GARDINER PARK DEVELOPMENT, LLC; GARDINER DESIGN & DEVELOPMENT, INC.; v. MATHERLY LAND SURVEYING, INC.; ALVA L. MATHERLY; and CARL DOUGLAS COMER and D. SEAN NILSEN and WOODWARD, HOBSON & FULTON v. HON. F. KENNETH CONLIFFE, JUDGE MATHERLY LAND SURVEYING, INC.; ALVA MATHERLY; CARL DOUGLAS COMER; GARDINER PARK DEVELOPMENT, LLC; GARDINER DESIGN & DEVELOPMENT, INC.; and GREGORY S. GARDINER
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APRIL 29, 2005; 10:00 A.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-002017-MR
GARDINER PARK DEVELOPMENT, LLC;
GARDINER DESIGN & DEVELOPMENT, INC.;
and GREGORY S. GARDINER
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE F. KENNETH CONLIFFE, JUDGE
ACTION NOS. 01-CI-006541 and 02-CI-002907
MATHERLY LAND SURVEYING, INC.;
ALVA L. MATHERLY; and
CARL DOUGLAS COMER
APPELLEES
CONSOLIDATED WITH AND TO BE HEARD WITH:
NO. 2003-CA-002048-MR
D. SEAN NILSEN and
WOODWARD, HOBSON & FULTON
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HON. F. KENNETH CONLIFFE, JUDGE
ACTION NOS. 01-CI-006541 and 02-CI-002907
MATHERLY LAND SURVEYING, INC.;
ALVA MATHERLY; CARL DOUGLAS COMER;
GARDINER PARK DEVELOPMENT, LLC;
GARDINER DESIGN & DEVELOPMENT, INC.;
and GREGORY S. GARDINER
APPELLEES
OPINION
VACATING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
JUDGE.1
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; BARBER, JUDGE; MILLER, SENIOR
BARBER, JUDGE:
This case presents the difficult question of
determining which statute of limitations is applicable to the
claims among the parties.
The core issue in the case involves
how a professional and professional services are defined under
KRS 413.245, the one-year professional malpractice statute.
The
circuit court found that the services provided were performed by
a professional engineer, and, thus, applied the one-year statute
of limitations to bar all claims against Matherly Land
Surveying, Inc., Alva L. Matherly, and Carl Douglas Comer.
We
vacate and remand.
In 1997 Matherly Land Surveying, Inc. (MLS) and
Gardiner Design & Development, Inc. (GDD) entered into a
contract whereby MLS agreed to perform engineering and survey
work associated with the development of a subdivision in
Jefferson County, Kentucky.
During the relevant time period MLS
employed three licensed professional engineers, at least part
time, and also employed civil engineering technicians and survey
technicians.
One of the part-time professional engineers
1
Senior Judge John D. Miller sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the
Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and
KRS 21.580.
2
employed by MLS was Carl Douglas Comer (Comer).
Alva L.
Matherly, the owner and president of MLS, is a land surveyor and
was the primary contact for GDD with MLS along with Comer on the
project.
Sometime toward the end of 1997 and the beginning of
1998 GDD became dissatisfied with the work being performed by
MLS.
It is undisputed that MLS and GDD parted ways in August
1998 and that GDD hired two other firms to complete, and in some
instances, re-do, the work called for by the contract between
MLS and GDD.
MLS and GDD could not resolve their differences over
the project and both hired counsel.
An agreement to conduct
mediation and arbitration of any unresolved issues remaining
after mediation was entered into in October 1999.
That
agreement specifically provided that a demand for arbitration
would not be made after any applicable statute of limitations
would bar the action.
The agreement originally called for
mediation to be conducted on or before December 8, 1999, but no
mediation was held until May and June 2001.
Prior to the mediation both MLS and GDD made their
positions known to the other.
MLS claimed it was owed money for
work it had performed and GDD filed a “position statement”
detailing the damages it had suffered due to the delays and
incomplete/incorrect work by MLS.
3
MLS also asserted that KRS
413.245 was the applicable statute of limitations and that any
action by GDD on its claims was barred.
Unsurprisingly the
mediation was not successful.
Until April 2001, just before the mediation, GDD had
been represented by Woodward, Hobson & Fulton (WHF),
specifically by D. Sean Nilsen (Nilsen).
