AND DIYUN D. BYARS v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: April 15, 2005; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-001655-MR
AND
NO. 2004-CA-000088-MR
DIYUN D. BYARS
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS B. WINE, JUDGE
ACTION NOS. 99-CR-000600, 99-CR-001441,
00-CR-000342, 00-CR-000586, AND 01-CR-000078
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION AND ORDER
AFFIRMING
AND DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUIDUGLI AND MINTON, JUDGES; EMBERTON, SENIOR JUDGE.1
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE:
Diyun D. Byars appeals, pro se, from the
Jefferson Circuit Court’s opinions and orders denying his RCr
11.42 motion and his CR 59.05 motion.
consolidated the appeals.
This Court has
Having thoroughly reviewed the
record, applicable rules, statutes and case law, we affirm.
1
Senior Judge Thomas D. Emberton, sitting as Special Judge by assignment of
the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 100(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution
and KRS 21.580.
Following several separate incidences, Byars was
indicted by the Jefferson County Grand Jury on the following
charges:
1) indictment 99-CR-0600, assault, first degree (KRS
508.010); 2) indictment 99-CR-1441, robbery, first degree (KRS
515.020); 3) indictment 00-CR-342, wanton endangerment, first
degree (KRS 508.060), trafficking in marijuana, less than eight
ounces (KRS 218A.1421), and persistent felony offender, second
degree (KRS 532.080); 4) indictment 00-CR-586, robbery, first
degree (KRS 515.020); and 5) indictment 01-CR-78, illegal
possession of a controlled substance (marijuana) while in
possession of a firearm (KRS 218A.1422, KRS 218A.992).
separate attorneys represented Byars.
Two
Honorable Dan Taylor
represented Byars on indictments 99-CR-0600 and 99-CR-1441 and
Honorable Eric Bachman represented him on the remaining
indictments.
Byars appeared in court on numerous occasions
relative to the indictments, including a jury trial on
indictments 99-CR-0600 (assault, first degree) and 99-CR-1441
(robbery, first degree) that resulted in a mistrial.
Subsequently, a plea agreement was negotiated and Byars entered
a guilty plea that resolved all the indictments on January 19,
2001.
The court accepted Byars’s plea to the following charges
as set forth in the judgment:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED by
the Court that Defendant is guilty of the
following offenses and sentenced as follows:
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fifteen years for Assault in the First
Degree under Indictment No. 99CR0600;
fifteen years for Robbery in the First
Degree under Indictment No. 99CR1441; five
years for Robbery in the Second Degree under
Indictment No. 00CR0586; three years for
Wanton Endangerment in the First Degree
Under Indictment No. 00CR0342; and three
years for Illegal Possession of a Controlled
Substance (Marijuana) While in Possession of
a Firearm under Indictment No. 01CR0078.
The fifteen year sentences under 99CR0600
and 99CR1441 shall run concurrently with
each other for fifteen years. The three
year sentence under 00CR0342 and the three
year sentence under 01CR0078 shall run
concurrently with each other for three
years, but consecutively with the fifteen
year sentences (above), and consecutively
with the five year sentence under 00CR0586,
and for a total of TWENTY-THREE (23) YEARS.
(Emphasis in original).
On November 16, 2001, Byars filed a pro se RCr 11.42
motion in all five cases, alleging ineffective assistance of
counsel.
At Byars’s request, the court appointed counsel and
permitted supplemental briefing on the issues.
On April 5,
2002, appointed counsel filed a supplemental memorandum raising
the following three issues:
(1) Byars’s guilty plea was not
entered into knowingly and voluntarily because counsel failed to
determine his mental condition at the time of the alleged
offenses; (2) counsel failed to investigate the existence of a
probable extreme emotional disturbance (EED) defense; and (3)
counsel was ineffective in not requesting a competency hearing
as required by KRS 504.100(3).
Following the Commonwealth’s
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response and at Byars’s request, the court ordered funds to be
provided (up to $4,000) to permit Byars to obtain the services
of a clinical psychologist to “assist [Byars’s] counsel with the
investigation of, preparation for, and possible presentation of
issues and evidence regarding issues raised in [Byars’s] postconviction proceedings. . . .”
2002.
