DONNIE AUTRY AND VIRGINIA WHITE, CO-ADMINISTRATORS OF THE ESTATE OF MELISSA KAYE AUTRY HONORABLE STEVEN ALAN WILSON, JUDGE v. WESTERN KENTUCKY UNIVERSITY; WKU STUDENT LIFE FOUNDATION, INC.; SANDRA HESS, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY; AUBREY LIVINGSTON, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY; LYNN ALLISON TODD, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY; ALEX KUEHNE, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY; AND AJA HENDRIX, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY
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MODIFIED:
MARCH 4, 2005; 10:00 a.m.
TO BE PUBLISHED
MAY 20, 2005; 2:00 p.m.
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2004-CA-000216-MR
DONNIE AUTRY AND VIRGINIA WHITE,
CO-ADMINISTRATORS OF THE ESTATE OF
MELISSA KAYE AUTRY
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM WARREN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE STEVEN ALAN WILSON, JUDGE1
ACTION NO. 03-CI-01492
WESTERN KENTUCKY UNIVERSITY;
WKU STUDENT LIFE FOUNDATION, INC.;
SANDRA HESS, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY;
AUBREY LIVINGSTON, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY;
LYNN ALLISON TODD, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY;
ALEX KUEHNE, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY; AND
AJA HENDRIX, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART, REVERSING IN PART
AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
JUDGE.2
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; JOHNSON, JUDGE; AND MILLER, SENIOR
1
Honorable Thomas R. Lewis presided in this case and signed various orders
until he took senior status in June 2003. Then Judge Lewis was assigned to
this case as a special judge until Judge Wilson took office in December 2003.
2
Senior Judge John D. Miller sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the
Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and
KRS 21.580.
JOHNSON, JUDGE:
Donnie Autry and Virginia White, Co-
Administrators of the Estate of Melissa Kay Autry (hereinafter
Autry), have appealed orders of dismissal of the Warren Circuit
Court entered on November 26, 2003, January 7, 2004, and January
26, 2004, dismissing Western Kentucky University (hereinafter
WKU), WKU Student Life Foundation, Inc. (hereinafter SLF), and
WKU employees, Sandra Hess, Aubrey Livingston, Lynne Allison
Todd, Alex Kuehne, and Aja Hendrix (hereinafter WKU employees),
in their official capacities only, from the wrongful death
action filed by Autry alleging negligence by these appellees in
failing to provide safe campus housing to their decedent.3
Having concluded that the trial court did not err by dismissing
WKU from the suit, as it is entitled to governmental immunity,
we affirm that portion of the trial court’s orders of dismissal.
Having concluded that the WKU employees are entitled to
immunity, in their official capacities, based on the
governmental immunity granted to WKU, we further affirm that
portion of the trial court’s orders of dismissal.
But having
concluded that the trial court erred in dismissing the claims
against SLF, we reverse that portion of the trial court’s orders
of dismissal and remand for further proceedings consistent with
this Opinion.
3
Hess, Livingston, Todd, Kuehne, and Hendrix remain defendants in the case in
their individual capacities along with the defendants Pikes, Inc. and Pi
Kappa Alpha Fraternity.
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Melissa Kaye “Katie” Autry was a freshman student at
WKU, a public university in Bowling Green, Kentucky, during the
2002-2003 school year and she was a resident of Poland Hall, a
dormitory owned by SLF and managed by WKU.
During the early
hours of May 4, 2003, Katie returned to her dorm room, alone,
after leaving a fraternity party.
It is alleged that later that
morning Stephen Soules and Lucas Goodrum entered Katie’s dorm
room, assaulted and raped her, and set her on fire.
Katie
suffered third-degree burns and died three days later.
Soules
has pled guilty to the assault, rape, and murder of Katie, but
Goodrum was acquitted of the same criminal charges by a jury on
March 21, 2005.
Neither Soules nor Goodrum was a resident of
Poland Hall or a student of WKU at the time of the attack on
Katie.
Poland Hall is owned by SLF, which is a non-stock,
non-profit Kentucky corporation incorporated on May 29, 1999,
having no employees.
SLF’s purpose, according to its Articles
of Incorporation, is to acquire, finance, and own residential
dormitories at WKU; and it was formed to provide a vehicle to
finance WKU’s renovation of its residence halls.
WKU manages
and operates the dorms according to an Amended and Restated
Management Agreement between SLF and WKU dated November 20,
2000.
WKU is responsible for all operations of the dorms and
WKU, not SLF, enters into housing agreements with students.
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WKU was responsible under the management agreement for
hiring employees to work at Poland Hall.
At the time Katie was
attacked, the WKU employees working in Poland Hall, who have
been sued in this action and their respective positions, are as
follows: Hess, the hall director; Livingston, assistant hall
director; Kuehne and Hendrix, resident assistants; and Todd,
desk clerk.
WKU had established safety regulations for the
dorms it managed, including that outside doors were to be locked
and all non-resident guests were required to check-in with the
desk clerk, leave identification with the desk clerk, and be
escorted by a resident to their dorm room.
