RONNIE LEE BOWLING v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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NOVEMBER 23, 2005; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-002339-MR
RONNIE LEE BOWLING
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM ROCKCASTLE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ROBERT E. GILLUM, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 89-CR-00027
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER, KNOPF, AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
BARBER, JUDGE:
On February 25, 1989, Appellant, Ronnie Lee
Bowling, entered the Quality Sunoco owned by Ricky Smith in
Rockcastle County and began asking Mr. Smith about possible
employment.
Mr. Smith explained to Appellant that only one
person ran the store each shift and currently no openings were
available.
the spring.
Mr. Smith asked the Appellant to inquire again in
The dispute in this case arises as to what occurred
after the above described exchange.
Appellant contends that Mr. Smith began acting
strangely and opened fire upon him in the store, hitting him
twice.
Appellant then fled the store, whereupon Mr. Smith fired
at him once more, but missed.
Appellant testified he fled in an
effort to get home to his wife out of fear for losing his life
due to his injuries.
The Commonwealth’s position is that Appellant first
opened fire on Mr. Smith and Mr. Smith returned fire in selfdefense and struck Appellant.
After Appellant fled the store,
Mr. Smith fired once more in an attempt to flatten one of
Appellant’s tires, but missed.
Mr. Smith then called the
authorities and a police chase commenced shortly thereafter.
At the end of the pursuit, Appellant was immediately
arrested and later indicted on April 28, 1989, for the attempted
murder of Ricky Smith.
His trial commenced on February 27,
1996, and ended the following day.
Mr. Smith and Appellant each
testified at trial as to what occurred that day.
Appellant was
convicted for attempted murder and subsequently sentenced to
twenty years’ imprisonment.
At the time of his Rockcastle County trial, Appellant
was on death row for two Laurel County murder convictions which
occurred in connection with service station robberies.
Bowling
v. Commonwealth, 942 S.W.2d 293 (Ky. 1997), cert. denied,
Bowling v. Kentucky, 522 U.S. 986, 118 S.Ct. 451, 139 L.Ed.2d
-2-
387 (1997).
The Appellant’s trial in Laurel County took place
in September and October 1992 with sentencing in December of
that same year.
Following his Rockcastle County trial, Appellant filed
a direct appeal in this matter to the Kentucky Supreme Court.
The appeal contained four claims for relief: (1) denial of
speedy trial; (2) claim of double jeopardy; (3) admission of
recorded testimony from the Laurel County trial; and (4) denial
of his petition for change of venue.
The Court issued an order
of remand on the issue of denial of speedy trial on December 18,
1997.
The Rockcastle Circuit Court had a hearing and issued an
order on the matter on March 5, 1998.
Following that order, the
Supreme Court considered the appeal in its entirety and affirmed
the Appellant’s conviction.
Bowling v. Commonwealth, case no.
96-SC-442, (October 15, 1998).
Appellant then filed a Petition
for Rehearing which was denied on January 21, 1999.
Appellant filed his first RCr 11.42 motion on January
22, 2002.
A “corrected” copy was filed on February 5, 2002.
On
May 3, 2002, Appellant filed a motion to Amend his Motion to
Vacate, Set Aside, or correct Sentence Pursuant to RCr 11.42.
At the same time, Appellant tendered an Amended RCr 11.42
motion.
On September 23, 2002, Appellant filed a motion for
Leave of the Court to Amend Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or
Correct Sentence Pursuant to RCr 11.42.
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Again at the same time,
Appellant tendered a Second Amended RCr 11.42 motion.
Various
responses and replies were filed in relation to these motions.
There were hundreds of pages of documents filed or tendered
relating to Appellant’s RCr 11.42 motion.
On June 16, 2003, the
Rockcastle Circuit Court issued an order denying the relief
requested under Appellant’s RCr 11.42 motion.
This order was
issued without an evidentiary hearing.
Appellant is appealing the June 16, 2003 order
claiming that he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his
RCr 11.42 motion and asserts seventeen arguments as grounds for
relief to support his position.
Appellant has asserted the
following: (1) twelve arguments based solely on ineffective
assistance of counsel, i.e. Strickland 1 errors; (2) three
arguments based on Strickland and/or Brady 2 violations; (3) an
argument based on prosecutorial misconduct; and (4) an argument
based upon an act of the court itself.
We will first determine
whether there were any Strickland violations as claimed by
Appellant.
I.
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.
The standards measuring ineffective assistance of
counsel have been established in Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); accord Gall v.
1
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674
(1984).
2
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963).
-4-
Commonwealth, 702 S.W.2d 37 (Ky. 1985).
Pursuant to Strickland,
in order to show ineffective assistance of counsel, the
defendant must show there is a reasonable probability that, but
for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.
Id. at 694, 466 U.S. 668.
A “reasonable probability” is defined as the probability
sufficient to undermine the confidence in the outcome.
Id.
It
is not enough for the defendant to show that the error by
counsel had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the
proceeding.
Id. at 693, 466 U.S. 668; accord Sanders v.
Commonwealth, 89 S.W.3d 380, 386, (Ky. 2002).
The defendant
must demonstrate that, absent the errors by trial counsel, there
is a reasonable probability that the jury would have reached a
different result.
Hodge v. Commonwealth, 116 S.W.3d 463, 468,
(Ky. 2003), cert. denied Hodge v. Kentucky, 541 U.S. 911, 124
S.Ct. 1619, 158 L.Ed.2d 258 (2004).
Strickland requires not optimal performance, but
reasonably effective performance.
478, 484, (6th Cir. 2001).
Fields v. Bagley, 275 F.3d
Counsel is strongly presumed to have
rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions
in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.
Strickland, supra 466 U.S. at 690.
A fair assessment of
attorney performance requires that every effort be made to
eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct
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the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to
evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.
Id. at 689, 466 U.S. 668.
The defendant must overcome the
presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action
might be considered sound trial strategy.
