SAMUEL MANLY v. HUGH SMITH HAYNIE, JUDGE OF JEFFERSON DISTRICT COURT DIVISION 18 AND OF JEFFERSON FAMILY COURT DIVISION TWO(2), IN HIS CAPACITY AS A SPECIAL JUDGE OF JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT; PATRICIA VAN HOUTEN, ASSISTANT JEFFERSON COUNTY ATTORNEY; AND COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: October 31, 2003; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2001-CA-001140-MR
SAMUEL MANLY
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON FAMILY COURT
HONORABLE HUGH SMITH HAYNIE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 94-FC-02190
HUGH SMITH HAYNIE, JUDGE
OF JEFFERSON DISTRICT
COURT DIVISION 18 AND OF
JEFFERSON FAMILY COURT
DIVISION TWO(2), IN HIS
CAPACITY AS A SPECIAL JUDGE
OF JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT;
PATRICIA VAN HOUTEN,
ASSISTANT JEFFERSON COUNTY
ATTORNEY; AND
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEES
OPINION
REVERSING
BEFORE:
JUDGE.1
** ** ** ** **
GUIDUGLI AND SCHRODER, JUDGES; AND MILLER, SENIOR
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE.
Samuel Manly (hereinafter “Manly”) appeals
from an order of the Jefferson Family Court finding him guilty
1
Senior Judge John D. Miller sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the
Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and
KRS 21.580.
of two counts of criminal contempt and sentencing him to one day
in jail on the first count and imposing a $1.00 fine on the
second count.
We reverse.
This matter arose as a result of Manly’s
representation of a client in a child support matter.
Patricia
Van Houten, (hereinafter “Van Houten”), Assistant Jefferson
County Attorney, had intervened in the domestic action to assist
the former spouse in collecting child support and to recoup
benefits previously paid to her in lieu of support.
On January
25, 2001, Manly, Van Houten, and their clients met for a
settlement conference.
contemptuous.
The settlement conference became
At one point Van Houten chuckled or laughed at a
response given by Manly’s client.
Thereupon Van Houten and
Manly got into a verbal dispute which culminated with Van Houten
requesting or demanding that Manly produce certain documents to
which she believed she was entitled.
Manly responded to her
request by stating, “I wouldn’t give you the sweat off my
balls”.
The settlement conference was then terminated.
The following day, Manly produced the requested
material, as well as, filing objections to some of the documents
and interrogatories Van Houten requested.
The matter was set
for motion hour on January 29, 2000, before Judge Hugh Haynie.
When the case was called before Judge Hugh Haynie, Van Houten
attempted to explain to the judge why she could not and would
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not go to Manly’s office to copy certain requested documents.
Van Houten’s explanation included a paraphrase of Manly’s
statement from the failed settlement conference to the effect
that she would receive “the sweat from his genitals” before she
would receive the requested discovery.
At that point, Manly
interrupted Van Houten and the following ensured:
Manly: No, I told her I wouldn’t give her
the sweat off my balls after she insulted me
and I still won’t give her the sweat off my
balls if she wants to insult me today.
Court:
Counsel, a little decorum.
Manly: What I said to this young lady
outside the presence of the court is none of
your business.
Van Houten: Judge, it is the court’s
business because he has refused to produce
the tax returns. He wants to only give. . .
Manly:
I did no such thing.
Van Houten: Judge would you ask counsel to
let me finish?
Court: Mr. Manly, this is my courtroom and
I would ask that you comport yourself with
some degree of dignity and decorum.
Manly:
I thought I was.
Court: Well, using that sort of language in
the tone of voice is not my idea. . . .
Manly:
I did not bring it up, she did.
Court: It doesn’t matter who brought it up,
it’s the way you addressed it. Now let’s
play nice here. Let’s deal with the issue
at hand.
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Thereafter, the parties continued discussing the
motion to produce and the hearing was completed without
incident.
No action was taken by Judge Haynie against Manly at
any time during the hearing and no mention of contemptuous
behavior was made.
The parties were again in court on the same domestic
matter on February 19, 2001.
According to numerous pleadings
filed by Manly subsequent to the contempt charge being filed
against him, the following events took place. Before the
hearing, Judge Haynie told Manly that he would like to see him
in chambers later that day, and advised Van Houten that she need
not be present as the matter was of no concern to her client.
Manly presented himself at Judge Haynie’s chambers later that
day, and an off-the-record discussion ensued regarding Manly’s
conduct at the hearing on January 29, 2001.
