JAMES ALLEN v. CANDACE ALLEN; ELZIE PRATER; AND SANDY PRATER
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RENDERED:
SEPTEMBER 3, 2004; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-002386-MR
JAMES ALLEN
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MONTGOMERY CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE BETH LEWIS MAZE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-CI-00082
CANDACE ALLEN; ELZIE
PRATER; AND SANDY PRATER
APPELLEES
OPINION
VACATING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; GUIDUGLI AND KNOPF, JUDGES.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE:
In this custody action, James Allen
(hereinafter “James”) has appealed from the Montgomery Circuit
Court’s October 28, 2003, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and Judgment, in which his minor children’s maternal
grandparents were declared to be their de facto custodians and
awarded sole custody.
Having considered the parties’ briefs,
the record and the applicable case law, we must vacate the
circuit court’s judgment and remand.
James and Candace Allen (hereinafter “Candace”) were
married in Montgomery County, Kentucky, on February 24, 1996.
Two children were born of the marriage:
1996; and J.R.A. on January 19, 1998.
C.E.A. on September 18,
James and Candace
separated on April 1, 1998, and Candace filed a Petition for
Dissolution of Marriage on May 22, 1998.
In the petition,
Candace requested dissolution of the marriage, sole custody of
the minor children, child support, and liberal visitation for
James.
After a brief reconciliation, James and Candace again
separated on April 1, 1999, after James had entered the
military.
On March 17, 1999, Candace’s parents, Elzie and Sandy
Prater (hereinafter “the Praters”) filed juvenile petitions in
the Montgomery District Court alleging that Candace had been
neglecting her minor children.
The district court entered a
juvenile emergency custody order for each child, removed the
children from Candace’s custody, and awarded the Praters
temporary custody.
At that time, James had entered the U.S.
Army and was stationed in Ft. Knox.
By order entered June 17,
1999, the district court ordered James to pay $400 per month and
Candace to pay $150 per month in child support to the Praters.
The district court held a hearing on July 28, 1999, at which
time Candace admitted to neglecting her children.
Dispositions
were entered the same day, in which the district court ruled
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that the Praters were to retain temporary custody and that the
natural parents were to have liberal visitation to be set by the
Praters.
James and Candace were to continue to pay the same
amount of child support as previously ordered.
James
sporadically paid his child support obligations during the first
year, and then the payments were automatically deducted from his
paychecks.
The divorce action languished in the circuit court
until James filed an Amended Response to Petition for
Dissolution of Marriage1 on July 18, 2003.
In this pleading,
James requested sole custody of the minor children and
reasonable child support from Candace.
The same day, James
filed a motion for temporary sole custody of the children and
for the Praters, as the current custodians, to be joined as
necessary parties.
In an affidavit attached to the motion,
James indicated that he was currently in a position to establish
a stable permanent home for the children and that he still
wanted the children to have close relationships with Candace and
the Praters.
On July 24, 2003, the Praters filed a pro se
motion with the circuit court requesting that they be declared
the children’s de facto custodians and that they be awarded sole
custody and child support.
The Praters attached an affidavit to
their motion, in which they stated that although James had been
1
The record does not contain any previously filed response to the petition.
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discharged from the U.S. Army in October 1999, he did not seek
to regain custody until July 2003 and that his visitations prior
to that time were sporadic.
By letter dated July 30, 2003,
Candace indicated to the circuit court that she wanted the
children to remain in the custody of her parents, the Praters.
James filed a response to the Praters’ motion, again requesting
that he be awarded sole custody of the children and that the
Praters be awarded visitation rights.
Following a brief motion hour hearing on August 15,
2003, the circuit court joined the Praters as necessary parties
and scheduled a hearing on custody for August 25, 2003.
At the
hearing, the circuit court heard testimony from several
witnesses.
James testified that he enlisted in the U.S. Army in
January 1999 and was discharged on October 21, 1999.
Following
his discharge, he moved around, eventually moving in with a
girlfriend, and obtained employment.
At the time of the
hearing, he was in a stable living environment and in a place
big enough for the children, and wanted to regain custody.
James’s mother and cousin also testified as to the good living
conditions James possessed.
Candace testified that the children
should remain with their grandparents.
Sandy Prater testified
that she and her husband received custody of the children on
March 17, 1999, and had been flexible with them in relation to
visitation with James and Candace.
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She indicated that she did
not keep track of the child support Candace was supposed to be
paying through the state, but that she had been receiving child
support payments from James out of his paycheck.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the circuit court
indicated that it would be making a decision on the de facto
custodian status as well as on the issue of custody without
holding a further hearing, over the objection of James, as no
further information regarding custody would be necessary in
order to make that determination.
James stated that he had only
prepared for a hearing on temporary custody as opposed to
permanent custody, and that he had planned on calling more
witnesses regarding his current living situation.