Id.
With these
principles to guide us, we shall now address each of the
ineffective assistance of counsel arguments raised by the
Appellant.
A.
Failure to Object to photo of Appellant. 3
Appellant claims ineffective assistance of counsel
when trial counsel failed to object to the admission of the
photo of Bowling since its potential prejudice far outweighed
its probative value.
The photograph is of Appellant crouched
down with a pistol lying on the countertop behind him.
The
trial transcript supports that trial counsel sufficiently
handled the issue of the photo of Bowling.
All parties,
including Appellant, were aware of this photo from the Laurel
County trial and that it would most likely be introduced into
evidence at the Rockcastle County trial.
In this instance, the
prosecutor stated that he would introduce this photograph if and
when Appellant testified.
The prosecutor made this statement in
chambers in the presence of Appellant, as well as trial counsel.
However, Appellant chose to take the stand, which is his right,
3
Appellant’s Argument II.
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to tell his side of the story.
Upon the Appellant taking the
stand, the prosecutor, as stated to Appellant in chambers,
introduced this photograph into evidence.
Also, we find it is
important to note that reasonableness of counsel’s actions may
be determined or substantially influenced by the defendant’s own
statements or actions.
Strickland, supra 466 U.S. at 691.
It is important to remember that just because another
attorney would have approached the situation differently does
not mean that Appellant’s trial counsel provided him ineffective
assistance of counsel.
Counsel is strongly presumed to have
rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions
in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.
690, 466 U.S. 668.
Id. at
It is our opinion Appellant fails to
overcome this presumption.
Trial counsel attempted to plant
seeds of doubt in the jury’s minds regarding the gun in the
background of the picture.
The simple fact that these seeds did
not grow does not mean trial counsel provided ineffective
assistance of counsel.
Trial counsel handled the situation
appropriately considering all the circumstances.
Even assuming trial counsel’s performance was
deficient we could not find that this failure to object
prejudiced the Appellant.
As explained earlier, it is not
enough to show some conceivable effect on the proceeding, rather
it must be shown that counsel’s errors were so serious that
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counsel deprived the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose
result is reliable.
Id. at 687, 466 U.S. 668.
Testimony was received from a defense witness, Ledford
Bowling, Sr., 4 as well as Appellant, that the two guns in the
photographs 5 were two different guns.
Based upon the record, we
are unable to find that trial counsel’s failure to object to the
admission of this photograph did not deprive Appellant of a fair
trial.
Hence, the Appellant has failed to prove the
requirements established by Strickland and the decision not to
object to the photograph’s admission does not rise to the level
of ineffective assistance of counsel.
B. Defense and Rebuttal Related to Two Pistols. 6 , 7
Appellant additionally argues the following in
relation to the defense and rebuttal presented on the two
pistols: (1) trial counsel failed to adequately investigate the
law and facts regarding the defense’s access to two pistols,
thus failing to present an adequate defense and rebuttal; and
(2) that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object,
request an admonition or limiting instruction, a continuance, or
a viewing of the two actual pistols once the prejudicial photo
4
Appellant’s father.
5
Commonwealth’s Exhibits 9 and 24.
6
Appellant’s Argument III.
7
Appellant’s Argument IV.
-8-
was admitted.
Appellant states that trial counsel should have
used Ky. CR 75.07(3) to gain access to the two pistols for the
Rockcastle County trial.
We agree with the Commonwealth that
this rule does not apply to trial at the circuit court level,
but rather at the appellate level.
We are unable to see how
Appellant can claim ineffectiveness of his counsel based upon
the non-use of a Kentucky Civil Procedure Rule that was
inapplicable to his Rockcastle County trial.
Appellant also argues that trial counsel should have
introduced a photograph of the two pistols side by side.
The
trial strategy urged by Appellant was utilized by his defense
counsel in his Laurel County trial and he was found guilty of
all charges in that matter.
As stated before, Strickland
requires not optimal performance, but reasonably effective
performance.
Fields, supra 275 F.3d at 484.
Trial counsel
chose not to introduce any additional photos of the second gun,
but did question Ledford Bowling, Sr., and Appellant about the
other gun.
The jury had testimony presented to it that there
were two different pistols.
It is not for this Court to
question why trial counsel chose the strategy it did, but rather
was Appellant prejudiced by it.
We believe that he was not,
because testimony was received that there were, in fact, two
different pistols and Appellant failed to prove that an
additional photo would have resulted in a reasonable probability
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that the jury’s decision would have differed.
S.W.3d at 468.
Hodge, supra 116
Therefore, neither element of Strickland has
been satisfied.
C.
Witness Preparation. 8
In relation to witness preparation, Appellant claims
trial counsel: (1) failed to adequately prepare Mr. Ledford
Bowling, Sr., for his testimony; (2) failed to request a short
recess to prepare Mr. L. Bowling for his testimony; or (3) to
adequately examine Mr. L. Bowling to elicit a key portion of the
defense rebuttal.
unpersuasive.
Again, we find Appellant’s argument
Mr. Ledford Bowling had testified in the Laurel
County trial on this same issue.
Also, trial counsel was aware
that there could be a possible issue with the guns, as evidenced
by trial counsel asking Mr. Ledford Bowling to leave during
Appellant’s testimony so that he could be called for rebuttal
purposes.
Trial counsel did, in fact, call Mr. Ledford Bowling
as a rebuttal witness.
We do not believe that trial counsel’s
performance in relation to this witness was deficient.
We also
do not see that trial counsel’s performance prejudiced
Appellant.
Appellant has not shown a reasonable probability
that additional prep time would have resulted in information
that may have caused a different result.
8
Appellant’s Argument V.
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Therefore, Appellant
has not proven the elements of a Strickland violation in
relation to this argument.
D.
Failure to Give Advice to Appellant About Testifying. 9
Appellant next argues that trial counsel failed to
advise Bowling that if he testified, the prosecutor would
introduce the prejudicial photo.
argument.
