OMER COOK v. CHRISTOPHER FAMILY, LLC; THOMAS CHRISTOPHER; ROBERT ROBERTS; JEANETTE ROBERTS; SAM FINLEY; and CAROLYN FINLEY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED:
NOVEMBER 18, 2005; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-001116-MR
AND
CROSS APPEAL NO. 2003-CA-001180-MR
OMER COOK
v.
APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE
APPEAL AND CROSS-APPEAL FROM MARION CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ALLAN RAY BERTRAM, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 99-CI-00145
CHRISTOPHER FAMILY, LLC;
THOMAS CHRISTOPHER; ROBERT ROBERTS;
JEANETTE ROBERTS; SAM FINLEY; and
CAROLYN FINLEY
APPELLEES/CROSS-APPELLANTS
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART, AND
REMANDING IN PART
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
TACKETT AND VANMETER, JUDGES; MILLER, SENIOR JUDGE. 1
VANMETER, JUDGE:
This is an appeal and cross-appeal from a
judgment entered by the Marion Circuit Court after a jury found
for appellees Christopher Family, LLC (LLC), Thomas Christopher
1
Senior Judge John D. Miller sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the
Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and
KRS 21.580.
(Christopher), Robert Roberts, Jeanette Roberts, Sam Finley and
Carolyn Finley on their claims that appellant Omer Cook
trespassed on and wrongfully harvested timber from their land.
For the reasons stated hereafter, we affirm in part and remand
in part.
Briefly, the record shows that appellees and Cook
owned various adjacent tracts of land in Marion County.
In June
1999, appellees filed the underlying action alleging that Cook
had trespassed and wrongfully harvested timber from their
property, and they sought relief pursuant to KRS 364.130.
Cook
defended by asserting that he possessed legal title to the
property and/or that he had acquired the contested areas
pursuant to parole boundary agreements.
After a trial, a jury found in favor of appellees as
to all claims except Sam Finley’s claim of outrage.
The trial
court entered a judgment consistent with the jury’s award of 10%
of the damages requested by appellees.
The court then trebled
certain damages, and it awarded costs and attorney’s fees.
Cook
appealed, raising more than sixty issues and sub-issues in his
appellate brief. 2
Appellees cross-appealed as to the inadequacy
of the award of damages.
For the reasons stated hereafter, we
affirm except insofar as we remand for further proceedings to
2
As the trial court stated in several orders, the parties “have filed enough
motions and memos to choke a goat.”
-2-
determine the Finleys’ interests in the award of damages
relating to Tract 9.
First, Cook contends that the trial court abused its
discretion by failing to grant his motions for a continuance of
the trial based on any one of several possible grounds, and that
the court erred by failing to later afford posttrial relief
based on the same grounds.
We disagree.
The first ground raised by Cook relates to the
property surveys conducted by appellees’ surveyor, Sam Anzelmo.
Cook asserts when Anzelmo was first deposed in March 2002,
Cook’s counsel was new to the case and therefore was unable to
effectively cross-examine the surveyor.
Cook argues that he was
prejudiced when the trial court, in November 2002, refused to
grant a continuance so that he could depose Anzelmo after
Anzelmo revisited the property and allegedly modified his
survey.
However, Cook fails to note that his counsel in fact
deposed Anzelmo a second time in September 2002, after the
latter’s return to the property, but chose not to question him
regarding any newly-gathered information.
Although Cook complains that Anzelmo brought a
“corrected” survey to court, that survey was not admitted into
evidence.
Moreover, Anzelmo indicated below that there were no
relevant substantive differences between the two surveys as to
the locations of the disputed boundary lines, that his
-3-
corrections were made only to comply with the county clerk’s
formal filing requirements, and that none of his opinions had
changed.
In response to Cook’s motion, the court delayed the
trial for some ninety minutes and then, after Anzelmo’s direct
examination, adjourned the trial to the following day to allow
Cook’s counsel time to prepare for cross-examination.
Under
these circumstances, we cannot say that the court abused its
discretion by denying Cook’s request for a continuance, or that
it later erred by denying his motion for a mistrial on this
ground.
Cook also asserts that the trial court erred by
permitting Christopher to intervene and assert a claim of
outrage against Cook some eleven days prior to trial.
We
disagree.
CR 15.01 provides that once a responsive pleading has
been served, a pleading may be amended “only by leave of court,”
which “shall be freely given where justice so requires.”
The
trial court possesses broad discretion in determining whether to
permit such an amendment. 3
Here, the record indicates that Christopher was the
managing member of the LLC.
