ELMER C. MAGGARD v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, BOARD OF EXAMINERS OF PSYCHOLOGY
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RENDERED:
NOVEMBER 18, 2005; 2:00 P.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2004-CA-000363-MR
ELMER C. MAGGARD
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM L. GRAHAM, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 02-CI-00690
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY,
BOARD OF EXAMINERS OF PSYCHOLOGY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
HENRY, TACKETT, AND VANMETER, JUDGES.
VANMETER, JUDGE:
Elmer C. Maggard appeals from an order of the
Franklin Circuit Court affirming a final order of the appellee,
Kentucky State Board of Examiners of Psychology (Board),
suspending Maggard’s license for one year.
For the reasons
stated hereafter, we affirm.
The circuit court summarized the relevant facts as
follows:
In the fall of 1998, an attorney
requested Maggard to perform a psychological
evaluation of a three (3) year old girl.
The girl’s parents had filed suit against a
dentist who had treated the girl when she
was approximately seventeen (17) months old.
Maggard met with the girl’s parents in his
office on two occasions. However, he only
had contact with the girl for a brief period
during one visit. Nonetheless, Maggard
prepared a written Summary of Clinical
Assessment in which he opined that the girl
had suffered a permanent psychological
injury as a result of the treatment she
received from the dentist. Furthermore, he
concluded the injury would have a long term
effect on her social and emotional
development. The dentist filed a complaint
with the Board as allowed by 201 KAR 26:130
Section 2(1)-(3). The Board began an
independent investigation per 201 KAR 26:130
Section 2(4). Subsequently, the Board filed
its Formal Complaint against Maggard.
Ultimately, the Board found that
Maggard rendered a formal, professional
opinion about a minor child “without direct
and substantial professional contact with,
or a formal assessment of,” that child in
violation of KRS 319.082(1)(f) and 201 KAR
26:145 Section 3(5). Further, the Board
found that Maggard committed an “unfair,
false, and misleading act or practice,” and
“practiced psychology in a negligent manner”
in violation of KRS 319.082(1)(c) and (d).
The Board suspended Maggard’s license to
practice psychology for one year. However,
it stayed the suspension and placed Maggard
on probation which allowed him to practice
psychology under supervision by the Board.
Maggard appealed the Board’s decision
to this Court. He claims that the Board’s
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are
not based upon substantial evidence in the
record. Further, he argues that the
sanction imposed was an abuse of the Board’s
discretion in violation of KRS Section
13B.150(2). This Court disagrees with
Maggard and AFFIRMS the Board’s Final Order.
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This appeal followed.
Maggard first contends that the circuit court erred by
failing to find that the evidence was insufficient to support
the Board’s order.
We disagree.
The function of a reviewing court in an appeal from an
administrative agency is to ensure that the agency’s decision
was based on substantial evidence of probative value, 1 and that
the agency applied the correct rule of law.
Evidence is
substantial if “when taken alone or in the light of all the
evidence it has sufficient probative value to induce conviction
in the minds of reasonable men.” 2
The fact that inconsistent
conclusions may be drawn from the evidence does not prevent the
agency’s findings from being supported by substantial evidence. 3
The trier of fact may consider all of the evidence and then
choose that evidence which it believes. 4
Here, the record shows that substantial evidence was
adduced to support the Hearing Panel’s findings of fact as
adopted by the Board, which included the following:
1
Kentucky Unemployment Insurance Comm’n v. King, 657 S.W.2d 250 (Ky.App.
1983). See KRS 13B.150(2)(c).
2
Kentucky State Racing Comm’n v. Fuller, 481 S.W.2d 298, 308 (Ky. 1972),
citing Blankenship v. Lloyd Blankenship Coal Co., 463 S.W.2d 62 (Ky. 1970).
See also Moore v. Asente, 110 S.W.3d 336, 354 (Ky. 2003).
3
Fuller, 481 S.W.2d at 307, citing Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Co. v. United
States, 298 F.Supp. 734 (D.C. 1968).