There is no merit in this
The trial transcript supports that Appellant and
trial counsel were informed by the prosecutor, while in
chambers, that the picture at issue would be utilized in some
manner, if and when Appellant took the stand.
This photograph
had been used in the Laurel County trial for similar purposes.
Trial counsel repeatedly advised the Appellant not to testify on
his own behalf in this trial as evidenced by the trial
transcript.
The trial court itself even explained to Appellant
that he was not required to testify.
Against his counsel’s
advice, Appellant chose to take the stand to testify and on
cross-examination the photograph was introduced.
Simply because
the Appellant chose not to adhere to the advice of his counsel
and testify does not make what occurred during his testimony
ineffective assistance of counsel.
The reasonableness of
counsel’s actions may be determined or substantially influenced
by the defendant’s own statements or actions.
466 U.S. at 691.
9
Strickland, supra
Following a review of Appellant’s testimony,
Appellant’s Argument VI.
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we believe trial counsel’s actions in this regard were neither
deficient nor resulted in prejudice towards Appellant.
Therefore, there is no Srickland violation in relation to this
issue.
E.
Expert Assistance and Roadside Gun. 10
Appellant next argues defense counsel was ineffective
for failing to investigate and requests expert assistance to
present the defense theory that it was impossible to know how
long the roadside gun had laid in the snow, and to consult an
independent expert to assist in challenging the state’s
ballistics evidence.
We note that Appellant omitted from his
Appellate Brief that Bob Foley testified for the defense in
relation to this very matter.
Mr. Foley testified he was riding
with David Gross along the road where the roadside gun was found
on the morning of February 25, 1989.
Mr. Foley testified that
during the drive, Mr. Gross threw out a .38 Smith & Wesson,
which is the same type of gun as the roadside pistol.
Mr. Gross
was unavailable as a witness because he was deceased at the time
of trial.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that had
an expert testified as to this matter, there is a reasonable
probability the outcome would have differed.
It is possible
that such expert assistance may have strengthened the case for
the Commonwealth.
10
The defendant must overcome the presumption
Appellant’s Argument IX.
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that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be
considered sound trial strategy.
689.
Strickland, supra 466 U.S. at
Appellant has failed to overcome this presumption
particularly since a different possibility of ownership of the
roadside gun was presented to the jury by the defense through
Mr. Foley.
Based on the surrounding circumstances, we believe
that trial counsel’s strategy in this matter was not deficient.
We also do not believe there was a sufficient probability that
such expert assistance would have undermined confidence in the
outcome.
Hence, we do not believe trial counsel’s acts in
relation to this matter prejudiced Appellant.
Therefore,
Appellant has failed to satisfy the elements of Strickland in
relation to this argument.
Appellant provides no argument as to consulting an
independent expert to assist in challenging the state’s
ballistics evidence.
only.
It is listed in the title of the argument
Therefore, we shall not address this issue because it is
not properly presented to this Court.
F.
Pro Se Motion to Discharge Counsel. 11
Appellant also argues that trial counsel provided
ineffective assistance of counsel when he failed to move the
trial court to conduct an inquiry or to hold a hearing on his
11
Appellant’s Argument XI.
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client’s motion to withdraw or discharge his appointed counsel,
Tim Despotes.
As the parties are aware, an RCr 11.42 motion is
limited to the issues that could not be raised on direct appeal.
An issue that could have been raised on direct appeal, but was
not, cannot be litigated in an RCr 11.42 motion by simply
claiming that it amounts to ineffective assistance of counsel.
Haight v. Commonwealth, 41 S.W.3d 436, 441, (Ky. 2001), cert.
denied 534 U.S. 998, 122 S.Ct. 471, 151 L.Ed.2d 386 (2001), see
also Sanborn v. Commonwealth, 975 S.W.2d 905 (Ky. 1998); Brown
v. Commonwealth, 788 S.W.2d 500 (Ky. 1990); and Stanford v.
Commonwealth, 854 S.W.2d 742 (Ky. 1993).
This is exactly what
the Appellant has tried to do in relation to this matter.
However, we will review the merits of Appellant’s argument.
This Pro Se motion was heard in chambers with
Appellant present.
Appellant said the request was made for the
reasons he wrote in his motion.
The detailed reasons in his Pro
Se motion were eight pages in length.
the motion.
The trial court overruled
The court stated:
”And I would cite for the record
it’s not the first time in this case
I’ve seen the situation of Mr. Bowling
on one hand personally or through an
attorney demanding a trial, and then at
the same time or near the same time
file a motion there’s been a conflict
with his lawyer or for his lawyer to
withdraw or taken some other steps that
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prevents the court from going ahead
with the trial. And it would seem now
at the same time he demands a speedy
trial he’s again, it’s like he wanted a
speedy trial, but not today.” The
court also stated its familiarity with
trial counsel and that his handling of
the case had not yet been deficient.
An attorney’s failure to request a hearing on whether
to remove him the morning of trial is not deficient.
We also
cannot see based on the judge’s reasoning that a different
result would have occurred had a hearing been held.
Hence,
there is no reasonable probability the outcome of the trial
would have changed following the hearing and trial counsel’s
actions did not prejudice Appellant.
Therefore, Appellant has
met neither requirement of Strickland.
G. Venue. 12
Appellant argues that trial counsel provided
ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to file an
updated/amended or new petition for change of venue including
new affidavits and examples of the prejudicial pretrial
publicity to reflect the current state of public opinion in
Rockcastle County at the time of trial and to produce evidence
in open court in support of the motion.
An issue raised on
direct appeal cannot be relitigated in an RCr 11.42 motion by
simply claiming that it amounts to ineffective assistance of
12
Appellant’s Argument XIII.
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counsel.
Haight, supra.
The issue of change of venue was
asserted by Appellant on direct appeal.
Bowling v.
Commonwealth, case no. 96-SC-442-MR, (October 15, 1998).