Only Manly and
Judge Haynie were present during this meeting.
Judge Haynie
told Manly that he had determined that Manly’s profane
statements and aggressive behavior before the court that day
constituted civil contempt, but that he did not wish to place
Manly in jail.
Instead, according to Manly, Judge Haynie
proposed that if Manly would admit that his behavior was
contemptuous, apologize in open court to the court and Van
Houten in a closed hearing, and pay $500 to the Louisville Home
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for the Innocents, he would suspend the execution of a ten-day
jail sentence.
In the alternative, Judge Haynie stated that if
Manly did not agree to such a resolution of the matter, he would
proceed to cite Manly for contempt in a public hearing and
imposed the ten-day jail sentence.
According to Manly, Judge
Haynie further reminded Manly that such an open hearing might
place Manly’s law license in jeopardy.
Manly responded that he did not feel that anything he
said or did before Judge Haynie during the hearing of January 29
was contemptuous or obstructed the administration of justice on
Judge Haynie’s court.
Manly stated that his use of strong
language before Judge Haynie was merely in response to Van
Houten’s having misquoted Manly on the record, and showed no
disrespect for the court.
Manly further advised Judge Haynie
that he did not believe he could be held in civil contempt for
his conduct, and that if he were charged with criminal contempt,
he would require notice, the opportunity to be heard, and a
hearing before an impartial judge.
A day or two later, Manly again spoke to Judge Haynie
about the contempt matter.
Judge Haynie told Manly that he had
done some research and determined that the contempt was not
civil in nature but was criminal.
Judge Haynie offered Manly
the same terms to purge himself of the criminal contempt and
granted Manly time to make a decision.
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Manly thereafter
consulted with counsel and decided that he would not admit to
the criminal contempt.
On March 5, 2001, Manly appeared before Judge Haynie
to set a date for the contempt hearing.
Judge Haynie asked
Manly if he wanted a “short hearing” or a “long hearing”.
Manly
responded that he wanted a “long hearing” but that he had yet to
find a date that was good with his counsel.
On March 7, 2001,
Judge Haynie entered an order requiring Manly to appear before
him to show cause why he should not be held in contempt for his
actions at motion hour on January 29, 2001.
On April 23, 2001, Manly’s criminal contempt hearing
was held before Judge Haynie and was closed to the public.
Manly was represented by attorney Aubrey Williams, who, on that
date, filed a memoranda alleging lack of jurisdiction,
insufficient notice of the charges, and that Manly’s conduct on
January 29, 2001, did not constitute contempt.
The court then
clarified that the comments it considered contemptuous were the
two remarks that Manly would not give Van Houten the “sweat off
his balls,” although the court recognized that the subsequent
comment that it was none of the court’s business what Manly said
to Van Houten outside the courtroom was also contempt-worthy.
Williams then requested leave to call Judge Haynie, Van Houten,
and Manly as witnesses.
Judge Haynie denied the request.
Haynie further denied Williams’ request to present said
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Judge
testimony by avowal.
Judge Haynie reiterated that he was only
interested in arguments as to why Manly’s conduct did not
constitute contempt.
Judge Haynie permitted Manly and Williams to both make
statements.
Williams asserted that Manly lacked the requisite
mens rea for criminal contempt because Manly did not intend to
show disrespect to the court.
Manly attempted to explain his
conduct and argued why the comments were not contemptuous.
Manly also asserted that he never intended any disrespect to the
court and apologized for the offensive remarks.
Judge Haynie adjudged Manly guilty of two counts of
criminal contempt and imposed a sentence of one day in jail as
to count one.
He further ordered Manly to return the following
day for sentencing on count two.
apologized for his conduct.
fine on count two.
The following morning Manly
Judge Haynie then imposed a $1.00
This appeal by Manly followed.
Manly argues that his conduct and statements before
the court on January 29 2001, did not constitute criminal
contempt.
“Contempt is the willful disobedience toward, or open
disrespect for, the rules or orders of a court.”
v. Burge, Ky., 947 S.W.2d 805, 808 (1997).
Commonwealth
“Criminal contempt
is conduct ‘which amounts to an obstruction of justice, and
which tends to bring the court into disrepute.’”
-7-
Id. (quoting
Gordon v. Commonwealth, 141 Ky. 461, 463, 133 S.W. 206, 208
(1911).