That order was entered May 22,
No additional action was taken in the case and on
February 10, 2003, the court entered an opinion and order
denying Byars’s RCr 11.42 motion.
Byars’s counsel timely filed a CR 59.05 motion
contending that the order was entered prematurely and without
notice to counsel.
In response, the court entered a new order
giving Byars an additional ninety days to supplement the record.
Specifically, the order stated, in relevant part:
On February 10, 2003, after eight
months of waiting for [Byars’s] counsel to
advise of any new information, the Court
ruled on the pending motions. Only then did
[Byars’s] assigned counsel make any effort
to determine the status of the evaluation.
The February 12, 2003[,] letter from Dr.
[Drogin] [the expert hired by Byars]
indicates that additional evaluation is
necessary. [Byars] shall have an additional
ninety (90) days to supplement the record.
If not supplemented, the Order of February
10, 2003[,] shall be entered.
[Byars’s] motion to vacate the Order of
February 10, 2003[,] is GRANTED. However,
this Court will not allow an open ended time
period for counsel [to] supplement [Byars’s]
original pro se motion.
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Following the entry of this order, Byars’s appointed
counsel filed a second supplemental memorandum in support of his
RCr 11.42 motion raising three additional issues.
issues were:
Those new
(1) original counsel’s failure to investigate a
victim’s identification of Byars; (2) failure to argue that
conviction on both the robbery first and assault first charges
violated double jeopardy; and (3) failure of counsel to demand a
competency hearing prior to entering a guilty plea.
Following
the Commonwealth’s response and no additional information being
provided by Byars as to his mental capacity, the court entered
another opinion and order denying Byars’s RCr 11.42 motion on
July 21, 2003.
In that opinion and order, the court stated:
This Court agrees the Commonwealth has
failed to address any of the issues raised
in the second supplemental brief, citing
only cases which stand for the proposition
that [Byars] is not entitled to multiple
bites at the post Judgment relief apple.
However, those grounds discussed in the
second supplemental motion filed by counsel
are identical to those filed by [Byars] pro
se and in the counsel assisted first
supplemental motion. Counsel has
supplemented the original motions with a
memorandum dated February 17, 2003[,] from
Bob Schildknecht which gives a brief
description of the medications “referred to
in the case of Diyun Byars”. Schildknecht’s
identity and qualifications are unknown to
the Court. There is no record in the file
of the evaluation Dr. Drogin was hired to
conduct, nor reference as to when these
medications were prescribed, in what dosage,
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for how long, nor their effect on the
ability of [Byars] to comprehend events
surrounding the allegation contained in
these indictments. Drogin suggested in his
letter of February 12, 2003, that [Byars] be
referred to the Kentucky Correctional
Psychiatric Center (KCPC) for further
evaluation. Either that was done and the
results did not support [Byars’s]
contentions or because of the treatment at
the Green River Correctional Complex (also
referred to in Drogin’s February 13, 2003[,]
letter) it was determined an additional
evaluation was not necessary.
Regardless, there is nothing of
substance, and only speculation in the
pleadings filed in [Byars’s] pro se and
counsel assisted pleadings that he was not
competent to stand trial or to enter a plea
of guilty.
[Byars] and his counsel ignore the fact
that this Court had ample opportunity to
observe [Byars] on numerous occasions during
pretrial hearings. Further, a jury was
selected on August 15, 2000[,] for the
purpose of trying the charges of Robbery I
and Assault I under 99CR0600 and 99CR1441.
Jury selection and the trial testimony
lasted more than thirteen hours before a
mistrial was declared. At no time did
[Byars’s] behavior suggest there were any
physical or mental problems. Subsequently
the co-defendant pled guilty [on] August 18,
2000.
On [January] 19, 2001, [Byars] pled
guilty to Robbery I and Assault I pursuant
to Alford vs. North Carolina. Thus, [Byars]
knew most if not all the facts against him.
While he disputed those facts, just as he
does now, he pled guilty to avoid more
serious consequences – forty (40) years
under these indictments; five years under
00CR342 charging him with Wanton
Endangerment I, twenty years under 00CR586;
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charging him with Robber[y] I (later amended
to Robbery II); and five years for Illegal
Possession of a Controlled Substance while
in Possession of a Fire Arm. [Byars] denied
suffering from any mental or physical
problems or taking any medication which
would affect his ability to understand the
proceedings.
