MICHAEL A. PASSIDOMO, M.D. AND MICHAEL A. PASSIDOMO, P.S.C. v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, CABINET FOR HEALTH SERVICES, DEPARTMENT FOR MEDICAID SERVICES
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RENDERED:
DECEMBER 5, 2003; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2002-CA-002326-MR
MICHAEL A. PASSIDOMO, M.D.
AND
MICHAEL A. PASSIDOMO, P.S.C.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ROGER L. CRITTENDEN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-CI-00230
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY,
CABINET FOR HEALTH SERVICES,
DEPARTMENT FOR MEDICAID SERVICES
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, COMBS, AND DYCHE, JUDGES.
BUCKINGHAM, JUDGE: Dr. Michael A. Passidomo appeals from an
order of the Franklin Circuit Court affirming a decision by the
Kentucky Cabinet for Health Services which determined that Dr.
Passidomo owed the Cabinet $119,208.38 based on a denial of
claims submitted by him for MRI1 services provided to Medicaid
recipients.
1
We affirm.
Magnetic Resonance Imaging.
Dr. Passidomo was a neurologist practicing in
Pikeville, Kentucky.2
He was the only neurologist in Pike
County, and he owned and operated Appalachian MRI, Inc., a
clinic that provided MRI and other diagnostic services.3
The
clinic where the MRI scanner was located was not at the same
location as Dr. Passidomo’s office.
Vicky Cole, a registered nurse and investigator from
the Surveillance and Utilization Review Subsystem (SURS) Branch
of the Department of Medicaid Services conducted a review of Dr.
Passidomo’s records beginning in October 1993.
This review
covered claims for MRI services provided by Appalachian MRI,
Inc., for the period from March 1, 1992, through June 30, 1993.
The SURS review conducted at that time identified 141 identical
claims submitted by Dr. Passidomo’s clinic in which a
precontrast MRI scan was performed on a particular Medicaid
recipient followed one or two days later by a contrast-enhanced
MRI scan for the same recipient.
The SURS review also included a sampling of Dr.
Passidomo’s patient records and MRI scans for 20 of the 141
claims at issue.
Based on this review, it was determined that
Dr. Passidomo failed to establish medical necessity for the
2
Dr. Passidomo is now retired.
3
The entity, Appalachian MRI, Inc., was subsequently renamed Michael A.
Passidomo, P.S.C.
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performance of the contrast-enhanced MRI scans after the
precontrast MRI scans had been performed and that there was no
record of physician-patient contact regarding the performance of
the contrast-enhanced scans.
Nurse Cole therefore concluded
that Dr. Passidomo’s claims for MRI services totaling
$119,208.38 were improper.
Dr. Passidomo requested an administrative review of
the denial pursuant to 907 KAR4 1:671,§ 9.
A hearing was held
before an administrative law judge (ALJ) at which time the
Cabinet presented the testimony of Nurse Cole, Nurse Caroline
Combs, and Dr. James Lee.
Dr. Passidomo testified on his own
behalf and presented testimony from Dr. Murray Solomon.
In a
hearing report dated April 29, 1996, the ALJ determined that the
Cabinet was entitled to recover the sum of $119,208.38 from Dr.
Passidomo.
The Secretary of the Cabinet for Health Services
adopted the ALJ’s report as final on May 9, 1996.
Dr. Passidomo appealed this decision to the Franklin
Circuit Court, which entered a judgment in favor of Dr.
Passidomo on March 3, 1998.
actions were arbitrary.
The court found that the Cabinet’s
In particular, the court concluded that
the Cabinet treated operators of low field scanners differently
from those who operated high field scanners.
Further, the court
noted that questions remained concerning whether the contrast4
Kentucky Administrative Regulations.
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enhanced scans were medically necessary and whether the use of
two billing codes by Dr. Passidomo resulted in greater cost to
the Medicaid program.
Thus, the court reversed the ALJ’s
decision and remanded the case for further proceedings.
After the case was remanded, a new hearing officer was
assigned to the case because the first ALJ had ended his
employment with the Cabinet.
Also, the parties agreed that the
issue of the use of two billing codes would not be dispositive
of the case.
On December 22, 2000, the second hearing officer
rendered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Recommended
Decision.
In an eight-page decision, the hearing officer
concluded that Dr. Passidomo “has failed to substantiate the
medical necessity of the contrast-enhanced MRI scans via the
medical records as required by the Manual.”
In short, the
hearing officer ruled in favor of the Cabinet as to its right to
recoup the money from Dr. Passidomo.
On January 23, 2001, the
Secretary for the Cabinet for Health Services adopted the
hearing officer’s report.
Dr. Passidomo once again appealed to the Franklin
Circuit Court.