In April 2001 GDD
retained other counsel, and, following the unsuccessful
mediation, GDD, Gardiner Park Development, LLC (GPD), and,
Gregory S. Gardiner (Gardiner)2 filed two separate cases in
Jefferson Circuit Court.
The first, filed originally against
WHF, Nilsen, and MLS, asked the court to declare what statute of
limitations applied to the contract between MLS and GDD and also
alleged legal malpractice against WHF and Nilsen.
The petition
was amended to include Alva L. Matherly (Matherly) and Comer as
well as assert a further count of legal negligence.
The second
action filed involved the same parties and similar allegations
and was consolidated with the first suit.
The essential nature of the consolidated suits was
that if the one-year statute of limitations in KRS 413.245
applied to GDD, GPD, and Gardiner’s claims, as asserted by MLS,
Matherly, and Comer, then any action against them was barred.
If the court found this to be the case, then there would be no
2
According to the parties Gardiner Park Development, LLC and Gregory S.
Gardiner also have an interest in the subdivision being developed: GPD as
owner of the real property and Gardiner as the owner of GDD and GPD.
4
point in pursuing arbitration and GDD, GPD, and Gardiner would
pursue claims of legal malpractice against WHF.
Some discovery
was taken and then all parties filed briefs on the subject of
which statute of limitations applied.
As noted above, the trial court found that KRS 413.245
was the correct statute of limitations, thus, all claims against
MLS, Matherly, and Comer were barred.
In its opinion the
circuit court declined to address whether land surveying
services qualified as professional services under KRS 413.245.
Instead it found that because engineers are considered to be
professionals under the statute and Comer was indisputably an
engineer, KRS 413.245 applied.
It is undisputed that GDD, GPD, and Gardiner’s claims
against MLS, Matherly, and Comer are for services that were not
timely completed and when completed were allegedly flawed.
At the trial court level the parties apparently made a
number of arguments regarding the statute of limitations issue
in this case.
However, on appeal the parties have presented one
issue for decision:
whether the one-year statute of limitations
for professional malpractice applies or whether the fifteen-year
statute of limitations on a written contract applies to all of
the claims.
Our standard of review on summary judgment is de novo.
Scifres v. Kraft, 916 S.W.2d 779, 781 (Ky.App. 1996).
5
GDD, GPD, and Gardiner have taken the position that
they believe the trial court’s decision to be correct, but wish
to preserve their rights against MLS, Matherly, and Comer if
this Court reverses the trial court’s determination.
Thus, the
arguments are, in actuality, between WHF on the one hand and
MLS, Matherly, and Comer on the other.
WHF makes several arguments for why the fifteen-year
statute of limitations in KRS 413.090(2) applicable to written
contracts is the correct statute of limitations in this case.
WHF maintains in its first two arguments that the type of
damages claimed by GDD, GPD, and Gardiner are for purely
economic losses.
That is, the damages are for delay produced by
the failure of MLS, Matherly and Comer to perform their land
surveying duties per the contract in a timely and acceptable
manner.
Because these claims are ones based strictly on breach
of contract, the one-year statute of limitations in KRS 413.245
is inappropriate.
Next WHF argues that the trial court applied the oneyear professional malpractice statute of limitations simply
because Comer is a professional engineer.
WHF maintains that
this is an incorrect analysis for a number of reasons.
First, it asserts that the bulk of the claims made by
GDD, GPD, and Gardiner are not for negligence in performing
engineering services, but for land surveying services.
6
It
argues that the trial court’s decision would allow the
application of the one-year statue of limitations to
nonprofessionals working for a professional company enabling
them to claim the benefit of KRS 413.245’s shorter statute of
limitations.
Secondly, WHF makes clear that it is undisputed that
MLS is a professional, licensed engineering firm that employs
professionals but states that this is irrelevant to GDD, GPD,
and Gardiner’s claims since their cause of action is based on
deficiencies in the land surveying services which are not
professional services.
As WHF notes, the circuit court declined
to make a finding on this issue, but it argues that such a
finding is necessary because, even if land surveying is held to
constitute professional services now (the statute relating to
land surveying and engineering was amended in 1999), it did not
qualify as such in 1997 and 1998 when the relevant circumstances
of the dispute occurred.