He was competently represented by two
different counsel, the Honorable Dan Taylor
(99CR1441 and 99CR0600) and the Honorable
Eric Bachman (00CR586, 00CR342 and
01CR0078). [Byars] faced as much as seventy
(70) years in the penitentiary for two
counts of Robbery I, Assault I, Wanton
Endangerment I and Illegal Possession of a
Controlled Substance while in Possession of
a Firearm. The minimum sentence was twentytwo years (00CR342, 00CR586 and 01CR0078
were all committed while [Byars] was
awaiting trial for the offenses under
99CR0600 and 99CR1441, so pursuant to KRS
532.060 they had to run consecutive). Thus
[Byars] received one year more than the
minimum.
The supplemental proceedings raise no
new issues not previously addressed by this
Court on February 7, 2003. Therefore, the
Court again adopts the Findings and
Conclusions of Law and DENIES [Byars’s]
motion for Post Judgment relief pursuant to
RCr 11.42. The Court believes Byars
knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently
entered into pleas of guilty on January 19,
2001. (Emphasis in original).
Byars appealed that order, which is the basis for appeal number
2003-CA-001655-MR.
Thereafter, on October 27, 2003, Byars, acting pro se,
filed a motion entitled motion for clarification of final
judgment and sentence.
In this motion, Byars contends that the
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court should “clarify” his sentence and instruct the Kentucky
Department of Corrections that he is not a violent offender
under KRS 439.3401 in that his plea did not specifically
designate him as a violent offender.
On October 29, 2003, the
circuit court denied his motion reasoning that it had no
jurisdiction over the issue as more than ten (10) days had
passed since the entry of the final judgment (January 19, 2001).
Byars elected not to appeal that order, but instead filed a
motion to alter, amend or vacate judgment pursuant to CR 59.05.
On November 19, 2003, the circuit court entered an order denying
Byars’s CR 59.05 motion.
Byars filed a timely notice of appeal
designating the November 19, 2003, order denying his CR 59.05
motion as the order being appealed.
number 2004-CA-000088-MR.
This second appeal is case
This Court consolidated both appeals
and the Commonwealth’s motion to dismiss appeal number 2004-CA000088-MR was passed to the merits panel for determination.
We shall address the second appeal (No. 2004-CA000088-MR) first.
In this appeal, the Commonwealth moves to
dismiss arguing that an order denying a motion pursuant to CR
59.05 is not a final and appealable order.
In response to this
motion, Byars argues that he is acting “pro se without the
benefit of counsel” and “is a layman at law with no legal
training whatsoever” and should be “held to a less stringent
standard of review.”
While we agree with the Commonwealth that
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a CR 59.05 motion is not final and appealable, it is clear that
Byars intended to appeal the denial of his motion to clarify.
As such, we deny the Commonwealth’s motion to dismiss.
Addressing the issue raised by Byars, we believe the
recent case of Jackson v. Taylor2 to be factually similar and the
opinion dispositive of the issues raised herein by Byars.
Jackson, this Court held:
Jackson’s primary claim of error on
appeal is that he could not have been
considered a “violent offender” under KRS
439.3401. Specifically, Jackson notes that
his final judgment and sentence does not
expressly state that he was convicted of a
Class B felony involving the death or
serious physical injury of the victim.
Hence, according to Jackson, since KRS
439.3401(1) states that “[t]he [trial] court
shall designate in its judgment if the
victim suffered death or serious physical
injury,” he could not have been considered a
“violent offender” under the statute. We
disagree.
Pursuant to KRS 439.3401(1), a person
is considered a “violent offender” if, inter
alia, that person has been convicted of or
has pleaded guilty to the commission of a
“Class B felony involving the death of the
victim or serious physical injury to a
victim[.]” As we mentioned above, Jackson
pled guilty to three counts of assault in
the first degree, which is a Class B felony.
Under KRS 508.010, a person is guilty of
assault in the first degree when:
(a) He intentionally causes
serious physical injury to another
person by means of a deadly weapon
2
153 S.W.3d 842 (Ky.App. 2004).
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In
or a dangerous instrument
[emphasis added]; or
(b) Under circumstances
manifesting extreme indifference
to the value of human life he
wantonly engages in conduct which
creates a grave risk of death to
another and thereby causes serious
physical injury to another person
[emphasis added].