Although the parties agreed to
dismiss the LLC’s outrage claim shortly before trial,
Christopher was permitted to individually intervene in lieu of
3
See, e.g., Cheshire v. Barbour, 481 S.W.2d 274, 276 (Ky. 1972); First
National Bank of Cincinnati v. Hartmann, 747 S.W.2d 614, 616 (Ky.App. 1988).
-4-
his involvement on the LLC’s behalf.
The allegations supporting
Christopher’s individual outrage claim were the same as those
which had supported the LLC’s outrage claim, and Cook already
had conducted discovery and extensively questioned Christopher
about those allegations during a September 2002 deposition.
As
the trial court stated in its order denying Cook’s motion for a
new trial,
[t]hroughout this litigation outrage claims
had been asserted by the Christopher Family,
LLC and Sam Finley. Christopher Family,
LLC’s claim of outrage consisted of acts
taken by the Defendant against the LLC’s
managing member, Tom Christopher. Discovery
was taken, including the deposition of Tom
Christopher regarding the Christopher
Family, LLC’s outrage claim. When the issue
arose as to whether or not the Christopher
Family, LLC could maintain a cause of action
under the tort of outrage Tom Christopher
was permitted to intervene and file a claim
for the tort of outrage. This was not
prejudicial to the Defendant.
Under these circumstances we cannot say that the trial court
abused its discretion by permitting Christopher to intervene and
assert a claim of outrage.
We also are not persuaded by Cook’s argument that
Christopher’s outrage claim should have been dismissed for
failure to state a claim.
Unlike the situations described in
Banks v. Fritsch 4 and the other cases cited by Cook, here the
alleged outrageous conduct did not involve touching or threats
4
39 S.W.3d 474 (Ky.App. 2001).
-5-
of touching which could amount to causes of action under
traditional torts.
The tort of outrage is a “gap filler” tort
which is intended to provide a remedy where the defendant’s
“actions or conduct is intended only to cause extreme emotional
distress to the victim,” 5 and no other tort is intended.
In Burgess v. Taylor, 6 a panel of this court reiterated
that
[i]n order to recover under the tort of
outrage, a plaintiff must prove:
1) the wrongdoer’s conduct must be
intentional or reckless;
2) the conduct must be outrageous and
intolerable in that it offends against
the generally accepted standards of
decency and morality;
3) there must be a causal connection
between the wrongdoer’s conduct and the
emotional distress; and
4) the emotional distress must be
severe.
Here, appellees adduced evidence to show that Cook threatened
Christopher’s life, property and employees.
As there was a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether Cook in fact
intended to cause severe emotional distress to Christopher, the
trial court did not err by failing to grant a summary judgment
in Cook’s favor as to Christopher’s outrage claim.
5
Brewer v. Hillard, 15 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Ky.App. 1999).
6
44 S.W.3d 806, 811 (Ky.App. 2001).
-6-
Moreover, we
are not persuaded by Cook’s argument that he was denied due
process when he was not afforded twenty days before trial in
which to answer appellees’ third amended complaint, as Cook not
only filed an answer to the amended complaint but he raised
multiple defenses that were not previously raised in response to
appellees’ claims.
Further, we are not persuaded by Cook’s contention
that he is entitled to relief because the trial court failed to
rule on numerous pending motions earlier than the day before or
the day of trial.
Despite the obvious advantages of having
substantial advance notice of a trial court’s rulings on pending
motions, a party is not entitled to receive such notice by a
particular date.
Next, Cook contends that the trial court erred by
finding that appellees hold record title to seven particular
tracts of land.
We disagree.
Title to land may be shown by proof that the land
comes from the Commonwealth, by proof of title to a common
source with the opposing party, or by proof of adverse
possession. 7
Although Cook correctly notes that our highest
7
Skaggs v. Ohio Valley Rock Asphalt Co., 292 Ky. 758, 166 S.W.2d 1005, 1007
(1942); Bentley v. Kentland Coal & Coke Co., 242 Ky. 511, 46 S.W.2d 1077
(1932). See also Rose v. Griffith, 337 S.W.2d 15 (Ky. 1960); Noland v. Wise,
259 S.W.2d 46 (Ky. 1953); Martt v. McBrayer, 292 Ky. 479, 166 S.W.2d 823
(1942).
-7-
court held in Bolin v. Buckhorn Coal & Lumber Co. 8 that proof of
title “through a common grantor is not sufficient to dispense
with proof of title from the commonwealth, where the tracts are
separate and distinct and the common grantor’s title was derived
from separate sources[,]” that court also held that “where each
of the parties claims that the disputed strip is covered by his
deed, proof of title to a common grantor is all that is
required.”