4
Bowling v. Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Cabinet, 891
S.W.2d 406, 410 (Ky.App. 1994), citing Commonwealth, Transportation Cabinet
v. Cornell, 796 S.W.2d 591, 594 (Ky.App. 1990).
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4. During the course of the lawsuit, on
or about October 8, 1998, Yancey White, the
attorney for [L.W.] in the lawsuit against
Dr. Emler, requested that . . . Dr. Maggard
perform a consultative, forensic evaluation
of [L.W.].
5. Dr. Maggard says he suggested that
he treat the child because she was not in
treatment at the time, that he prepare a
summary of his clinical assessment rather
than a forensic examination report, and that
attorney White obtain a forensic assessment
from another psychologist if Dr. Maggard’s
clinical assessment was insufficient. Dr.
Maggard says attorney White agreed to this
arrangement.
6. Dr. Maggard saw [L.W.] and her
parents in his office on two dates, October
14 and 28, 1998.
7. Dr. Maggard did not have contact
with [L.W.] on her first visit to his
office, but instead, met with her mother.
He observed [L.W.] only for a brief period
of time during her second visit to his
office.
8. [Maggard] sent the Summary of
Clinical Assessment to attorney White on or
about December 8, 1998.
9. In the Summary of Clinical
Assessment, Dr. Maggard says, “The child’s
parents served as the sole informants about
[L.W.’s] current functioning and history.
Medical records from the office of Dr.
Bernard T. Moynahan and dental records from
the office of Dr. Kimberly Boling were
available for review.”
10. In the Summary of Clinical
Assessment, Dr. Maggard makes the following
statements:
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a. The child has been emotionally and
developmentally injured by the trauma
she experienced during dental treatment
to extract two of her front teeth.
b. In addition to her anxiety she
exhibits aggression and anger
consistent with the nature of the
injury as it was described by her
mother.
c. This type of early trauma causes
permanent psychological injury and can
have pervasive consequences for
subsequent social and emotional
development.
d. For a child [L.W.’s] age, the
effects of such trauma can even affect
character structure.
e. Ongoing treatment with [L.W.] and
her family, possibly over a number of
years, probably will be necessary to
manage the generalized behavioral and
emotional consequences of the child’s
psychological injury. She could
require professional help into her
mid-to-late adolescence.
11. There is no indication in Dr.
Maggard’s Summary of Clinical Assessment
that he questioned whether [L.W.’s] mother’s
statements concerning her daughter were
motivated by secondary gain or by her own
anxiety, or whether the child’s statements
to her mother, if she made them, had been
influenced by her mother’s statements to
her.
12. Further, in the Summary of Clinical
Assessment Dr. Maggard says, “Though over
two years have elapsed since the injury,
there is sufficient memory and focused
emotional reactivity to enable the child to
benefit from desensitization and
deconditioning of her anxiety and anger
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responses to dental offices and
practitioners.” Dr. Maggard did not
indicate in his Summary of Clinical
Assessment or his testimony the basis for
his conclusion that [L.W.] possessed her own
memories of events that occurred two years
previously when she was 18 months old.
13. Dr. Maggard did not have direct and
substantial professional contact with, and
did not make a formal assessment of, [L.W.]
during her two visits to his office.
14. Thus, Dr. Maggard’s statements in
the Summary of Clinical Assessment were not
supported by direct and substantial
professional contact with [L.W.].
. . . .
16. Dr. Maggard’s [L.W.’s] office notes
and records were obtained, entered into the
record, and reviewed by the Hearing Panel.
Dr. Maggard’s office notes and records do
not contain any credible evidence that he
had direct and substantial professional
contact with [L.W.] during her two office
visits. Dr. Maggard’s notes and records
contain a written summary that he prepared
on June 25, 2001, of his examination of
[L.W.] on October 29, 1998. This record
indicates contact with [L.W.] on that date.