Manly admits that his statement that he wouldn’t give
Van Houten “the sweat off my balls,” was vulgar and uncivil, but
maintains that he did not intend any disrespect to the court by
its utterance.
Rather, he claims he was merely correcting Van
Houten’s misquotation of the remark on the record.
While we may
not agree with Manly’s basis for arguing his statements were not
contemptuous, we do agree that, under the circumstances
presented herein, the trial court erred in finding Manly in
contempt.
As previously stated, the actual statement was made
to Van Houten during a settlement conference outside the
courtroom.
When Van Houten attempted to paraphrase Manly’s rude
remarks to her, Manly interrupted her and stated the exact words
he had previously used.
A review of the video tape of the
proceedings shows that the trial judge did not show any
indication that he was shocked or offended by the statement or
that he had lost control over the parties or lost decorum in the
courtroom.
In fact, Judge Haynie exhibited complete control of
the proceedings and no loss of composure.
In Cooke v. United States, 19 L.Ed. 767 (1925), the
United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of when contempt
occurs “under the eye or within the view of the court” as
follows:
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We think the distinction finds its reason
not any more in the ability of the judge to
see and hear what happens in the open court
than in the danger that, unless such an open
threat to the orderly procedure of the court
and such a flagrant defiance of the person
and presence of the judge before the public
in the “very hallowed place of justice,” as
Blackstone has it, is not instantly
suppressed and punished, demoralization of
the court’s authority will follow.
Punishment without issue or trial was so
contrary to the usual and ordinarily
indispensable hearing before judgment,
constituting due process, that the
assumption that the court saw everything
that went on in open court was required to
justify the exception; but the need for
immediate penal vindication of the dignity
of the court created it.
Id. at 774.
See also In Re Oliver, 33 U.S. 257; 68 S.Ct. 499;
92 L.Ed. 682 (1948).
In the case of Eaton v. Tulsa, 39 L.Ed.2d
693 (1974), the United States Supreme Court addressed a case
similar to this in that the attorney used offensive and vulgar
language.
In that case, the Court stated:
This single isolated usage of street
vernacular, not directed at the judge or any
officer of the court, cannot
constitutionally support the conviction of
criminal contempt. “The vehemence of the
language used is not alone the measure of
the power to punish for contempt. The fires
which it kindles must constitute an
imminent, not merely a likely, threat to the
administration of justice.” Craig v.
Harney, 331 US 367, 376, 91 L. Ed. 1546, 67
S. Ct. 1249 (1947). In using the expletive
in answering the question on crossexamination “[i]t is not charged that
[petitioner] here disobeyed any valid court
order, talked loudly, acted boisterously, or
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attempted to prevent the judge or any other
officer of the court from carrying on his
court duties.” (Citations omitted). In the
circumstances, the use of the expletive thus
cannot be held to “constitute an imminent .
. . threat to the administration of
justice.”
In affirming, however, the Court of
Criminal Appeals rejected petitioner’s
contention that the conviction must be taken
as resting solely on the use of the
expletive. Rather, that court concluded
from its examination of the trial record
that, in addition to the use of the
expletive, petitioner made “discourteous
responses” to the trial judge. The court
therefore held that the conviction should be
affirmed because “[c]oupling defendant’s
expletive with the discourteous responses,
it is this Court’s opinion there was
sufficient evidence upon which the trial
court could find defendant was in direct
contempt of court.” (Emphasis in original).
In Justice Powell’s concurring opinion, he
stated:
As noted in the Court’s opinion, it was not
directed at the trial judge or anyone
officially connected with the trial court.
But the controlling fact, in my view, and
one that should be emphasized, is that
petitioner received no prior warning or
caution from the trial judge with respect to
court etiquette. It may well be, in view of
the contemporary standards as to the use of
vulgar and even profane language, that this
particular petitioner had no reason to
believe that this expletive would be
offensive or in any way disruptive of proper
courtroom decorum. Language likely to
offend the sensibility of some listeners is
now fairly commonplace in many social
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gatherings as well as in public
performances.
I place a high premium on the
importance of maintaining civility and good
order in the courtroom. But before there is
resort to the summary remedy of criminal
contempt, the court at least owes the party
concerned some sort of notice or warning.
No doubt there are circumstances in which a
courtroom outburst is so egregious as to
justify a summary response by the judge
without specific warning, but this is surely
not such a case.
