DARRELL TYRONE LAWSON v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY and CURTIS LAWSON v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
DECEMBER 22, 2005; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-002269-MR
DARRELL TYRONE LAWSON
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM WHITLEY CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE PAUL E. BRADEN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 00-CR-00115
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
AND
APPELLEE
NO. 2004-CA-000286-MR
CURTIS LAWSON
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM WHITLEY CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE PAUL E. BRADEN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 00-CR-00115
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART, REVERSING IN PART AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUIDUGLI, MINTON AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE:
Curtis Lawson and Darrell Tyrone Lawson were
tried jointly following the death of Curtis’s eighteen-month-old
child in a single car accident.
Both Curtis and Darrell alleged
that the other was the driver of the car at the time of the
fatal accident.
Following a jury trial, both Curtis and Darrell
were found guilty of second-degree manslaughter and sentenced to
five years imprisonment.
In that we believe the jury
instructions were fatally flawed, we reverse both convictions.
Curtis Lawson is Darrell’s uncle.
On November 8,
2000, they decided to go riding in Curtis’s Ford Bronco.
took Curtis’s eighteen-month-old son with them.
They
Over the course
of several hours, they drove around and stopped and talked with
several people.
time.
Apparently they were both drinking during this
Around 8:00 p.m. that night, the car left the road and
struck a tree.
While neither of the adults was seriously
injured, the baby suffered severe head trauma and died.
Testimony relating to the events of that evening
varied greatly.
Curtis claimed Darrell was driving at the time
of the accident and left the scene immediately thereafter.
Darrell alleged
Curtis was driving and asked Darrell to go get
the child’s mother after the accident.
Darrell stated that
Curtis “flagged” down a car and asked the driver to give Darrell
a ride.
After the accident the baby and Curtis were taken to
the hospital in Jellico, Tennessee, where the child was
pronounced dead at 10:02 p.m.
Curtis was treated for minor
injuries and cooperated with the investigation by giving a
statement and submitting to a blood alcohol test.
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The blood
alcohol analysis revealed Curtis had a blood alcohol level of
.15.
As part of the police investigation, the police went to
Darrell’s residence and found him to be sleeping.
He was then
taken to police headquarters for questioning and he submitted to
a urine test.
The result of his urine analysis revealed an
alcohol level of .06 but also showed he had marijuana in his
system.
Following the police investigation, the case was
submitted to the Whitley County Grand Jury.
On December 11,
2000, the grand jury indicted Darrell on the charge of murder
alleging that he operated a motor vehicle in a wanton manner
which cased the death of Aaron Ray Lawson (Curtis’s eighteenmonth-old son).
The grand jury also returned an indictment
against Curtis for criminal complicity to commit murder.
The
indictment alleged that Curtis had a legal duty to prevent
Darrell from driving that night and his failure to act resulted
in the death of his son.
Almost a year later, on November 16, 2001, the
Commonwealth moved to amend the indictment and switch the
charges as to both Curtis and Darrell.
The motion alleged that
based upon further investigation and upon DNA blood test
results, Curtis was the driver at the time of the accident and
Darrell was the passenger.
Despite Curtis’s objection, the case
was eventually set for a jury trial on July 29, 2003, with
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Curtis facing the wanton murder charge and Darrell being charged
with criminal complicity to commit murder.
Also, prior to the
beginning of the trial, several additional motions were filed by
defense counsel to suppress evidence, limit evidence, exclude
evidence, and/or dismiss the charges.
The motions were denied
and the trial proceeded.
At trial, the evidence as to who was driving, Curtis
or Darrell, was contradictory.
There was no question that the
two were together that evening and drinking and driving around
with the child in the back seat of the Bronco.
But who was
actually driving, how the accident occurred, what the injuries
each sustained indicated and what Darrell and Curtis had told
other people after the accident was greatly contested.
Following all the testimony, it appears that the Commonwealth
and the court could not clearly decide this issue as can be
evidenced by the jury instructions presented to the jury.