On September 18, 2003, Autry filed a wrongful death
action against the appellees alleging that their negligence in
failing to provide adequate security caused Katie’s death.
Claims were asserted against the WKU employees in their official
capacities as employees of WKU, and individually.4
On October 3,
2003, and October 13, 2003, the appellees filed separate motions
to dismiss, arguing that they were immune from liability based
on governmental immunity and official immunity.5
On November 26,
2003, the trial court in two separate orders granted motions to
dismiss on behalf of SLF and WKU and all of the WKU employees in
4
Autry’s claims against the WKU employees, individually, were not addressed
in the employees’ motion to dismiss or the trial court’s orders of dismissal.
5
At the time of the hearing on the motions, the parties had not yet taken any
depositions and were in the early stages of discovery.
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their official capacities.
On December 5, 2003, Autry filed a
motion to alter, amend, or vacate the orders of dismissal, which
the trial court denied by an order entered on January 7, 2004.6
This appeal followed.
Autry asserts that the trial court erred in dismissing
the negligence claims against all the appellees because none was
entitled to any form of immunity.
Since these appeals present
purely legal issues, this Court reviews the matter de novo.7
Despite the high standard imposed on the trial court in
dismissing an action,8 we find no error in the trial court’s
dismissal of Autry’s claims against WKU based on WKU’s
governmental immunity, nor its dismissal of Autry’s claims
against the WKU employees in their official capacities based on
their official immunity.
The Supreme Court of Kentucky in Yanero v. Davis,9
6
On January 26, 2004, the trial court entered another order making the order
dismissing the claims against SLF final and appealable. Honorable Steven
Alan Wilson replaced Judge Lewis and signed the orders of January 7, 2004,
and January 26, 2004.
7
Carroll v. Meredith, 59 S.W.3d 484, 489 (Ky.App. 2001).
8
“[E]very well-pleaded allegation of the complaint must be taken as true and
construed in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion is
made.” City of Louisville v. Stock Yards Bank & Trust Co., 843 S.W.2d 327,
328 (Ky. 1992) (citing Gall v. Scroggy, 725 S.W.2d 867 (Ky.App. 1987)). “[A]
court should not grant the motion unless it appears the pleading party would
not be entitled to relief under any set of facts which could be proved in
support of his claim” [citation omitted]. Pari-Mutuel Clerks’ Union of
Kentucky, Local 541, SEIU, AFL-CIO v. Kentucky Jockey Club, 551 S.W.2d 801,
803 (Ky. 1977).
9
65 S.W.3d 510 (Ky. 2001).
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provided a comprehensive summary of the law of sovereign
immunity, governmental immunity, and official immunity, and
their current applications in this Commonwealth.
As the Supreme
Court noted, the concept of immunity has its roots in the common
law of England and was adopted early in the history of our
country and as early as 1828 in this Commonwealth.10
While
sovereign immunity is not found in the Kentucky Constitution,
Sections 230 and 231 of our Constitution allow the Legislature
to “waive the Commonwealth’s inherent immunity either by direct
appropriation of money from the state treasury (Section 230)
and/or by specifying where and in what manner the Commonwealth
may be sued (Section 231).”11
“It is an inherent attribute of a
sovereign state that precludes the maintaining of any suit
against the state unless the state has given its consent or
otherwise waived its immunity.”12
“The absolute immunity from
suit afforded to the state also extends to public officials sued
in their representative (official) capacities, when the state is
the real party against which relief in such cases is sought.”13
10
Yanero, 65 S.W.3d at 517.
11
Id. at 524.
12
Id. at 517 (citing Restatement (Second) of the Law of Torts § 895B(1)
(A.L.I. 1979); and 72 Am.Jur.2d, States, Territories, & Dependencies, § 99
(1974)).
13
Yanero, 65 S.W.3d at 518 (citing Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 756, 119
S.Ct. 2240, 2267, 144 L.Ed.2d 636 (1999); 72 Am.Jur.2d, States, Territories,
& Dependencies, § 104 (1974); e.g. Tate v. Salmon, 79 Ky. 540, 543 (1881);
and Divine v. Harvie, 23 Ky. 439, 441 (1828)).
-6-
“The rationale for absolute immunity . . . is not to protect
those individuals from liability for their own unjustifiable
conduct, but to protect their offices against the deterrent
effect of a threat of suit alleging improper motives where there
has been no more than a mistake or a disagreement on the part of
the complaining party with the decision made.”14
Thus, the
immunity afforded to the Commonwealth and certain officials is
sovereign immunity.15
Distinct from sovereign immunity is governmental
immunity which “‘is the public policy, derived from the
traditional doctrine of sovereign immunity, that limits
imposition of tort liability on a government agency.’”16
Under
the doctrine of governmental immunity, “a state agency is
entitled to immunity from tort liability to the extent that it
is performing a governmental, as opposed to a proprietary,
function.”17
14
Yanero, 65 S.W.3d at 518 (citing Restatement (Second) Torts, supra, § 895D
cmt. c).