The Cabinet filed a motion to dismiss the appeal
for failure of Dr. Passidomo to exhaust his administrative
remedies.
In particular, the Cabinet argued that Dr.
Passidomo’s exceptions to the hearing officer’s report were
untimely filed.
Finding that there was substantial reason to
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believe that the Cabinet’s usual practices concerning the
entering and mailing of orders were not followed, the circuit
court entered an order on April 5, 2002, directing the Secretary
to consider Dr. Passidomo’s exceptions.
After considering Dr. Passidomo’s exceptions, the
Secretary once again affirmed the hearing officer’s report.
Secretary’s order was entered on May 23, 2002.
The
Rather than file
a new appeal, a motion was filed in the same case in the
Franklin Circuit Court submitting the matter for final
adjudication.
The circuit court entered its final order on October
17, 2002.
After presenting the procedural history of the case
and reviewing the applicable case law involving a court’s
authority when reviewing an administrative agency action, the
court then held as follows:
Having examined the record, the testimony of
the individual’s [sic] in question, and
other evidence, this Court concludes that
sufficient, admissible information exists to
support the findings of fact made by the ALJ
and the decision of the Cabinet that it is
entitled to recoup the funds is supported by
substantial evidence.
Dr. Passidomo’s appeal to this court followed.
Dr. Passidomo’s first argument is that the circuit
court violated his due process rights by failing to produce an
opinion capable of review by this court.
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Dr. Passidomo refers
to the court’s opinion as “a cursory opinion.”
Dr. Passidomo’s
description of the court’s opinion is correct to the extent it
resolved the case in the one sentence set forth above and did
not discuss what “substantial evidence” supported the Cabinet’s
decision.
This court stated in Commonwealth, Dept. of Educ. v.
Commonwealth, Ky. App., 798 S.W.2d 464, 467 (1990), that “[t]he
position of the circuit court in administrative matters is one
of review, not reinterpretation.”
In reviewing the Cabinet’s
decision, the circuit court could review whether the Cabinet
acted in excess of its granted powers, whether all parties were
afforded due process of law, and whether the Cabinet’s action
was supported by substantial evidence.
American Beauty Homes
Corp. v. Louisville & Jefferson County Planning and Zoning
Comm’n, Ky., 379 S.W.2d 450, 456 (1964).
See also KRS5 13B.150.
As it does not appear that there were issues concerning whether
the Cabinet acted in excess of its granted powers or whether Dr.
Passidomo was afforded his due process rights in connection with
the Cabinet proceedings, Dr. Passidomo’s complaint is that the
circuit court did not explain its reasons for holding that the
Cabinet’s decision was supported by substantial evidence.
Dr.
Passidomo asserts that “the reviewing Circuit Court must clearly
explain the reasoning that supports its action in order to
5
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
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provide for meaningful appellate review.”
He maintains that the
failure of the circuit court to explain its reasoning violates
his due process rights.
It is true that the Cabinet was required to “make
findings of basic evidentiary facts, as opposed to a simple
statement which reaches a conclusion and quotes the words of a
statute.”
Shields v. Pittsburg & Midway Coal Mining Co., Ky.
App., 634 S.W.2d 440, 443 (1982).
508 S.W.2d 776 (1974).
See also Caller v. Ison, Ky.,
However, these cases relate to the
necessity of fact findings by an administrative agency and do
not relate to fact findings to be made by the circuit court.
Where circuit courts review administrative agency decisions, the
court does not make additional fact findings but rather reviews
the actions of the administrative agency.
of Educ., supra.
Commonwealth, Dep’t
In short, although the circuit court did not
explain the reasons for its decision, it made the necessary
determination concerning whether there was substantial evidence
to support the Cabinet’s decision.
We find no error in the
manner and form in which the court affirmed the Cabinet’s
decision.
Dr. Passidomo’s second argument is that the court’s
decision was arbitrary and capricious because it was not
supported by substantial evidence and was incorrect as a matter
of law.
His argument has three parts.
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First, he argues that
the circuit court committed clear error when it failed to
identify the standard of medical practice for a neurologist in
Pike County, Kentucky.
Second, he argues that the circuit court
failed to give Dr. Passidomo’s testimony as a treating physician
the weight to which it was entitled as a matter of law.
Third,
he argues that by affirming the Cabinet’s decision, the circuit
court erroneously upheld a decision that was not supported by
substantial evidence.
In connection with the standard of medical practice
for a neurologist in the Pike County area, Dr. Charles Lee, a
neuroradiologist, testified on behalf of the Cabinet.
The
hearing officer determined that Dr. Lee, who practiced at the
University of Kentucky, was an expert in neuroradiology and that
Dr. Lee was familiar with the standard of medical practice in
the nation and in Kentucky.