Therefore, we decline to relitigate this issue simply because
Appellant now claims ineffective assistance of counsel in
relation to that matter.
H.
Individual Sequestered Voir Dire. 13
Appellant also argues that trial counsel provided
ineffective assistance of counsel when he failed to move the
trial court for individual sequestered voir dire on the issues
of pretrial publicity, including the Laurel Circuit Court trial,
the murder convictions and the death sentences.
As correctly
noted by the Commonwealth, RCr 9.38 requires individual voir
dire in capital cases only.
However, RCr 9.38 does not preclude
counsel from requesting the same in other criminal trials.
a decision is at the discretion of each attorney.
Such
Based upon
the voir dire transcript, each juror was questioned related to
the pretrial publicity surrounding this matter.
Also, the
events at issue in this trial occurred in 1989 and the Laurel
County trial concluded in 1992.
began in 1996.
The Rockcastle County trial
It had been several years since the alleged
incidents had been in the forefront of the community’s mind.
Based on the foregoing, trial counsel’s failure to request
13
Appellant’s Argument XIV.
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individual voir dire did not render his performance deficient or
result in prejudice to Appellant.
Therefore, Appellant’s
argument fails to meet the standards established by Strickland.
I. Prosecutors Statements about Ricky Smith. 14
Appellant’s next argument is that counsel was
ineffective for failing to object to the prosecutor’s improper
vouching for witness Ricky Smith in voir dire and closing
argument, and stating his personal opinion that Bowling was
guilty.
Again, Appellant attempts to mask an argument that
should have been raised on direct appeal using RCr 10.26 under
an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
Despite the
procedural deficiency, we shall analyze Appellant’s argument.
We do not see that the statements made by the
prosecutor during voir dire concerning Ricky Smith constitute
improper vouching.
Mr. Smith was seated at the table to ensure
that no one on the jury panel knew him, which was explained to
the jury.
Because he was a key witness for the prosecution, we
do not believe that the prosecutor acted improperly.
We believe
that a failure to object to an act that was proper could not
result in deficient performance by trial counsel.
We also do
not believe that Appellant was prejudiced by trial counsel’s
actions.
In fact, Appellant’s right to a fair trial was
benefited by an assurance no member of the jury knew Mr. Smith.
14
Appellant’s Argument XV.
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Mr. Smith’s presence during voir dire ensured no one would sit
on the jury that had a favorable bias toward him.
In reference to the statements made by the prosecutor
during his closing argument, we believe there is no merit to
Appellant’s arguments.
The statements which Appellant refers to
are as follows: (1) “First of all, I would like to say on behalf
of Mr. Smith and his family, the Commonwealth of Kentucky who I
represent. . .”; (2) “We’re here today looking at Ricky Keith
Smith.
I suggest we look at him.
But if he hadn’t had some
blessings and some luck on February 25, 1989, he would have been
dead”; (3) “They say it’s a question of who to believe.
withstand the test.
We will
And we’ll stand here with him.”; (4) “He
[Appellant] was too scared to stop.
I believe that.
I don’t
believe it was because he was wanting to get home to his wife, I
believe it was because he knew that he had shot up the place
trying to kill a man. . .”; and (5) “Mr. Ricky Smith, who was
lucky enough, who was blessed enough on February 25 to survive
to be able to defend himself. . .”
We must determine whether the conduct was of such an
“egregious” nature as to deny the accused his constitutional
right of due process of law.
Slaughter v. Commonwealth, 744
S.W.2d 407, 411, (Ky. 1987), cert. denied, Slaughter v.
Kentucky, 490 U.S. 1113, 109 S.Ct. 3174, 104 L.Ed.2d 1036
(1989), (citing Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 94
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S.Ct. 1868, 40 L.Ed.2d 431 (1971)).
The required analysis, by
an appellate court, must focus on the overall fairness of the
trial, and not the culpability of the prosecutor.
Id. at 411-
412, (citing Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 102 S.Ct. 940, 71
L.Ed.2d 78 (1982)).
Great leeway is allowed to both counsel in
a closing argument.
Id. at 412.
Further, a prosecutor may
express his personal opinion of a defendant’s guilt as long as
that opinion is based on evidence in the case.
Id., (citing
Koonce v. Commonwealth, 452 S.W.2d 822 (Ky. 1970)).
In the first statement, the prosecutor was thanking
the jury as well as the court for their time during the trial
and he stated that he represented the Commonwealth.
The other
statements were the prosecutor’s own inferences based on the
evidence, which is appropriate.
Tamme v. Commonwealth, 973
S.W.2d 13, 39, (Ky. 1998), cert. denied, Tamme v. Kentucky, 525
U.S. 1153, 119 S.Ct. 1056, 143 L.Ed.2d 61 (1999), (citing Bills
v. Commonwealth, 851 S.W.2d 466 (Ky. 1993)).
The statements
made about Mr. Smith during prosecutor’s closing arguments are
not of an egregious nature.
Based on the foregoing, the prosecutor’s statement
about the Appellant’s guilt was based upon the evidence
presented by the Commonwealth and did not affect the overall
fairness of the trial.
There was no prosecutorial misconduct
for trial counsel to object to in relation to the closing
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argument.
Trial counsel should not be expected to object to an
act that was proper.
Trial counsel’s performance in relation to
Appellant’s argument was not deficient, nor did it result in any
type of prejudice to Appellant.
Therefore, Appellant has failed
to satisfy the Strickland elements with either of his arguments.
J. Prosecutor’s Closing Argument. 15
Appellant claims trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to object to the prosecutor’s closing argument,
containing “facts” not in evidence and misstatements of fact.
Appellant refers to several statements made by the prosecutor
about the pistols in the photos and Appellant’s wounds from
being shot by Mr. Ricky Smith.
Appellant again argues that
trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to a portion
of the prosecutor’s closing argument.