In response MLS, Matherly, and Comer argue that, by
the terms of KRS 413.245, it is irrelevant whether the claims
against them are ones sounding in contract or tort.
They also
assert that the claims by GDD, GPD, and Gardiner are ones based
on the engineering services that Comer was to provide through
MLS under the contract and that, if there were a trial in this
7
action, expert testimony would be needed to establish the
appropriate duty, standard of care, and any breach.
Further, MLS, Matherly, and Comer maintain that even
if the services GDD, GPD, and Gardiner are complaining of are
land surveying services, those services were provided incidental
to the engineering services that Comer performed, and, thus,
still fall under the ambit of “professional services” and in the
purview of KRS 413.245.
Finally, MLS, Matherly, and Comer contend that land
surveying services are professional services and were considered
to be professional services by the legislature prior to 1999
when the statute was amended.
Therefore, under any view of the
case the statute of limitations in KRS 413.245 applies.
At oral argument WHF raised the further argument that
even if KRS 413.245 is the correct statute of limitations in
this case, the cause of action has yet to accrue.
It bases this
stance on Kentucky law such as Alagia, Day, Trautwein & Smith v.
Broadbent, 882 S.W.2d 121, 125-126 (Ky. 1994), which essentially
holds that the time for bringing a cause of action under KRS
413.245 does not begin to run until the damages are fixed and
non-speculative.
WHF maintains that, to date, the damages
incurred by GDD, GPD, and Gardiner remain uncertain and will
continue to be so until the project, Gardiner Park Subdivision,
is completed.
8
In response MLS, Matherly, and Comer argue that the
case law WHF relies on is only applicable to “litigation
negligence” cases and points out that WHF wrote a position
statement on behalf of GDD, GPD, and Gardiner for the
anticipated mediation on December 2, 1999, that states in its
opening that the full extent of damages had only become known
within the past few months.
KRS 413.245 provides as follows:
Notwithstanding any other prescribed
limitation of actions which might otherwise
appear applicable, except those provided in
KRS 413.140, a civil action, whether brought
in tort or contract, arising out of any act
or omission in rendering, or failing to
render, professional services for others
shall be brought within one (1) year from
the date of the occurrence or from the date
when the cause of action was, or reasonably
should have been, discovered by the party
injured. Time shall not commence against a
party under legal disability until removal
of the disability.
“Professional services” is defined in KRS 413.243 as
meaning, “any service rendered in a profession required to be
licensed, administered and regulated as professions[.]”
Obviously the definition of professional services in KRS 413.243
is only marginally helpful.
However, KRS 413.245 is clear that actions based on
professional services, whether those claims arise out of a tort
or a contract, are subject to a one-year statute of limitations.
9
Thus, to the extent that GDD, GPD, and Gardiner’s claims against
MLS, Matherly, and Comer are based on the rendering or failure
to render professional services, KRS 413.245 is the correct
statute of limitations.
This is true even if one examines GDD, GPD, and
Gardiner’s claims based on the type of damages sought.
WHF’s
argument that the 15-year statute of limitations for breach of
contract in KRS 413.090(2) is applicable because GDD, GPD, and
Gardiner are seeking purely economic losses is not persuasive.
KRS 413.245 makes no such distinction – the focus of the statute
is on the nature of the cause of action, not the type of damages
claimed.
WHF also contends that if this case is analyzed under
the economic loss rule, it becomes apparent that GDD, GPD, and
Gardiner’s claims against MLS, Matherly, and Comer are ones for
breach of contract, not professional negligence, and should
therefore be subject to the longer statute of limitations in KRS
413.090(2).
It points to the concurring opinion in Presnell
Construction Managers, Inc. v. EH Construction, LLC, 134 S.W.3d
575 (Ky. 2004) for support that the economic loss rule is
appropriately applied.
The economic loss rule in a simple and broad
formulation prohibits a litigant from recovering in tort for
losses that are purely economic.
10
Although the rule is a bit
more limited than this expression, this statement of the rule is
how WHF wishes it to be applied.
It has most commonly been
applied in the context of products liability cases.
Id. at 583-
584 (Keller, J. concurring).
We believe that the economic loss rule is simply
irrelevant to the issues in this case.
The authority cited by
WHF does not consider the application of the economic loss rule
in the context of KRS 413.245.
