RONALD L. HARGROVE AND TONY E. HARGROVE AND ANNA V. HARGROVE v. AMOS HALL
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DECEMBER 16, 2005; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2002-CA-002027-MR
RONALD L. HARGROVE AND
TONY E. HARGROVE AND
ANNA V. HARGROVE
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM HARDIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JANET P. COLEMAN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 00-CI-00714
v.
AMOS HALL
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER, SCHRODER, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.
SCHRODER, JUDGE:
Ronald L. Hargrove, Tony E. Hargrove, and Anna
V. Hargrove, his wife (collectively referred to as the
“Hargroves”), appeal from a judgment entered in a boundary line
dispute by the Hardin Circuit Court in favor of Amos Hall (“Dr.
Hall”).
Finding no error, we affirm.
Dr. Hall initiated this action in the Hardin Circuit
Court seeking to resolve a boundary line dispute with the
Hargroves.
In 1996, the Hargroves acquired two tracts of land
that bordered on the northwest side of Dr. Hall’s property.
Hall had acquired his property in 1976.
Dr.
The trial court
concluded that none of the parties had personal knowledge of the
actual location of the disputed boundary line between their
respective properties.
The court observed:
According to the
testimony at trial, this land is rough undeveloped land, with no
activity on either side of the land in the way of farming or any
other type of continuous activity which might demonstrate a
claim of ownership to an observer.
The Hargroves and Dr. Hall
retained surveyors who gave expert testimony at trial regarding
the location of the boundary.
On December 12, 2001, the court
conducted a bench trial and subsequently entered judgment on
April 16, 2002, in favor of Dr. Hall.
The Hargroves filed a
motion to “vacate, alter or amend” the court’s judgment, which
was denied by order entered on September 10, 2002.
This appeal
follows.
Before analyzing in detail the issues raised on
appeal, we believe that a review of the history of both parties’
property is necessary to fully understand the extent of the
boundary dispute before this Court.
HARGROVES’ PROPERTY
Ronald Hargrove and Tony and Anna Hargrove acquired
adjacent tracts of land in Hardin County, from AAAH Investments,
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Inc. on November 22, 1996.
Ronald acquired a 31.02-acre tract,
and Tony and Anna acquired a 31.57-acre tract from AAAH.
The
property was part of a larger tract known as the Darst Farm.
The Darst Farm contained approximately 128½ acres.
It is
important to note that the Darst Farm was originally part of a
166-acre tract that had been conveyed to Betty Springer in 1956.
Springer sold 128½ acres to Leslie and Dorothy Darst in 1969.
Both parties to this appeal agreed that the Hargroves’ property
was once part of the Springer property that was conveyed to the
Darsts and formed the northwest boundary adjacent to the
property subsequently conveyed to Dr. Hall.
It is also
important to note that there is no dispute as to the legal
description for the Springer property, whose title was traced
back in the record to the early 1900s.
DR. HALL’S PROPERTY
Dr. Hall acquired his property from Lyndell L. Hill,
Sr. and Lyndell Hill, Jr. (collectively referred to as “the
Hills”) in July of 1976.
The legal description for Dr. Hall’s
property referenced that the tract contained 252 acres.
However, in examining the source deed to the Hills dated January
2, 1974, the legal description of the property conveyed to the
Hills consisted of three separate tracts containing 100 acres,
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85 acres, and 30 acres respectively, for a total of 215 acres,
not 252 acres.
The parties agreed for purposes of this appeal that
the portion of the property owned by Dr. Hall, from which the
boundary dispute in this case arises is the 100-acre tract of
land described in the Hill deed dated and recorded in January
1974.
The legal description for the 100-acre tract as set forth
in the 1974 deed is as follows:
BEGINNING at a Post Oak and Black Oak, being
corner to the Phil Brown land; thence N 60 E
110 poles to a post oak; thence S 40 E 126
poles to two Black Oaks and a Hickory;
thence S 40 W 112 poles to three Red Oaks;
thence to the beginning, containing 100
acres, more or less.
Surveyors for both parties testified as experts at
trial.