As to
Curtis and Darrell, the court instructed the jury that it could
find each of them guilty of wanton murder, complicity to wanton
murder, second-degree manslaughter, reckless homicide or
criminal facilitation to wanton murder.
The jury found both
Curtis and Darrell guilty of second-degree manslaughter and
recommended a sentence of five years each.
The court denied a
motion filed by both defendants for a new trial, and following a
pre-sentence investigation, entered final judgment and sentence
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on September 10, 2003.
Each party thereafter filed an appeal
and the two appeals have been consolidated by this Court.
On appeal, each party alleges the trial court erred in
regards to the jury instructions submitted in the case and each
party argues several alleged errors specific to his case.
We
shall address the jury instruction issue first and the
individual claims thereafter only if necessary.
The following
jury instructions were given as to Curtis after the necessary
introduction and definitions:
INSTRUCTION NO. 4
COMPLICITY TO WANTON MURDER
OR MURDER
You will find the Defendant Curtis
Lawson guilty of Complicity to Wanton Murder
under this Instruction if, and only if, you
believe from the evidence beyond a
reasonable doubt all of the following:
A.
That in Whitley County on or about
the 8th day of November, 2000 and
before the finding of the
Indictment, Darrell Tyrone Lawson
killed Aaron Ray Lawson by driving
a vehicle while he was intoxicated
at an excessive rate of speed
and/or in a reckless manner such
that he lost control of the
vehicle causing the death of Aaron
Ray Lawson.
B.
That in so doing, Darrell Tyrone
Lawson was wantonly engaging in
conduct which created a grave risk
of death to another and thereby
caused the death of Aaron Ray
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Lawson under circumstances
manifesting an extreme
indifference to human life.
C.
That the defendant, Curtis Lawson,
was the father of Aaron Ray Lawson
AND
D.
That at the time of Aaron Ray
Lawson’s death, the Defendant,
Curtis Lawson, was acting wantonly
or recklessly with respect to the
risk that Darrell Tyrone Lawson
would inflict death or injury upon
Aaron Ray Lawson and failed to
make an effort reasonable under
the circumstances to protect Aaron
Ray Lawson from such harm.
OR
A.
That in Whitley County on or bout
November 8, 2000, and before the
finding of the indictment herein,
he killed Aaron Ray Lawson by
driving a vehicle while he was
intoxicated at an excessive rate
of speed and/or in a reckless
manner such that he lost control
of the vehicle causing the death
of Aaron Ray Lawson.
B.
That in so doing, he was wantonly
engaging in conduct which created
a grave risk of death to another
and thereby caused the death of
Aaron Ray Lawson under
circumstances manifesting an
extreme indifference to human
life.
INSTURCTION NO. 5
SECOND-DEGREE MANSLAUGHTER
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If you do not find the Defendant guilty
under Instruction No 4, you will find the
Defendant guilty of Second-Degree
Manslaughter under this Instruction if, and
only if, you believe from the evidence
beyond a reasonable doubt all of the
following:
A.
That in this county on or about 8th
day of November, 2000 and before
the findng of the Indictment
herein, he killed Aaron Ray
Lawson:
AND
B.
That in so doing, he was acting
wantonly as that term is defined
under Instruction No. 3.
INSTRUCTION NO. 6
RECKLESS HOMICIDE
If you do not find the Defendant guilty
under Instruction No. 4 or 5, you will find
the Defendant guilty of Reckless Homicide
under this Instruction if, and only if, you
believe from the evidenced beyond a
reasonable doubt all of the following:
A.
That in this county on or about
the 8th day of November, 2000, and
before the finding of the
Indictment herein, he killed Aaron
Ray Lawson by driving a vehicle
while he was intoxicated at an
excessive rate of speed and/or in
a reckless manner such that he
lost control of the vehicle;
AND
B.
