TONI MARIE MADDOX v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
November 1, 2002; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2002-CA-000061-MR
TONI MARIE MADDOX
v.
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSONS CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS B. WINE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 99-CR-002573
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
EMBERTON, CHIEF JUDGE; SCHRODER, AND TACKETT, JUDGES.
SCHRODER, JUDGE:
Toni Marie Maddox appeals from her conviction
of first-degree illegal possession of a controlled substance and
illegal possession of drug paraphernalia pursuant to a
conditional guilty plea reserving the right to appeal the denial
of her suppression motions.
Having reviewed the record and the
applicable law, we affirm.
On July 19, 1999, a roadblock was being conducted by
the Louisville Police Department.
Detective Gayle Clemmons, an
officer working the road block, observed a car pull out of a side
street, Fisk Court, and turn in the direction of the road block.
The car traveled about 3 car lengths and then, before reaching
the roadblock, stopped so abruptly that the front end of the car
went down and the rear end went up.
The car then began backing
back down the street quickly, weaving into both lanes as it did
so, and finally the rear end of the car cut around back into Fisk
Court.
At this point Clemmons pulled up in front of the car,
turned on his blue lights and got out of his car.
Appellant was
the driver of the stopped car, and Bonita Harris was in the
passenger seat.
Clemmons approached the car, and saw Harris
stuffing something down between her left leg and the console.
Suspecting it might be a weapon, Clemmons asked Harris to step
out of the car, after which he saw two crack pipes lying on the
seat.
While another officer watched appellant, Clemmons spoke to
Harris, who told him that the car was hers, but that she wasn’t
driving because she and appellant had been smoking crack cocaine
all day and that she was so high she couldn’t drive, and
therefore she let appellant drive.
The car and appellant were
subsequently searched.
As a result of the stop and search, appellant was
charged with first-degree illegal possession of a controlled
substance, illegal use or possession of drug paraphernalia,
reckless driving (KRS 189.290), operating a motor vehicle without
a license, and being a first-degree persistent felony offender.
On June 22, 2000, appellant filed a motion to suppress, with a
hearing held thereon on January 5, 2001.
At the suppression
hearing, Detective Clemmons testified to the facts as stated
above.
On January 9, 2001, the court entered an order denying
the motion, finding that the testimony of Detective Clemmons as
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to appellant’s driving pattern was undisputed, and that the
manner in which appellant was driving was sufficient to create a
reasonable suspicion to justify a stop.
Also on January 9, 2001,
appellant filed a second motion to suppress, in which she argued
that, based on the testimony of Detective Clemmons at the
January 5, 2001 hearing, that Clemmons did not have probable
cause to stop appellant for reckless driving pursuant to KRS
189.290.
A hearing was held on the motion on February 19, 2001.
The motion was denied in an order entered April 23, 2001, with
the court again finding that under the totality of the
circumstances, appellant’s driving action created a reasonable
suspicion to stop the car.
On August 16, 2001, appellant entered a conditional
guilty plea to first-degree possession of a controlled substance,
and illegal possession of drug paraphernalia, reserving the right
to appeal the trial court’s denial of her suppression motions.
The remaining charges were dismissed.
This appeal followed.
Appellant’s sole argument on appeal is that the trial
court erred in finding the stop was valid, as no evidence was
presented that she was operating the car recklessly within the
meaning of KRS 189.290.
The standard of review of a trial
court’s decision on a suppression motion has two prongs.
v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 44 S.W.3d 376, 380 (2000).
Stewart
First, a
trial court’s findings of fact pursuant to a motion to suppress
are conclusive if they are supported by substantial evidence.
RCr 9.78.
The second prong is a de novo review to determine
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whether the trial court’s ruling is correct as a matter of law.
Stewart, 44 S.W.3d at 380.
"In order to justify an investigatory stop of an
automobile, the police must have a reasonable articulable
suspicion that the persons in the vehicle are, or are about to
become involved in criminal activity."
Ky., 987 S.W.2d 302, 305 (1998);
Taylor v. Commonwealth,
United States v. Cortez, 449
U.S. 411, 101 S. Ct. 690, 66 L. Ed. 2d 621 (1981).
See also
Creech v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 812 S.W.2d 162 (1991).
"In
order to determine whether there was a reasonable articulable
suspicion, the reviewing appellate court must weigh the totality
of the circumstances."
Taylor, 987 S.W.2d at 305.
Although Detective Clemmons did testify that he pursued
the vehicle because it was driving recklessly, his testimony also
included his observations that upon approaching the roadblock,
appellant stopped very abruptly and began backing up quickly,
weaving into both lanes as she did so, and subsequently cut back
into the street she came out of.
The trial court found that “any
individual driving in the manner described by Detective Clemmons
was sufficient to create a reasonable suspicion to justify a
stop.”
We conclude that the testimony of Detective Clemmons
constitutes substantial evidence to support the trial court’s
findings as to appellant’s actions.
Further, considering the
totality of the circumstances, we agree with the trial court that
appellant’s actions were sufficient to create reasonable
suspicion to stop the car.
Taylor, 987 S.W.2d at 305.
See also,
Steinbeck v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 862 S.W.2d 912, 914 (1993).
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(Driver’s turn away from sobriety checkpoint, combined with
police officer’s experience in similar instances, was sufficient
for officer to form reasonable suspicion that driver may have
been engaging in criminal activity.)
Having concluded that
reasonable suspicion existed to justify the stop, we need not
address appellant’s argument as to whether her actions
constituted reckless driving pursuant to KRS 189.290.
For the aforementioned reasons, the judgment of the
Jefferson Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
J. David Niehaus
Louisville, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler, III
Attorney General
Kent T. Young
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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