Hence, except in certain instances not relevant
here, it is not necessary to trace title back to the
Commonwealth where both parties can prove title to their
property back to a common grantor. 9
If a defendant files a
counterclaim asserting title, both parties must prove their
respective claims. 10
Here, Cook has challenged the trial court’s summary
judgment finding that appellees hold legal record title to seven
of the thirteen tracts surveyed for purposes of this action. 11
We disagree, as it is clear from a careful review of the record
that the parties’ tracts trace back to common sources.
The record shows that the Cooks’ Tract 2, and the
Finleys’ Tracts 3 and 4, share a common source of title as
8
211 Ky. 847, 278 S.W. 154, 154 (1925).
9
Jones v. O’Connell, 237 Ky. 219, 35 S.W.2d 290, 292 (1931).
10
Madden v. Bond, 269 Ky. 31, 106 S.W.2d 95 (1937).
11
Tracts 3, 4, 8, 9, 10, 12 and 13.
-8-
reflected in Deed Book 53, page 522, dated April 14, 1937,
pertaining to the conveyance of 640 acres which subsequently
were divided.
Similarly, the Cooks’ Tract 7, and the LLC’s
Tract 8, share a common source of title as reflected in Deed
Book 9, page 525, dated June 4, 1877, regarding the conveyance
of 218 acres which subsequently were divided to form Tract 7 on
the north end of the property and Tract 8 on the south.
Tract 9, which apparently is owned by Sam Finley,
Edwin Smith, James Tyler and Larry Kruse, can be traced back to
an 1848 land grant to William Hayes 12 .
Although the original
deeds were destroyed in an 1863 courthouse fire, the record
shows that on April 21, 1864, the Marion County Clerk certified
that on October 15, 1851, William Hays [sic] and Nancy Hays
[sic] conveyed to Samuel Kinnett their interests in two parcels
of land including the 201-acre land grant parcel from which
Tract 9 evidently was later carved.
The clerk also certified
that on October 13, 1851, Henry Taylor, Artemisia Taylor, Usia
Gartin and Elizabeth Gartin transferred their interests in the
same property to Samuel Kinnett.
Thus, the undisputed record
shows that through two different transactions conducted three
years after the land grant was issued, the three couples
conveyed to Kinnett all their interests in the subject property.
12
Also spelled as “Hays” in the various records.
-9-
Cook nevertheless argues that subsequent title to
Tract 9 was not adequately traced because there is a gap between
Samuel Kinnett’s 1851 acquisition of the property and Charles
Kinnett’s 1867 conveyance of the property to others.
However,
the 1867 deed in fact shows that Charles Kinnett acquired title
to the property when it was “hereby Sold under Samuel Kinnetts
heirs.”
In the absence of any evidence to contradict that
recorded statement, we are not persuaded by Cook’s assertion
that appellees’ source of title was not adequately traced to the
1848 land grant.
However, this matter must be remanded for a
determination of the Finleys’ proportionate interests in the
damages resulting from the claims relating to Tract 9.
Although
Edwin Smith, James Tyler, and Tina Tyler each assigned and
conveyed to Finley “all of their right, title and interests” in
any claims against Cook in this action, the record does not
address whether the fourth purchaser listed in the 1972 deed,
Larry Kruse, continues to hold any interest in Tract 9.
If an
interest in Tract 9 is held by Kruse or by his heirs or
assignees, on remand the trial court must conduct further
proceedings to determine the Finleys’ interests in the award of
damages relating to Tract 9.
Next, the LLC’s Tracts 10 and 13, and the Cooks’ Tract
5, share a common source of title as reflected in a deed filed
-10-
at Deed Book 136, page 526, dated August 8, 1984, which
transferred four parcels of land including Tracts 5, 10 and 13.
The Cooks acquired Tract 5 in 1990, while the LLC acquired the
remaining parcels, or portions thereof, as reflected in Deed
Book 191, page 498, dated March 18, 1997.
Thus, the parties’
respective titles to Tracts 5, 10 and 13 may be traced back to
the common 1984 source.
Any and all interests which the
Frenches may have in the claims against Cook were assigned to
the LLC in April 2002.
Finally, the Cooks’ Tract 11 and the LLC’s Tract 12
share a common source of title in Deed Book 109, page 150, dated
January 3, 1977, regarding the conveyance of some 140 acres to
Harry and Lois Hinsley.
The Hinsleys transferred to the LLC’s
predecessors in title some 121 acres (Tract 12) of the 140-acre
parcel, as documented in Deed Book 129, page 264, dated October
11, 1980.