15
Id. at 518. Those who are entitled to sovereign immunity include, but are
not limited to, legislators in the performance of their legislative
functions, judges for all their judicial acts, prosecutors with respect to
initiation and pursuit of prosecutions, and a sitting President of the United
States.
16
Id. at 519 (quoting 57 Am.Jur.2d, Municipal, County, School & State Tort
Liability, § 10 (2001)).
17
Yanero, 65 S.W.3d
Dependencies, § 104
“application of the
consistent results.
relative simplicity
at 519 (citing 72 Am.Jur.2d, States, Territories, &
(1974)). The Court in Yanero acknowledged that the
governmental/proprietary test does not guarantee
. . . However, that analysis has the attribute of
in application and affords a reasonable compromise
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In this case, Autry asserts that WKU’s liability
arises out of its failure, as operator and manager of the dorms,
to provide adequate security and to follow its own security
regulations at Poland Hall.
WKU asserts that it is a state
agency and that the operation of the dorms is a governmental
function, whereby it is shielded from liability for any
negligence.
Autry asserts that WKU is not entitled to
governmental immunity because its function as operator and
manager of the dorms is a proprietary type of activity engaged
in by private entities for profit, and not governmental in
nature.
Since WKU is a state agency, we must determine whether
it is entitled to governmental immunity for any negligence in
providing, managing, and operating dormitories for its students.
KRS18 44.073(1)19 establishes that WKU, as a state
institution of higher education, is an agency of the state.
The
Supreme Court of Kentucky in Kentucky Center for the Arts Corp.
v. Berns,20 also states that an entity is a state agency if it is
between allowing state agencies to perform their governmental functions
without having to answer for their decisions in the context of tort
litigation, and allowing private enterprises to pursue their legitimate
business interests without unfair competition from government agencies
performing purely proprietary functions without the same costs and risks
inherent in commercial enterprise.” Id. at 521.
18
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
19
KRS 44.073(1) provides that state institutions of higher learning are state
agencies within the meaning of the Board of Claims Act, which is found in KRS
44.070 – KRS 44.990.
20
801 S.W.2d 327 (Ky. 1991).
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“‘under the direction and control of the central State
government[;]’” “‘supported by monies which are disbursed by
authority of the Commissioner of Finance out of the State
treasury[;]’”21 and thus, “when viewed as a whole, the entity is
carrying out a function integral to state government.”22
The Supreme Court of Kentucky has applied the Berns
test to identify other educational entities as state agencies in
Withers v. University of Kentucky,23 (the University of Kentucky)
and in Yanero (the Jefferson County Board of Education).
KRS
44.073(1) and KRS 164.290(1) provide that WKU is a state
university and an agency of the Commonwealth, and by serving as
an institution of higher education under these statutes, WKU
carries out a function integral to state government.24
WKU is supported by the state treasury.25
Further,
Thus, WKU is clearly a
state agency under the Berns test.
21
Berns, 801 S.W.2d at 331 (quoting Gnau v. Louisville & Jefferson Co.
Metropolitan Sewer Dist, 346 S.W.2d 754, 755 (Ky. 1961)). In Berns, it was
found that the Kentucky Center for the Arts Corporation was a municipal
corporation, that while created by statute, does not perform services of
central state government and was not entitled to governmental immunity.
22
Id. at 332.
23
939 S.W.2d 340 (Ky. 1997).
24
See Berns, 801 S.W.2d at 332.
25
See KRS 446.010(31), which provides:
“State funds” or “public funds” means sums
actually received in cash or negotiable instruments
from all sources unless otherwise described by any
state agency, state-owned corporation, university,
department, cabinet, fiduciary for the benefit of any
form of state organization, authority, board, bureau,
-9-
The function of WKU at issue in this case; i.e., its
providing, managing, and operating of housing for its students,
is analogous to the function of the University of Kentucky in
Withers and that of the Jefferson County Board of Education in
Yanero.
In Withers, the Supreme Court concluded that the
University of Kentucky was a governmental agency26 and entitled
to immunity from a medical malpractice claim arising from its
teaching hospital.27
Then, the Supreme Court in Yanero,
concluded that the Jefferson County Board of Education was an
agency of state government28 and that it was entitled to
governmental immunity against the claim that it had negligently
failed to promulgate rules requiring students playing baseball
to wear batting helmets.29
Since KRS 164.300 provides as part of
WKU’s purpose that it “render such supplemental services as
conducting . . . dormitories . . . ” and since WKU provides
dormitories only to its students, we conclude that the
interstate compact, commission, committee,
conference, council, office, or any other form of
organization whether or not the money has ever been
paid into the Treasury and whether or not the money
is still in the Treasury if the money is controlled
by any form of state organization . . . [emphasis
added].
26
Withers, 939 S.W.2d at 343.
27
Id. at 342.
28
Yanero, 65 S.W.3d at 527.
29
Id.
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dormitories serve an educational purpose by providing students
with affordable and convenient housing on the university campus.