Both parties agreed that John Duvall was a predecessor
in title to the 100-acre tract and that Duvall’s title was
derived in 1871.
The surveyors further agreed that the
reference in the Springer deed to the Duvall line was in fact
the boundary line between the Duvall 100-acre tract (now owned
by Dr. Hall) and the property owned by Betty Springer (a portion
of which is now owned by the Hargroves).
Additionally, the Hargroves have noted that there is a
gap in the chain of title to the 100-acre tract dating from 1871
to 1934, as referenced in a deed dated May 18, 1934 from Mary
Cundiff.
The deed acknowledges that John Duvall was Mary
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Cundiff’s father and that a deed establishing her ownership of
the property had been destroyed by fire and was never recorded.
The 1934 deed further states that Cundiff asserted title to the
100-acre tract under the doctrine of adverse possession,
claiming that she had lived on the property for more than fifty
years to the exclusion of all other persons.
There is nothing
in the record to reflect that these adverse possession rights
were ever adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction.
For
reasons discussed later in this opinion, we do not believe this
title gap is relevant to this appeal.
THE SURVEYORS
Each party retained a registered land surveyor to
testify at trial regarding the boundary dispute.
The Hargroves
retained Kendall Clemons, who was an experienced land surveyor
from Leitchfield, Kentucky.
Dr. Hall retained Jim Banks, who
was an experienced land surveyor from Hodgenville, Kentucky.
Clemons had surveyed the Darst Farm (128½-acre tract) on at
least two occasions in the mid-1990s.
Additionally, Clemons
surveyed the lot division that created the tracts that were
subsequently conveyed to the Hargroves in their respective
deeds.
Clemons testified that he had conducted a field survey
of the Darst Farm, and his survey found 117 acres existed, not
128½.
He also surveyed the Springer property and testified that
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his survey was consistent with the descriptions in the Springer
deed and the Darst deed.
Banks testified that he conducted a field survey of
Dr. Hall’s property.
He acknowledged that his first survey
utilized the survey findings of Clemons as pertained to the
northwest boundary line for the property, but that the initial
survey only accounted for 175 acres of Dr. Hall’s 252-acre legal
description.
Banks made a subsequent survey of the property and
determined that the northwest boundary with the Hargroves’
property was an old barbwire fence that meandered across the
property.
He based this conclusion on his field observations,
the identification and location of monuments, and discussions
with neighbors from adjoining properties.
Banks also concluded
that Clemons had made an error in platting the legal description
of the Darst Farm by adding a call that was not included in the
Springer deed (the 166-acre tract from which the Darst tract was
derived).
Banks’s final survey that was introduced at trial
determined that Dr. Hall’s property consisted of 198 acres and
as previously noted, that the northwest boundary with the
Hargroves was an old fence line.
Banks’s revised survey thus
reflected a boundary overlap with the Hargroves’ property of
approximately 22 acres.
The overlapping deeds were the basis
for this action commenced by Dr. Hall.
TRIAL COURT JUDGMENT
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The trial court conducted a bench trial on December
12, 2001.
The court considered the testimony of both Clemons
and Banks as well as the testimony of neighbors who lived
adjacent to Dr. Hall and the Hargroves’ property.
The court
also considered testimony from Tony Hargrove and Tim Aulbach,
who owned AAAH Investments, Inc., a predecessor in title to the
Hargroves’ property.
The testimony of Dr. Hall was submitted by
deposition as stipulated by the parties. 1
The court entered
findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment on April 16,
2002.
The court concluded that Banks’s testimony was the more
credible of the surveyors and determined that the old fence line
was the proper boundary between Dr. Hall’s property and the
Hargroves’ property, as set forth on Banks’s survey.
The court
further applied the legal doctrine of “boundary by inaction” in
determining that the fence line was the actual boundary between
Dr. Hall and the Hargroves’ property.
This appeal followed.
THE APPEAL
The Hargroves assert a number of errors on appeal.
First, the Hargroves assert that they have superior record
title, and that under KRS 382.280, record title controls.