Therefore, under KRS 508.010, a
conviction for assault in the first degree
necessarily means that the victim suffered
“serious physical injury.” Hence, when
Jackson pled guilty to three counts of
assault in the first degree, he effectively
admitted that the victims of those offenses
suffered serious physical injures. []
Jackson is correct that KRS 439.3401(1)
requires trial courts to designate in its
(sic) judgment whether the victim of a Class
B felony “suffered death or serious physical
injury.” However, since a conviction for
assault in the first degree necessarily
means that the victim suffered “serious
physical injury,” a conviction for assault
in the first degree appearing on a
defendant’s final judgment satisfies the
statute’s designation requirement.
Accordingly, Jackson was properly considered
a “violent offender” under KRS 439.3401.
In addition to claiming that he could
not have been considered a “violent
offender” under KRS 439.3401, Jackson has
argued in his brief that his final judgment
and sentence may not now be amended to
specifically state that he was convicted of
a Class B felony involving the death or
serious physical injury of the victim. In
support of this argument, Jackson relies
upon the law of the case doctrine and
separation of power principles. However, as
we stated previously, even though Jackson’s
final judgment did not expressly state that
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he had been convicted of a Class B felony
involving the death or serious injury of the
victim, Jackson was still properly
considered a “violent offender” under KRS
439.3401. Accordingly, since there is no
need to amend Jackson’s final judgment and
sentence, we will not discuss these issues
on appeal.[3]
The Jackson case is the controlling law to be applied to this
case.
And based upon Jackson, we affirm the trial court’s
denial of Byars’ motion to clarify his sentence.
Byars also appealed the denial of his RCr 11.42 motion
(Appeal No. 2003-CA-001655).
In that appeal, Byars raises
numerous issues in his pro se appellate brief.
We agree with
the Commonwealth that it appears Byars has raised the following
seven (7) areas of alleged error:
(1) counsel was ineffective
because of a merger of offenses (double jeopardy as to assault
first and robbery first); (2) counsel failed to interview a
potential witness; (3) counsel coerced Byars into pleading
guilty; (4) counsel failed to explore Byars’s alleged mental
deficiencies; (5) counsel failed to explain the possibility of
an extreme emotional disturbance (EED) defense; (6) counsel
failed to request a competency hearing; and (7) counsel failed
to challenge a witness’s out-of-court identification (photo
lineup).
3
Id. at 843-44.
(Footnote omitted.)
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Recently the Kentucky Supreme Court again addressed
the standard of review to be applied in RCr 11.42 motions.
Hodge v. Commonwealth,4 our Supreme Court stated:
It is again necessary to set out the
standard of review for claims raised in a
collateral attack pursuant to RCr 11.42,
alleging ineffective assistance of counsel
at the trial. Such a motion is limited to
the issues that were not and could not be
raised on direct appeal. An issue raised
and rejected on direct appeal may not be
reconsidered in these proceedings by simply
claiming that it amounts to ineffective
assistance of counsel. Haight v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 41 S.W.3d 436 (2001),
citing Sanborn v. Commonwealth, Ky., 975
S.W.2d 905 (1998).
The standards which measure ineffective
assistance of counsel have been set out in
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104
S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); accord
Gall v. Commonwealth, Ky., 702 S.W.2d 37
(1985). In order to be ineffective, the
performance of defense counsel must be below
the objective standard of reasonableness and
so prejudicial as to deprive a defendant of
a fair trial and a reasonable result.
Strickland, supra. It must be demonstrated
that, absent the errors by trial counsel,
there is a reasonable probability that the
jury would have reached a different result.
See Norton v. Commonwealth, Ky., 63 S.W.3d
175 (2001). The purpose of RCr 11.42 is to
provide a forum for known grievances, not to
provide an opportunity to research for
grievances. Gilliam v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
652 S.W.2d 856 (1983); Haight, supra.
The RCr 11.42 motion must set forth all
facts necessary to establish the existence
of a constitutional violation. The court
4
116 S.W.3d 463 (Ky. 2003).
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In
will not presume that facts omitted from the
motion establish the existence of such a
violation. Cf. Skaggs v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
803 S.W.2d 573 (1990).
. . .