39 L.Ed.2d. 696, 697.
As can be seen from the cases cited thus far, direct
criminal contempt is committed in the presence of the court and
is an affront to the dignity of the court.
808.
See Burge, supra at
It is normally punished immediately by the court so as to
maintain the court’s dignity and decorum.
In the case before
us, the actions of Manly occurred before the court and the court
gave no notice to Manly that his statements were contemptuous or
even being considered as such.
The court maintained control
over the proceeding and resolved the issue before it without
having to utilize its contempt powers.
It was only several
weeks later and after the trial judge admitted speaking to
others (according to Manly’s version of his off-the-record
conversations with Judge Haynie) that the judge informed Manly
that his in-court statements on January 29, 2001, were being
considered as contempt.
We do not believe such reflection and
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afterthought is normally necessary when contempt actually occurs
in the courtroom.
When direct criminal contempt occurs the
judge knows it and must act accordingly to protect the “very
hallowed place of justice” and that if “not instantly suppressed
and punished, demoralization of the court’s authority will
follow.”
Cooke, supra.
That did not occur in this case.
While
we do not condone Manly’s behavior at the settlement conference
or in the courtroom, we do not believe that under the facts as
presented to us, that he could be held in contempt of court.
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Jefferson
Family Court holding Manly in contempt of court is reversed.
MILLER, SENIOR JUDGE, CONCURS.
SCHRODER, JUDGE, DISSENTS AND FILES SEPARATE OPINION.
SCHRODER, JUDGE, DISSENTING:
I agree with the lower
court that appellant’s statements were criminally contemptuous
and that appellant’s due process rights were satisfied.
I would
affirm the trial court.
Judge Haynie adjudged Manly guilty of two counts of
criminal contempt and imposed a sentence of one day in jail as
to count one.
The following morning Manly apologized for his
conduct and acknowledged that he had a problem.
Judge Haynie
then imposed a $1.00 fine on count two.
Manly’s first argument was that Judge Haynie abused
his contempt power by failing to use the least stringent means
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to achieve his objective in holding Manly in contempt.
It has
been held as a general rule that trial courts are to use the
“least possible power adequate to the end proposed” in punishing
a contemnor.
Harris v. United States, 382 U.S. 162, 165, 86 S.
Ct. 352, 354, 15 L. Ed. 2d 240 (1965).
In holding Manly in
contempt, Judge Haynie sought to elicit from Manly recognition
that his conduct was contemptuous and an apology to the court
and Ms. Van Houten, and to punish Manly for his contemptuous
conduct.
In attempting to achieve these goals, Judge Haynie
first offered Manly the opportunity to purge the contempt by
admitting the impropriety of his conduct, apologizing, and
making a specific charitable donation.
It was only after Manly
declined the offer that Judge Haynie adjudged the stricter
penalty of one day in jail and a $1.00 fine, which I do not
believe to be unduly harsh, nor an abuse of Judge Haynie’s
contempt power in punishing Manly.
Manly next argued that his conduct and statements
before the court on January 29, 2001, did not constitute
criminal contempt.
“Contempt is the willful disobedience
toward, or open disrespect for, the rules or orders of a court.”
Commonwealth v. Burge, Ky., 947 S.W.2d 805, 808 (1997).
“Criminal contempt is conduct ‘which amounts to an obstruction
of justice, and which tends to bring the court into disrepute.’”
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Id. (quoting Gordon v. Commonwealth, 141 Ky. 461, 463, 133 S.W.
206, 208 (1911)).
Manly made the statement before the court that he
wouldn’t give Van Houten “the sweat off his balls.”
Manly
admits that the statement was vulgar and uncivil, but maintains
that he did not intend to disrespect the court by its utterance.
Rather, he claims he was merely correcting Van Houten’s
misquotation of the remark on the record.
I do not buy it!
There was no need for Manly to correct Van Houten’s version of
the remark because Manly surely knew that Van Houten was merely
paraphrasing the remark for sanitization purposes.
I see
Manly’s conduct in “clarifying” the remark and thereafter
repeating it as willful disregard and disrespect for the court.
Breaches of decorum and the use of profanity are properly within
the court’s criminal contempt power.
See Sacher v. United
States, 343 U.S. 1, 72 S. Ct. 451, 96 L. Ed. 2d 717 (1952);
Kentucky Bar Association v. Waller, Ky., 929 S.W.2d 181 (1996),
cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1111, 117 S. Ct. 949, 136 L. Ed. 2d 837
(1997).