KRS
382.280 does provide “deeds of trust or mortgages shall take
1
Dr. Hall is a physician/surgeon who resides in Oregon. Due to a conflict in
his schedule, the parties stipulated the submission of his deposition as
evidence at trial.
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effect in the order that they are lodged for record.”
However,
we are not dealing with either such encumbrance but deeds of
conveyance.
The rule on deeds of conveyance in Kentucky is
contained in KRS 382.270 which establishes Kentucky as a racenotice state, that is, the first to record a deed without notice
of a prior conveyance has superior title.
See Minix v. Maggard,
652 S.W.2d 93, 96 (Ky.App. 1983) and for an explanation, see 4
American Law Of Property § 17.5 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
The
question in this case is not who recorded first (without notice)
because the statute, KRS 382.270, on its face, applies to a
conveyance of the same parcel.
The case before us involves
different parcels, each with its own chain of title, and
separate legal descriptions.
It was not until the surveys were
performed that the parties learned of a possible overlap or
mistaken call in one of the boundaries.
An overlap, by
definition, involves two or more parcels, and is not what is
being regulated by a race-notice statute which involves one
parcel.
The Hargroves contend that their survey was the only
correct and accurate survey.
The trial court as a fact-finder
may choose between conflicting opinions of surveyors as long as
the opinion relied upon is not based upon erroneous assumptions
or the opinion does not ignore established factors.
Webb v.
Compton, 98 S.W.3d 513 (Ky.App. 2002) (citing Howard v. Kingmont
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Oil Co., 729 S.W.2d 183 (Ky.App. 1987)).
In our case, the trial
court found:
Each of the two sides has presented the
testimony of a surveyor, and the opinions of
these two surveyors conflict. Considering
the testimony of both of the surveyors, the
testimony of Mr. Banks seems to be the more
credible as Mr. Banks surveyed the parent
tract which consists of 166 acres and
belonged to Betty Springer before she sold
off 128 ½ acres to a party named Darst who,
in turn, sold the property which was
subdivided and portions of that sold to
Defendants. The deed from Springer to Darst
contained a call that did not exist in the
parent tract, and the surveyor who testified
for the Defendants, Mr. Clemmons [sic],
surveyed the 128 ½ acre tract with this
additional call, with the result that his
survey showed a line a few hundred feet
southeast of an existing fence line. When
surveyor Banks surveyed the Hall property,
he was of the opinion that the fence line
was on the boundary line, based upon the
calls and found monuments in the Hall deed.
The testimony of surveyor Banks is
supported by witnesses Edwin Elliot, Ethel
Pillow and Kenneth Pillow. Edwin Elliot
testified that he had lived in the area for
25 years, that the old fence had survey
ribbons on it at one point, and a previous
owner of the Springer property, by the name
of Baker, told Mr. Elliot that he believed
the fence to be the boundary line. Both
Ethel Pillow and her son Kenneth used to
live on adjoining property for many years.
Both testified that the fence was the
boundary line. Kenneth Pillow testified
that he remembers as a boy that survey tags
existed along the old fence line.
The findings of fact made by the trial court at a bench trial
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous.
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CR 52.01.
This rule is applied in boundary disputes.
S.W.2d 418 (Ky. 1980).
Croley v. Alsip, 602
We do not believe the trial court’s
analysis of the facts was clearly erroneous.
To the contrary,
the trial judge made a thorough analysis of the testimony and
the facts, and ruled appropriately.
The Hargroves’ third argument is that the fence cannot
be the boundary line because it zigzags and ends up nowhere.
How much the fence zigzags is an issue of fact.
That is one
consideration the surveyors reviewed in forming their expert
opinions.
In the case of a boundary line overlap, there are
sure to be conflicting opinions, and it is the trial court’s job
as a fact finder, to sort it out.
This argument is part of the
previous argument and answered above.
The fourth argument is that Dr. Hall’s claim is really
an adverse possession claim, and since the area was all grown
over, there was no evidence of actual physical possession.
The
trial court concluded the fence line was established as the
boundary by virtue of the legal doctrine of boundary by
inaction.
There are four elements that must be proven to claim
a boundary by inaction.