That in so doing, he was acting
recklessly as that term is defined
in Instruction No. 3.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 7
CRIMINAL FACILITATION OF WANTON MURDER
If you do not find the Defendant guilty
under Instruction No. 4, 5, or 6, you will
find the Defendant guilty of Criminal
Facilitation of Wanton Murder under this
Instruction, if and only if, you believe
from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt
all of the following:
A.
That in this county, on or about
November 8, 2000, and before the
finding of the Indictment herein,
he solicited Darrell Tyrone Lawson
to drive a 1985 Ford Bronco;
B.
That Darrell Tyrone Lawson
wantonly intended to drive said
vehicle, with the said Darrell
Tyrone Lawson being in a drunken
state;
C.
That when the Defendant Curtis
Lawson solicited Darrell Tyrone
Lawson to drive said vehicle, the
Defendant Curtis Lawson knew or
should have known that the said
Darrell Tyrone Lawson’s drunken
state could reasonable result in
the death of the victim herein,
Aaron Lawson, or some other member
of the public;
AND
D.
That Darrell Tyrone Lawson
thereafter wantonly killed Aaron
Lawson by running his vehicle off
a public highway.
Darrell’s jury instructions were similar with the obvious
exception that Darrell’s name and actions/duties were inserted
where Curtis’s was and vice versa.
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From a quick review of the
instructions, it becomes clear that the court had decided that
the jury should determine who was driving the vehicle at the
time of the accident and who was the passenger.
It is also
obvious that under the manslaughter instruction no method of
committing the criminal activity was stated.
on this.
The jury picked up
It sent a note to the court asking the following:
Can we give both defendants seconddegree manslaughter[?] Instruction #4 for
Darrell Lawson does not specify that he was
the driver[.] Instruction #5 for Curtis
Lawson does not specify that he was the
driver[.]
The court could not answer the inquiry and the jury was
instructed it had to rely upon the instructions as given.
Ultimately, the jury found both defendants guilty of
manslaughter second degree.
While we do not fault the jury for
reaching its conclusions, we do believe the instruction to be so
erroneous as to mandate reversal for each defendant.
By failing to require the jury to make a finding of
the specific act or acts engaged in by Curtis and Darrell that
form each defendant’s criminal culpability, the instructions
erroneously permitted the jury to not reach the main issue of
this case – who was actually driving the Bronco at the time of
the fatal crash.
A review of 1 Cooper, Kentucky Instructions to
Juries, (Criminal), clearly shows that each sample instruction
includes a blank space in which the instructing court is to
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supply the method utilized by the defendant to carry out the
criminal act.
Defining the method of action undertaken by a
defendant is essential to insuring that each and every element
of a criminal offense is fulfilled as well as assuring that the
proper degree of criminal culpability is achieved.
In Elliott
v. Commonwealth, 1 the Kentucky Supreme Court addressed the
homicide statutes and held:
The penal code defines two degrees of
intentional homicide, viz: intentional
murder and first-degree manslaughter; and
three degrees of unintentional homicide,
viz: wanton murder, second-degree
manslaughter and reckless homicide. Each
offense requires proof that the defendant
committed an act which caused the death at
another person. The degree of the offense
depends upon the state of mind, or mens rea,
of the defendant at the time of the act.
Intentional murder requires “an intent to
cause the death of another person,” KRS
507.020(1)(a); whereas first-degree
manslaughter requires either “an intent to
cause the death of another person,” but
while acting under extreme emotional
disturbance, KRS 507.030(1)(b), or “an
intent to cause serious physical injury to
another person,” though the act nevertheless
caused that person’s death. KRS
507.030(1)(a). Second-degree manslaughter
requires proof that the defendant “wantonly
cause[d] the death of another person.” KRS
507.040. Wanton murder requires proof that
the defendant “cause[d] the death of another
person” by “wantonly engag[ing] in conduct”
creating a grave risk of death to another
person under circumstances manifesting
extreme indifference to human life. KRS
507.020(1)(b). Reckless homicide requires
1
976 S.W.2d 416, 418 (Ky. 1998).
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proof that the defendant “with recklessness
... cause[d] the death of another person.”
