JOHN COTTRELL v. CITY OF HILLVIEW AND CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
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RENDERED:
AUGUST 19, 2005; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2004-CA-000327-MR
JOHN COTTRELL
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BULLITT CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS L. WALLER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 03-CI-00251
v.
CITY OF HILLVIEW AND
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUIDUGLI, JOHNSON, AND McANULTY, JUDGES.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE:
This is an appeal from the Bullitt Circuit
Court’s judgment entered January 13, 2004, which upheld the
suspension of a police officer because of his inability to
possess a firearm due to a Domestic Violence Order entered
against him.
We affirm.
John Cottrell was hired as a police officer at the
Hillview Police Department on May 24, 1999. On February 26,
2001, a Domestic Violence Order (DVO) was entered against
Cottrell with a term of three years.
The DVO provides in
pertinent part that “pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 922(g), it is a
federal violation to purchase, receive or possess a firearm
while subject to this order.”
The policies and procedures of the Hillview Police
Department require that officers be armed at all times and have
their badge and identification.
The Mayor of Hillview at the
time, Leemon Powell, initially suspended Cottrell from active
duty on March 3, 2001, because he was unable to carry a firearm.
Cottrell was then terminated on July 1, 2001, because there were
no positions that would allow him to work without carrying his
weapon.
Mayor Powell later re-hired Cottrell for
“administrative duties” only, which meant he did not have to be
armed to perform his duties, on October 21, 2002.
In January 2003, Mayor Jim Eadens took office and on
January 9, 2003, wrote a letter suspending Cottrell from duty.
The letter provided Cottrell 5 days in which to return all City
issued equipment and gave notice that a hearing would be
scheduled.
A hearing before the Commission was conducted on
February 18, 2003.
The Commission rendered its decision on
February 25, 2003, upholding Mayor Eadens’s decision to suspend
Cottrell from his position in the Hillview Police Department.
Cottrell then petitioned the Bullitt Circuit Court for review of
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his suspension and hearing.
suspension.
The circuit court upheld the
This appeal followed.
The standard of de novo review applies in all public
employee discharge cases.
S.W.2d 461, 462 (Ky. 1988).
Crouch v. Jefferson County, 773
Judicial review of administrative
action is concerned with the question of arbitrariness.
464.
Id. at
The reviewing court must review the record, briefs and any
other evidence relevant to the narrow issue of arbitrariness in
the discharge of the employee.
Id. at 462.
By "arbitrary," the
court means clearly erroneous, and by "clearly erroneous," the
court means unsupported by substantial evidence.
Kentucky Bd.
Of Nursing v. Ward, 890 S.W.2d 641, 642 (Ky.App. 1994).
We have reviewed the record and conclude that the
Hillview Civil Service Commission had sufficient evidence to
conclude that Mayor Eadens’s suspension of Cottrell was not
arbitrary.
Cottrell was prohibited from carrying a weapon under
18 U.S.C. 922(g)(8).
This section specifically makes it
unlawful for any person who is subject to a domestic violence
court order to possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or
ammunition.
However, 18 U.S.C. 925(a)(1) creates an exception
for police officers by stating,
the provisions of this chapter, except for
sections 922(d)(9) and 922(g)(9) and
provisions relating to firearms subject to
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the prohibitions of section 922(p), shall
not apply with respect to the
transportation, shipment, receipt,
possession, or importation of any firearm or
ammunition imported for, sold or shipped to,
or issued for the use of, the United States
or any department or agency thereof or any
State or any department, agency, or
political subdivision thereof.
Therefore, while 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(8) prohibits all individuals
subject to a DVO from possessing a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 925(a)(1)
creates an exception for firearms issued by the United States,
or any state or agency thereof.
This statute has been challenged in federal court by
police officers whose employment has been terminated for their
inability to carry a firearm, and has been upheld.
Gillespie v.
City of Indianapolis, 185 F.3d 693 (7th Cir. 1999).
In
Gillespie, Jerald Gillespie could no longer carry a firearm
because of his misdemeanor conviction of domestic violence and,
as a result, lost his job as a police officer.
The court in
Gillespie specifically stated that there is a separate provision
that,
exempts the state and federal governments
from most of the firearms disabilities
specified in the statute, thereby allowing
members of the armed services and law
enforcement agencies who might otherwise be
prohibited from carrying firearms to do so
in connection with their public
responsibilities. 18 U.S.C. § 925(a)(1).
However, by its express terms, that
provision of the statute does not apply to
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the firearms disability set forth in section
922(g)(9).
Therefore, the police officer, in Gillespie, was prohibited from
possessing a firearm because he had been convicted of a domestic
violence misdemeanor, which is specifically excluded from the
exception that allows members of the armed services and law
enforcement agencies to carry a firearm in connection with their
public responsibilities.
However, Cottrell has not been convicted of a domestic
violence misdemeanor, but rather is subject to a DVO.
Unlike
being convicted of a domestic violence misdemeanor, being
subject to a DVO does not exclude Cottrell from the exemption
created by 18 U.S.C. 925(a)(1).
Therefore, since he is included
in the exemption, as a police officer he may be able to carry a
firearm issued by the City.
Even though 18 U.S.C. 925(a)(1) provides an exception
to the statute, we agree with the circuit court that Cottrell
has not followed the appropriate steps to have the exemption
apply to him.
The proper step Cottrell should have taken was to
move the Warren Family Court that there was a specific exemption
to the federal statute which would allow a police officer
subject to a DVO to carry a firearm.
Cottrell has made no
attempt to move the Warren Family Court to amend his DVO and he
is, therefore, still subject to a valid court order and the
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prohibition contained therein.
If Cottrell wants the exemption
to apply to him, he must follow the appropriate steps to have
his DVO amended based on this exemption.