First, the boundary must exist between
two adjoining land owners.
Liberty National Bank & Trust Co. v.
Merchant’s & Manufacturers Paint Co., 307 Ky. 184, 209 S.W.2d
828 (1948).
Second, the neighbor who claims the boundary must
occupy the property up to the visibly marked boundary.
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Combs v.
Combs, 240 S.W.2d 558 (Ky. 1951).
Third, the parties must
acquiesce or otherwise fail to act as to the existence of the
new boundary claimed by inaction.
must last for fifteen years.
Id.
Finally, this inaction
Id.
The evidence presented at trial satisfies these
elements.
As the trial court noted, the land was rough
undeveloped land with no real activity on either side.
However,
there was an old fence in the trees for a good portion of the
alleged boundary line.
Witnesses testified that through the
years, survey tape was attached to the fence and for some fifty
years or so, people treated it as the boundary line.
One
surveyor placed the fence along a boundary line described in Dr.
Hall’s deed.
Even though Dr. Hall hadn’t walked the boundaries
when he purchased the property, he had constructive possession
up to the fence.
(Ky. 1951).
See Mullins v. Hargis, 242 S.W.2d 611, 612
We agree with the trial court that the facts of
this case fit into a boundary by inaction case.
The Hargroves’ final argument is that the trial court
failed to make specific definite findings of fact and that the
case must be reversed and remanded for specific findings.
The
requested issues and findings were mostly discussed in the
preceding arguments dealing with KRS 382.280; the gap in Dr.
Hall’s title; the differences in the surveys; and the problems
with the fence line.
These issues were all discussed by the
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trial court which made sufficient findings.
The Hargroves’
request is just a rehash of the above issues and we see no need
for further discussion.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Hardin
Circuit Court is affirmed.
BARBER, JUDGE, CONCURS.
TAYLOR, JUDGE, DISSENTS AND FILES SEPARATE OPINION.
TAYLOR, Judge: I respectfully dissent.
This case
looks to an extremely complex boundary dispute that apparently
has laid dormant for over one-hundred years.
I believe that the
findings of fact made by the trial court in its judgment are
clearly erroneous and warrant reversal of the judgment.
I would first point out that the majority has ignored
several facts in its opinion that are relevant to this appeal.
As noted, Dr. Hall’s property actually consisted of three
separate tracts containing 100 acres, 85 acres, and 30 acres
respectively - for a total of 215 acres - not 252 acres as set
forth in his deed from the Hills.
There is no recorded plat
consolidating the three tracts conveyed by the Hills to Dr. Hall
between the date of the Hills source deed of January 2, 1974 and
Dr. Hall’s deed dated and recorded July 1976.
Thus, there is
absolutely no explanation in the records of the Hardin County
Clerk regarding how the 252-acre legal description in Dr. Hall’s
deed came into existence, given the source deeds reflected the
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tract consisted of only 215 acres.
Banks, as Dr. Hall’s
surveyor and expert, could not explain this discrepancy at
trial, other than to say that the 252-acre description was in
error.
As noted by the majority, Banks’ initial survey found
that only 175 acres existed from Dr. Hall’s 252-acre legal
description.
Banks’ first survey matched up with the Clemons
survey for the Hargrove property as pertains as to the northwest
boundary line.
However, as Dr. Hall testified at his
deposition, he was not satisfied with these findings by Banks
and instructed Banks to locate his missing land.
Banks
obviously complied with his instructions, thus generating a new
survey locating 198 acres which effectively took approximately
22 acres of the Hargroves’ property.
The majority ignores the
fact that Banks testified there were boundary problems with his
survey for Dr. Hall’s property on the northeast boundary with
another adjoining property owner and that Banks could not
explain at trial deficiencies in the legal descriptions for both
the 85-acre and 30-acre tract that comprised the remainder of
Dr. Hall’s property.
Banks’ opinion is simply based upon
numerous erroneous assumptions and ignores established factors
that were presented into evidence at trial.
The trial court concluded as a matter of law that the
boundary line would be established in accordance with Banks’
survey, finding that the boundary line between Dr. Hall and the
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Hargroves’ properties was an old fence line, which Banks’
revised survey had identified.