Deed Book 156, page 119, dated October 16, 1990,
reflects that the Hinsleys transferred to the Cooks the
remainder (Tract 11) of the 140-acre parcel, specifically
excepting the 121 acres earlier transferred to the LLC’s
predecessors.
Contrary to Cook’s contention, the conveyances do
not appear to be in conflict.
In summary, after carefully reviewing the record,
including the evidence as to appellees’ possession of the
property, we conclude that except as to any possible ownership
-11-
interest retained by Larry Kruse or his assignees in Tract 9,
the trial court did not err by granting summary judgment
regarding the ownership of the tracts in issue.
Next, Cook contends that the trial court erred both by
failing to find as a matter of law that some of appellees’
timber trespass claims were barred by limitations, and by
finding that appellees were entitled to assert claims assigned
to them by others.
We disagree.
KRS 413.120(4) requires any action for “trespass on
real or personal property” to be “commenced within five (5)
years after the cause of action accrued[.]”
Hence, the LLC
could not pursue any claims regarding trespass which occurred
more than five years prior to the filing of their initial
complaint on June 11, 1999.
Further, the Finleys and the
Roberts could not pursue any claims regarding trespass which
occurred more than five years before their April 2000 entry into
the case, and Christopher could not pursue any claims of
trespass which occurred more than five years before his November
2002 joinder.
The record shows that appellees’ trespass claims
relate to events which occurred after April 1995.
Although Cook
asserts that the Roberts waived all claims by failing to
identify any trespass while still in possession of the property,
there is evidence that shortly before selling the property to
-12-
the LLC in 1999, Cook and Robert Roberts discussed the location
of boundary lines and Roberts voiced an intent to obtain a
survey.
After Cook nevertheless continued to log and hunt in
the disputed area, the Roberts and the LLC, as their successor
in title, jointly made the claim below and thereby ensured that
the claims were brought by the parties in possession of the
property at all pertinent times.
Further, although the Frenches did not join the
proceedings below, they assigned any and all of their claims
against Cook to the LLC.
Contrary to Cook’s assertion the
assignment of those interests, and the assignment to the Finleys
of the interests of at least two of the three Tract 9 co-owners,
were not void as champertous given the LLC’s and the Finleys’
existing interests in the proceedings and their status as
legitimate parties. 13
Also, we are not persuaded by Cook’s
assertion that those claims were choses in action which were not
assignable, as it is well established in Kentucky that even a
parol assignment of a chose of action is valid to transfer a
party’s rights in any possible recovery. 14
Regardless of whether there is evidence that timber
trespass occurred more than five years before the June 1999
13
See KRS 372.060. See also Whisman v. Wells, 206 Ky. 59, 266 S.W. 897
(1924); Wilhoit’s Adm’x v. Richardson, 193 Ky. 559, 236 S.W. 1025 (1921).
14
Young v. Auxier, 302 Ky. 571, 195 S.W.2d 295, 298 (1946).
-13-
filing of the LLC’s initial complaint, the record shows that all
of the parties’ claims of timber trespass pertain to dates after
April 1995.
Although Cook seems to argue that the evidence was
insufficient to send the claims to the jury, the record in fact
shows that there was considerable evidence of timber trespass by
Cook within the five-year period preceding each party’s claim.
The weight to be given to the evidence against Cook was an issue
for the finder of fact herein.
Next, other than as to the possible Tract 9 issue
discussed above, we are not persuaded by Cook’s contention that
appellees’ recovery should be limited because their cotenants in
title were not joined as parties below.
It is settled that the
assignee of an interest in property is the real party in
interest, and that a court may grant complete relief even in the
absence of the assignors of such interests. 15
Moreover, we have
found and Cook has cited to nothing in the record to show that
he timely preserved his contention that his wife, as the owner
of an undivided one-half interest in the property in dispute,
was an indispensable party to the proceedings below.
Hence,
this issue will not be further discussed on appeal.
Next, Cook contends that the trial court erred by
entering summary judgment for appellees on his claim of
ownership by adverse possession.
Cook relies on KRS 413.072(4),
15
See Maxwell v. Moorman, 522 S.W.2d 441 (Ky. 1975); Root v. John Deere Co.
of Indianapolis, Inc., 413 S.W.2d 901 (Ky. 1967).
-14-
which provides that for purposes of nuisance and trespass, a
silvicultural operation “shall be deemed continuously operating
so long as the property supports an actual or developing
forest.”
However, that statute simply has no relevance to any
claim by Cook that he is entitled to ownership of land by
adverse possession.
Next, Cook contends that the trial court abused its
discretion by granting appellees’ motion to allow the jurors to
view a portion of the property.
