
finder of fact must determine.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Frank P. Doheny, Jr.
Michael M. Hirn
Louisville, Kentucky
R. Gregg Hovious
John David Dyche
Louisville, Kentucky
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