The Supreme Court in Withers held that the
operation of a university hospital was a governmental function
because it was integral to the teaching and research function of
the university, noting that medical school accreditation would
be “impossible” without the teaching hospital.30
Autry attempts
to distinguish this function of the teaching hospital from WKU’s
providing, managing, and operating dormitories for students by
asserting that it would be possible to carry on the operations
of the university without engaging in this housing function.
However, the Supreme Court in Yanero did not follow that
reasoning in determining whether a function was governmental.
Despite Yanero’s argument that sponsoring a baseball team was
not a function integral to state government, the Supreme Court
concluded that because interscholastic athletics was
specifically included by statute as a function of the Board of
Education, supervising athletic teams fell within the agency’s
governmental function.31
Thus, we conclude that WKU’s function
of providing, managing, and operating dorms for its students is
also a governmental function under the same rule delineated in
Withers and Yanero.
30
Withers, 939 S.W.2d at 343.
31
Yanero, 65 S.W.3d at 527.
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Autry further asserts that WKU should not
be immune from liability for negligence in its providing,
managing, and operating of student housing when private
organizations engaged in the same business are not sheltered
from liability.
This same argument was rejected by the Supreme
Court in Withers, where the appellants asserted that the
university was engaged in a proprietary function because “the
University of Kentucky Medical Center is nothing more than a
hospital which is in full competition with and performs the same
function as private hospitals.”32
The Supreme Court stated that
governmental immunity to a state university will not be denied
merely because a private entity provides similar services.
The
Supreme Court noted that only the Legislature can waive
immunity,33 and it had not done so under those circumstances.34
In Yanero,35 the Supreme Court reiterated this view and quoted
Withers with approval.
Likewise, in this case the providing of
affordable on-campus housing is an essential function of a
public university and the existence of alternative housing off
campus does not destroy the essential role of this function in
WKU’s providing of higher education.
32
Withers, 939 S.W.2d at 343.
33
Id. at 344.
34
Id. at 346.
35
Yanero, 65 S.W.3d at 521.
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In this case, we are not persuaded that the
relationship between SLF and WKU has any relevance to WKU’s
entitlement to governmental immunity.
There is no restriction
in the enabling statute as to how WKU is to provide dorms to its
students; i.e., whether the dorms are to be owned by WKU or
managed by it as in this case.
Nor, is it relevant that the
money received by WKU for its management services comes from SLF
rather than from the state treasury.
Providing dorms to its
students is a part of WKU’s overall educational function, and as
stated in Berns, WKU’s educational function must be viewed as a
whole in determining if it is carrying out a function integral
to state government.
We disagree with Autry’s argument that the New York
Board of Claims case, Miller v. New York,36 should be persuasive
in denying WKU immunity.
The New York Board of Claims did not
discuss the university’s role in education as a governmental
function, nor did it evaluate the relative importance of a state
university’s operating dormitories as part of its educational
function, taken as a whole.
No party in the Miller case
disputed that the operation of dorms was a proprietary
function;37 however, our Legislature has authorized the function
as governmental in KRS 164.300.
36
467 N.E.2d 493 (N.Y. 1984).
37
Further, the New York Board of
Id. at 496.
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Claims focused on the nature of the act, and it did not
determine whether it was a governmental function or a
proprietary function.38
Thus, we are not persuaded by Miller.
The claims that Autry asserted against the WKU
employees alleged that they failed to exercise reasonable care
in providing security at Poland Hall in both their official
capacities and individually.
The trial court dismissed the
claims against the employees in their official capacities only.
Yanero notes that “when an officer or employee of a
governmental agency is sued in his/her representative capacity,
the officer’s or employee’s actions are afforded the same
immunity, if any, to which the agency, itself, would be entitled
. . . .”39
Thus, since WKU has governmental immunity in this
case, the trial court also properly dismissed Autry’s claims
against the WKU employees in their official capacities.
Since
the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over these
38
Miller, 467 N.E.2d at 497. As a state agency with governmental immunity,
WKU cannot be held vicariously liable for any alleged negligence of its
employees. Thus, Autry’s claims against WKU were filed in the wrong forum.
As stated in the Withers case, our Legislature has waived immunity against
governmental agencies such as WKU by enacting the Board of Claims Act. See
KRS 44.070 – KRS 44.990. The Board of Claims Act “represents not a creation
of immunity, but rather a limited waiver of immunity to the extent that
immunity exists.” Yanero, 65 S.W.3d at 524. In affirming the decision to
dismiss the claims against the University of Kentucky, the Court in Withers
explained, “persons having negligence claims against the Commonwealth may be
heard in the Board of Claims, but not elsewhere.” Withers, 939 S.W.2d at
346. The Warren Circuit Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over WKU
and consistent with Withers, the Kentucky Board of Claims is the exclusive
forum for the claims asserted against WKU in this action.
39
Yanero, 65 S.W.3d at 522.
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claims against the WKU employees, the claims should have been
brought in the Board of Claims.40
Autry also claims that SLF, as the owner of the
fee simple interest in the dorm real estate, failed to exercise
reasonable care in providing security for Poland Hall, resulting
in the attack on Katie.