We view the argument as one that
mixes apples and oranges – that is, even if the damages sought
by GDD, GPD, and Gardiner are for purely economic losses, that
is beside the point.
distinction.
KRS 413.245 does not allow for such a
The statute is concerned with whether the claims
are ones for rendering or failing to render “professional
services” regardless of whether the generation of damages comes
from a tort or a breach of contract.
So it is seen that it becomes central to this decision
to determine who qualifies as a professional and what
constitutes professional services.
An examination of the law on the subject of who or
what services qualify as “professional” reveals that the law is
unsettled.
In Kentucky, most major decisions addressing the
issue have been expressed by this Court and, while lending some
guidance, have not fully considered the issue.
11
In Plaza Bottle Shop, Inc. v. Al Torstrick Ins.
Agency, Inc., 712 S.W.2d 349 (Ky.App. 1986), this Court
considered whether an insurance agent qualified as a
professional enabling him to plead the statute of limitations of
KRS 413.245.
The Court noted that the mere fact that one is
required to be licensed by the state does not automatically make
Id. at
the services he or she provides “professional services.”
350-351.
Profession has traditionally been defined at common
law as consisting of law, medicine, and theology.
The Court
observed that there was no indication from the legislature that
it intended for KRS 413.245 to apply to any calling except the
traditional three.
Id. at 351.
However, it acknowledged that
other occupations are generally considered to be professions
such as accounting, engineering, and teaching but observed that,
“the admission to [the profession] requires higher education,
special knowledge and training[.]”
Based on the fact that an
insurance agent has no need to have obtained any more education
than a high school diploma, the Court determined that KRS
413.245 was not intended to apply to claims against insurance
agents.
Id.
Plaza Bottle Shop suggests that whether a particular
vocation is regarded as a profession is dependent upon finding
that it requires specialized education, knowledge and training.
A license to engage in that vocation is not determinative.
12
Shortly after Plaza Bottle Shop this Court again
considered the question of who is a professional, this time in
the context of a licensed civil engineer who operated his own
business.
In Vandevelde v. Falls City Builders, Inc., 744
S.W.2d 432 (Ky.App. 1988), this Court held that a licensed civil
engineer is a professional under KRS 413.245.
Id. at 433.
In
doing so the Court stated:
That an activity can be performed by a
variety of people can be said for virtually
any of the professions. . . . The issue is
the status of the person performing the
particular activity. We believe that
setting aside those activities or trying to
determine which of those activities could be
performed by a lay person, renders the
statute ineffective. Clearly the
legislature intended to limit actions
against professionals for duties performed
in the course of their professional
activities. Since the appellant is a
professional and was performing a duty
consistent with his profession, even though
it might have been done by a client or
another layman, we hold that it is the type
of duty envisioned by KRS 413.245.
Id.
The case has been taken, and indeed has been argued here,
as creating a bright line rule that the only relevant factor for
determining whether KRS 413.245 is applicable is based upon the
status of the person providing the services.
We do not believe
the case can be read so broadly.
Finally, in Old Mason’s Home of Kentucky, Inc. v.
Mitchell, 892 S.W.2d 304 (Ky.App. 1995), we held that an
13
architect providing services pursuant to a contract was
“certainly a professional and it is not disputed that he was
performing duties consistent with his profession.”
Id. at 306.
No analysis of why an architect is considered to be a
professional appears in the opinion save for the citation to
Vandevelde, supra, and Plaza Bottle Shop, supra.
The Kentucky Supreme Court has not issued any
published opinions that address the issues presented by this
case.
When it has considered the application of KRS 413.245, it
has, for the most part, been in the context of legal
malpractice; although it has held that a claim against a nurse
fell within its purview.
See Underhill v. Stephenson, 756
S.W.2d 459, 460 (Ky. 1988).
In another instance, the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals certified to the Kentucky Supreme Court questions
involving the liability of a subcontractor’s engineers on a
construction project to the general contractor when the general
contractor had been found liable.
The engineers argued, in
part, that any claims against them were governed by the one-year
statute of limitations in KRS 413.245 because the claims were
ones for substandard engineering services; i.e., professional
services.
The Kentucky Supreme Court rejected this argument
stating:
14
The primary focus of the current matter
before this Court does not involve the
professional status of the parties. It is a
case about indemnity.