As stated earlier, this
should have been raised on direct appeal under RCr 10.26, but we
will again address Appellant’s arguments.
In closing remarks, a prosecutor may draw all
reasonable inferences from the evidence and propound his
explanation of the evidence.
(Ky. 1998).
Tamme, supra 973 S.W.2d at 39,
Upon a review of the record, the alleged
misstatements are more accurately characterized as
interpretations of the evidence.
Id., see also Stopher v.
Commonwealth, 57 S.W.3d 787, 806, (Ky. 2001), cert. denied,
15
Appellant’s Argument XVI.
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Stopher v. Kentucky, 535 U.S. 1059, 122 S.Ct. 1921, 152 L.Ed.2d
829 (2002).
It has been consistently held that opening and
closing arguments are not evidence and prosecutors have wide
latitude during both.
Stopher, supra 57 S.W.3d at 805-806.
The
prosecutor’s interpretations of the testimony and evidence
related to the guns and Appellant’s wounds during closing
arguments did not affect the overall fairness of the trial,
which is essential to proving prosecutorial misconduct.
Slaughter, supra 744 S.W.2d at 411-412.
Again, we are unable to
see how trial counsel would be deficient for failing to object
to a matter which does not meet the definition of prosecutorial
misconduct.
We also are unable to see how the failure to object
to proper conduct could result in prejudice toward Appellant.
Therefore, Appellant has failed to prove either of the elements
of Strickland.
K. Remand Hearing. 16
Appellant next argues trial counsel provided
ineffective assistance of counsel at the limited hearing on
remand when she failed to adequately investigate matters
relevant to the hearing, such as the court records pertaining to
the prosecutor’s schedule, and failed to controvert the
prosecutor’s unsupported assertions.
The counsel appointed for
the remand hearing differed from that of the original trial.
16
Appellant’s Argument XVII.
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As
stated earlier, an issue raised on direct appeal cannot be
relitigated in an RCr 11.42 motion by simply claiming that it
amounts to ineffective assistance of counsel.
Haight supra.
The timeliness issue was part of Appellant’s direct appeal,
which was remanded for a hearing by the Rockcastle County
Circuit Court.
Bowling v. Commonwealth, case no. 96-SC-442-MR,
(December 18, 1997).
A hearing was held on February 27, 1998,
with an order issued finding the delay in trial reasonable.
Subsequently, the Kentucky Supreme Court rendered a decision on
the direct appeal, including the timeliness issue, affirming
Appellant’s conviction.
Bowling v. Commonwealth, case no. 96-
SC-442-MR, (October 15, 1998).
It was held that the evidence
presented at the hearing was sufficient to support the trial
judge’s conclusion that the continuance was necessary and
reasonable.
Id.
The purpose of an RCr 11.42 proceeding is to review a
judgment and sentence for constitutional validity of the
proceedings prior to judgment or in the sentence and judgment
itself.
Harper v. Commonwealth, 978 S.W.2d 311, 318, (Ky.
1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1056, 119 S.Ct. 1367, 143 L.Ed.2d
527 (1999).
Therefore, we decline to relitigate this issue
simply because Appellant now claims ineffective assistance of
counsel in relation to this matter.
Despite the procedural
deficiency, Appellant’s argument is without merit.
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There is no
constitutional right to an attorney in state post-conviction
proceedings.
Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752, 111 S.Ct.
2546, 2566, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1990), accord T.Bowling v.
Commonwealth, 981 S.W.2d 545, 552, (Ky. 1998), cert. denied, T.
Bowling v. Kentucky, 527 U.S. 1026, 119 S.Ct. 2375, 144 L.Ed.2d
778 (1999).
Consequently, Appellant cannot claim
constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel in such
proceedings.
Id.
We would like to note that following a review
of the remand hearing transcript, we could not see that
counsel’s performance in relation to the remand hearing was
either deficient or prejudicial to Appellant.
Thus, even if we
could have made a ruling in relation to this argument, it would
not have satisfied the Strickland standard.
II. STRICKLAND AND/OR BRADY ERRORS.
The Appellant has three arguments in which he claims
Strickland and/or Brady errors.
The standards established by
Strickland have been analyzed ad nauseum in the foregoing
paragraphs; however, we have not yet discussed the elements of a
Brady violation.
The United States Supreme Court held that the
suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an
accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is
material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the
good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.
-23-
Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83, 87, 88 S.Ct. 1194, 1196-1197, 10 L.Ed.2d 215
(1963).
The evidence is material only if there is a reasonable
probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the
defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.
U.S. v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 3383, 87
L.Ed.2d 481 (1985).
A reasonable probability is the probability
sufficient to undermine the confidence in the outcome.
Id. at
682, 473 U.S. 667.
The duty to disclose such evidence is applicable even
though there has been no request by the accused.
U.S. v. Agurs,
427 U.S. 97, 107, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 2397, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976).
Further, Brady only applies to the discovery, after trial, of
information which had been known to the prosecution but unknown
to the defense.
Id. at 103, 427 U.S. 97.
In sum, there are
three components of a true Brady violation: (1) the evidence at
issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is
exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; (2) that evidence must
have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or
inadvertently; and (3) prejudice must have ensued.
Strickler v.
Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-282, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 1948, 144 L.Ed.2d
286 (1999).
With these guidelines, we will examine each
argument propounded by the Appellant for Strickland as well as
Brady violations.
-24-
A. Failure to Impeach. 17
Appellant claims that key prosecution witnesses were
not impeached, violating Strickland, Brady, or both.
Appellant
argues that a violation occurred when key prosecution witnesses,
Ricky Smith and James Smith, were not impeached.
According to
the trial transcript, trial counsel did point out several
inconsistencies in their testimony to the jury.
At that point,
it was for the jury to determine each witness’ credibility.
Simply because another attorney may have chosen an alternate
strategy does not make trial counsel’s performance deficient.
We believe trial counsel’s cross examination of these witnesses
did not prejudice the Appellant.
