RICHARD T. KEMPER v. EDWARD MARSHALL THOMPSON AND CITY OF MONTEREY, KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: DECEMBER 27, 2002; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2002-CA-000013-MR
RICHARD T. KEMPER
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM OWEN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE STEPHEN L. BATES, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 00-CI-00059
v.
EDWARD MARSHALL THOMPSON AND
CITY OF MONTEREY, KENTUCKY
APPELLEES
OPINION
VACATING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM; McANULTY, AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
SCHRODER, JUDGE:
An attorney requested (by motion) a trial judge
to recuse himself.
After the Judicial Conduct Commission ruled
against the attorney, the judge denied the motion and proceeded
with the case.
Subsequently, the attorney filed an affidavit of
bias and prejudice with the circuit clerk but that affidavit was
not forwarded to the Chief Justice.
It is necessary to vacate
the final judgment and remand the matter in order that the
circuit clerk can certify the facts to the Chief Justice and
await a decision thereon.
The City of Monterey (the City) passed a nuisance
ordinance (effective 2-11-98) which, among other things,
prohibits accumulations of rubbish, defined as filth, refuse,
trash, garbage, or other waste material which endangers the
public health, welfare, safety, or interferes with the adjacent
property owners’ peaceful enjoyment of their property.
The
ordinance also prohibits houses from having broken windows or
uncovered windows or doorways.
The enforcement section, section
4, requires that:
When the City of Monterey receives
written complaints from two separate
households with adjacent or nearby property,
the city council will take action. With a
first warning, occupants or owner will have
thirty (30) days to correct the violation.
After thirty days (30), if the violation is
not corrected, it shall be the duty of any
law enforcement officer to serve or cause to
be served a notice upon the occupant or owner
a second notice of violation with a
correction date of ten (10) days from the
date the second notice is served. If the
violation is not corrected within ten (10)
days, then a citation to appear in district
court will be issued.
After the City received two letters (dated March 5,
2000) of complaint (from Donald Wilson and Joyce Atha) about
appellee, Edward Marshall Thompson’s property (Mr. Thompson), the
City gave Mr. Thompson a written notice (dated March 13, 2000) of
violations of the nuisance ordinance on his property, with ten
days to correct the violations.
At the April 2000 city council
meeting, the council noted that the violations had been corrected
and that no further action was to be taken under the ordinance.
However, the mayor was to send a letter to Mr. Thompson
requesting that the structure be restored.
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Apparently the
residence located on the property contained a lot of housing code
problems, but the City either did not have a housing code or did
not cite Mr. Thompson under the housing code.
The nuisance code
does not deal with habitability or restoration, but the April 18,
2002, letter from the mayor to Mr. Thompson did indicate the City
would like to see the house fixed up.
On May 12, 2000, Richard T. Kemper (Mr. Kemper) filed a
complaint against Mr. Thompson and the City alleging that Mr.
Kemper was an adjacent property owner to the Thompson’s property
and he was unsatisfied with the City’s enforcement of the
nuisance ordinance.
Mr. Kemper requested a declaration that the
Thompson property harbored a public nuisance and an injunction or
mandamus to compel the City to enforce the nuisance ordinance.
An amended complaint was authorized in part by the trial court on
December 5, 2000.
It was never filed.
On January 16, 2001, Mr.
Kemper’s attorney, his son, Gerald T. Kemper (Attorney Kemper)
filed a motion (pursuant to SCR 4.300) in the action, moving that
the trial judge recuse himself, and other motions.
On
January 23, 2001, the trial court held the case in abeyance.
On
February 12, 2001, the trial court entered an order which noted
the case was being held in abeyance until the confidential matter
was resolved, which has been resolved, and set a hearing on all
pending motions for February 27, 2001.
Attorney Kemper had
previously filed a complaint with the Judicial Conduct Commission
(JCC) against the trial judge which had been dismissed.
Subsequently, Attorney Kemper filed a supplemental complaint with
the JCC requesting the trial judge be removed from this case on
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the basis of prejudice as a result of the filing of the first
complaint.
By letter dated April 2, 2001, the Judicial Conduct
Commission dismissed the supplemental complaint.
An affidavit
was filed on March 1, 2001, by Attorney Kemper with the circuit
clerk alleging bias and prejudice by the trial judge.
On
March 8, 2001, the trial court entered an order dated March 7,
2001, denying the motion to disqualify.
Immediately thereafter,
the trial court proceeded to rule on all pending motions.
Attorney Kemper appealed the March 8, 2001, order in this Court
in 2001-CA-000746.
This Court dismissed that action on
October 8, 2001, as having been taken from a non final order.
Attorney Kemper filed a petition for a writ of prohibition on
April 9, 2001, in this Court (2001-CA-000756).
Said writ (CR
76.36 Relief) was denied on June 4, 2001 and final on July 16,
2001.
Meanwhile, a motion for summary judgment was granted
against the appellant by order entered May 10, 2001.
This appeal
followed.
On appeal, appellant presents two arguments.
The first
is that the trial judge erred in not disqualifying himself
pursuant to SCR 4.300.
In appellant’s argument he argues
procedure, contending the Supreme Court had not ruled on the
matter and that it was error for the trial judge to rule on the
matter.
The attorney apparently is not familiar with the
processes for recusal.
As one appellee correctly pointed out, in
Kentucky there are two methods for seeking to disqualify a judge.
See Nichols v. Commonwealth, Ky., 839 S.W.2d 263, 265 (1992).
The first method is to file a motion to disqualify the presiding
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judge with the presiding judge pursuant to KRS 26A.015(2), which
Attorney Kemper did in this case.
The second method, pursuant to
KRS 26A.020(1), is to file an “affidavit that the judge will not
afford him a fair and impartial trial” with the circuit clerk,
which Attorney Kemper did also.
