DAVID ALAN HARNISH v. BARBARA KAY HARNISH
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RENDERED:
FEBRUARY 25, 2005; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-002687-ME
DAVID ALAN HARNISH
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MASON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOHN W. MCNEILL, III, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 02-CI-00302
BARBARA KAY HARNISH
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART
VACATING AND REMANDING IN PART
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
SCHRODER, TAYLOR, AND VANMETER; JUDGES.
TAYLOR, JUDGE:
David Alan Harnish appeals from a September 24,
2003, judgment of the Mason Circuit Court dissolving their
sixteen-year marriage and awarding sole custody of the parties’
children to Barbara Kay Harnish.
We affirm in part, vacate and
remand in part.
David and Barbara were married May 2, 1987.
children were subsequently born of the marriage.
Three
Barbara
initiated the underlying action by filing a petition for legal
separation in the Mason Circuit Court.
The petition was later
amended to one for a decree of dissolution of marriage.
On
September 24, 2003, the circuit court entered “Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Judgment of Dissolution and Award of
Child Custody, Division of Property.”
Relevant to this appeal,
sole custody of the parties’ three children was awarded to
Barbara and visitation was granted to David.
David and Barbara subsequently filed motions to alter,
amend or vacate the judgment and David filed a motion for a new
trial.
Ky. R. Civ. P. (CR) 59.05 and CR 59.01.
David argued
the judgment was insufficient as it failed to make findings of
fact as required by CR 52.01.
By order entered November 24,
2003, the circuit court denied David’s motions.
This appeal
follows.
David first contends the circuit court erred by
failing to make findings of fact pursuant to CR 52.01 to support
its conclusion that an award of sole custody by Barbara was in
the best interest of the children.
Specifically, David argues
that the Court made no findings of fact regarding the best
interest of the children.
The standard of review applied by this Court when
reviewing a child custody determination is whether the circuit
court’s findings of fact are clearly erroneous.
Reichle v. Reichle, 719 S.W.2d 442 (Ky. 1986).
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CR 52.01;
CR 52.01
provides, in relevant part, that “[i]n all actions tried upon
the facts without a jury . . . the court shall find the facts
specifically and state separately its conclusions of law. . . .”
The language of CR 52.01 is mandatory.
Standard Farm Stores v.
Dixon, 339 S.W.2d 440 (Ky. 1960); Brown v. Shelton, _____ S.W.3d
_____ (Ky.App. 2005).
The reason for requiring the facts to be
found specifically is to provide the reviewing court with a
basis for understanding the circuit court’s “view of the
controversy.”
Richle, 719 S.W.2d at 444.
Furthermore, CR 52.01
clearly applies to child custody cases as findings of fact are
particularly important in custody determinations.
Id.
In the case sub judice, the circuit court made no
findings of fact to support the conclusion that it was “in the
best interest of the children” to award sole custody to Barbara.
Thus, we have no findings of fact to review.
As the circuit
court made no findings of fact to support its award of custody,
we vacate the award of sole custody to Barbara and remand for
the court to make specific findings of fact regarding the best
interest of the children in its awarding of custody consistent
with CR 52.01.1
David’s second contention is that the circuit court
abused its discretion by ordering that he have “standard
1
A review of the record reveals that the parties submitted a joint trial
memorandum wherein both requested an award of joint custody. We do not reach
the merits of the circuit court’s underlying custody determination.
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visitation.”
As we have vacated and remanded the circuit
court’s custody determination, we believe any issue as to
visitation is moot as the circuit court will necessarily have to
revisit the issue upon remand.
David’s third contention is that “awarding sole
custody of a child to one parent based upon the ‘best interest
of the child’ violates the disenfranchised parents’
constitutionally protected fundamental liberty interest in the
care, custody and control of their child.”
16.
Appellant’s Brief p.
David asserts that pursuant to Troxel V. Granville, 530
U.S. 57, 147 L. Ed. 49, 120 S. Ct. 2054 (2000), sole custody
cannot be awarded to a parent unless the other parent is unfit.
We believe Troxel is distinguishable.
The issue in
Troxel was whether a grandparent could be granted visitation
with a grandchild over the objection of a parent.
The facts of
Troxel are obviously distinguishable from the case sub judice
where parents are involved in a dissolution proceeding and an
award of sole custody is made.
We, thus, believe David’s
argument is without merit.
David’s fourth contention is that the circuit court
erred when it overruled his objection to hearsay testimony.
David asserts that Barbara testified to what the parties’
counselor had said to her.
Specifically, Barbara testified that
the counselor “basically informed me that she didn’t think she
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could counsel us.”
David contends that the statement was
offered for the truth of the matter asserted and that the
counselor was not called to testify.
Ky. R. Evid. (KRE) 801(c), states as follows:
‘Hearsay’ is a statement, other than one
made by the declarant while testifying at
the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to
prove the truth of the matter asserted.
We believe Barbara’s testimony constituted hearsay
under KRE 801.
Barbara failed to respond to this issue in her
brief, and we have not been cited to an applicable exception to
the hearsay rule.
Thus, we can only conclude the circuit court
erred by overruling David’s objection.
Upon remand, the circuit
court should not consider this hearsay testimony in rendering
its ruling.
David’s final contention is that the circuit court
erred by denying his motion to amend the judgment to include a
statement that Barbara was not pregnant.
David asserts that
such a statement is required under Kentucky Revised Statutes
403.150.
While David is technically correct, we note the
petition for a decree of dissolution was filed in January 2003
and the judgment was not entered until September 2003.
Neither
party has alleged that Barbara was pregnant when the petition
was filed or at any other time during the pendency of the
action, and the record has not been supplemented to reflect
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same.
Accordingly, we do not believe the circuit court
committed reversible error in failing to indicate whether
Barbara was pregnant.
See CR 61.01.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Mason
Circuit Court is affirmed in part, vacated in part and this
cause is remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this
opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT:
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE:
William D. Tingley
Louisville, Kentucky
Patrick E. Price
Suit, McCartney & Price, PLLC
Flemingsburg, Kentucky
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