It is not sufficient to prove
that the additional information would have had a conceivable
effect on the outcome.
Strickland, supra 466 U.S. at 693.
All
Appellant’s arguments would have merit, if “conceivable effect”
were the appropriate measure.
Fortunately, it is not.
Appellant has failed to prove that had the jury received the
alleged prior inconsistent statements from the Laurel County
trial and police statements that there would be a reasonable
probability that the jury’s determination would have differed.
Therefore, the Appellant failed to establish either element of a
Strickland violation.
17
Appellant’s Argument I.
-25-
We are also unpersuaded that Appellant’s argument
supports a Brady violation.
It is true that impeachment
evidence falls within the Brady rule.
Bagley, supra 473 U.S. at
676, see also Giglio v. U.S., 405 U.S. 150, 154, 92 S.Ct. 763,
31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972).
However, as stated earlier, Brady only
applies to the discovery, after trial, of information which had
been known to the prosecution but unknown to the defense.
Agurs, supra 427 U.S. at 103.
The prior testimony of both Ricky
Smith and James Smith was available in the record from
Appellant’s Laurel County trial.
Brady does not require a
prosecutor to disclose information which is part of a public
record.
Sanborn v. Commonwealth, 892 S.W.2d 542, 556, (Ky.
1994), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 854, 116 S.Ct. 154, 133 L.Ed.2d 98
(1995).
The record from the Laurel County trial is obviously a
public record.
Hence, the prosecutor did not have a duty to
provide a trial transcript to trial counsel.
Appellant does not
make a specific argument that he failed to receive related
police reports, including witnesses’ statements, during
discovery and we will not speculate as to what occurred.
We
cannot see that either of these arguments fall under the scope
of Brady.
Therefore, we believe there is no Brady violation.
B. Gun Ownership of Ricky Smith. 18
18
Appellant’s Argument VIII.
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Appellant argues that because of errors under Brady,
Strickland, or both, the jury never learned that key prosecution
witness, Ricky Smith, owned a Smith & Wesson .38 caliber pistol.
According to the trial transcript, in chambers, trial counsel
commented that based on his theory of the case, the motion for
Ricky Smith’s criminal history was “probably not too relevant.”
We agree.
We are unable to see support for a Strickland
violation.
It must be demonstrated that, absent the errors by
trial counsel, there is a reasonable probability that the jury
would have reached a different result.
at 468.
Hodge supra 116 S.W.3d
It is not enough to argue that this information could
have had some sort of conceivable effect upon the jury.
Strickland, supra 466 U.S. at 693.
We believe this is exactly
the type of argument Appellant has proposed.
We do not believe
that proving ownership of a .38 Smith & Wesson by witness, Ricky
Smith, more than four years after the incident in February 1989
would result in a reasonable probability that the jury would
have reached a different result.
Trial counsel’s decision not
to inform the jury of this information is not deficient or
prejudicial towards Appellant.
Therefore, there is no
Strickland violation in relation to Appellant’s argument.
will now turn to Appellant’s Brady argument.
-27-
We
As stated earlier, Brady does not require a prosecutor
to disclose information which is part of a public record.
Sanborn, supra 892 S.W.2d at 556.
The information which
Appellant claims would have assisted him, a misdemeanor
conviction of Ricky Smith, was public record.
Because the
information in question does not fall within the Brady rule, we
are unable to find a Brady violation in this argument.
C. Evidence Collected at Quality Sunoco. 19
Appellant states that because of errors under Brady,
Strickland, or both, the defense could not effectively challenge
evidence collected at the Quality Sunoco, a critical aspect of
the state’s case.
An RCr 11.42 motion requires specificity that we are
unable to find in this argument.
Appellant does not argue what
type of information he believes was withheld by the prosecution
in this matter.
It seems as though he believes omitted
information exists even though he is not quite sure of its
identity.
Appellant’s entire argument appears to be based on
speculation.
Testimony was presented to the jury about the time
frames in which the investigation at the service station
occurred.
The prosecution cannot be under a Brady duty to
disclose information the Appellant merely believes to exist.
Also, as stated before, a conceivable effect on the outcome of a
19
Appellant’s Argument X.
-28-
proceeding is insufficient to support an ineffective counsel
claim.
Strickland, supra 466 U.S. at 693.
Therefore, we are
unable to see support for either a Brady or Strickland violation
in this argument.
III. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT. 20
Appellant claims that prosecutorial misconduct
rendered Bowling’s trial fundamentally unfair where the
Commonwealth’s unqualified agreement not to introduce the photo
was not honored.
The Commonwealth knew two real pistols
existed, but the defense was unprepared to introduce them, and
the Commonwealth misrepresented to the jury that only one pistol
existed.
It is presumed that Appellant intended this argument
to be based upon ineffective assistance of counsel when trial
counsel failed to object to the prosecutor’s comments made in
relation to the pistols during closing, since an allegation of
prosecutorial misconduct is proper for direct appeal.
With this
in mind, we will examine this argument and determine whether a
Strickland violation exists.
Upon a review of the record, the alleged misstatements
are more accurately characterized as interpretations of the
evidence.
Tamme, supra 973 S.W.2d at 39.
It has been
consistently held that opening and closing arguments are not
evidence and prosecutors have wide latitude during both.
20
Appellant’s Argument VII.
-29-
Stopher v. Commonwealth, 57 S.W.3d 787, 805-806, (Ky. 2001),
cert. denied 535 U.S. 1059, 122 S.Ct. 1921, 152 L.Ed.2d 829
(2002).
This did not affect the overall fairness of the trial,
which is essential to proving prosecutorial misconduct.
Slaughter supra 744 S.W.2d at 411-412.
Trial counsel was not
ineffective for failing to object to a matter which does not
meet the definition of prosecutorial misconduct.
As a result
trial counsel’s performance was reasonable and Appellant was not
prejudiced by the failure to object to a non-issue.