KRS 507.050.
Under the amended indictment, Curtis was charged with murder
under KRS 507.020.
Pursuant to KRS 507.020(1)(b), a person is
guilty of murder when:
(b)
Including, but not limited to, the
operation of a motor vehicle under
circumstances manifesting extreme
indifference to human life, he wantonly
engages in conduct which creates a
grave risk of death to another person
and thereby causes the death of another
person.
However, a similar and lesser included offense is manslaughter
in the second degree, KRS 507.040(10(a), which states:
(1)
A person is guilty of manslaughter in
the second degree when he wantonly
causes the death of another person,
including, but not limited to,
situations where the death results from
the person’s:
(a) Operation of a motor vehicle[.]
The commentary following KRS 507.040 explains the distinction
between KRS 507.020 and KRS 507.040 as to a death caused due to
the wanton operation of a motor vehicle.
part,
COMMENTARY
KENTUCKY CRIME COMMISSION/LRC
1974:
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It states, in relevant
When KRS 507.040 is read in
conjunction with KRS 507.020(1)(b), it is
clear that all deaths resulting from wanton
conduct must constitute either murder or
manslaughter in the second degree. It is
also clear that once the elements of
wantonness are shown to exist, the choice
between the two offenses depends upon
whether or not the defendant’s conduct
manifested “extreme indifference to human
life.” As indicated in the Commentary to
KRA 507.020, this distinguishing standard
cannot be cited as an example of linguistic
clarity. Yet it is used by most of the
modern penal codes and justified as follows:
Whether [wantonness] is so extreme
that it demonstrates similar
indifference is not a question
that, in our view, can be further
clarified; it must be left
directly to the trier of the
facts. If [wantonness] exists but
is not so extreme, the homicide is
manslaughter . . . Model Penal
Code, § 201.2, Comment 2 (Tent.
Draft No. 9, 1959).
KRS 507.050 in conjunction with KRS
501.020 defines the offense of reckless
homicide, which cannot exist without the
following elements: a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that death will occur as
a result of the conduct in question; a gross
deviation from the standard of conduct that
a reasonable person would observe, and a
failure by the defendant to perceive the
substantial and unjustifiable risk of death.
The only distinction between this offense
and the one defined by KRS 507.040
(manslaughter in the second degree) is in
the defendant’s state of mind. For the
latter offense he is aware of the risk of
death and consciously disregards it; for the
former, he is unaware of the risk.
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Based upon the preceding commentary, it becomes clear
that the conduct of the action is essential to the trier of fact
in determining if one is guilty of murder or manslaughter in the
second degree.
The court in the case before us set forth the
conduct alleged of each defendant as to murder, complicity to
murder, reckless homicide and facilitation to reckless homicide,
but conspicuously omitted any conduct on the part of either
defendant as to second-degree manslaughter.
palpable error.
This is clear and
Consequently, both convictions must be
reversed.
A more problematic issue is what happens now that
Darrell’s and Curtis’s convictions have been reversed.
As to
Curtis, we believe the Commonwealth can retry him but only as to
manslaughter in the second degree or any lesser offense.
However, the more difficult question is can Darrell be retried.
Darrell’s arguments on appeal as to whether he had a legal duty
to the child and as to the jury instructions indirectly touches
on this issue.
Darrell was charged in the amended indictment
with complicity to commit murder.
The Commonwealth’s motion
seeking the amended indictment stated:
Due to new evidence, the Commonwealth
moves the Court to amend the above
Indictment as follows:
COUNT I
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On or about the 8th day of November,
2000, in Whitley County, Kentucky, the
above-named defendant, DARRELL TYRONE
LAWSON, committed the offense of Criminal
Complicity To Commit Murder when knowing
that he had a legal duty to prevent Curtis
Lawson from operating a motor vehicle in a
wanton manner in which the infant child,
Aaron Ray Lawson, was riding he brought
about the circumstances which caused the
death of Aaron Ray Lawson.