Dr. Lee testified that he was
familiar with Medicaid rules and policies regarding the medical
necessity and use of MRI, that he was familiar with the medical
standards in Eastern Kentucky because the University of Kentucky
receives many referrals from the area, that he has experience
using low field scanners, that he was familiar with applicable
national and Kentucky standards, that he reads 40-50 scans per
year from low field scanners which are referred to the radiology
department from other neurosurgeons, and that the medical need
for a contrast-enhanced MRI was no different for individuals
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living in Lexington, Kentucky, than it was for individuals
living in Pikeville, Kentucky.
Based on his qualifications,
training, and practice, Dr. Lee testified that the contrastenhanced MRI scans provided by Dr. Passidomo were not medically
necessary.
While Dr. Passidomo argues that Dr. Lee’s testimony
was “unreliable and entitled to no probative value,” we believe
otherwise.
Rather, it appears obvious to us that Dr. Lee was
qualified to give his opinion as to the medical necessity of the
MRI scans.
Furthermore, the Cabinet hearing officer was
entitled to choose between the conflicting testimony presented
to him.6
See Square D Co. v. Tipton, Ky., 862 S.W.2d 308, 309
(1993).
The second part to Dr. Passidomo’s second argument is
that the Cabinet and the circuit court failed to give Dr.
Passidomo’s testimony as a treating physician the weight to
which it was entitled as a matter of law.
He argues that there
is a “treating physician doctrine” under which courts must give
the testimony of treating physicians deference over the
testimony of nontreating physicians.
6
Thus, he asserts that his
Dr. Arthur Solomon, a neuroradiologist, testified on behalf of Dr.
Passidomo. Dr. Solomon testified that seventeen of the twenty contrastenhanced MRI scans appeared to be medically necessary. However, Dr. Solomon
testified that the medical necessity of the scans was outside his area of
expertise.
-9-
testimony concerning medical necessity should have been given
greater weight than the testimony of Dr. Lee.
Dr. Passidomo failed to cite any Kentucky case law
which would support his position.
Furthermore, the federal
cases upon which he relies are distinguishable and do not
persuade us to support his position.
In short, it was for the
fact finder to choose between the conflicting testimony of the
experts, see Square D, supra, and Dr. Passidomo’s testimony was
not entitled to be given greater weight than the testimony of
the other experts.
The last part of Dr. Passidomo’s second argument is
that the Cabinet’s decision was not supported by substantial
evidence.
Specifically, he argues that the Cabinet “failed to
substantiate the finding of medical necessity” and that the
Secretary “did not articulate any facts to support that legal
conclusion.”
In short, Dr. Passidomo’s argument is that the
Cabinet’s decision was arbitrary as a matter of law because it
was not supported by substantial evidence.
“So long as the agency’s decision is supported by
substantial evidence of probative value, it is not arbitrary and
must be accepted as binding by the appellate court.”
Aubrey v.
Office of Attorney Gen., Ky. App., 994 S.W.2d 516, 519 (1998).
“Substantial evidence is defined as evidence of substance and
relevant consequence, having the fitness to induce conviction in
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the minds of reasonable people.”
Id.
“[T]he possibility of
drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not
prevent an administrative agency’s finding from being supported
by substantial evidence.”
Bowling v. Natural Resources, Ky.
App., 891 S.W.2d 406, 410 (1994), quoting Kentucky State Racing
Comm’n v. Fuller, Ky., 481 S.W.2d 298, 307 (1972).
Dr. Lee testified that the contrast-enhanced MRI scans
performed by Dr. Passidomo were not medically necessary.
Dr.
Solomon testified that seventeen of the twenty contrast-enhanced
MRI scans performed by Dr. Passidomo appeared to be medically
justified.
However, Dr. Solomon also testified that the medical
necessity of the scans was outside his area of expertise.
Dr.
Passidomo testified that the scans were medically necessary.
Dr. Passidomo challenges the value and credibility of
Dr. Lee’s testimony.
However, “the trier of facts is afforded
great latitude in its evaluation of the evidence heard and the
credibility of witnesses appearing before it.”
S.W.2d at 409-10.
Bowling, 891
“[I]t is the exclusive province of the
administrative trier of fact to pass upon the credibility of
witnesses, and the weight of the evidence.”
Kentucky State Racing Comm’n, supra.
Id., citing
We conclude there was
substantial evidence to support the findings and conclusions of
the hearing officer.
The order of the Franklin Circuit Court is affirmed.
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ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
Holly J. Turner
Lisa English Hinkle
Lexington, Kentucky
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEES:
Paula J. Holbrook
Office of the General Counsel
Frankfort, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLANT:
Lisa English Hinkle
Lexington, Kentucky
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