Autry contends that SLF, as a non-
profit corporation, was not entitled to any type of immunity;
and thus, the trial court’s dismissal of the claims against SLF
was improper.
In support of its motion to dismiss, SLF asserted
three arguments:
(1) that it was entitled to official immunity
as the agent of WKU, which was entitled to governmental
immunity; (2) that the criminal attack on Katie by Soules and
Goodrum constituted a superseding cause of her injuries and
death; and (3) that Autry failed to join as defendants Soules
and Goodrum, who were indispensable parties.
Since the trial
court did not provide any ground in its order of dismissal, we
are given little insight into the basis for the trial court’s
ruling.41
We conclude, as set forth below, that SLF was not
40
Autry asserts that dismissal of their claims against WKU and its employees
in their official capacities was premature because discovery had not been
completed. However, since WKU and its employees in their official capacity
are immune from liability, discovery as to their possible negligence in this
matter is irrelevant.
41
While CR 12 does not require the trial court to state the ground for
dismissal, when multiple grounds are asserted, it obviously is helpful in
appellate review for the trial court to state which ground or grounds it
relied on in granting the dismissal.
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entitled to immunity.
Further, neither of SLF’s other arguments
justifies the trial court’s dismissal of Autry’s claims against
it.
Instead, whether SLF is liable for damages related to
Katie’s injuries turns on whether SLF was in possession of
Poland Hall at the time of the attack; whether in the exercise
of ordinary care, the employees in charge of Poland Hall should
have foreseen the risk that Katie would be attacked by another
person or persons in the dorm; whether the employees could have
taken reasonable actions to prevent such an occurrence, but
failed to do so; and whether such failure was a substantial
factor in causing Katie’s injuries.42
It is elemental tort law that a negligence action
requires proof of: (1) a duty on the part of the defendant; (2)
a breach of that duty; and (3) a consequent injury, which
consists of actual injury or harm and legal causation between
the defendant’s breach and the plaintiff’s injury.43
presents a question of law.
Duty
“If no duty is owed by the
defendant to the plaintiff, there can be no breach thereof, and
42
See Palmore, Kentucky Instructions to Juries § 24.19 (4th ed., 1989). But
for WKU’s governmental immunity, it would have been proper to determine its
negligence, along with SLF’s. However, WKU’s immunity renders its negligence
moot except as it may result in SLF’s liability under the doctrine of
respondeat superior as discussed infra.
43
Mullins v. Commonwealth Life Insurance Co., 839 S.W.2d 245, 247 (Ky.
1992)(citing Illinois Central R.R. v. Vincent, 412 S.W.2d 874, 876 (Ky.
1967)). See also Pathways, Inc. v. Hammons, 113 S.W.3d 85, 89 (Ky. 2003).
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therefore no actionable negligence.”44
“Breach and injury[ ] are
questions of fact for the jury to decide” [citations omitted].45
In Kentucky, the damages recoverable in a tort action are those
that “actually flow from the wrongful act, although the
particular consequences may not have been contemplated . . . .”46
“‘It has long been recognized that “a possessor of
land who holds it open to the public for entry for business
purposes is subject to liability to members of the public while
they are upon the land for such a purpose, for physical harm
caused by the accidental, negligent or intentionally harmful
acts of third persons . . . and by the failure of the possessor
to exercise reasonable care to (a) discover that such acts are
being done or are likely to be done, or (b) give a warning
adequate to enable the visitors to avoid the harm, or otherwise
to protect them against it.”’”47
Katie, as a resident of Poland
44
Ashcraft v. People’s Liberty Bank & Trust Co., Inc., 724 S.W.2d 228, 229
(Ky.App. 1987).
45
Pathways, Inc., 113 S.W.3d at 89.
46
Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Ramsey, 261 Ky. 657, 88 S.W.2d 675, 677
(1935).
47
Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial Hospital, 695 P.2d 653, 657 (Cal. 1985)
(quoting Peterson v. San Francisco Community College Dist., 685 P.2d 1193
(Cal. 1984) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 344)). See also 62
Am.Jur.2d Premises Liability § 44 (1990).
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Hall, a college dormitory, was both an invitee48 and a tenant49 of
the possessor of Poland Hall.50
Regardless of Katie’s status as
tenant, invitee, or other, the landlord’s liability is not
48
A duty is owed by a business to its invitees “to protect them from imminent
criminal harm and reasonably foreseeable criminal conduct by third persons.”
Nivens v. 7-11 Hoagy’s Corner, 943 P.2d 286, 293 (Wash. 1997). “If the place
or character of his business, or his past experience, is such that he should
reasonably anticipate careless or criminal conduct on the part of third
persons, either generally or at some particular time, he may be under a duty
to take precautions against it[.]” Id. at 292. Reasonable steps should be
taken to prevent such harm in order to satisfy the duty. Id. at 293.
A person is an invitee if “‘(1) he enters by invitation, express or
implied, (2) his entry is connected with the owner’s business or with an
activity the owner conducts or permits to be conducted on his land and (3)
there is mutuality of benefit or benefit to the owner.’” Johnson v. Lone
Star Steakhouse & Saloon of Kentucky, Inc., 997 S.W.2d 490, 491-92 (Ky.App.