Clemons’ survey located a
different boundary based upon the legal descriptions set forth
in the Springer deed and the Darst deed.
Clemons rejected the
fence line as a boundary due to its lack of consistency and
erratic path through the wooded area.
In other words, the fence
could not be a straight line boundary as concluded by the court
in adopting Banks’ survey, especially since there was no
beginning or ending point for the fence on the Hargroves’
property. 2
The trial court’s reliance on Banks’ survey regarding
the fence line boundary is misplaced for several reasons.
First, I would note that I have made a thorough review of each
and every deed in the chain of title that was submitted into
evidence at trial.
There is absolutely no reference whatsoever
in any of these deeds to a fence line constituting a boundary
between the Hargroves’ property and Dr. Hall’s property.
Next,
no predecessor in title for either party testified at trial that
the fence line had been constructed or otherwise existed as a
boundary between the two properties.
The trial court heard
hearsay testimony from some adjoining neighbors who alleged that
former owners had told them that the fence line was a boundary.
In fact, the court specifically cites to hearsay testimony in
2
The record reflects that the trial judge did not conduct an on-site
examination of the properties, including the disputed boundary area.
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its findings of fact as a basis for entering judgment in favor
of Dr. Hall.
This is reversible error on its face under
applicable Kentucky law.
The problem of reliance upon hearsay testimony by a
trial court as a finder of fact was addressed directly by this
Court in G.E.Y. v. Cabinet for Human Resources, 701 S.W.2d 713
715 (Ky.App. 1986). 3
The Court summarized the applicable rule of
law as follows:
We agree when a judge acts as a fact finder
it is presumed that he will be able to
disregard hearsay statements. However,
where, as here, it is apparent that he
relied on the hearsay in making his
decision, the error in the admission of the
unreliable evidence cannot be deemed
harmless or nonprejudicial. As the court
noted in Santosky, citing Woodby v. INS, 385
U.S. 276, 282, 87 S.Ct. 483, 486, 17 L.Ed.2d
362 (1966), "[J]udicial review is generally
limited to ascertaining whether the evidence
relied upon by the trier of fact was of
sufficient quality and substantiality to
support the rationality of the judgment."
Id., p. 757, n. 9, 102 S.Ct. at p. 1397, n.
9.
G.E.Y., 701 S.W.2d at 715.
The evidence in this case does not
meet either test set out in the opinion above.
Even Dr. Hall, who acquired his property in 1976,
testified that he had never walked the entire fence line and had
only seen about 100 feet of it during his twenty-five years of
ownership.
Dr. Hall, at his deposition in December of 2000,
3
Discretionary review was denied and the opinion in this case was ordered
published by the Kentucky Supreme Court on January 28, 1986.
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could not identify the fence line on a plat prepared by Banks
for him and testified that his only knowledge of the alleged
fence arose from purported (hearsay) discussions with his
predecessor in title, Lyndell Hill Sr.
Mr. Hill nor his son
testified at trial.
Dr. Hall did reveal that Mr. Hill had provided him a
“plat” of the purported 252 acres he purchased in 1976.
This
plat was prepared for Mr. Hill by a post-engineer from Fort
Knox.
The plat is also arguably hearsay evidence and notably,
has never been approved by any governmental entity nor recorded
in the county clerk’s office. 4
Banks testified that he used this
plat as a “piece of evidence” in conducting his survey, though
noting it had several deficiencies.
More importantly, this plat
was obtained by Mr. Hill in contemplation of the sale of his
property to Dr. Hall and makes no reference whatsoever to a
fence boundary on the northwest property line.
Since Banks
relied on this survey in part, I believe that Banks’ survey
fails to address an established factor from the land records he
relied on – that there was no fence line boundary in existence
4
This plat was introduced as Plaintiff’s Exhibit No. 10 by Dr. Hall at trial.