Affholder, Inc. v. Preston Carroll Co., Inc., 27 F.3d 232, 234
(6th Cir. 1994).
Again, we believe it is illustrated by the Kentucky
Supreme Court’s statements in Affholder that more than simply
the status of the person performing the services is relevant to
determining whether KRS 413.245 is appropriately applied.
The legislature has also made further indications of
what it considers to be a professional and what constitutes
professional services in KRS 275.015.
Although the statute
relates to definitions used in a chapter concerning business
entities, in subsection 19 it defines a professional limited
liability company as one that is formed for purposes including
the rendering of professional services.
KRS 275.015(20) defines
“professional services” as those services:
[R]endered by physicians, osteopaths,
optometrists, podiatrists, chiropractors,
dentists, nurses, pharmacists,
psychologists, occupational therapists,
veterinarians, engineers, architects,
landscape architects, certified public
accountants, public accountants, physical
therapists, and attorneys.
While we do not believe KRS 275.015(19) & (20) can be
used to define who is a professional and what constitutes
professional services for purposes of KRS 413.245, the
15
provisions do support the notion echoed in the cases that a
“professional” in Kentucky is defined more broadly than at
common law and the services provided by those professionals, if
incident to their profession, are also considered “professional
services.”
However, the definitions and analysis in our case law
and statutes at present are insufficient.
They do provide a
starting point, but more is needed we think because, utilizing
the case law as it stands under Plaza Bottle Shop, Vandevelde,
and Old Mason’s Home, there is no real distinction among a trade
or occupation versus a profession.
Clearly the legislature
intended for there to be a distinction among these categories
since it enacted a different statute of limitations to apply to
professionals.
Other states have similarly struggled, and continue to
struggle, with the question of how to define a professional
and/or professional services.
Among the states that have considered the question of
whether the professional malpractice statute of limitations
applies to particular vocations or services there appear to be
three main approaches and other approaches peculiar to the
jurisdictions.
The first adopts the view of the common law and
restricts the statute’s application only to those engaged in the
professions of law, medicine, or divinity.
16
A second approach
simply defines a professional and professional services as all
licensed occupations.
The third approach follows what has been
termed the “dictionary” definition of professional.
Jilek v.
Berger Electric, Inc., 441 N.W.2d 660, 662 (N.D. 1989).
Yet a
fourth approach appears to be followed by Florida where that
state’s Supreme Court has created a bright-line test requiring
that any vocation that wishes to be considered a profession must
require, at a minimum, a four-year college degree before
licensing.
If alternative methods may be used to practice the
vocation it is not a profession.
Garden v. Frier, 602 So.2d
1273, 1275 (Fla. 1992).
Some courts have also utilized the definitions and
analyses contained in 29 U.S.C. §152(12) defining professional
employee (Lewis v. Rodriguez, 107 N.M. 430, 432-433, 759 P.2d
1012, 1014-1015 (N.M.App. 1988)) and the Restatement (Second) of
Torts §299A comment b discussing the undertaking of services in
the practice of a profession or trade.
Jilek v. Berger
Electric, Inc., 441 N.W.2d 660, 663 (N.D. 1989)(noting that
§299A maintains a distinction between a profession and a trade).
A law review article on the subject discusses these
various approaches and notes:
In summary, courts have generally
declined to clearly define who is a
professional and who is not. Instead, they
have sometimes decided that no liability
existed based strictly on policy grounds.
17
Other times they have concluded that the
defendant is or is not a professional with
little or no reasoning in support.
Sometimes, as in cases involving physicians
and lawyers, the decision simply rests on
precedent. What is missing in most
decisions is a clear identification of
professional occupations for purposes of
malpractice litigation.
Who’s On First, and What’s a Professional?, 33 USFLR 205, 217
(1999).
The thesis of the article and its message to the
judiciary is that the “central criterion” of whether a
particular occupation should qualify as a profession should be
dependent on whether the vocation has a “credible code of
fiduciary ethics that is effectively enforced.”
Id. at 227.
In general courts appear to recognize law, medicine,
divinity, engineering, architecture, teaching, and accounting as
professions.
But, as could be expected from the varying state
of the law, decisions about who and what services are
“professional” in nature have been all over the map.