Therefore,
Appellant has failed to meet the elements established by
Strickland.
IV. FAILURE TO ACT BY THE COURT. 21
Appellant claims the trial court denied Ronnie Bowling
his Sixth Amendment right to counsel when the trial court failed
to conduct a sua sponte inquiry or to hold a hearing on
Bowling’s motion to withdraw or discharge his appointed counsel,
Tim Despotes.
This is very similar to the argument presented
earlier wherein Appellant claimed a Strickland error in relation
to this motion.
argument.
Then, as now, there is no support for that
The argument raised by the Appellant in relation to
the trial court was appropriate for direct appeal, not an RCr
11.42 motion.
Therefore, this argument is not properly before
the court and will not be considered.
21
Appellant’s Argument XII.
-30-
V. AMENDMENT OF RCR 11.42 MOTION.
Appellant argues he was entitled to amend his RCr
11.42 motion.
Appellant appeals the denial of a motion to amend
his RCr 11.42 motion by order of the Rockcastle Circuit Court
dated September 26, 2003.
According to the record, the original
order denying Appellant’s RCr 11.42 motion states the matter was
before the Court on the motion pursuant to RCr 11.42, 22 the
Defendant’s (i.e. Appellant) corrected copy of the motion to set
aside the Judgment, 23 and the Defendant’s second amended motion
to set aside the Judgment. 24
This order was issued on June 16,
2003, by Judge Venters, the trial judge.
On September 26, 2003, a different judge, Judge
Gillum, issued an order related to Appellant’s CR 59.05 motion
asking the Court to Alter, Amend or Vacate the judgment entered
on June 16, 2003, which denied his RCr 11.42 motion to Vacate,
Set Aside, or Correct Sentence overruling said motion.
Judge
Gillum also ruled on two previous motions related to Appellant’s
RCr 11.42 motions.
The Court specifically overruled Appellant’s
motion to Amend Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence
22
The original RCr 11.42 motion was filed on January 22, 2002.
23
The “corrected” copy of the motion was filed February 5, 2002.
24
The “second amended” motion was tendered September 23, 2002.
-31-
pursuant to RCr 11.42 filed May 3, 2002, 25 as well as Appellant’s
motion for Leave of Court to Amend Motion to Vacate, Set Aside,
or Correct Sentence pursuant to RCr 11.42 filed September 23,
2002. 26
The September 26, 2003 order contradicts what the June
16, 2003 order states it considered before it rendered its
decision.
The record is unclear as to whether on June 16, 2003
the Court did consider the very documents not allowed to be
filed per the September 23, 2003 order.
In the interest of
judicial economy, we will assume that the Appellant was not
allowed to file any amendments other than his “corrected” copy
that was filed on February 5, 2002.
The Kentucky Supreme Court held in Baze v.
Commonwealth, 23 S.W.3d 619, 623, (2000), cert. denied , Baze v.
Kentucky, 531 U.S. 1157, 121 S.Ct. 1109, 148 L.Ed.2d 979 (2001),
that an RCr 11.42 motion must be filed in an expeditious manner
and is subject to amendment, if appropriate, with leave of
court.
Further, a trial court’s ruling on a motion to amend
will not be disturbed on appeal unless there has been a clear
abuse of discretion.
T. Bowling, supra 981 S.W.2d at 548,
(citing Graves v. Winer, 351 S.W.2d 193 (Ky. 1961)).
Appellant
had three years to file his RCr 11.42 motion with the court.
25
Appellant also tendered Movant’s Amended Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or
Correct Sentence Pursuant to RCr 11.42 on May 3, 2002.
26
Appellant also tendered Movant’s Second Amended Motion to Vacate, Set
Aside, or Correct Sentence Pursuant to RCr 11.42 on September 23, 2002.
-32-
The first amendment request was made nearly three months after
the original motion was filed and the second amendment request
was made more than seven months after the original motion was
filed.
None of the motions to amend in the record contain any
reason for the delay in presenting the new arguments.
Based on
the record, we believe there was no abuse of discretion in
disallowing Appellant to twice amend his RCr 11.42 motion months
after filing his “corrected” motion.
Notwithstanding our
finding of no abuse of discretion, in the interest of judicial
economy we will review the five additional claims that were
contained in said motions and that are presented in this appeal.
A. Amended Claim I:
Because of Strickland errors, the jury never learned that the
Commonwealth attributed two different serial numbers to the
roadside gun.
The Appellant concedes in his brief that Sgt.
Biggerstaff testified in the Laurel County trial that the serial
number on one of his typewritten reports was incorrect and his
handwritten report was correct.
His testimony at the Laurel
County trial was that the serial number to the roadside gun had
a serial number consistent with that used in his handwritten
report.
The Laurel County trial resulted in a conviction
despite this information.
Trial counsel’s failure to use a
tactic that was unsuccessful in a prior trial is reasonable.
Further, it has not been demonstrated that Appellant suffered
-33-
any prejudice as a result of not having this information
presented to the jury.
The Appellant has failed to prove that
there is a reasonable probability that the jury’s finding would
have differed with this information.
It is more likely that had
Sgt. Biggerstaff been asked about the two different serial
numbers, he would again testify that the typewritten report
contained the error.
Therefore, Appellant has failed to satisfy
the elements of Strickland in relation to this argument.
Appellant also asserts issues related to the chain of
custody of the roadside gun.
According to the trial transcript,
the chain of custody was established through Commonwealth
witnesses Sgt. Biggerstaff and Det. Lewis.
This argument is
purely speculative in nature because Appellant fails to
specifically state what information related to the chain of
custody of the gun would have assisted him and how.
This
argument is without merit and fails to rise to the level of a
Strickland violation because the information was presented to
the jury.
B. Amended Claim II:
Trial Counsel was Ineffective for Failing to Investigate and
Present Readily Available Evidence to Corroborate Ronnie
Bowling’s Defense and Trial Testimony. Specifically, Photos
Showing How Bowling Looked After Ricky Smith Shot Him in the
Head.