The circuit
court first noted that although James could have moved for
custody of his children upon his discharge in 1999 and had been
employed since 2000, he waited until 2003 to petition the
circuit court for custody.
The circuit court ruled that the
statutory period for de facto custodianship began to run in
November 1999 when James was discharged and that the Praters had
been the children’s custodians from that time.
The circuit
court then declared that the Praters were the de facto
custodians of the minor children and awarded them sole custody
as it would be too traumatic to move the children from their
grandparents’ stable home in which they had been living for over
four years.
On October 28, 2003, the circuit court entered a
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written judgment memorializing its oral rulings regarding
custody and dissolving the marriage between James and Candace.
This appeal followed.
On appeal, James argues that the Praters are not
entitled to the status of de facto custodians, as they had not
been acting as the children’s primary financial supporter for
more than one year; James had been paying child support to the
Praters and the Praters had been receiving K-TAP2 benefits for
the children.
Furthermore, James asserts that the circuit court
did not consider all of the relevant factors set forth in KRS
403.270(2) and failed to conduct a final hearing before deciding
upon a permanent custody award.
On the other hand, in their
brief, the Praters3 argue that clear and convincing evidence
exists to support the circuit court’s decision.
Candace did not
file a brief in this matter.
In Moore v. Asente, Ky., 110 S.W.3d 336 (2003), the
Supreme Court of Kentucky addressed the standard of review for
appellate courts in this type of case, and held that a reviewing
court may set aside findings of fact,
[O]nly if those findings are clearly
erroneous. And, the dispositive question
that we must answer, therefore, is whether
the trial court’s findings of fact are
clearly erroneous, i.e., whether or not
those findings are supported by substantial
2
Kentucky transitional assistance program. See KRS 205.200.
Attorney Stephen E. Neal entered an appearance in the circuit court on
behalf of the Praters on December 4, 2003.
3
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evidence. “[S]ubstantial evidence” is
“[e]vidence that a reasonable mind would
accept as adequate to support a conclusion”
and evidence that, when “taken alone or in
the light of all the evidence, . . . has
sufficient probative value to induce
conviction in the minds of reasonable men.”
Regardless of conflicting evidence, the
weight of the evidence, or the fact that the
reviewing court would have reached a
contrary finding, “due regard shall be given
to the opportunity of the trial court to
judge the credibility of the witnesses”
because judging the credibility of witnesses
and weighing evidence are tasks within the
exclusive province of the trial court.
Thus, “[m]ere doubt as to the correctness of
[a] finding [will] not justify [its]
reversal,” and appellate courts should not
disturb trial court findings that are
supported by substantial evidence.
(Citations omitted.)
Id. at 354.
With this standard in mind, we shall review the
trial court’s decision.
We shall first address the issue as to whether the
Praters were entitled to be deemed de facto custodians.
403.270(1)(a) defines a de facto custodian as:
[A] person who has been shown by clear and
convincing evidence to have been the primary
caregiver for, and financial supporter of, a
child who has resided with the person for a
period of six (6) months or more if the
child is under three (3) years of age and
for a period of one (1) year or more if the
child is three (3) years of age or older or
has been placed by the Department for
Community Based Services. Any period of
time after a legal proceeding has been
commenced by a parent seeking to regain
custody of the child shall not be included
in determining whether the child has resided
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KRS
with the person for the required minimum
period.
KRS 403.270(1)(b) provides that once the court determines that a
person is a de facto custodian, “the court shall give the person
the same standing in custody matters that is given to each
parent under this section and KRS 403.280, 403.340, 403.350,
403.420, and 403.020.”
S.W.3d 777 (2002).
See Sherfey v. Sherfey, Ky.App., 74
It is undisputed in this case that the
Praters had been the primary caregivers for the children for
more than one year.
The issue in this case is whether they were
also the primary financial supporters for that time.
Because we
cannot hold that clear and convincing evidence exists to support
the circuit court’s decision that the Praters were the primary
financial supporters at the time when the status was raised, we
must vacate that ruling.
Although the question was somewhat disputed, it is now
settled that a person must have “been the primary caregiver for
the child but also the primary financial supporter of the child
in order to prove de facto custodian status.”
Swiss v. Cabinet
for Families and Children, Ky.App., 43 S.W.3d 796, 798 (2001).
In Swiss, this Court affirmed the trial court’s ruling that the
Swisses were not de facto custodians because the cabinet, rather
than the Swisses, provided the primary support.
Furthermore, in
Sullivan v. Tucker, Ky.App., 29 S.W.3d 805 (2000), this Court
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stated, “[t]his language (“the court, not “every court
thereafter”) . . . suggests that the determination of de facto
custodianship is a matter that must be addressed anew whenever
the status is asserted.”
Id. at 808.
The Praters did not
assert the status of de facto custodian until July 24, 2003.