Beyond those categories noted in the previous
paragraph courts have held that certified financial planners are
not professionals.
1999).
Kuntz v. Muehler, 603 N.W.2d 43, 47 (N.D.
Soil testing for the construction of a silo is
professional.
Bottineau Farmers Elevator v. Woodward-Clyde
Consultants, 963 F.2d 1064, 1070 (8th Cir. 1992).
agent is not a professional.
An insurance
Chase Scientific Research, Inc. v.
NIA Group, Inc., 96 N.Y.2d 20, 30, 749 N.E.2d 161, 167, 725
18
N.Y.S.2d 592, 598 (N.Y.App. 2001).
professional.
A polygrapher is a
Lewis v. Rodriguez, 107 N.M. 430, 434, 759 P.2d
1012, 1016 (N.M.App. 1988).
A land surveyor is a professional.
Landmark Engineering, Inc. v. Cooper, 222 Ga.App. 752, 753, 476
S.E.2d 63, 64 (Ga.App. 1996).
professional.
1992).
A land surveyor is not a
Garden v. Frier, 602 So.2d 1273, 1277 (Fla.
A blood bank provides professional services.
Advincula
v. United Blood Servs., 176 Ill.2d 1, 25, 678 N.E.2d 1009, 1021,
223 Ill.Dec. 1, 13 (Ill. 1996).
professional.
An electrician is not a
Jilek v. Berger Electric, Inc., 441 N.W.2d 660,
663 (1989).
The list could go on, but our point is simply that
many different, and sometimes opposing, outcomes have been
reached in the cases considering the question of what
constitutes a professional or professional services for the
purposes of a malpractice statute of limitations.
The difficulty, we believe, comes from the underlying
policy considerations that overlay a particular state’s
statutory scheme and case law.
At the heart of making a
distinction between who is a professional and who is not are
concerns such as those voiced by the Arizona Supreme Court in
Rossell v. Volkswagen of America, 147 Ariz. 160, 165, 709 P.2d
517, 522 (Ariz. 1985).
There, the Court did not allow
Volkswagen to be treated as a professional so as to require the
19
plaintiff to present expert proof as to its failure to
adequately design a component of its vehicle.
Although not
involving a statute of limitations question, the Court
disallowed the argument observing that professionals often set
their own standards that they are judged by, and, in general,
industries are not permitted to do likewise.
Id. 147 Ariz. at
165, 709 P.2d at 522.
Taking all of this into consideration as well as our
own case law and statutes, we believe the following can be said
about this issue in Kentucky:
The legislature clearly intended
for professionals providing professional services to be subject
to a one-year statute of limitations whether the claim was one
based on tort or contract.
KRS 413.245.
However, as was stated
in Plaza Bottle Shop, supra, there is no indication that it
meant to include any professions except law, medicine, and
divinity.
But, the legislature has enacted other statutes
defining profession and professional services more broadly than
the traditional three.
Therefore, while the law of this
jurisdiction does not limit the application of KRS 413.245 to
only the traditional three “professions,” we conclude that it
should still be construed narrowly to effectuate the intent of
the legislature that there is a distinction between professions
and other occupations.
20
Secondly, the case law, as we stated above provides a
starting point but is insufficient.
The guidance from our cases
is that licensing is not determinative; specialized education,
knowledge and training are important.
Plaza Bottle Shop, supra.
The status of the person performing the services and whether
those services are professional in nature or are consistent with
the duties of that profession are important to determining
whether KRS 413.245 applies.
Vandevelde, supra.
The nature of
the claims between the parties is also important.
Affholder,
supra.
Having examined the case law of other jurisdictions
outlined above and other sources of legal persuasion, we believe
Jilek, supra, and Chase Scientific Research, Inc., supra,
contain a clear, well-fleshed-out framework for deciding whether
a particular occupation should be considered to be a profession
within the malpractice statute of limitations.
We would make
clear that their statements add to, rather than replace, the
established statutory and case law in this jurisdiction.
Thus, for instance, in Jilek, the Court described
several different dictionary definitions of profession -- all of
which referred to advanced education and training and involved
labor that is predominantly intellectual and mental in nature.
It also noted that one of the hallmarks of a profession as
distinguished from a trade or occupation is (ordinarily) the
21
requirement of a college degree in that specific field.