Obviously under this charge, the Commonwealth was pursuing
Curtis as the driver of the Bronco at the time of the accident
and Darrell as the passenger.
At the conclusion of the trial,
there is nothing in the record to indicate the Commonwealth had
again amended the indictment to conclude Darrell was operating
the vehicle and Curtis was merely the passenger.
contradictory
Despite the
evidence at trial as to who was driving, the
court erred by presenting jury instructions which presented a
new legal theory of culpability and action on Darrell’s part.
We believe the court’s use of the Commonwealth’s proposed jury
instruction affected Darrell’s substantial rights and resulted
in prejudice to him.
Once the Commonwealth amended the
indictment prior to trial to allege only complicity, it was
error to again amend the method of Darrell’s criminal action
from merely a duty to protect the child to being the principal
in causing the murder by his driving the vehicle.
Darrell could
not reasonably expect the Commonwealth to change its theory a
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second time and his defense was not based upon such a theory of
criminal behavior.
The court erred in instructing the jury on wanton
murder as to Darrell.
The instruction as to second-degree
manslaughter was a lesser included offense under the erroneous
murder instruction.
There was no instruction given as to
complicity to manslaughter in the second degree or to reckless
homicide.
Therefore, the question again is whether Darrell can
be retried.
We do not believe he can be retried.
The general
rule, sometimes called the implied acquittal theory, states that
when the jury returns a verdict finding the defendant guilty of
a lesser included offense, this has the effect of acquitting him
on the greater charge. 2
Darrell was accused of complicity only.
The complicity charge alleged he violated a legal duty to
prevent Curtis from operating a motor vehicle in a wanton manner
as to cause the death of Aaron.
The only jury instructions
which presented that theory was the complicity to commit wanton
murder.
The jury did not find him guilty of that crime.
And
while second-degree manslaughter is a lesser included offense of
wanton murder, it is not a lesser included offense of complicity
to commit wanton murder.
While we believe the jury instructions
could have included an instruction as to complicity to
2
McGinnis v. Wine, 959 S.W.2d 437 (Ky. 1998). See also, Gunter v.
Commonwealth, 576 S.W.2d 518 (Ky. 1979); Klee v. Lair, 621 S.W.2d 892 (Ky.
1981).
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manslaughter in the second degree or even reckless homicide,
they did not.
Thus, there is no lesser included offense for
Darrell to be tried on.
In that we have reversed Darrell’s conviction and
remanded for dismissal, the remaining issues raised by Darrell
on appear are moot.
Those issues included his motion to sever
the trials and arguments that he had no legal duty to the child
victim (his cousin) of the accident.
While the issue of a legal
duty to a child victim is extremely intriguing, it must wait for
another day since it is not our position to give advisory
opinions.
Curtis also raised several other issues in his appeal.
They include his arguments that the trial court erred by
amending the indictment on the day of trial, by permitting the
introduction of his blood alcohol analysis, by failing to grant
a mistrial when Darrell mentioned his offer to take a lie
detector test, and as a result of cumulative errors.
reviewed each of these claims and find no error.
We have
The motion to
amend Curtis’s indictment from complicity to murder was first
filed on November 16, 2001.
While the court may not have ruled
on Curtis’s opposition to that motion until the day of the
trial, Curtis had notice and prepared for trial on the amended
charge.
Despite Curtis’s arguments to the contrary, his rights
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were not substantially prejudiced by the court’s ruling on this
matter. 3
Curtis also contends that his blood alcohol analysis
should have been suppressed because the test did not comply with
the requirements of KRS 189A.010 and KRS 189A.103.