Unlike Eaton v. Tulsa, 415 U.S. 697, 94 S. Ct. 1228, 39
L. Ed. 2d 693 (1974), as cited by Manly, this was not a single
use of street vernacular by a non-lawyer party in reference to a
witness.
Rather, this was a willfully profane vulgar comment
directed at an officer of the court.
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His repetition of the
remark before the court only served to underscore its
willfulness.
I also agree with the trial court that the remark,
“what I said to this young lady outside the presence of the
court was none of [the court’s] business” was likewise
criminally contemptuous, although the court indicated at the
contempt hearing that said remark was not the basis for the
contempt charges.
At that point, Manly had been warned by the
court to use some decorum.
This remark was clearly
disrespectful of the court’s authority and demonstrated Manly’s
intent to provoke the court.
See United States v. Schiffer, 351
F.2d 91 (6th. Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1003, 86 S. Ct.
1914, 16 L. Ed. 2d 1017 (1966).2
Manly contends that in order to find him in contempt,
the court was required to first warn Manly that it considered
his conduct contemptuous.
I favor the holding of 6th Circuit of
the United States Court of Appeals that prior notice that the
court considers the conduct contemptuous is not required when
the conduct is clearly contemptuous.
Schiffer, 351 F.2d 91.
Here, Manly’s statements were profane, vulgar, and blatantly
contemptuous.
Although Judge Haynie did not immediately hold
Manly in contempt in this case when the contemptuous statements
2
I would also note that I view the language used by Manly in his affidavit
likening his interest in co-counsel to that of a cow as contempt-worthy. It
was maliciously insulting and in complete disregard for the dignity of the
court and our legal system.
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were made, I believe the courts have and need the power to
immediately squelch such blatantly contemptuous behavior before
it is repeated and taints the proceedings.
Manly argued that the trial court denied him his
constitutional rights by summarily denying his pretrial motions
and holding summary contempt proceedings.
Because Manly’s
contemptuous statements were made in the presence of the court,
it constituted direct criminal contempt which can be punished
summarily by the court since the court personally witnessed all
of the elements of the offense.
15 S.W.3d 393, 395 (2000).
Commonwealth v. Pace, Ky. App.,
This is in contrast to indirect
criminal contempt which “‘is committed outside the presence of
the court and requires a hearing and the presentation of
evidence’ in order to ‘establish a violation of the court’s
order.
It may be punished only in proceedings that comport with
due process.’”
Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Burge, Ky., 947
S.W.2d 805, 808 (1996)).
Speaking to the necessity of a court
to take immediate action against direct criminal contempt, the
United States Supreme Court has stated:
To preserve order in the court room for the
proper conduct of business, the court must
act instantly to suppress disturbance or
violence or physical obstruction or
disrespect to the court when occurring in
open court. There is no need of evidence or
assistance of counsel before punishment,
because the court has seen the offense.
Such summary vindication of the court’s
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dignity and authority is necessary. It has
always been so in the courts of the common
law and the punishment imposed is due
process of law.
Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 534, 45 S. CT. 390, 394,
69 L. Ed. 2d 767 (1925).
In the instant case, although Manly’s conduct clearly
constituted direct criminal contempt, the court waited until
long after the contemptuous conduct occurred to find him in
contempt.
It has been held that a court can delay a finding of
direct criminal contempt until after the proceeding wherein the
contemptuous conduct occurred.
Sacher v. United States, 343
U.S. 1, 72 S. Ct. 451, 96 L. Ed. 2d 717 (1952).
In Taylor v.
Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 94 S. Ct. 2697, 41 L. Ed. 2d 897 (1974),
defense counsel in a jury trial made numerous contemptuous
remarks during trial, and each time, the trial judge made it
known during the trial that he considered the remarks
contemptuous and sometimes allowed counsel to respond and other
times did not.
After the trial had concluded but while the jury
was still present, the judge summarily adjudicated counsel in
contempt without allowing counsel an opportunity to be heard.