1999) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 827 (6th ed. 1990)). “[T]he invitee,
or . . . business visitor, is placed upon a higher footing than a licensee”
[footnote omitted]. Prosser and Keaton, The Law of Torts, § 61 (5th ed.
1984). It is undisputed that Katie’s presence at the dorm was by invitation;
her presence was connected with the activity conducted on the land; and her
presence provided both her and the possessor a benefit. Thus, Katie, as a
resident of Poland Hall, was an invitee.
49
It could also be argued that SLF and Katie had a landlord-tenant
relationship, which “is contractual, created by a lease . . . for a term
. . . and exists when one person occupies the premises of another with the
lessor’s permission or consent, subordinated to the lessor’s title or
rights.” Black’s Law Dictionary, 883 (7th ed. 1990). “A landlord owes its
tenant the duty to take reasonable security measures to eliminate harm that
is foreseeable, based on the nature of the known criminal activity on the
premises.” University of Maryland Eastern Shore v. Rhaney, 858 A.2d 497, 504
(Md.App. 2004). “[A] landlord’s duty to maintain safe common areas is not
limited to preventing harm that occurs only within the common areas. Rather,
negligent maintenance . . . in areas under the control of the landlord may
result in liability for injuries that occur within the leased premises[.]”
Id. The housing agreement was executed between Katie and WKU. However, WKU
entered into the housing agreement based on the authority it had been given
by SLF through the management agreement, and thus, it served as an agent for
SLF for the purpose of renting the dorm rooms. SLF was aware that there was
a housing agreement between WKU and Katie, SLF accepted Katie’s payment of
rent through WKU, and SLF allowed Katie to reside in the dorm. By accepting
the benefits of the contract between WKU and Katie, SLF adopted the housing
agreement as its own. See Matzger v. Arcade Building & Realty Co., 141 P.
900, 905 (Wash. 1914).
50
University of Maryland, 858 A.2d at 497.
-18-
affected, “because a landowner owes a duty of care to all lawful
visitors.”51
SLF argues that it owed no duty to Katie because,
pursuant to the management agreement, WKU, not SLF, was the
entity that contracted with Katie to provide her housing; that
SLF was merely an agent of WKU; and that its only connection to
Poland Hall was its ownership of the real property.
Premises
liability requires the presence of both possession and control
over the premises, because the entity in possession is normally
best able to prevent any harm to others.52
A “possessor” is
defined as a person who is in occupation of land with intent to
control it.53
It is undisputed that, at the time of the attack,
SLF was the fee simple owner of Poland Hall; that WKU had
entered into a management agreement with SLF to contract with
students to live in the dorms; that under Article Four, Section
4.1 of the management agreement, WKU was responsible for
providing security services to Katie and other residents of the
dorms; that under Article Four, Section 4.9 of the management
agreement, WKU was to hire all employees to manage and operate
Poland Hall; and that all of WKU’s duties under the management
51
Michael J. Glazerman, Asbestos in Commercial Buildings: Obligations and
Responsibilities of Landlords and Tenants, 22 Real Prop. Prob. & Tr. J. 661,
686 (1987).
52
Merritt v. Nickelson, 287 N.W.2d 178, 180 (Mich. 1980).
53
Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 328E (1965 & Supp. 2004).
-19-
agreement, were subject to the review and ultimate authority of
SLF.
In light of these facts, reasonable people might differ as
to who had possession of Poland Hall; and thus, “the probative
value of the evidence, and the conclusions to be drawn from it,
lies in the hands of the jury.”54
Article Six of the management agreement states that
WKU shall have the status of independent contractor and shall
have no authority, express or implied, to act as agent of SLF
for any purpose “other than set forth in this Agreement”
[emphasis added].
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 387 states
that the fact that an independent contractor or servant, to whom
the owner or possessor of land turns over its entire charge, is
liable for its own negligence does not eliminate the liability
of a possessor for the harm done.
Further, if the relationship
between the owner and the manager is a principal/agent
relationship, the owner would be vicariously liable for the
negligence of the manager under the doctrine of respondeat
superior.55
Thus, it is irrelevant for the purposes of managing
the dorm whether WKU was SLF’s agent or an independent
contractor, as “[a] contract by which one party delegates and
the other assumes a duty in respect to safety to persons or
54
The Law of Torts, at § 37.
55
See American General Life & Accident Insurance Co. v. Hall, 74 S.W.3d 688,
692 (Ky. 2002).
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property . . . will not be permitted to [be used to] avoid
personal responsibility to third persons” [citation omitted].56
Therefore, if SLF were the possessor of Poland Hall and if the
injuries to Katie were foreseeable, then SLF owed a duty to
Katie to protect her from criminal acts of third persons.
In determining whether a duty exists, the most
important factor is foreseeability.57
“‘“Forseeability”’ means
that a person of ordinary intelligence should have anticipated
the dangers that his negligence created’”58 [citations omitted].
