CLARENCE T. HARPER v. KENTUCKY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
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RENDERED: APRIL 8, 2005; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-002447-MR
CLARENCE T. HARPER
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE REBECCA M. OVERSTREET, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 03-CI-03967
v.
KENTUCKY DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, JOHNSON, AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
SCHRODER, JUDGE:
Inmate Clarence T. Harper appeals from an
order of the Fayette Circuit Court denying his petition for
declaratory judgment requesting that, pursuant to House Bill 269
(H.B. 269), he be awarded credit towards his remaining unexpired
sentence for time spent on parole.
As Harper is not entitled to
credit under the provision at issue, we affirm.
In 1979 Harper was sentenced to 15 years’
imprisonment.
He was paroled, unsuccessfully, six times, in
1981, 1982, 1985, 1986, 1992, and 1997.
On three occasions, he
was convicted of new felonies, and for being a persistent felony
offender, increasing his total sentence by an additional fifteen
years.
On September 24, 2003, Harper filed a petition for
declaratory judgment in the Fayette Circuit Court, contending
that, pursuant to H.B. 269, he is entitled to have two periods
of time when he was paroled and had his parole revoked for
technical violations with no new felony charges, October 9, 1992
to May 16, 1996, and December 10, 1997 to May 1, 2000, credited
toward his remaining unexpired sentence.
Harper’s petition.
The trial court denied
This appeal followed.
KRS 439.344, “Effect of parole time on sentence”,
provides that “[t]he period of time spent on parole shall not
count as a part of the prisoner’s maximum sentence except in
determining parolee’s eligibility for a final discharge from
parole as set out in KRS 439.354.”
However, in 2003 the General
Assembly passed a state budget bill, H.B. 269, which contained
the following provision:
36.
COMMUNITY SERVICES AND LOCAL FACILITIES
a. Probation and Parole Credit:
Notwithstanding KRS 439.344, the period of
time spent on parole shall count as a part
of the prisoner’s remaining unexpired
sentence, when it is used to determine a
parolee’s eligibility for a final discharge
from parole as set out in KRS 439.354, or
when a parolee is returned as a parole
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violator for a violation other than a new
felony conviction.
2003 Ky. Acts, Ch. 156, Part IX, item 36(a), p. 1876.
H.B. 269
was vetoed in part on March 20, 2003, became law on March 23,
2003, without the Governor’s signature, and the Governor’s
vetoes were overridden in part on March 25, 2003.
Acts, Vol II, p. 1912.
See 2003 Ky.
The veto and veto overrides did not
affect the provision at issue in this case.
Id.
The bill did
not permanently change the relevant statutes on parole.
See
Com. ex rel. Armstrong v. Collins, 709 S.W.2d 437 (Ky. 1986)
(General Assembly may suspend or modify existing statutes in a
budget bill).
See also, KRS 446.145.
As an appendix to his brief, Harper attaches a letter
from the Department of Corrections which states that “HB 269 was
effective April 1, 2003 and will remain in effect until June 30,
2004.
Only parolees who have their parole revoked after April
1, 2003 are eligible for Supervision Credit.”1
On appeal, Harper
contends that H.B. 269 creates a liberty interest for all
Kentucky prisoners, and that the Department of Corrections
interpretation, that H.B. 269 applies solely to prisoners whose
parole was revoked after April 1, 2003, conflicts with the
1
H.B. 269 was the budget bill for July 1, 2002 through June 30, 2004. See
2003 Ky. Acts, Vol. II, p. 1723. We note that the effective date cited by
the Department of Corrections, April 1, 2003, is not apparent from the
language of the bill, however, Harper does not dispute this date. The bill
apparently became law at some point on or after March 23, 2003, see 2003 Ky.
Acts, Vol. II, p. 1912, and would expire as of the expiration date of the
bill, June 30, 2004. See 2003 Ky. Acts, Vol. II, p. 1723; KRS 48.310.
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legislative intent of easing prison overcrowding and saving the
state money.
Harper contends that because H.B. 269 is remedial
and procedural in nature, and expressly states that “the period
of time spent on parole shall count . . .”, that it should be
interpreted as applying retroactively to any and all time spent
on parole which qualify under its provisions.
While a statute should be construed to carry out the
intent of the legislature, see KRS 446.080(1), KRS 446.080(3)
states that “[n]o statute shall be construed to be retroactive,
unless expressly so declared.”
The provision at issue in H.B.
269 contains no express declaration of retroactivity.
Remedial
or procedural statutes can be retroactively applied in the
absence of an express declaration of retroactive application if
consistent with the legislative intent.
S.W.2d 900 (Ky. 1997).
Spurlin v. Adkins, 940
However, the provisions of a budget bill
are only effective for the time period of the budget.
48.310.
See KRS
We believe that if the General Assembly intended to
provide a remedial statute, it would have permanently amended
KRS 439.344 instead of providing a temporary suspension of the
statute through the budget bill.
Accordingly, we conclude that
H.B. 269 was not intended to be retroactive.
The law in effect
at the time of Harper’s parole revocations at issue (1997 and
2000) was KRS 439.344, under which he is not entitled to receive
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credit towards his remaining unexpired sentence for time spent
on parole.
Harper further contends that the Department of
Corrections interpretation of H.B. 269 violates the prohibition
against double jeopardy and his right to equal protection.
From
our review of the record, it appears that Harper failed to
comply with KRS 418.075 by notifying the Attorney General of
these constitutional challenges.
Accordingly, we will not
address these issues on appeal.
For the aforementioned reasons, the Fayette Circuit
Court’s denial of Harper’s petition for declaratory judgment is
affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Clarence T. Harper, Pro Se
Lexington, Kentucky
Brenn O. Combs
Frankfort, Kentucky
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