While it has
been held to be error to instruct a jury on the statutory
presumption that applies only to D.U.I. cases (KRS 189A.010), in
cases other than D.U.I’s, there is no such prohibition on
admitting evidence tending to prove alcohol consumption. 4
The
fact that Curtis had consumed alcohol beverages prior to the
accident and the amount of alcohol in his blood stream is
relevant evidence in proving and distinguishing the elements of
the crimes of wanton murder and manslaughter in the second
degree.
As stated In Walden, 5
The 1984 Amendment declares legislative
intent to include vehicular homicide as
potentially serious enough to justify a
murder conviction, but it does not change
the essential nature of the elements of the
offense. Wanton murder continues to be
distinguished from second-degree
manslaughter, KRA 507.040, which also
punishes “wantonly caus[ing] the death of
another person,” by the additional element
described in the phrase, “under
circumstances manifesting extreme
3
See generally, RCr 6.16; Anderson v. Commonwealth, 63 S.W.3d 135 (Ky. 2002);
Robards v. Commonwealth, 419 S.W.2d 570 (Ky. 1967).
4
See Walden v. Commonwealth, 805 S.W.2d 102 (Ky. 1991), reversed on other
grounds.
5
Id. at 104-05.
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indifference to human life.” The 1984
“Slammer Bill” also amended second-degree
manslaughter (KRS 507.040) by adding the
phrase, “including, but not limited to, the
operation of a motor vehicle.” The
difference between wanton murder and
involuntary manslaughter (Manslaughter II)
continues to be, as the Penal Code
originally intended, whether there is
evidence from which the jury could find
“circumstances manifesting extreme
indifference to human life.” Depending on
the situation, drunk driving may be such a
circumstance.
In Nichols v. Commonwealth, Ky., 657
S.W.2d 932 (1983), involving “firing of a
pistol into an occupied car,” we held that
whether the evidence proved wanton murder or
second-degree manslaughter was a question of
fact, quoting the Model Penal Code, § 201.2
[sic], Comment 2 (Ten.Draft No. 9, 1959), to
the effect that whether wantonness is so
extreme that it demonstrates such
indifference to human life as to qualify as
the culpable equivalent of intentional
murder “is not a question that, in our view,
can be further clarified; it must be left
directly to the trier of the facts.” 657
S.W.2d at 935. Applying this rule to
present circumstances, we hold that here the
extreme nature of the appellant’s
intoxication was sufficient evidence which a
jury could infer wantonness so extreme as to
manifest extreme indifference to human life.
Therefore, we affirm the conviction for
wanton murder.
Curtis next argues that a mistrial should have been
granted when Darrell mentioned that he had offered to take a lie
detector test.
Since we have reversed on other grounds, we
state that upon retrial, Darrel should be admonished prior to
his testimony not to mention his willingness to submit to a
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polygraph test.
However, it should also be noted that in
Phillips v. Commonwealth, 6 the Kentucky Supreme Court held that
there “must arise a clear inference that there was a result and
that the result was favorable, or some other manner in which the
inference could be deemed prejudicial” before a mistrial would
be deemed necessary under similar circumstances.
And in Tramme
v. Commonwealth, 7 it was held that mere utterance of the word
“polygraph” is not grounds for reversal.
While this situation
should not re-occur at another trial, it is clear that the mere
inadvertent utterance of the word “polygraph” or “lie detector”
is not grounds for reversal.
Finally, we address the issues of whether Darrell and
Curtis were entitled to separate trials.
Darrell argues that
pursuant to RCr 9.16 each defendant should have received
separate trials.
RCr 9.16 provides, in relevant part:
If it appears that a defendant or the
Commonwealth is or will be prejudiced by a
joinder of offenses or of defendants in an
indictment, information, complaint or
uniform citation or by joinder for trial,
the court shall order separate trials of
counts, grant separate trials of defendants
or provide whatever other relief justice
requires.
Under RCr 9.16, the court is required to grant
separate trials if a defendant “is or will be prejudiced by
6
17 S.W.3d 870, 877 (Ky. 2000) citing McQueen v. Commonwealth, 669 S.W.2d 519
(Ky. 1984).