17. The Hearing Panel does not find the
June 25, 2001, record credible. Besides the
fact that it was written almost three years
after the office visit, it also was written
after the completion of the first three days
of the hearing and immediately prior to the
Hearing Panel, by orders of the Hearing
Officer, obtaining Dr. Maggard’s notes and
records. At the time this record was
prepared, Dr. Maggard knew the Hearing Panel
was concerned with the extent of his contact
with [L.W.]. This record is the only
evidence in Dr. Maggard’s notes and records
that indicates he had direct and substantial
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professional contact with [L.W.] on either
visit to his office. The contact documented
in the June 25, 2001, record is not
reflected in any other contemporaneous
office note or record prepared by Dr.
Maggard. None of the contacts with [L.W.]
recited in the June 25, 2001, record are
reflected in the Summary of Clinical
Assessment. Thus, the circumstances of the
preparation of the record, and the lack of
any other corroborating evidence, make the
June [25], 2001, record untrustworthy.
. . . .
19. The Hearing Panel’s finding
regarding Dr. Maggard’s lack of direct and
substantial professional contact with [L.W.]
during her visits to his office on October
14 and 28, 1998, remained unchanged after
its review of Dr. Maggard’s office notes and
records concerning [L.W.].
20. Although Dr. Maggard characterized
his report as a Summary of Clinical
Assessment, he knew or should have known it
would be used as a forensic assessment
report. According to Dr. Maggard’s own
testimony, he accepted the [L.W.] referral
from her attorney, an attorney from whom he
had accepted numerous prior referrals to
provide a forensic assessment report. He
was initially contacted to provide a
forensic assessment report, and he knew
about the pending litigation with Dr. Emler.
For all these reasons, Dr. Maggard knew or
should have known how his report was going
to be used by [L.W.’s] attorney.
. . . .
22. Dr. Maggard’s statements in the
Summary of Clinical Assessment about
permanent or long-term injury to [L.W.], and
his statements about the treatment that
[L.W.’s] condition required, are false and
misleading because he did not have direct
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and substantial professional contact with
[L.W.] and did not formally assess her,
because his statements are unsupported by
peer-review psychological literature,
because Dr. Maggard did not question
[L.W.’s] mother’s motivation in providing
information to him, and because he knew or
should have known how his report was going
to be used by [L.W.’s] attorney.
23. Dr. Maggard’s statements in the
Summary of Clinical Assessment about
permanent or long-term injury to [L.W.], and
his statements about the treatment that
[L.W.’s] condition required, are unfair to
Dr. Emler and to her insurance company, both
of whom would have reviewed Dr. Maggard’s
Summary of Clinical Assessment in evaluating
whether to settle the suit against Dr.
Emler, and unfair to [L.W.], whose future
mental health could be affected by Dr.
Maggard’s treatment recommendations.
24. Dr. Maggard’s statements in the
Summary of Clinical Assessment about
permanent or long-term injury to [L.W.], and
his statements about the treatment that
[L.W.’s] condition required, were negligent
because they were not supported by direct
and substantial professional contact with
[L.W.] or by formal assessment of her, and
because they were false and misleading.
25. Dr. Maggard’s statements in the
Summary of Clinical Assessment about
permanent or long-term injury to [L.W.], and
his statements about the treatment that
[L.W.’s] condition required, constitute
formal professional opinions which he
rendered without direct and substantial
professional contact with, or a formal
assessment of, [L.W.].
Based on those findings, the Board concluded that “in preparing
the Summary of Clinical Assessment and providing it to [L.W.’s]
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attorneys in the Dr. Emler case,” Maggard violated KRS
319.082(1)(c), (d) and (f) by “committing an unfair, false, and
misleading act or practice,” by “practicing psychology in a
negligent manner,” and by “rendering a formal professional
opinion without direct and substantial professional contact with
or a formal assessment of [L.W.], in violation of 201 KAR 26:145
§3(5).”