Even if it is determined that the exception applies to
Cottrell, he is permitted only to carry a firearm “issued for
the use of” the police department and is not permitted to carry
a personal firearm.
Since Hillview does not “issue” their
police officers firearms the plain language of the exemption may
not apply to Cottrell.
The decision of the Hillview Civil Service Commission
is not arbitrary because it was based on substantial evidence
including the language of the DVO, the fact sheet provided by
Bullitt District Court, and the state police department’s
procedures manual.
The express language of the DVO states that “pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. 922(g), it is a federal violation to purchase,
receive, or possess a firearm while subject to this order.”
Regardless of whether the exception should apply to Cottrell as
a police officer, the DVO did not make such an exemption and was
not amended pursuant to such an exemption.
The Mayor, the Civil
Service Commission, and the police department appropriately
relied on the express language of the DVO since it was, and
still is, a valid court order.
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Mayor Eadens did not rely solely on the DVO but also
had the city attorney, Mark Edison, research whether there was
an exception to the statute for police officers.
At Edison’s
request, a fact sheet was provided by the Bullitt District Court
on January 3, 2003, explaining the federal law.
The fact sheet
specifically states that the statute “does not exempt military
or law enforcement personnel.”
Edison also contacted the state police department to
determine how they deal with and interpret federal law.
In
response, he received an excerpt from its procedures manual,
which provides the state police with specific authority to
suspend employees for a DVO.
Cottrell also raises several issues regarding whether
there being too many persons on the Hillview Civil Service
Commission resulted in prejudice to him, whether he was
effectively terminated because the suspension could last longer
than one year, and whether the misstatement by the circuit court
amounts to reversible error.
The Court has reviewed each of
these issues and finds that none of them has merit.
The number of persons on the Hillview Civil Service
Commission did not result in prejudice to Cottrell.
Since four
of the five members voted to uphold Mayor Eadens’s suspension of
Cottrell, striking any two of the members would not change the
result in Cottrell’s favor.
Therefore, the wrong number of
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persons on the Commission is harmless error and did not result
in prejudice to Cottrell.
Cottrell was not effectively terminated simply because
it was possible that his suspension could last longer than one
year.
He was informed that his suspension would end as soon as
he took care of the DVO.
The Bullitt Circuit Court’s initial review of the
Civil Service Commission’s findings contained a misstatement
regarding whether the exemption was presented during the
Hillview Civil Service Commission’s hearing.
However, the
Bullitt Circuit Court again reviewed the transcripts and record,
corrected the misstatement, and found that the action of the
Commission was not arbitrary.
Cottrell was afforded substantive and procedural due
process.
The minimum requirements of due process are notice, an
opportunity for a hearing appropriate to the nature of the case,
and the making of particularized findings of fact for the
record.
Pangallo v. Ky. Law Enforcement Council, 106 S.W.3d
474, 477 (Ky.App. 2003); citing Cape Publications, Inc. v.
Braden, 39 S.W.3d 823, 827 (Ky. 2001).
In Pangallo, the Court
of Appeals reversed a judgment of the circuit court, which
upheld a decision to revoke a police officer’s certification
without notice of the allegations or an opportunity to be heard.
Unlike the police officer in Pangallo, Cottrell was given proper
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notice of his suspension and was afforded an opportunity to be
heard at a hearing before the Hillview Civil Service Commission.
Cottrell was given notice of his suspension in a
letter written by Mayor Eadens dated January 9, 2003, which set
forth the reason for his suspension.
The letter specifically
stated that Cottrell had a DVO issued against him that would
limit his ability to perform his duties as a police officer by
restricting his ability to possess a firearm.
The letter
specifically states that since there were no other positions
available that would not require the possession of a firearm, he
was suspended until the outstanding DVO expires or is
overturned.
The letter written by Mayor Eadens did everything
possible to inform Officer Cottrell that he was suspended from
duty, why he was suspended, and what was required to end the
suspension.
In addition, the letter also gave notice that there
would be a hearing scheduled. It specifically stated that this
notice was being forwarded to the Clerk of Civil Service
Commission, who would proceed to schedule a hearing.
A hearing
was scheduled before the Hillview Civil Service Commission and
Cottrell was present and was represented by counsel.
Finally,
the hearing satisfied the final requirement of due process by
making particularized findings of fact for the record.
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Therefore, since the minimum requirements of due process were
met, Cottrell was afforded substantive and procedural due
process.
While 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(8) prohibits all individuals
subject to a DVO from possessing a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 925(a)(1)
creates an exemption for firearms issued to police officers.
However, even though 18 U.S.C. 925(a)(1) provides an exception
to the statute, Cottrell has not followed the appropriate steps
to have the exemption apply to him.
Cottrell must move the
Warren Family Court to amend his DVO based on this exemption.
However, since the Hillview Police Department does not “issue”
firearms, the exemption may not benefit Cottrell.
The decision of the Hillview Civil Service Commission
was not arbitrary because it was based on substantial evidence,
including the express language of the DVO, the Fact Sheet
provided by Bullitt District Court, and the state police
department’s procedures manual.
Finally, Cottrell was given proper notice of his
suspension, was afforded an opportunity to be heard, and the
hearing made particularized findings of fact for the record.
Since the minimum requirements of due process were met, Cottrell
was afforded substantive and procedural due process.
For the foregoing reasons the order of the Bullitt
Circuit Court is affirmed.
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McANULTY, JUDGE, CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY.
JOHNSON, JUDGE, CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
Garry Richard Adams, Jr.
Thomas E. Clay
Mark Richard Lafeir
Louisville, KY
Kristie Babbitt Walker
Gregory L. Smith
Louisville, KY
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