Although Cook concedes that
this matter fell within the court’s sound discretion, he asserts
that in this instance the court abused its discretion because
the jurors were angered by the delay occasioned by the viewing,
because the delay increased the attorney’s fee award against
him, and because the viewing of certain parts of the property
prejudiced the jury against him.
However, after reviewing the
record we are not persuaded that the court abused its discretion
in this regard.
Moreover, we find no merit in Cook’s contention
that the court abused its discretion by allowing the jury to
dictate the course of the trial when it considered the jurors’
input when scheduling dates for the trial’s continuation.
Next, Cook contends that the trial court erred by
permitting appellees to introduce evidence of Anzelmo’s August
2000 survey, including Anzelmo’s testimony regarding the
location of the various boundaries.
-15-
We disagree.
KRE 702 provides for testimony by expert witnesses as
follows:
If scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will assist the trier
of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education, may
testify thereto in the form of an opinion or
otherwise.
Here, the record shows that both Anzelmo and Cook’s surveyor
testified in great detail regarding their opinions about the
locations of various boundary lines.
Under KRE 702, such
testimony was admissible to assist the jury as the trier of
fact, and Cook’s efforts to impeach or discredit Anzelmo’s
testimony under 201 KAR 18:150, pertaining to the standards of
practice for surveyors, went to the weight of the evidence
rather than its admissibility.
We cannot say that the trial
court abused its discretion in admitting the evidence. 16
Next, Cook contends that the trial court erred by
permitting witnesses to voice their previously-undisclosed
opinions regarding the cutting of the timber; by permitting
Anzelmo to estimate the size of the tracts based on the
measurements contained in deeds; by permitting appellees to
introduce photos without proper foundations and to introduce
some but not all of Anzelmo’s field notes; by failing to permit
16
See Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Thompson, 11 S.W.3d 575 (Ky. 2000).
-16-
Cook to introduce evidence of gunshots allegedly fired toward
his friends by LLC members or their friends; by allowing opinion
testimony regarding Christopher’s emotional distress and state
of mind; by admitting allegedly irrelevant and prejudicial
testimony as well as improper hearsay and testimony; and by
permitting Christopher to testify from notes and a videotape.
However, we are not persuaded that reversible error occurred in
regard to any of these matters.
Further, although Cook
complains that the court prohibited his witnesses and him from
testifying “about certain aspects of the parol boundary line
agreements,” the excluded testimony was not entered into the
record by avowal and thus may not be reviewed on appeal. 17
Next, Cook contends that the trial court erred when
instructing the jury.
We disagree.
Cook first alleges that the court erred by failing to
instruct the jury in accordance with the instruction set out in
Louisville Cooperage Co. v. Collins, 18 which described in great
detail the legal principles and methods which should be used by
surveyors when locating deed descriptions.
The trial court
instead simply directed the jury to find from the evidence
whether “the Anzelmo survey correctly locates the boundaries of
17
KRE 103. Noel v. Commonwealth, 76 S.W.3d 923 (Ky. 2002); Commonwealth v.
Ferrell, 17 S.W.3d 520 (Ky. 2000).
18
228 Ky. 266, 14 S.W.2d 1090, 1092 (1929).
-17-
the properties of the Plaintiffs being Tracts #3, 4, 8, 9, 10
and 12 on the Anzelmo survey[.]”
An interrogatory and
additional instructions followed.
Section 13.01 of Palmore’s Kentucky Instructions to
Juries 19 addresses the function of jury instructions as follows:
The basic function of instructions in
Kentucky is to tell the jury what it must
believe from the evidence in order to
resolve each dispositive factual issue in
favor of the party who bears the burden of
proof on that issue. In other
jurisdictions, as at common law, it may be
appropriate to say that the purpose of
instructions is to advise the jury on the
law of the case, but not in this state. The
enumeration or definition of a party’s
rights or duties is permissible only as a
convenient means of presenting the factual
question of whether such rights or duties
were violated. The increasing use of
interrogatories instead of general
instructions reflects a realization that the
less the jurors know about the law of the
case the easier it is for them to remain
strictly within the province of factfinding. The jury’s only function is to
decide disputed issues of fact, and the
instructions should seek to “fairly submit
proper issues to the jury.” In at least one
case it has been suggested that when there
is more than one issue on which a general
verdict may be based it is better practice
to submit those issues separately in the
form of special interrogatories.
“Contrary to the practice in some
jurisdictions, where the trial judge
comments at length to the jury on the law of
the case, the traditional objective of our
form of instructions is to confine the
19
(4th ed. 1989)
-18-
judge’s function to the bare essentials, and
let counsel see to it that the jury clearly
understands what the instructions mean and
what they do not mean.”