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the contempt citation,
holding that where the final adjudication of contempt is
postponed, the contemnor is entitled to notice and an
opportunity to be heard:
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[W]here conviction and punishment are
delayed, ‘it is much more difficult to argue
that action without notice or hearing of any
kind is necessary to preserve order and
enable (the court) to proceed with its
business.’ [Groppi v. Leslie, 404 U.S. 496,
504, 92 S. Ct. 582, 587, 30 L. Ed. 2d 632
(1972)]. . . . Groppi counsels that before
an attorney is finally adjudicated in
contempt and sentenced after trial for
conduct during trial, he should have
reasonable notice of the specific charges
and opportunity to be heard in his own
behalf. This is not to say, however, that a
full-scale trial is appropriate. Usually
the events have occurred before the judge’s
own eyes, and a reporter’s transcript is
available. But the contemnor might at least
urge, for example, that the behavior at
issue was not contempt but the acceptable
conduct of an attorney representing his
client; or, he might present matters in
mitigation or otherwise attempt to make
amends with the court. Cf. Groppi v.
Leslie, [404 U.S.] at 503, 506 n. 11, 92 S.
Ct., at 586, 588.
Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. at 498-499, 94 S. Ct. at 2703.
In the case at bar, the contempt proceedings were not
adjudicated summarily.
Manly was given notice of the contempt
proceedings and an opportunity to be heard by himself and
counsel.
Manly and his counsel had the opportunity to and did
argue the very things contemplated in Taylor – that Manly’s
conduct did not constitute criminal contempt, mitigating
factors, as well as offering an apology.
As to the court’s denial of Manly’s pretrial motions
to dismiss, for notice of intent to present KRE 404(c) evidence,
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for discovery and inspection, and for exculpatory and
impeachment materials, I do not believe the court erred in so
denying these motions.
As stated above in Taylor, given the
fact that the contempt was committed directly in the court’s
presence, Manly was not entitled to a full-scale trial and all
of its concomitant rights.
Moving on to Manly’s contention that he was not given
notice that he was being charged with two counts of contempt,
Manly maintains that the first time he realized he was being
charged with two counts of contempt was during the court’s
ruling at the contempt hearing.
The court’s show cause order of
March 7, 2001, stated as follows:
Upon motion of the Court, counsel for the
Petitioner, the Honorable Samuel Manly,
shall appear in Jefferson Family Court. . .
to show cause why he should not be held in
Contempt of this Court for his actions at
motion hour on January 29, 2001.
Counsel has been orally advised of the
basis for the Court’s Order and a video tape
copy of the above referenced events was
provided for him to review. Should counsel
wish to obtain his own copy of the video
tape to prepare his defense, he may contact
the Family Court Video Tape Office. The
Court will also keep the above-styled case
at the secretaries desk should counsel wish
to review it prior to the hearing.
In Paul v. Pleasants, 551 F.2d 575 (4th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 908, 98 S. Ct. 310, 54 L. Ed. 2d 196
(1977), the contemnor argued that he received inadequate notice
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of the contempt charges against him.
In that case, the judge
gave the contemnor a verbatim transcript of the remarks the
court found objectionable and was informed when the contempt
hearing was to be held.
The Court found that such notice was
sufficient to comport with due process.
Id. at 578-579.
In the instant case, the show cause order reflects
that Judge Haynie verbally advised Manly of the basis of the
contempt charge.
Further, the order informed Manly that the
conduct the court considered contemptuous occurred during motion
hour on January 29, 2001, and was contained in the videotape of
said proceeding.
Given the short duration of the January 29,
2001, proceeding, the exchanges that occurred during that
hearing, and the fact that the judge admonished Manly more than
once during the exchange, I believe Manly surely knew which
statements/conduct were contempt-worthy and the fact that he may
be subject to more than one contempt charge.
Accordingly, I
believe the notice was sufficient.
Manly also maintains that the trial court erred in
closing the contempt hearing to the public.
It is not disputed
that Manly did not object to the closed contempt hearing at
anytime during the hearing.
In his brief, Manly claims that he
and his counsel were not aware that the hearing was closed until
after the fact, thus, they did not have the opportunity to
preserve the alleged error.
I find that hard to believe.
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Footnote 1 of Manly’s contempt hearing memorandum stated, “Payne
[v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 724 S.W.2d 230 (1986)] also
expressly disapproves of contempt hearings that are closed to
the public, as this court has proposed that this hearing be.”
However, Manly never requested or otherwise argued he was
entitled to a public contempt hearing in this memorandum.
Further, during his ruling in the contempt hearing, Judge Haynie
expressly stated that he closed the hearing to protect Manly
from further embarrassment and public humiliation regarding the
matter.
I believe the matter was unpreserved because Manly
never asked for a public hearing, nor objected to the fact that
the hearing was closed at anytime during the hearing.