The post-engineer had apparently prepared this plat based upon the 252-acre
legal description for Hall’s property. This plat details various permanent
monuments including trees, posts, drains, and the like, yet fails to make any
reference whatsoever to a permanent fence boundary on the northwest property
line. I believe Banks’ assumption of the existence of a fence line boundary
was erroneous, and thus his testimony not credible for the trial court to
rely on.
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on the northwest boundary of Dr. Hall’s property at the time it
was acquired by Dr. Hall.
Additionally, the boundary line adopted by the court
in its judgment is a straight line.
However, the undisputed
evidence at trial was that the fence line was uneven, zigzagged
in several locations, did not cross the entire property, and had
no definitive starting and ending points.
Clemons platted the
fence line on an exhibit introduced at trial that clearly
demonstrated the fence was not constructed in a straight line
across the property.
The finding by the trial court of a
straight line boundary is not supported by the evidence
introduced, and thus, is clearly erroneous.
The trial court also relied upon Banks’ explanation of
a purported additional call in the Darst deed that did not exist
in the Springer deed and his conclusion that Clemons must have
erred in his survey as a result.
twofold.
The fallacy of this finding is
First, Banks did not testify that he surveyed the
Springer tract as set forth in the court’s findings, which I
believe is a blatant error by the trial court.
In fact, the
only person who testified about surveying the entire Springer
tract and the Darst property was Clemons.
Banks testified that
he examined the legal descriptions and platted the calls from
these descriptions in the area where the boundary dispute
existed.
Banks then adjusted his field survey on Dr. Hall’s
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property to a point adjacent to the fence to establish the
boundary line for his survey of the Hall property.
There were
no exhibits introduced at trial that reflect Banks made a
comprehensive field survey or prepared a survey plat for either
the Springer or Darst property.
Secondly, it was undisputed
that the conveyance from Springer to Darst was less than the
entire 166 acres that Springer had title to.
As noted, the
Darst out conveyance was approximately 128½ acres.
Obviously,
the legal description for a lesser tract from a parent tract
will contain different calls from those contained in the parent
deed.
If the trial court had applied the same reasoning to the
Banks’ survey based upon the vague legal description of the 252
acres described in Dr. Hall’s deed, then the court would have
had justification to throw out the entire Banks survey since
there is no call in the Banks’ survey that corresponds to the
calls in Dr. Hall’s deed.
As noted, there was no predecessor in Dr. Hall’s title
who testified at trial.
However, Tim Aulbauch, a predecessor in
title to the Hargroves, testified that the alleged fence was
nothing more than two strands of barbwire that ran erratically
across the property.
He further testified that the fence had
never been identified as a boundary line during his ownership of
the property.
Notably, during the period of 1976 through 1999,
Dr. Hall never expressed to the Hargroves or any predecessor in
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title that the northwest boundary to his property was the fence
line.
There was additional evidence introduced at trial that
refuted the fence line boundary theory.
Testimony by both Dr.
Hall and Tony Hargrove indicated that Dr. Hall had contacted the
Hargroves about obtaining a right-of-way easement for access
across the very property that is now the subject of this
boundary dispute.
Dr. Hall never disclosed to the Hargroves
that they were encroaching across a fence line boundary on his
property.
This lawsuit was commenced shortly after the
Hargroves declined to grant Dr. Hall the easement.
Additionally, Dr. Hall admitted under oath that most
of the timber in the disputed boundary area had been harvested
by a predecessor to the Hargroves’ title.
Dr. Hall did not at
any time object to the removal of the timber, but he hinted in
his testimony that he would take legal action against those
responsible if he prevailed in this action.
His actions (or
lack thereof) clearly establish that the timber was not located
on his property.
The majority further erroneously affirms the trial
court’s conclusion that the fence line was established by the
“doctrine of boundary by inaction.”
The evidence presented at
trial clearly refuted two of the four necessary elements to
invoke the doctrine.
There is no evidence in the trial record
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that Dr. Hall actually occupied his property up to the alleged
fence line.
In fact, Dr. Hall testified at his deposition that
he did not know the exact location of the fence line on his
boundary and further admitted that timber had been removed from
much of the disputed area inside the alleged fence line boundary
without any protest by Dr. Hall.