7
973 S.W.2d 13, 33 (Ky. 1998).
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joinder for trial.” 8
Whether to grant separate trials is
primarily within the discretion of the trial judge. 9
A reviewing
court will not reverse a conviction for failure to grant
separate trials unless it is clearly convinced that prejudice
occurred and that the likelihood of prejudice was so clearly
demonstrated to the trial judge as to make his failure to grant
severance an abuse of discretion. 10
Neither antagonistic defenses nor the fact that the
evidence for or against one defendant incriminates the other
amounts, by itself, to unfair prejudice. 11
In Phillips, supra,
at 876, citing Ware, supra, the Court held:
Phillip’s claim of entitlement to a
separate trial is premised upon the fact
that Johnson accused him of being the first
to shoot and his perception that he was thus
being prosecuted by both the Commonwealth’s
attorney and Johnson’s attorney. Suffice it
to say that:
[N]either antagonistic defenses
nor the fact that the evidence for
or against one defendant
incriminates the other amounts, by
itself, to unfair prejudice. . . .
That different defendants alleged
to have been involved in the same
transaction have conflicting
versions of what took place, or
the extent to which they
8
Hoskins v. Commonwealth, 374 S.W.2d 839 (Ky. 1964).
9
Slone v. Commonwealth, 677 S.W.2d 894 (Ky. 1984).
10
Wilson v. Commonwealth, 836 S.W.2d 872 (Ky. 1992).
11
Ware v. Commonwealth, 537 S.W.2d 174 (Ky. 1976).
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participated in it, vel non, is a
reason for rather than against a
joint trial. If one is lying, it
is easier for the truth to be
determined if all are required to
be tried together.
The trial judge did not abuse its discretion by
deciding to try Curtis and Darrell together.
The analysis in
Ware applies because, while both defendants admit to being in
the vehicle at the time of the accident, both defendants also
deny driving the vehicle at the time of the crash.
At trial,
Curtis and Darrell maintained their conflicting versions of what
took place on the night of the accident.
In order for the truth
to be determined, it was appropriate for both defendants to be
tried together.
For the foregoing reasons, the final judgments entered
by the Whitley Circuit Court against Curtis Lawson and Darrell
Tyrone Lawson are affirmed in part, and reversed in part and
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
TAYLOR, JUDGE, CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY.
MINTON, JUDGE, CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY AND FILES
SEPARATE OPINION.
MINTON, JUDGE, CONCURRING IN RESULT ONLY:
I agree
with the result reached by the majority in these appeals.
write separately because I would reach the results in a
different way, especially as to Darrell.
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But I
As to Curtis, it appears to me that even though the
last-minute addition of a complicity charge against him was
improper, that error ultimately proved to be harmless as he was
acquitted of all complicity-related charges. 12
Rather, the
reversible error as to Curtis lies in the instruction for
second-degree manslaughter.
That instruction improperly omits
the required factual finding as to the method by which Curtis
allegedly caused the death of the victim. 13
So I concur with the
majority’s conclusion that Curtis’s conviction must be reversed
for an instructional error and that he is, on remand, subject to
retrial for second-degree manslaughter and any appropriate
lesser-included offenses.
And I agree with the majority’s ultimate conclusion
regarding Darrell’s conviction, but for an entirely different
reason.
As a prefatory note, I also agree with the majority
that the last-minute addition of principal actor charges, such
as wanton murder, against Darrell was improper and merits
reversal.
But unlike the majority, I believe that Darrell may
12
See, e.g., Skinner v. Commonwealth, 864 S.W.2d 290 (Ky. 1993) (holding that
a defendant is not prejudiced by the giving of an erroneous instruction not
used by the jury in finding a conviction).
13
Justice Cooper’s instruction manual clearly provides that the method used
to cause death is an element of a second-degree manslaughter instruction.