In Waldon v. Housing Authority of Paducah,59 this Court held that
a landlord has a duty to take reasonable steps to prevent the
infliction of injury on a tenant from reasonably foreseeable
criminal acts of third persons.
Waldon stated that “[i]n
Kentucky, ‘[t]he rule is that every person owes a duty to every
other person to exercise ordinary care in his activities to
prevent foreseeable injury’” [emphasis original].60
is ‘not a guarantor of the tenants’ safety.’
“A landlord
However, a
landlord’s conduct can make him liable to his tenant for the
56
Louisville Cooperage Co. v. Lawrence, 313 Ky. 75, 78, 230 S.W.2d 103, 105
(1950).
57
Pathways, Inc., 113 S.W.3d at 89.
58
University of Maryland, 858 A.2d at 504.
59
854 S.W.2d 777, 779 (Ky.App. 1991).
60
Waldon, 854 S.W.2d at 778 (quoting Grayson Fraternal Order of Eagles, Aerie
No. 3738, Inc. v. Claywell, 736 S.W.2d 328 (Ky. 1987)).
-21-
criminal acts of third persons, if the landlord fails to take
reasonable steps to avoid injury from reasonably foreseeable
criminal acts” [citation omitted].61
In Waldon, the victim was shot and killed outside her
public housing unit.
The trial court granted summary judgment
to the housing authority, but this Court reversed and held that
there was a genuine issue as to a material fact as to whether
the landlord took reasonable steps to prevent reasonably
foreseeable criminal acts upon its tenant.62
The housing
authority argued that because the plaintiff estate could not
prove that the housing authority “aided, abetted or
participated” with the assailant, it could not prevail on its
claim.63
This Court disagreed and stated that “[e]ven an
intervening criminal act does not relieve one for liability for
his or her negligent acts or omissions, where the criminal act
is a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the defendant’s
negligent act.”64
Accordingly, in determining whether the injuries to
Katie were foreseeable, evidence of prior similar incidents can
61
Waldon, 854 S.W.2d at 779 (quoting Davis v. Coleman Management Co., 765
S.W.2d 37 (Ky.App. 1989)).
62
Id.
63
Id. at 778.
64
Id. at 779 (citing Wheeler v. Andrew Jergens Co., 696 S.W.2d 326 (Ky.
1985)).
-22-
be considered if relevant and if their probative value is not
outweighed by undue prejudice.65
This type of evidence may raise
a triable issue of fact as to the foreseeability of the
injuries.66
If so, the jury will determine whether the security
measures at Poland Hall as actually carried out by the employees
prior to, during, and following the attack on Katie were
reasonable under the circumstances,67 and if not, whether the
breach of the duty owed to Katie was a substantial factor in
causing Katie’s injuries.
Only then could SLF, if it has in
fact been found to be the possessor of Poland Hall, be held
directly liable for Katie’s injuries and resulting damages.
Certainly the record in the case before us in its current state
does not establish as a matter of law that SLF was not the
possessor of Poland Hall, that the criminal acts in this case
were not foreseeable, and that SLF did not breach its duty to
Katie.
SLF made three arguments in support of the dismissal
of Autry’s claims against SLF.
SLF concedes that it is not
entitled to governmental immunity because it is not a
governmental agency, but it asserts it is entitled to official
immunity because it is an agent of WKU, a state agency entitled
65
Isaacs, 695 P.2d at 663.
66
Id. at 660.
67
Id. at 663.
-23-
to governmental immunity in this case.
There is no document of
record establishing a relationship between WKU as principal and
SLF as agent.
While SLF is correct that an agency relationship
can be established by implication68 and by actions of the
parties,69 there is no basis for finding such a relationship in
this case.
SLF attempts to compare its relationship to WKU to
that of the Kentucky High School Athletic Association (KHSAA) to
the Board of Education in Yanero.
However, a key distinction
between the Board of Education/KHSAA relationship and the
WKU/SLF relationship is that the Board of Education had
statutory authorization to designate an organization to manage
interscholastic athletics under KRS 156.070(2).70
WKU placed legal title of the dorm real estate in the
name of SLF for the purpose of SLF’s providing a vehicle to
finance WKU’s renovation of its residence halls and as part of a
plan to use the bonding authority of Warren County to finance
renovations of the dorms.
SLF and WKU entered into an Amended
and Restated Management Agreement dated November 20, 2000,
wherein it is established that WKU is to manage the dorms for
SLF and is SLF’s agent to the extent as stated in the agreement,
and is otherwise an independent contractor.
There is no
68
Kentucky-Pennsylvania Oil & Gas Corp. v. Clark, 57 S.W.2d 65 (Ky. 1933).
69
Wedding v. Duncan, 310 Ky. 374, 380, 220 S.W.2d 564, 568 (1949).
70
Yanero, 65 S.W.3d at 530.
-24-
contract between SLF and the students.
The housing contract is
directly between WKU and the students.
Under the agreement, WKU
charges fees to the students for housing, and then turns the
fees over to SLF.
management fee.
SLF, in return, pays WKU $40,000.00 as a
All renovations are the property of SLF;
however, WKU has the exclusive option to purchase the real
estate.
