JOHN PETER VINCENT HOLLIS, DVM v. CHERYL HOLLIS
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED:
FEBRUARY 11, 2005; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-002740-MR
JOHN PETER VINCENT HOLLIS, DVM
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM WOODFORD CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE PAUL F. ISAACS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 99-CI-00152
v.
CHERYL HOLLIS
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
DYCHE, KNOPF, AND MINTON, JUDGES.
DYCHE, JUDGE:
John and Cheryl Hollis were married in 1986 and
separated in 1999.
The parties have three children.
Their
marriage was dissolved in 2000, and this Court, in a twenty-one
page opinion rendered May 2, 2003, affirmed all aspects of the
dissolution judgment.
However, issues continued to arise
between John and Cheryl, and court intervention became necessary
more than once.
The appeal before us, brought by John pro se,
contains three arguments.
We affirm.
John first disagrees with the trial court’s finding
that he was in contempt for failing to cooperate with Cheryl
over the visitation schedule.
The court had ordered that the
parties work together to establish a yearlong visitation
schedule by January 31, 2003; the order further stated that,
should an agreement fail to be reached, the court would set the
schedule and the non-cooperating party would be sanctioned.
John was found in contempt, and he appeals that finding, arguing
that “[t]he language in the order did not specify adequately the
criteria to be used to determine fault.”
The record indicates that the January 31, 2003,
deadline was set by order entered July 3, 2002, giving the
parties half a year to agree to a schedule.
Once the deadline
passed and Cheryl moved for sanctions, John was given an
opportunity to answer and a hearing at which he could present
his side of the story.
The Domestic Relations Commissioner
filed its recommendations in April 2003, after which John filed
no exceptions.
The trial court adopted those recommendations in
May 2003, and the record contains no further challenge from John
until after the trial court’s November 2003 order finding him in
contempt for not paying the sanctions imposed in the May 2003
order.
Therefore, this issue is not properly before us.
Furthermore, John has not met his burden on appeal, and we have
no recourse but to affirm the finding.
-2-
John’s second argument concerns the parental
counseling sessions.
In its Final Order dated March 27, 2002,
the trial court included this finding:
“The Court determines
that it is in the best interest of the parties and their minor
children to continue family and parental counseling with Dr.
Diana Hartley with the parties being responsible for the cost
associated with this counseling on a 50-50 basis.”
However, after these sessions proved fruitless, the
trial court, in its November 2003 order, amended its earlier
finding, thereby suspending the parental counseling.
This
finding was prompted by John’s motion to hold Cheryl in contempt
for refusing to attend any further meetings with the counselor.
John insists that this finding should be reversed, that Cheryl
should be held in contempt, and that she should be ordered to
pay half of the family therapist’s bill.
The record supports
the trial court’s findings on this issue in all respects, and we
affirm it.
Appellant’s last argument is that the wage assignment
should have been changed to reflect his deduction for paying
health insurance premiums.
This issue is not properly before
us, not having been addressed by John in his initial appeal to
this Court.
John is again attempting to bypass the rules of
civil procedure in an effort to reduce his child support
payment.
The trial court correctly denied his motion.
-3-
The judgment of the Woodford Circuit Court is
affirmed.
MINTON, JUDGE, CONCURS.
KNOPF, JUDGE, CONCURS WITH SEPARATE OPINION.
KNOPF, JUDGE, CONCURRING:
I agree with most of the
reasoning and the result of the majority opinion.
But I write
separately because I do not agree that the third issue raised in
John’s appeal is not properly before this Court.
To the extent
that John sought reimbursement for health-insurance premiums
which he had paid prior to filing his motion, I agree that this
was an improper attempt to circumvent the final and unappealed
support order entered in 2002.
However, KRS 403.213 permits a party to move to
prospectively modify a support order.
While John’s pro se
motion was poorly drafted, he specifically requested a
modification of his support obligation prospectively as well as
retroactively.
Furthermore, when calculating a child-support
obligation, the child’s health insurance premium is added to the
total child-support obligation, which is then allocated
proportionally between the parents based on their respective
incomes.
When the court orders the non-custodial parent to pay
the child’s health insurance premium, the premium is subtracted
from the total amount of support owed by the non-custodial
parent.
KRS 403.211(7).
Thus, John had a reasonable basis to
-4-
argue that he may be entitled to an adjustment in his support
obligation to reflect the health-insurance premium which he pays
on behalf of his children.
Therefore, I disagree with the trial
court that John’s motion violated CR 11.
Nevertheless, any error by the trial court in this
regard did not affect John’s substantial rights.
Although the
trial court found that John violated CR 11, it declined to
impose any sanctions.
Moreover, John’s motion did not state any
grounds for prospectively modifying child-support.
He did not
attempt to show that his support obligation would be reduced by
more than 15% under a proper application of the child-support
guidelines.
KRS 411.213(2).
Furthermore, in its original
support order, the trial court deviated from the child-support
guidelines, reducing John’s child support obligation to account
for the nearly equal amount of custodial time granted to each
parent.
John was not entitled to an additional reduction in his
child-support to reflect the amount of the health insurance
premiums which he paid on behalf of the children.
Consequently,
I agree with the majority that the trial court did not err in
denying John’s motion to modify child support.
APPELLANT PRO SE
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
John P. Hollis, DVM
Frankfort, Kentucky
James L. Thomerson
Lexington, Kentucky
-5-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.