We are aware in the present case that James’s child
support payments for at least the first year were somewhat
sporadic and that he most likely did not pay the entire amount
he owed.
However, that is not the issue in this case.
It is
undisputed that, at least for the year previous to and at the
time of the hearing, he had been making his regular $400 per
month child support payments through deductions from his
paycheck.
At the time the Praters moved for a determination of
de facto custodian status, there is no evidence to support their
assertion that James was not, or that the Praters were, the
primary financial supporter of the children.
The Praters did
not produce any evidence regarding money they expended for
support of the children over and above that provided by James
and Candace as well as through the K-TAP benefits they
collected.
Although we recognize that the full amount needed to
raise a child is not necessarily provided for by the child
support scale, we are not persuaded by the Praters’ argument
that they were the primary financial supporter because they were
responsible for paying the mortgage or rent, the taxes, and for
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clothing and entertainment expenses.
There is no clear and
convincing evidence as to what the Praters expended of their own
money in support of the children over that which they received
from other sources.
Therefore, we must hold that the circuit
court erred in declaring the Praters to be de facto custodians
of the minor children and vacate that decision as well as the
resulting custody award.
We remand this matter for further
proceedings regarding the Praters’ financial contribution to the
children’s upbringing to allow for a proper determination as to
whether the Praters should be afforded de facto custodian
status.
As a result of our decision on this issue, the
remaining issues regarding consideration of the factors of KRS
403.270(2) and the failure to hold a final hearing are moot.
For the foregoing reasons, we must reverse the
circuit court’s decision declaring the Praters to be de facto
custodians and awarding them sole custody, and remand this
matter for further proceedings regarding custody.
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE, CONCURS.
KNOPF, JUDGE, CONCURS AND FILES SEPARATE OPINION.
KNOPF, JUDGE, CONCURRING:
I agree with the reasoning
and the result of the majority opinion, but I write separately to
emphasize that the Praters’ receipt of child support from James
Allen does not necessarily disqualify them from being considered
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de facto custodians of the Allen children.
In enacting KRS
403.270(1), the legislature recognized that a third party who has
assumed the role of a parent should be recognized as such.
Thus,
a person established to be a de facto custodian has the same
standing as a natural parent in a custody dispute.
As the majority correctly notes, a person claiming de
facto custodian status must show by clear and convincing evidence
that he or she has been the primary caregiver for, and primary
financial supporter of the child.
Swiss v. Cabinet for Families
and Children, Ky. App., 43 S.W.3d 796, 798 (2001); citing KRS
403.270(1)(a).
It is not enough that a person provide for the
child alongside the natural parent.
Rather, “the statute is
clear that one must literally stand in the place of the natural
parent to qualify as a de facto custodian.”
Consalvi v. Cawood,
Ky. App. 63 S.W.3d 195, 198 (2001).
In this case, the Praters obtained legal custody of the
children in 1999.
Neither James nor Candace objected to that
award of custody.
However, this custody order did not extinguish
James’s or Candace’s obligation to support their children.
To
this end, the district court properly ordered James and Candace
to pay child-support to the Praters.
James’s payment of this
court-ordered support was sporadic until a wage assignment order
was entered.
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The majority correctly holds that a person’s status as
a de facto custodian must be addressed as of the time the status
is asserted.
Furthermore, the Praters’ legal custody of the
children since 1999 is clearly relevant to determine their
status.
The proper standard to determine whether the Praters are
de facto custodians is whether they have been the primary
caregivers for and primary financial supporters of the children.
The trial court clearly erred by failing to make a finding on the
extent of the Praters’ financial support of the children.
But as of July 24, 2003, when the Praters asserted the
status, they had been the primary caretakers of the children for
nearly four years.
Although they had been receiving some child
support from James Allen, I would not presume that $400.00 a
month for two children would constitute the primary means of
support of these children.
Rather, their receipt of child
support payments or state benefits should only be a factor in
determining whether they have been the primary financial
supporters of the children for the past four years.
As correctly noted by the majority, there was no
evidence concerning the amounts that the Praters have spent to
support the Allen children, as opposed to what they received from
other sources.
Therefore, I agree that the trial court erred in
finding them to be de facto custodians of the Allen children.
Furthermore, the majority properly remands this case to the trial
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court for an additional hearing and findings in accord with the
proper standard.
Although I agree that the Praters bear the
burden of proving that they have provided the primary means of
support for the children, I strongly disagree with any suggestion
that de facto custodian status could be defeated merely because
the custodial non-parents are receiving support payments that the
parents are lawfully obligated to pay.
The result would be to
discourage the de facto custodian from seeking support from the
parents for fear of losing the status.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
Leah N. Hawkins
Mt. Sterling, KY
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES, ELZIE
PRATER AND SANDY PRATER:
Stephen E. Neal
Mt. Sterling, KY
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