Jilek,
441 N.W.2d at 662-663.
In Chase Scientific Research, Inc., supra 96 N.Y.2d at
29, 749 N.E.2d at 166, 725 N.Y.S.2d at 597, the Court of Appeals
of New York observed that there were relatively few categories
such as doctors, attorneys, accountants, architects, and
engineers considered to be “professional” and pointed out that:
The qualities shared by such groups
guide us in defining the term
“professional.” In particular, those
qualities include extensive formal learning
and training, licensure and regulation
indicating a qualification to practice, a
code of conduct imposing standards beyond
those accepted in the marketplace and a
system of discipline for violation of those
standards . . . . Additionally, a
professional relationship is one of trust
and confidence, carrying with it a duty to
counsel and advise clients (citations
omitted).
Turning to the case at hand, it is clear that
professional engineers may claim the application of KRS 413.245.
Vandevelde, supra.
We also believe that a business, such as
MLS, may argue for the one-year statute of limitations in KRS
413.245 to be applied to its contracts involving professional
services.
All of this Court’s cases cited herein have applied
KRS 413.245 in the context of an individual performing services
through a company or corporation.
Further, the legislature has
enacted statutes pertaining to the formation of professional
22
limited liability companies suggesting that it regards the
business entity the same as an individual.
See KRS Chapter 275.
Therefore, GDD, GPD, and Gardiner’s claims against
MLS, Matherly, and Comer are barred by the one-year statute of
limitations contained in KRS 413.245 to the extent that the
services about which GDD, GPD, and Gardiner complain involve the
performance of professional engineering services or services
incident to professional engineering.
The real twist comes in determining what comprises
services incident to professional engineering.
At the time of
the contract and the performance of the duties under the
contract (1997 and 1998) the statute defining “engineering”
specifically excluded “work embraced within the practice of land
surveying” from the definition of engineering.
(1997 and 1998 versions).
KRS 322.010(3)
And, although the statute also
defines land surveying and refers to the practice of land
surveying as the “performance of any professional service
included in subsection (5) of this section” the fact that the
word “professional” is used is not determinative.
KRS
322.010(7) (1997 and 1998 versions).3
3
The newest version of KRS 322.010 includes certain land surveying services
as incident to the practice of engineering and excludes certain land
surveying activities from the practice of engineering. KRS 322.010(4)(a)5.
23
Therefore, we agree with WHF that a determination of
whether land surveying constitutes professional services is
necessary.
At the time of the contract and its performance (1997
and 1998) we believe that it is clear that land surveying
services were not considered professional services and claims
for such services are not subject to the one-year statute of
limitations in KRS 413.245 for two reasons.
First, KRS
322.010(3) excluded land surveying from professional engineering
services.
Secondly, although not a model in drafting, KRS
413.243 is clear that licensure is required for any service to
be considered “professional” under KRS 413.245.
Until 1999 land
surveyors were not required to be licensed.
Even after the statutory scheme was amended in 1999,
we believe that taking the factors from Kentucky case law and
other factors identified from our sister states, land surveying
cannot be considered “professional services” if not provided
incident to professional engineering services.
Here, there is no dispute that the status of the
person performing the services, Comer, is that of a
professional.
There is a dispute among the parties about
whether these services were professional engineering services or
land surveying services.
At the time of the contract the
statute excluded land surveying services from professional
24
engineering.
KRS 322.010(3).
Clearly specialized knowledge and
training are needed to perform land surveying services, but it
appears that no special educational background is necessary.
There is no evidence that a code of conduct “imposing
standards beyond those accepted in the marketplace” exists for
land surveyors.
Chase Scientific Research, Inc., supra.
Nor is
there any evidence of a system of discipline for violating a
code of conduct.
Finally, there is no evidence that the
relationship between a land surveyor and his or her client is
one of trust or confidence, and there is certainly no evidence
that a land surveyor has a fiduciary duty to advise his or her
client.
For these reasons a land surveyor cannot be considered
a professional under KRS 413.245 even after the revamping of KRS
322.010 in 1999 unless those services are provided incidental to
professional engineering as defined in KRS 322.010.
WHF’s argument that any claims GDD, GPD, and Gardiner
may have against MLS, Matherly, and Comer have not accrued
because the damages have yet to become fixed and non-speculative
also must fail.