(Footnotes omitted.)
Further, Section 13.10 20 specifies that
“[r]egardless of which form is used, the instructions should be
simple, direct, and confined to the specific factual issues
raised by the pleadings and the evidence.”
Although Kentucky
Instructions to Juries does not contain a model instruction
which exactly fits the scenario now before us, the land dispute
instructions set out in Chapter 47 utilize a simple form
requiring the jury to find, for instance, whether “the trees in
question were located within the boundary described in his
deed,” 21 or whether parties “held adverse possession of any part
of the land described in the deeds from X to Y and from Y to P,
claiming it to the full extent of the boundaries mentioned
therein[.]” 22
Here, although Cook’s tendered instruction mimicked
that set out in Louisville Cooperage in 1929, it far exceeded
the “bare essentials” objective later supported in Kentucky
Instructions to Juries. 23
The court’s instruction, by contrast,
met the goal of submitting the factual issues to the jury while
20
John S. Palmore, Kentucky Instructions to Juries (4th ed. 1989).
21
See Sections 47.01 and 47.02.
22
See Sections 47.03 and 47.04.
23
Id. at Section 13.01.
-19-
leaving to counsel the opportunity to flesh out those
instructions in closing argument.
We are not persuaded that the
trial court erred when instructing the jury regarding the
Anzelmo survey lines.
Cook also argues that the court improperly instructed
the jury that he could not prove that boundary lines were
established by parol agreement unless the jury found that such
boundary lines were plainly marked by the participants to the
agreement.
However, the court’s instruction was consistent with
long-established case law which provides that
before a parol agreement is binding the
location of the boundary line must be in
doubt and a bona fide dispute must
exist . . . . We think this case comes
within the doctrine laid down in Garvin v.
Threlkeld, 173 Ky. 262, 190 S.W. 1092, 1093,
quoted in two of the above cases and in
others since decided. The rule is well
stated in that case as follows: “While the
validity of parol agreements to settle
disputed boundaries was long resisted on the
ground that, in effect, they passed the
title to real property without the
solemnities required by the statute, it is
now settled that, where the dividing line is
uncertain and there is a bona fide dispute
as to its location and the parties agree on
the dividing line and execute the agreement
by marking the line or building a fence
thereon, such an agreement is not prohibited
by the statute of frauds, nor is it within
the meaning of the provisions of the law
that regulate the manner of conveying real
estate. The reason for the rule is that the
parties do not undertake to acquire and to
pass the title to real estate, as must be
done by written contract or conveyance.
-20-
They simply by agreement fix and determine
the situation and location of the thing that
they already own, the purpose being simply
by something agreed on to identify their
several holdings and to make certain that
which they regarded as uncertain.” 24
(Emphasis omitted.)
Here, the court’s instruction simply
followed a long line of cases, including Wolf and Garvin v.
Threlkeld, 25 in requiring the parties to have clearly marked and
identified the location of any boundary line fixed by oral
agreement.
That instruction was not erroneous.
Cook also asserts that the trial court erred by
failing to provide a separate instruction concerning the
assignment of co-owners’ interests to the Finleys; by failing to
limit the instructions “to the claims and amounts stated in
their pleadings and discovery;” by failing to instruct the jury
concerning estoppel, acquiescence or waiver; and by failing to
define the clear and convincing standard or to require the jury
to find nominal or actual damages before awarding punitive
damages for outrage.
However, as Cook failed to specifically
indicate whether or how he timely preserved these issues below,
we shall not consider these assertions on appeal.
Next, Cook contends that the trial court erred in
several respects when issuing injunctive relief in favor of
appellees.
We disagree.
24
Wolf v. Harper, 313 Ky. 688, 233 S.W.2d 409, 411 (1950).
25
173 Ky. 262, 190 S.W. 1092, 1093 (1917).
-21-
Appellees’ second amended complaint, alleging that
Cook “virtually destroyed a road across the [LLC] easement built
by [the LLC] on land” owned by the LLC and third parties, sought
to permanently enjoin Cook “from trespassing upon” their
property.
After the jury unanimously found that Cook had no
right of way “across the [LCC] property . . . tracts #10, 12,
13,” the court entered a judgment concluding that there was no
right of way in Cook’s favor across the three tracts.
However,
the court then provided that Cook, his agents and his employees
were permanently enjoined
from going upon or removing trees and logs
from the Plaintiffs’ tracts 3, 4, 8, 9, 10
and 13; traveling upon the “Christopher
road”; destroying any gates, chains, locks
or fences; hunting upon or leasing the
plaintiffs’ land to others; destroying any
personal property of the Plaintiffs;
blocking or damming Wheeler’s Branch;
threatening, intimidating or assaulting any
of the Plaintiffs, the Plaintiffs’ agents,
employees or family.