WKU’s duties under the agreement include, but are
not limited to:
(1) management of the premises as residence
halls for students of WKU; (2) billing and collecting revenues
from students; (3) contracting on behalf of SLF for all services
and utilities for the premises; (4) keeping the premises in good
repair; (5) hiring, negotiating with, supervising, and
discharging all employees (the employee shall be WKU employees
but SLF reimburses WKU for all costs associated with said
employees); (6) providing police services, fire protection
services, and other reasonable security services; (7)
maintaining insurance coverage; (8) inspecting the premises; (9)
recommending the rate structure for housing fees; (10)
establishing and enforcing housing policies; and (11) informing
SLF of any problems or complaints at the dorms.
An important
aspect in the relationship between SLF and WKU is that all
actions of WKU pertaining to the real estate owned by SLF are
subject to the review and ultimate authority of SLF.
-25-
Thus,
there is no support for SLF’s claim that it was WKU’s agent for
the purpose of managing student housing.
SLF next asserts that Autry’s claims against it were
properly dismissed regardless of immunity because the criminal
attack on Katie by Soules and Goodrum was a superseding cause of
her injuries and death.
SLF argues that since it had no direct
contractual agreement with Katie, and since WKU was solely
responsible for the operations of Poland Hall, SLF owed her no
duty of care.
Further, SLF argues that, since there is no
dispute that intervening criminal acts caused Katie’s death, it
is a question of law as to whether the criminal acts constitute
a superseding cause.
SLF relies on James v. Meow Media, Inc.,71
where the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
held that a school shooting was not a foreseeable consequence of
the viewing of the movies and the playing of the video games the
defendants produced.72
As stated above, we conclude under Waldon
that there was no superseding cause that shielded SLF from
liability.
As its third ground for dismissal of Autry’s claims
against it, SLF argues that Autry’s failure to join the alleged
criminal assailants, Soules and Goodrum, requires dismissal
because they are indispensable parties to the action.
71
300 F.3d 683, 691 (6th Cir. 2002).
72
Id.
-26-
In
reviewing the record, it appears that the trial court found no
merit in this argument, and we agree.
SLF bases its argument on KRS 411.182(1), which
establishes that fault should be apportioned among those
responsible for the injuries claimed and that CR 19 establishes
that Soules and Goodrum are “indispensable parties.”
In Cabinet
for Human Resources v. Kentucky State Personnel Board,73 this
Court discussed the law on indispensable parties as follows:
When one litigant believes there to be an
indispensable party it should request the
court to order joinder by the simple
expedient of filing a motion. If the court
concurs then service of process shall issue,
but in any event, it should be accomplished
by a pleading or motion and a brief is
neither. CR 7.01. Therefore, appellant did
not preserve the issue in the trial court
. . . .74
Similarly, SLF had the opportunity to request the joinder of
Soules and Goodrum, but did not do so; and thus, it failed to
preserve this claim for appellate review in the trial court.
While Soules and Goodrum could perhaps be joined as parties for
apportionment, that obligation falls on SLF and not Autry.
For SLF to be entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law, it must show (1) that it was impossible for Autry to
produce any evidence in her favor on one or more of the genuine
73
846 S.W.2d 711 (Ky.App. 1992).
74
Id. at 714.
-27-
issues of material fact, (2) that under the undisputed facts of
the case, it owed no duty to Katie, or (3) that, as a matter of
law, any breach of a duty it owed to Katie was not a legal cause
of her injuries.75
Even though WKU was the manager and operator
of Poland Hall, all its actions were under the ultimate
authority of SLF.
Before the trial court entered the orders of
dismissal, very limited discovery had occurred.
After viewing
the facts in this case in the light most favorable to the party
opposing summary judgment, we conclude that the trial court
failed to consider the appropriate issues and improperly
dismissed Autry’s claims against SLF.
Accordingly, the orders of the Warren Circuit Court
dismissing Autry’s claims against WKU and the WKU employees in
their official capacities are affirmed.
The order of the Warren
Circuit Court dismissing Autry’s claims against SLF is reversed
and this matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent
with this Opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS:
Joseph R. Kirwan
Benjamin D. Crocker
Bowling Green, Kentucky
75
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, WKU
STUDENT LIFE FOUNDATION:
Charles E. English, Jr.
David W. Anderson
Bowling Green, Kentucky
Pathways, Inc., 113 S.W.3d at 89.
-28-
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLANTS:
Benjamin D. Crocker
Bowling Green, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEE,
WKU STUDENT LIFE FOUNDATION:
Charles E. English, Jr.
Bowling Green, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES, WESTERN
KENTUCKY UNIVERSITY, HESS,
LIVINGSTON, TODD, KUEHNE AND
HENDRIX:
Greg N. Stivers
Scott D. Laufenberg
Bowling Green, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEES,
WESTERN KENTUCKY UNIVERSTIY,
HESS, LIVINGSTON, TODD, KUEHNE
AND HENDRIX:
Greg N. Stivers
Bowling Green, Kentucky
-29-
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