We do not believe trial counsel’s performance was
deficient in failing to introduce evidence which may have had a
-34-
negative effect on his client.
After a review of the photos at
issue, we find trial counsel’s choice not to introduce such
photos was reasonable.
Such photos would have been open to
interpretation by each member of the jury.
Because of this, it
is possible that those photos may have actually harmed
Appellant’s defense.
Trial counsel’s performance was not
deficient in this regard.
We also do not see that the failure
to submit these photos resulted in prejudice to the Appellant.
As stated earlier, it is possible the admission of the photo
could have done more harm than good.
Therefore, we are unable
to find a Strickland error in relation to these photos.
C. AMENDED CLAIM III:
The Commonwealth Withheld Exculpatory Photos of Ronnie Bowling
Showing How He Appeared After Ricky Smith Shot Him In the Head
and Used the “Wound Locator” to Cast Bowling’s Injuries In a
False Light.
We would like to note that the prior amended claim
referred to these same photos as being “readily available.”
Despite that statement, we will determine whether there was a
Brady violation in relation to these photos.
Appellant contends
that the photos were in the custody of the London State Police
Post.
The Brady rule does encompass evidence known only to
police investigators and not to the prosecutor.
Stickler v.
Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280-281, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 144 L.Ed.2d 286
(1999).
The individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any
-35-
favorable evidence known to the others acting on the
government’s behalf in a case, including the policy.
Id. at
281, 527 U.S. 263, (citing Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437,
115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995)).
With this in mind, we will determine whether the three
components of a true Brady violation were met.
We cannot say
for certain that the photos were favorable to the accused.
It
is also unclear whether this evidence was suppressed by the
State, especially since Appellant referred to it earlier as
“readily available.”
Assuming arguendo that both of these
requirements were met, the Appellant still cannot meet the
requirement that prejudice ensued.
As stated in the preceding
argument, it is probable that these photos could have had a
detrimental effect upon the Appellant because of the jurors own
interpretations as to the severity of Appellant’s wounds.
Appellant failed to prove that there is a reasonable probability
that the jury decision would have differed upon submission of
this evidence.
Therefore, we are unable to see a Brady
violation in this argument.
D.
Amended Claim IV:
Trial Counsels Failure to Obtain Readily Available Information
about Weather Conditions in Mount Vernon in February of 1989,
and to Provide That Information to a Firearms Expert.
This is a factual amendment of Appellant Argument IX
which claimed that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
-36-
investigate and request expert assistance related to the
roadside gun.
Even with this additional allegation, we are
unable to substantiate a Strickland violation for the same
reasons stated earlier.
E.
AMENDED CLAIM V:
Trial Counsel Provided Ineffective Assistance of Counsel When
He Failed to Investigate an Exculpatory Explanation for
Bowling’s Flight From the Gas Station and Police Pursuit,
Specifically Bowling’s Medical History, Including a Broken
Neck in 1985 Resulting from a Truck Accident, and Failed to
File a Motion to Obtain Funds to Retain the Services of an
Independent Defense Neuropsychologist or Comparable Expert to
Evaluate Bowling to Determine Whether He Suffered from PTSD or
Organic Brain Injury at the Time of the Charged Offenses.
Defense counsel has an affirmative duty to make a
reasonable investigation for mitigating evidence or to make a
reasonable decision that a particular investigation is not
necessary.
Strickland, supra 466 U.S. at 691.
The
reasonableness of counsel’s investigation depends on the
circumstances of the case.
Id.
In the instant case, Appellant
does not state how these alleged injuries may have changed the
result of his trial.
Based upon the circumstances, it was reasonable for
trial counsel to decide not to pursue investigation into
Appellant’s mental health at the time of the alleged criminal
act.
It was just as possible that evidence into Appellant’s
mental condition may have proven beneficial to the Commonwealth.
Trial counsel’s performance was not deficient, nor can it be
-37-
substantiated that this decision prejudiced the client,
especially since there has been no mention of what evidence they
hoped to secure using an expert.
Therefore, Appellant has
failed to establish the elements of Strickland.
Lack of an RCr 11.42 Evidentiary Hearing.
This entire appeal is based upon the trial court’s
failure to hold an evidentiary hearing on Appellant’s RCr 11.42
motion.
An RCr 11.42 movant is not automatically entitled to an
evidentiary hearing.
Stanford v. Commonwealth, 854 S.W.2d 742,
743, (Ky. 1993), cert. denied 510 U.S. 1049, 114 S.Ct. 703, 126
L.Ed.2d 669 (1994), (citing Skaggs v. Commonwealth, 803 S.W.2d
573 (Ky. 1990), cert. denied 502 U.S. 844, 112 S.Ct. 140, 116
L.Ed.2d 106 (1991)).
It is settled that a movant under RCr
11.42 is not entitled to a hearing if his motion on its face
does not allege facts which, if true, render the judgment void.
Maggard v. Commonwealth, 394 S.W.2d 893, 894, (Ky. 1965),
(citing Maye v. Commonwealth, 386 S.W.2d 731 (Ky. 1965)).
In
other words, if the record refutes the claims of error, there is
no basis for granting an RCr 11.42 motion.
Stanford, supra 854
S.W.2d at 743, (citing Glass v. Commonwealth, 474 S.W.2d 400,
401, (Ky. 1971)).
Based on the foregoing paragraphs, we were
unable to substantiate any of alleged errors proposed by the
Appellant based upon the record.
The record refuted each error.
-38-
Therefore, there was no basis for holding an evidentiary hearing
on the RCr 11.42.
For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the
Rockcastle Circuit Court’s denial of Bowling’s RCr 11.42 motion.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Susan M.J. Martin
Assistant Public Advocate
Owensboro, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Ian G. Sonego
Assistant Attorney General
Susan Roncarti Lenz
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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