Cook now contends that the court’s judgment improperly
enjoined him both from using a road not in controversy, and from
engaging in acts involving nonparties to the action.
However,
Cook fails to show that he adequately objected 26 to the court’s
26
Cook asserts for the first time in his reply brief that his “instructions
were specific enough to avoid any controversy on this point, R. 1245-1267,
but the court gave a more broad one, to which [he] objected. [Dec.] 1815:29:05 et seq., [Dec.] 18-19:18:30, et seq., and [Dec.] 19-02:03:05, et
seq.” However, Cook does not provide this court with any more information to
support his contention that he adequately and specifically preserved the
issue on the grounds now raised on appeal, and neither he nor the record
provides us with any reasonable means of determining where, on the eight
-22-
instruction which resulted in the jury’s specific finding that
he had no right of way across tracts 10, 12 and 13.
He
therefore waived any objection to the court’s subsequent entry
of a judgment enjoining him from either going upon tracts 10 and
13, or traveling upon the Christopher road.
However, as the
court’s grant of injunctive relief does not specifically address
tract 12, there is no merit to Cook’s allegation that the court
erred by issuing an injunction regarding that tract. 27
Moreover,
we are not persuaded by Cook’s argument that the trial court’s
order granting injunctive relief should be stricken as being
vague and overbroad.
Next, Cook raises various arguments in support of his
allegation that the trial court erred or abused its discretion
when awarding damages, costs and attorney’s fees.
We disagree.
KRS 364.130(1) specifically provides that
any person who cuts or saws down, or causes
to be cut or sawed down with intent to
convert to his own use timber growing upon
the land of another without legal right or
without color of title in himself to the
timber or to the land upon which the timber
was growing shall pay to the rightful owner
of the timber three (3) times the stumpage
undated trial videotapes, the cited references might be located so that we
might review his contention that this issue was preserved. This court will
not search the record for testimony where there is no reference to the
record, Ventors v. Watts, 686 S.W.2d 833 (Ky.App. 1985), or where such
reference is inadequate.
27
We shall not address any allegations regarding orders which may have been
issued by the trial court after this appeal was filed, as such matters are
not properly before us on appeal.
-23-
value of the timber and shall pay to the
rightful owner of the property three (3)
times the cost of any damages to the
property as well as any legal costs incurred
by the owner of the timber.
Thus, while it is the jury’s function to determine the award of
damages, it is the trial court’s statutory duty to treble such
damages, and “to award legal costs to the damaged party, which,
under the statute, include a reasonable attorney’s fee.”
28
Here, Cook asserts that appellees are not entitled to
an automatic award of legal costs since such an award would
amount to punitive damages.
However, legal costs are clearly
distinguishable from those common law punitive damages which may
not be awarded in addition to trebled damages under KRS
364.130. 29
Moreover, since KRS 364.130 requires the trebling of
damages in addition to the payment of costs and attorney’s fees,
there is no merit to Cook’s argument that the court erred by
trebling that award.
Cook then argues that although appellees’ attorney’s
fees were not unreasonable, the court’s award of those fees was
excessive since the jury awarded appellees only about 10% of the
requested damages and Cook “established that any trespass was in
good faith.”
However, since the jury in fact found that Cook
acted without legal right or color of title when cutting the
28
King v. Grecco, 111 S.W.3d 877, 883 (Ky.App. 2002).
29
Id. at 882.
-24-
timber, we cannot say that the trial court abused its broad
discretion by awarding the attorney’s fees and costs to which
appellees were statutorily entitled.
Cook also asserts that the court’s award of attorney’s
fees and costs should be reduced by the amounts attributable to
prosecuting appellees’ outrage claims, since fees and costs
relating to such claims are not recoverable under KRS 364.130.
However, appellees’ counsel submitted to the court an itemized
list of the billable hours associated with the outrage claims,
and those identifiable costs were deducted from the final award
of fees.
Again, we cannot say that the trial court abused its
considerable discretion in this regard.
Further, Cook contends that the award for expert
witnesses’ fees were excessive since the jury awarded
substantially less damages than those sought by appellees.
He
argues that Anzelmo’s fee in any event should be limited to the
agreed amount for surveying the thirteen tracts, minus the costs
of surveying certain areas which Cook contends were unnecessary
to the resolution of the claims.
Cook also asserts that the fee
should be reduced by the costs associated with preparing for
trial, performing additional pretrial survey work, and surveying
an unrelated property line.