Our review of the record shows, contrary to Maggard’s
contention, that substantial evidence supports the Board’s
findings that Maggard provided formal opinions about the child
without having direct and substantial professional contact with
her, and without conducting a formal assessment of her.
We
cannot say that the circuit court erred in reaching its
conclusions after reviewing the conflicting evidence.
Next, Maggard contends that the circuit court erred by
finding that he was not entitled to conduct further discovery or
to try his issues in front of a jury.
He relies on KRS
13B.150(1), which states in pertinent part that judicial review
of a final administrative hearing
shall be conducted by the court without a
jury and shall be confined to the record,
unless there is fraud or misconduct
involving a party engaged in administration
of this chapter.
There is simply no support for Maggard’s contention
that the court erred by failing to conduct a jury trial herein,
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as a judicial review of an administrative proceeding does not
involve the fact finding function which is an inherent function
of an initial administrative or trial court proceeding.
Instead, the court may only review the record and affirm the
agency’s final order, or reverse and remand that order for
further proceedings after finding that it meets one of the
conditions set out in KRS 13B.150(2).
Such conditions exist
when constitutional or statutory provisions are violated, or
when the agency’s statutory authority is exceeded. 5
Such
conditions may also exist when the order is unsupported by
substantial evidence, when it is “arbitrary, capricious, or
characterized by abuse of discretion[,]” when it is based on
prejudicial ex parte communications, when it is affected by the
hearing officer’s failure to be disqualified as required by
statute, or when it is “[d]eficient as otherwise provided by
law.” 6
No such conditions were satisfied here.
Further, there is no merit to Maggard’s contention
that he was entitled to conduct additional discovery regarding
allegations of fraud or misconduct relating to the
administrative proceeding.
CR 9.02 specifies that allegations
of fraud must be pled with particularity.
5
KRS 13B.150(2)(a) and (b).
6
KRS 13B.150(2)(c), (d), (e), (f) and (g).
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Although Kentucky’s
highest court stated in Scott v. Farmers State Bank 7 that the
complaint need not “attain such detail as to recite each minute
detail[,]” Scott confirmed that the complaint should state “the
time, the place, the substance of the false representations, the
facts misrepresented, and the identification of what was
obtained by the fraud.” 8
Here, Maggard’s complaint did not
include the necessary level of specificity regarding the alleged
fraud, and we cannot agree that the circuit court erred by
denying discovery as to the allegations.
Next, Maggard contends that the circuit court erred by
failing to find that he was entitled to absolute immunity from
liability relating to the child’s proceeding against the
dentist, as any misconduct occurred within the judicial process
while he served as a witness.
However, we agree with the
circuit court that the immunity from civil monetary damages
which is afforded to court-appointed experts 9 is not applicable
here, as Maggard was neither court-appointed nor an integral
part of the judicial process.
Moreover, the proceeding now
before us was one seeking to discipline Maggard for violating
KRS Chapter 319 pertaining to the practice of psychology and the
7
410 S.W.2d 717, 722 (Ky. 1966).
8
Id. at 722.
9
See Rogers v. Luttrell, 144 S.W.3d 841 (Ky.App. 2004); Stone v. Glass, 35
S.W.3d 827 (Ky.App. 2000).
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licensing of psychologists, rather than one seeking damages
against him pertaining to the alleged misconduct.
Further,
given the fact that Maggard is not employed by any “accredited
institutions of higher education,” 10 there is no merit to any
contention that he is entitled to be exempted from the
application of KRS Chapter 319 by virtue of the exemption set
out for such persons in KRS 319.015(2).
Finally, to borrow the words of the circuit court,
Maggard has included “a melting pot of other arguments” on
appeal.
As we fail to find any merit in those arguments, they
are rejected on appeal.
The court’s order is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
J. Fox DeMoisey
Louisville, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Monte D. Gross
Hazard, Kentucky
Mark Brengelman
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
10
KRS 319.015(2).
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