Conclusionary allegations which are not
supported with specific facts do not justify
an evidentiary hearing because RCr 11.42
does not require a hearing to serve the
function of discovery. Stanford v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 854 S.W.2d 742 (1993).
Our review of the record indicates that it
conclusively disposes of the allegations.
. . .
The burden is on the movant to
establish convincingly that he has been
deprived of some substantial right which
would justify the extraordinary relief
afforded by post-conviction proceedings.
Dorton v. Commonwealth, Ky., 433 S.W.2d 117
(1968); See also Haight.
. . .
As noted in Strickland, no particular
set of detailed rules for counsel’s conduct
can satisfactorily take into account the
variety of circumstances faced by defense
counsel or the range of legitimate decisions
regarding how best to represent a criminal
defendant. Any such set of rules would
interfere with the constitutionally
protected independence of counsel and
restrict the wide latitude counsel must have
in making tactical decisions.
. . .
Judicial review of the performance of
defense counsel must be very deferential to
counsel and to the circumstances under which
they are required to operate. There is
always a strong presumption that the conduct
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of counsel falls within the wide range of
reasonable professional assistance because
hindsight is always perfect. Cf. Bell v.
Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 122 S.Ct. 1843, 152
L.Ed.2d 914 (2002).
Technical errors which do not deprive a
defendant of a substantive or procedural
right to which the law entitles the
defendant or a fair trial are not sufficient
to establish prejudice under Strickland.
Cf. Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 113
S.Ct. 838, 12 L.Ed.2d 180 (1993); Baze v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 23 S.W.3d 619 (2000);
Norton, supra.[5]
With this standard of review in mind, we believe it
unnecessary to address each of Byars’s allegations individually.
A review of the record, and specifically of the video tape of
the plea on January 19, 2001, refutes Byars’s contentions of
ineffective assistance of counsel.
Byars was represented by two
seasoned defense counsel, who each pursued his defense
professionally and aggressively.
Attorney Taylor was prepared
for and had begun a jury trial on the two more serious charges
when a mistrial was declared.
The plea was entered months after
the indictments were issued and only after numerous court
appearances, several motion hearings, a mistrial, entry of
guilty pleas by co-defendants, review of the evidence, and in
consultation with Byars.
As the trial court stated in its July
21, 2003 order, there “is nothing of substance, and only
speculation in the pleadings filed in [Byars’s] pro se and
5
Id. at 467-69.
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counsel assisted pleadings that he was not competent to stand
trial or to enter a guilty plea.”
The trial court and both
attorneys had ample opportunity to observe Byars and there was
no basis to believe a competency hearing under KRS 504.100 was
indicated.
Our review of Byars’s entry of the plea confirms the
trial court’s finding that “[a]t no time did [Byars’s] behavior
suggest there were any physical or mental problems.”
Byars received the benefit of a well negotiated plea
that reduced a potential 70 year sentence to one year above the
minimum he could have received if he went to trial on all the
charges.
This is because some of the sentences had to run
consecutively since they occurred while he was awaiting trial.6
On the day of the plea, the trial court thoroughly and
meticulously explained to Byars his constitutional rights, the
various charges against him, and the effects of his plea.
Byars
freely acknowledged that he had discussed the plea with his
attorneys, that he was pleased with their representation, that
he was in fact guilty of the charges, and that he was
voluntarily entering his plea.
Byars has failed to overcome the
strong presumption that counsel failed to render reasonably
professional assistance and that he would not have entered his
plea otherwise.
6
Thus, the guilty plea was valid, and a valid
KRS 532.060.
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guilty plea waives all defenses, except that the indictment does
not charge a public offense.7
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the orders of the
Jefferson Circuit Court, which form the basis of these two
appeals, and deny the Commonwealth’s motion to dismiss in Appeal
No. 2004-CA-000088-MR.
ALL CONCUR.
ENTERED:
April 15, 2005______
\s\ Daniel T. Guidugli_____
JUDGE, COURT OF APPEALS
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Diyun Byars, pro se
Central City, KY
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General
Ken W. Riggs
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, KY
7
Bush v. Commonwealth, 702 S.W.2d 46 (Ky. 1986); Sanders v. Commonwealth, 663
S.W.2d 216 (Ky.App. 1984).
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