However, the award of such costs
lies squarely within the trial court’s discretion, and we cannot
say that the court abused that discretion.
-25-
As the trial court
stated when denying Cook’s motion to alter, amend or vacate the
judgment, both parties’
surveyors testified that finding the
original boundary lines on the type of
terrain involved in this case could not be
done without substantial survey work.
Throughout the course of this litigation the
Defendant argued that the Plaintiffs’ survey
work was inadequate or incomplete. The
Defendant cannot now complain that the
Plaintiffs’ surveyors spent too much time
preparing the survey.
Cook next contends that he “has already paid $875.00
of [deposition] fees and an additional $100.00 by order of the
Court after he contested the propriety of the other charges.”
He apparently miscalculated those figures when concluding that a
charge of “$1,875.00” must be deducted from the amount due
Anzelmo.
As it seems that the trial court already addressed
this issue when noting that $975 was deducted from appellees’
“final survey invoice” for the “costs and depositions” of their
surveyors, Cook is not entitled to the requested relief.
We also are not persuaded by Cook’s contention that
the trial court erred by awarding certain costs not allowed by
CR 54.04, including the costs of copies of depositions.
Again,
there is no merit to the argument that the costs should be
reduced because appellees did not prevail in all respects.
Moreover, although CR 54.04(2) permits only the recovery of
“costs of the originals of any depositions . . . and such other
-26-
costs as are ordinarily recoverable by the successful party,”
KRS 364.130 permits a broader recovery of costs in timber
cutting cases to include “any legal costs incurred by the owner
of the timber.”
(Emphasis added.)
Such language clearly
authorizes the trial court’s award.
Next, Cook contends that the trial court erred by
failing to find that KRS 364.130 “is unconstitutional to the
extent that it deprives [him] of his jural rights” by
impermissibly eliminating any good faith defense to punitive
damages for timber trespass, by providing for trebled damages
that could not be awarded against a trespasser at common law,
and by permitting appellees to determine whether Cook could
exercise his jural rights.
Further, he asserts that the term
“legal costs” allows for awards which violate his rights.
We
disagree.
Contrary to Cook’s contention, KRS 364.130(2)
specifically provides for a good faith defense to punitive
damages if the defendant can demonstrate that he or she obtained
advance written permission from the timber’s putative owner.
Given that the jury found that Cook did not act in good faith,
he was not denied a meritorious good faith defense herein.
Moreover, there is no merit to any argument that Cook otherwise
was denied a fundamental jural right, as he had no common law
right to engage in timber trespass, and the legislature
-27-
certainly is vested with the authority to set or change the
terms of punishment for actions taken in violation of state
laws.
Further, we are not persuaded that there is any merit to
Cook’s argument that the term “legal costs” is impermissibly
vague and arbitrary, or that the allowance of such costs
violates his rights in any way.
Next, given the outcome of this appeal, we need not
address the issues raised by Cook regarding the posting of a
bond on remand, or regarding the court’s denial of postjudgment
motions for relief.
The remaining issues raised by Cook on
appeal lack merit and need not be discussed in this opinion.
Finally, appellees contend on cross-appeal that the
trial court erred by denying their motion for a new trial as to
damages.
They assert that the jury’s award of only 10% of the
requested damages failed to fall within the range of the
evidence presented by both parties’ expert witnesses, and that
at a minimum the jury should have awarded the damage amounts put
forth by Cook’s expert witness.
Appellees seek relief pursuant
to CR 59.01, which permits the granting of a new trial where it
appears that excessive or inadequate damages were “given under
the influence of passion or prejudice or in disregard of the
evidence or the instructions of the court.”
The trial court instructed the jury that any award of
damages should not “exceed the sum of” the maximum figure shown
-28-
by the evidence for each requested item of damages.
However,
there is no indication that appellees timely objected to the
instructions’ failure to include minimum damage figures.
Given
the conflicting evidence as to when the damages occurred, and as
to whether some of the damages may have been caused by persons
other than Cook, his agents or his employees, it follows that
the jury’s award of 10% of the maximum damages set out in the
instructions fell within the range of the evidence presented.
It follows, therefore, that the trial court did not err by
denying appellees’ motion to alter, amend or vacate the
judgment.
The court’s judgment is affirmed in part, and remanded
in part for further proceedings to determine the Finleys’
interests in the award of damages relating to Tract 9.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT/
CROSS-APPELLEE:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES/
CROSS-APPELLANTS:
Wayne F. Collier
Lexington, Kentucky
David A. Nunery
Bryan E. Bennett
Campbellsville, Kentucky
-29-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.