ROGER VAUGHN v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED:
FEBRUARY 25, 2005; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2002-CA-001197-MR
ROGER VAUGHN
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM LAUREL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE RODERICK MESSER, JUDGE
ACTION NOS. 01-CR-00010 & 01-CR-00064
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
VACATING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; BARBER AND BUCKINGHAM, JUDGES.
BARBER, JUDGE:
Appellant, Roger Vaughn (Vaughn), appeals the
Laurel Circuit Court’s denial of payment for the services of an
investigator, which were authorized by the court in advance.
We
vacate the court’s order denying payment of the investigator,
and remand for a determination of the reasonable and necessary
nature of the expenses charged.
Vaughn was charged with assault in the first degree,
wanton endangerment in the first degree, and being a persistent
felony offender in the first degree.
Defense counsel requested
and received authorization to incur expenses for an
investigator.
The court’s order permitted defense counsel to
utilize an investigator provided that a detailed billing was
submitted, and expenditures did not exceed $5,000.00.
An
investigator was retained and provided services to the defense.
The final bill for all investigative expenses was $4999.66.
Vaughn pleaded guilty to the assault charge, and the other
charges were dismissed.
Defense counsel then submitted the
investigator’s bill to the court.
The court authorized payment
for only half the bill, allowing payment of $2,500.00 on
September 24, 2001.
The investigator submitted an affidavit showing
expenses incurred, and a bill, requesting payment of the
remaining balance of $2,499.66.
The court refused to authorize
payment of the balance due and owing, and entered an order so
showing on April 17, 2002.
In its order the court stated that
some of the entries on the bill were “very general in nature,”
and refused to authorize payment for that reason.
The court did
not detail which entries he found overly general, with the
exception of the entry “attempt to locate and interview
witnesses.”
The court’s final determination was made without
benefit of a hearing.
The court made his order of April, 2002,
final and appealable.
It is this order which was appealed from.
-2-
Vaughn argues that as the court authorized the use of
an investigator, and pre-approved investigative expenses up to
the sum of $5,000.00, the court was required to approve payment
of all reasonable and necessary expenses incurred.
Vaughn
requested and received pre-approval of the costs, as suggested
in McCracken County Fiscal Court v. Graves, 885 S.W.2d 307, 312
(Ky. 1994).
In denying payment of the expenses, the court did not
find that the expenses were not reasonable or necessary.
Vaughn
contends that the court’s denial was an abuse of discretion.
The court disallowed certain items on the expense report, but
the specific items disallowed were not listed by the court.
The
items addressed by the court as being “too general” do not add
up to the sum of expenses which were disallowed.
Vaughn argues
that this shows that the court was not acting properly in
denying the expenses.
The court gave the example of “attempting
to locate witnesses to interview” as an invalid expense, and
disallowed payment therefore.
That expense was considerably
less than the amount denied by the court.
The court did not
explain its disallowance of the remaining charges.
With the
exception of entries on the bill listed as “attempt to locate
and interview witnesses,” all other entries on the bill
submitted are detailed, and contain specific information about
-3-
the action taken and the witness or documentary evidence to
which such action related.
Vaughn asserts that locating witnesses was a
reasonable and necessary service of the investigator, and
expenses, therefore, were appropriate and should have been paid.
Vaughn reminds this body that it is essential to locate
witnesses as part of pre-trial preparation, and that the
difficulty of locating such witnesses was one of the reasons the
services of the investigator were requested.
As the witnesses
were not located, the investigator could not make those portions
of his report more detailed.
Often, such expenses are followed
by expenses for interviewing named witnesses.
Apparently, the
attempt to locate witnesses was sometimes successful.
Vaughn argues that he was entitled to a hearing
regarding the reasonable and necessary nature of the expenses
prior to the court’s entry of a final order disallowing half the
expenses billed.
This is particularly so where, as here, the
court is objecting to certain items as not reasonable, or
unnecessary for trial preparation.
The bill at issue is four
pages long and contains numerous separate entries for services
rendered.
In the “motion to pay additional amounts previously
authorized for defense counsel to hire an investigator,” defense
counsel detailed the reasonable and necessary nature of the
investigation, stating “the investigator worked diligently to
-4-
assist in the defense of this client.”
The investigator filed
an affidavit which states that “the work indicated on the
attached invoices was necessary and performed in good faith for
the Laurel Circuit Court. . . .”
The Commonwealth did not file
a response to the motion.
Kentucky law mandates payment of reasonable and
necessary defense expenses on behalf of an indigent defendant.
Binion v. Commonwealth, 891 S.W.2d 383, 384 (Ky. 1995);
McCracken Fiscal Court v. Graves, 855 S.W.2d 307, 314 (Ky.
1994).
To disallow payment of half of the submitted expenses
without a hearing to determine the reasonable and necessary
nature of those expenses, is unfair and improper.
Such a ruling
may have a chilling effect on the ability of indigent defendants
to obtain reasonable and necessary assistance with pre-trial
preparation of a defense.
For this reason, the court’s denial
of expenses, in the absence of a request for a more detailed
accounting, constitutes reversible error.
The Commonwealth utterly fails to respond to the issue
raised by Vaughn.
The Commonwealth argues that as the motion
for full payment was not made until April, 2002, it was
untimely.
The court granted partial payment of the invoice in
September, 2001.
That “Order to be Paid” was not made final or
appealable by the court.
That order was not a “judgment” making
the case final, or depriving the court of jurisdiction over the
-5-
action.
Following the filing of Vaughn’s motion for full
payment of the invoice, the court made a ruling it detailed as
“final and appealable.”
It was not until that point that the
matter was ripe for appeal.
order.
A timely appeal was taken from that
Therefore, the appeal was timely filed.
The Commonwealth next asserts that the public defender
should have been made a party to the appeal, and contends that
the appeal should be dismissed for failure to name an
indispensable party.
In support of this contention, the
Commonwealth cites McCracken Fiscal Court v. Graves, 855 S.W.2d
307, 314 (Ky. 1994).
As is apparent from the style of that
case, the public defender is not a party to the action, which
was similar to the one before us today.
As the Kentucky Supreme
Court has made clear, the interested party in a case where an
indigent defendant seeks funds to pay for reasonable and
necessary defense preparation is the defendant himself.
v. Commonwealth, 891 S.W.2d 383, 384 (Ky. 1995).
Binion
To require
defense counsel to be made a party to such appeals is improper.
Such a requirement would hamper judicial process, and place an
additional burden upon those charged with defense of indigent
defendants.
We deny the Commonwealth’s request for dismissal
for failure to name an indispensable party.
The judgment of the Laurel Circuit Court is vacated
and remanded for findings consistent with this Opinion.
-6-
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Dennis Stutsman
Assistant Public Advocate
Frankfort, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Matthew D. Nelson
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
-7-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.