See
McDonald v. Commonwealth, Ky., 554 S.W.2d 84 (1977); Levine v.
United States, 362 U.S. 610, 80 S. Ct. 1038, 4 L. Ed. 2d 989
(1960).
Manly next takes issue with the fact that the lower
court did not make written findings in the case.
Manly contends
that the lack of written findings renders meaningful appellate
review impossible.
I disagree.
There is no requirement that
the judge make written findings so long as the findings are
dictated somewhere in the record.
673 S.W.2d 733 (1984).
Skelton v. Roberts, Ky. App.,
Judge Haynie made extensive oral
findings of fact supporting his ruling at the conclusion of the
contempt hearing which were contained in the videotape of those
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proceedings and which were clearly audible.
Hence, there was no
error in the manner of the court’s findings.
Finally, Manly argues that Judge Haynie should have
been disqualified from presiding over the contempt hearing.
Manly cites numerous factors which purport to demonstrate that
Judge Haynie was biased in the case, including:
the fact that
Judge Haynie was the judge in the proceeding wherein the
contemptuous conduct occurred and, thus, was a material witness
in the matter; that Judge Haynie had an interest in the subject
matter in controversy pursuant to KRS 26A.015(2)(c); that Judge
Haynie engaged in ex parte communications with Manly and Van
Houten; and that Judge Haynie’s statements and conduct toward
Manly indicated a personal bias against Manly.
There is no rule of law that the judge before whom the
contemptuous conduct occurred cannot make the final
determination of criminal contempt.
Cooke v. United States, 267
S.W.2d 517, 45 S. Ct. 390, 69 L. Ed. 2d 767 (1925).
Unless
there is such a “likelihood of bias or an appearance of bias
that the judge was unable to hold the balance between
vindicating the interests of the court and the interests of the
accused,” the judge in whose presence the contemptuous conduct
occurred should not be disqualified from adjudicating the
contempt.
Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 501, 94 S. Ct. 2697,
2705, 41 L. Ed. 2d 897 (1974) (quoting Ungar v. Sarafite, 376
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U.S. 575, 84 S. Ct. 841, 11 L. Ed. 2d 921 (1964)).
In the
present case, I believe Judge Haynie successfully balanced the
interests of the court and the interests of Manly so as to avoid
the appearance of personal bias against Manly.
Judge Haynie
acknowledged during the contempt proceedings that Manly was a
brilliant attorney, that he had always liked Manly, and that he
harbored no animosity towards Manly.
Judge Haynie, however,
went on to characterize Manly as a “bully” with regard to his
conduct toward the court and Van Houten in the domestic case at
issue.
Given Manly’s behavior in the case, I cannot say that
such a characterization was unwarranted.
Judge Haynie stated
that in order to ensure the level of civility in his courtroom,
he could not tolerate such conduct and felt he had to punish
Manly therefor.
From my review of the videotapes of the
January 29, 2001, motion hour and the contempt hearing, although
Judge Haynie was direct and stern, he remained composed and did
not assume a malevolent or argumentative posture with Manly.
Unlike the judge in Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. at 501, 94 S. Ct.
at 2705, Judge Haynie did not allow himself to become “embroiled
in a running controversy” with Manly.
Contrary to Manly’s view, I believe that Judge
Haynie’s ex parte communications with Manly in offering a fine
in lieu of jail time demonstrated his fairness and willingness
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to settle the matter without further hardship to Manly.3
Moreover, Judge Haynie displayed some matter of restraint in not
holding Manly in contempt for the other statements/conduct which
I and Judge Haynie recognized to be contemptuous.
Finally, I
see no merit in Manly’s accusation that Judge Haynie had a
subject matter interest in the controversy pursuant to KRS
26A.015(2)(c).
For the reasons stated above, I would affirm the
Jefferson Circuit Court.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Christopher N. Lasch
Louisville, KY
A. B. Chandler
Attorney General
Samuel Manly
Louisville, KY
Bill Pettus
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, KY
Aubrey Williams
Louisville, KY
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLANT:
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEE:
Morgain Mary Sprague
Frankfort, KY
Christopher N. Lasch
Louisville, KY
Aubrey Williams
Louisville, KY
3
For future reference, I would point out to the court that KRS 533.030(5),
which previously allowed fines to be paid to D.A.R.E. or other local
government-sponsored programs, was amended effective August 1, 2002, to
eliminate this provision.
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