See 1 COOPER, KENTUCKY INSTRUCTIONS TO JURIES (CRIMINAL) § 3.28. Curiously,
the trial court did provide the method by which the victim was killed in the
wanton murder instruction, which immediately preceded the second-degree
manslaughter instruction.
-22-
not be retried on complicity charges because he had no legal
duty toward the victim, who was his first cousin.
Complicity under these facts is governed by
KRS 502.020.
Subsection one of that statute provides, in
relevant part, as follows:
“A person is guilty of an offense
committed by another person when, with the intention of
promoting or facilitating the commission of the offense, he:
.
. . (c) [h]aving a legal duty to prevent the commission of the
offense, fails to make a proper effort to do so.”
Under the
Commonwealth’s theory of the case, Darrell was liable for
complicity to Curtis’s wanton murder because Darrell failed in
his legal duty to prevent Curtis from driving while intoxicated.
The Commonwealth’s appellate brief does not, unfortunately,
address this argument.
So I will discuss the arguments made by
the Commonwealth’s Attorney to the trial court.
First, the Commonwealth argued that KRS 620.010
supported complicity charges against Darrell.
But KRS 620.010
stands for the position that children have the right to be free
from physical or sexual injury. 14
This is an admirable position
with which no one could rationally disagree.
14
But the plain
KRS 620.010 is a statement of legislative purpose underlying the statutes
dealing with neglect and abuse of children. The portion of the statute
relied upon by the Commonwealth below is as follows: “Children have certain
fundamental rights which must be protected and preserved, including but not
limited to, the rights to adequate food, clothing and shelter; the right to
be free from physical, sexual or emotional injury or exploitation . . . .”
-23-
language of KRS 620.010 imposes no duty of care toward the
victim on Darrell or, for that matter, anyone else.
In addition, the Commonwealth’s reliance below upon
KRS 620.030 is misplaced.
Subsection one of that statute states
that “[a]ny person who knows or has reasonable cause to believe
that a child is dependent, neglected or abused shall immediately
cause an oral or written report to be made to a local law
enforcement agency or the Kentucky State Police[.]”
Under that
statute, it has been held that a parent has a legal duty to
prevent intentional physical injury to his or her child. 15
The
case at hand, however, does not involve intentional injury to
the victim.
Furthermore, the Commonwealth has not cited, nor
have we independently located, any authority extending the legal
duty toward a child to anyone beyond those situations identified
in West v. Commonwealth. 16
As noted by Darrell, the extension of
the legal duty doctrine proposed by the Commonwealth’s Attorney
is limitless.
The law simply has not imposed criminal liability
for omissions to act so broadly.
In order to avoid such a problematic result, I believe
that Darrell, as a matter of law, was improperly charged with
15
Lane v. Commonwealth, 956 S.W.2d 874, 875 (Ky. 1997) (“In view of the
expressed statement of legislative intent of Chapter 620, we hold that KRS
620.010 creates an affirmative duty for the parent of a child to prevent such
physical injury which would result in an assault on that child.”) (Plurality
opinion of three justices).
16
935 S.W.2d 315, 317 (Ky.App. 1996).
-24-
complicity in the tragic death of Curtis’s child in the first
place. 17
So the trial court erred by not directing a verdict of
acquittal on the complicity charges against Darrell at the close
of the Commonwealth’s case, meaning that Darrell is not subject
to retrial on those charges.
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT, DARRELL TYRONE
LAWSON:
BRIEFS FOR APPELLEE:
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Astrida L. Lemkins
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
Frankfort, KY
Gregory C. Fuchs
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, KY
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT, CURTIS LAWSON:
ORAL ARUGMENT FOR APPELLEE:
Gregory C. Fuchs
Kim Brooks Tandy
Covington, KY
17
The absence of a legal duty does not mean that Darrell owed no moral duty
toward the victim. Rather, it means only that Darrell cannot be held
criminally liable for failing to prevent the child’s death.
-25-
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