However, we do not agree with MLS, Matherly,
and Comer that there is necessarily a distinction between the
accrual of a cause of action for “litigation negligence” and
other professional malpractice actions.
25
Cases such as Alagia, Day, Trautwein & Smith v.
Broadbent, 882 S.W.2d 121, 125-126 (Ky. 1994) and Stephens v.
Denison, 64 S.W.3d 297, 299 (Ky.App. 2001) hold that a cause of
action for professional negligence cannot accrue until “the
legal harm [becomes] fixed and non-speculative . . . .”
Broadbent, supra at 125-126.
But, this does not mean, as argued
by WHF, that an ascertainable sum certain amount of money
damages must be known.
The law, as acknowledged in Broadbent is
simply that “[a] cause of action does not exist until the
conduct causes injury that produces loss or damage.”
Broadbent,
supra at 126 (quoting Saylor v. Hall, 497 S.W.2d 218, 225 (Ky.
1973)).
This legal principle is equally applicable to cases of
what MLS, Matherly, and Comer have referred to as “litigation
negligence” and all other cases of professional negligence.
The conduct that causes injury and reasonably
ascertainable damages is what triggers the one-year statute of
limitations in KRS 413.245.
Accrual of the cause of action may
be measured from the date of the occurrence or the date of
discovery depending on the case.
KRS 413.245; Faris v. Stone,
103 S.W.3d 1 (Ky. 2003).
Here, there is ample evidence in the record that GDD,
GPD, and Gardiner were well aware of their injuries at least by
December 2, 1999, when Nilsen authored the mediation position
statement.
We do not view the statements in that correspondence
26
that the damages were known, etc., to be determinative since the
letter was drafted in preparation for a proceeding that was
aimed to settling the dispute.
However, there is in the record other correspondence
from Gardiner himself to Matherly that arguably indicates GDD,
GPD, and Gardiner had knowledge of the fact of injury as well as
their damages earlier than December 2, 1999.
The parties made
this argument at the circuit court level in some detail as is
observed through a review of the motions and cross-motions for
summary judgment.
The circuit court considered all of the
evidence and found that GDD, GPD, and Gardiner knew no later
than December 2, 1999 that MLS, Matherly, and Comer had caused
them damage.
We cannot see the error in this based on the
evidence in the case and the principles that determine when a
cause of action accrues under KRS 413.245.
In conclusion, the claims of GDD, GPD, and Gardiner
against MLS, Matherly, and Comer are not barred by the one-year
statute of limitations in KRS 413.245 to the extent that they
relate to land surveying services rendered.
However, the parties are in disagreement about whether
the services GDD, GPD, and Gardiner complain are those of a
professional engineer or those of a land surveyor.
This, in our
view, is a question to be determined by the trial court.
Therefore, the judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court is
27
vacated and the case remanded to the circuit court for a
determination of what services are professional engineering
versus land surveying.
To the extent that the claims relate to
professional engineering, they are subject to the one-year
statute of limitations in KRS 413.245 and should be dismissed
with respect to MLS, Matherly, and Comer.
To the extent that
the claims relate to land surveying, they are not subject to the
statute of limitations in KRS 413.245.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS, GARDINER
PARK DEVELOPMENT, LLC,
GARDINER DESIGN & DEVELOPMENT,
INC., and GREGORY S. GARDINER:
F. Larkin Fore
Sarah M. Fore
Louisville, Kentucky
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEES, MATHERLY LAND
SURVEYING, INC., ALVA
MATHERLY, and CARL DOUGLAS
COMER:
Robert M. Brooks
Louisville, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLANTS,
GARDINER PARK DEVELOPMENT,
LLC, GARDINER DESIGN &
DEVELOPMENT, INC., and GREGORY
S. GARDINER:
Sarah M. Fore
Louisville, Kentucky
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANTS, D. SEAN
NILSEN and WOODWARD, HOBSON &
FULTON, LLP:
C. Terrell Miller
Bowling Green, Kentucky
Elizabeth Ullmer Mendel
Louisville, Kentucky
28
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLANTS,
D. SEAN NILSEN AND WOODWARD,
HOBSON & FULTON, LLP:
Elizabeth Ullmer Mendel
Louisville, Kentucky
29
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