Likewise, there was absolutely
no evidence in the record that indicated the Hargroves or a
predecessor in title, had acquiesced to the fence line being a
boundary for their property.
the opposite.
In fact, the testimony was just
For almost twenty-five years of ownership, Dr.
Hall never took any action that one could reasonably construe as
an act asserting ownership of property up to the alleged fence
line boundary.
Accordingly, I believe the trial court clearly
erred as a matter of law in applying the doctrine of boundary by
inaction in this case.
If anything, the doctrine works to the
Hargroves’ advantage.
Finally, although I believe the trial court erred in
establishing the fence line as the boundary between the
Hargroves’ and Dr. Hall’s property, I believe there was
sufficient evidence presented to the trial court to establish
the boundary.
There exists no dispute between the parties that
the Hargroves’ property was derived from the Darst Farm which
had been obtained from Springer in 1969 as set forth in that
deed.
As noted, Springer obtained the 166-acre tract in 1956 by
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deed of record in Deed Book 149, Page 175, in the Office of the
Hardin County Clerk.
The boundary line between the Dr. Hall and
Hargroves’ properties as set forth in the Springer deed reads as
follows:
[T]hence with Duvall’s line S 40 W 126 poles
to the beginning at a post oak in Shawler’s
line. 5 (Emphasis added.)
The evidence presented at trial established that Duvall was a
predecessor in title to Dr. Hall on the 100-acre tract that
formed the northwestern boundary of Dr. Hall’s property with the
Hargroves.
In fact, Banks acknowledged this property line on
the survey plat prepared for Dr. Hall and introduced as
plaintiff’s exhibit 12 at trial.
The survey plat referenced
this boundary line as follows:
[L]ocation of the original Betty Springer
line as per D.B. 149 Pg. 175.
I would note that the legal description for this same
boundary line in the Darst deed from Springer is a similar call,
albeit not identical, but is the exact same boundary length,
2079 feet.
In determining boundaries, our courts have followed
the general rule that natural and permanent monuments are the
most satisfactory evidence and control all other means of
description.
Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Hoskins, 117 S.W.2d 180
5
A pole is equivalent to 16.5 feet. Lewis v. Louisville and Nashville R.R.
Co., 99 S.W. 658 (Ky. 1907). 126 poles is equivalent to 2,079 feet.
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(Ky. 1937).
If permanent or natural monuments cannot be
identified, artificial marks, courses, distances and area follow
in that order with area being the weakest of all methods for
description.
Id.
In this case the only monument located by
either surveyor was a stone found purportedly at the base of a
large oak, which was located near the Shawler property, but was
completely at the opposite end of the 100-acre tract from which
the boundary dispute has arisen. 6
I do not believe that monument
has any significance in determining the location of the disputed
boundary.
Since I would reject the fence line as not being
sufficient for an artificial marking to identify the boundary, I
then look at courses and distances, which takes us back to the
legal description in the Springer deed.
This deed clearly
identifies the boundary line between the Springer property and
Duvall property which I believe is the boundary line in dispute.
As noted, the Banks’ survey reflected the exact location of this
boundary line originating from an iron pin corner that had been
identified in Clemons’ survey for the Hargroves’ property.
This
boundary line is further reflected in a comparative drawing
prepared by Banks shown on Plaintiff’s Exhibit No. 11.
Based on
the evidence presented and the record as a whole, I believe this
is the actual boundary between the properties.
6
Upon reversal
I also note with great curiosity that in the 100-acre description set forth
in the Hill deed, a nearly identical call to the Springer deed, in the length
of 2,079 feet is found. However, neither surveyor addressed this at trial.
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and remand, I would have directed the trial court to enter a
judgment that reflects the location of the original Betty
Springer line as shown on Plaintiff’s Exhibit No. 12 to be the
actual boundary line between the Hargroves’ property and Dr.
Hall’s property.
For the foregoing reasons, I would reverse the
judgment and remand this case to the circuit court with
directions.
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANTS:
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE:
Dwight Preston
LEWIS & PRESTON
Elizabethtown, Kentucky
James T. Kelley
Elizabethtown, Kentucky
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