The trial judge was made aware of the motion under KRS
26A.015(2) to disqualify and did enter an order holding the case
in abeyance until after the JCC reviewed the case and found no
bias or prejudice.
Subsequently, the trial court denied the
motion to recuse and proceeded with the case.
That ruling was
interlocutory and is subject to appeal when the case is final.
See Nichols, 839 S.W.2d 263.
The second or supplemental
complaint to the JCC contends the trial judge will be prejudiced
because a previous complaint was filed.1
No new motion was filed
with the court so there was no reason to hold the case in
abeyance.
Thus, the trial court did not err per se in ruling on
the pending motion.
KRS 26A.020(1) “provides a separate and distinct
opportunity to a party who does not believe he or she will
receive a fair and impartial trial.
It allows a complaining
party to file an affidavit with the circuit clerk who certifies
the facts to the Chief Justice who then reviews the facts and
determines whether to designate a special judge.”
S.W.2d at 265.
Nichols, 839
In discussing the two methods of seeking a
1
The JCC subsequently dismissed this complaint but
theoretically the process could go on and on. Next the appellant
could contend the judge was prejudiced because “two” complaints
had been filed, then “three”, etc.
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recusal, the Court in Nichols went on to say, “It would also
appear that an aggrieved party can do either or both.”
added.)
Id.
In this case, Attorney Kemper did both.
(emphasis
The
subsequent affidavit was filed with the Owen County Clerk’s
office on March 2, 2001.
There is no evidence in the record that
the Owen Circuit Court certified and forwarded the matter to the
Chief Justice as required by KRS 26A.020(1).
the circuit clerk’s part.
This was error on
Once the affidavit is filed, the
circuit clerk must promptly certify and forward the matter to the
Chief Justice, and notify the trial judge that the matter is
pending so that the matter is held in abeyance pending a ruling
by the Chief Justice.
S.W.2d 643, 645 (1991).
See Jackson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 806
Because the statutory procedure was not
followed, it is necessary to vacate the orders entered after
March 1, 2001, and to remand the matter to the circuit court for
the matter to be held in abeyance until the circuit clerk
certifies the facts to the Chief Justice and he rules on the
matter.
The appellant’s second argument is that summary
judgment was prematurely granted.
Inasmuch as the judgment is
being vacated and held in abeyance until the Chief Justice rules
on the matter, the second argument is moot.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Owen
Circuit Court is vacated and the matter remanded for proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
McANULTY, JUDGE, CONCURS.
BUCKINGHAM, JUDGE, DISSENTS AND FILES SEPARATE OPINION.
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BUCKINGHAM, JUDGE, DISSENTING.
I respectfully dissent.
As the majority opinion notes, the Nichols case holds that a
party may seek the recusal of a judge pursuant to KRS 26A.015,
KRS 26A.020, or both.
839 S.W.2d at 265.
that Attorney Kemper did both.
The majority concludes
In my opinion, Attorney Kemper
sought recusal pursuant to KRS 26A.015 only.
The recusal motion was filed on January 16, 2001, and
the affidavit was filed on March 2, 2001.
Attorney Kemper made
no mention that the affidavit was filed pursuant to KRS 26A.020,
he filed no contemporaneous motion with it, and he took no action
to direct the clerk to certify the facts to the Chief Justice as
required by the statute.
See KRS 26A.020(1).
It appears to me that the affidavit was filed in
support of the motion to disqualify.
In fact, the appellant
acknowledges this on page six of his brief.2
Furthermore, a
motion for a judge to recuse himself must be supported by an
affidavit, and “[s]uch an unsupported motion is deficient.”
Crane v. Commonwealth, Ky., 833 S.W.2d 813, 818 (1992).
Finally, even if the affidavit was not intended by the
appellant to be in support of his motion to disqualify but was
intended to be pursuant to KRS 26A.020(1), I conclude that the
appellant did not preserve any error in this regard in that he
did not seek to bring the matter to the attention of either the
clerk or the judge.
I realize that, according to the statute,
2
Appellant states in his brief that “in support of his
motion and with his consent, the Appellant’s attorney, Gerald
Kemper, filed an affidavit stating that he believed Judge Bates
to be prejudiced against him and the Appellant, Richard Kemper.”
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the filing of the affidavit requires the clerk to certify the
facts to the Chief Justice.
However, since Crane requires an
affidavit in support of a KRS 26A.015 motion, it was entirely
reasonable for the appellee, the judge, and the clerk to assume
that the affidavit was in support of the motion for the judge to
disqualify himself.
Moreover, if the appellant desired to proceed under KRS
26A.020 in addition to KRS 26A.015, he would have not only
advised the appellee, the judge, and the clerk, but he would also
have stated in his motion to alter, amend, or vacate the
additional ground that the judgment should be vacated due to
noncompliance with KRS 26A.020.
As the court had not had the
opportunity to consider the fact that the appellant might have
filed the affidavit in support of a KRS 26A.020 motion (which was
never made), his CR 59.05 motion to alter, amend, or vacate
should have stated this additional ground in order to preserve
the issue for review.
See 7 Bertelsman-Philipps, Kentucky
Practice, Rules of Civil Procedure Annotated, at 382 (4th ed.
1984).
This court will not review contentions which the trial
court had no opportunity to consider.
S.W.2d 530, 532 (1968).
Payne v. Hall, Ky., 423
Furthermore, “[w]hen trial counsel is
aware of an issue and fails to request appropriate relief on a
timely basis, the matter will not be considered plain error for
reversal on appeal.”
Crane, 833 S.W.2d at 819.
v. Commonwealth, Ky., 916 S.W.2d 181, 183 (1996).
See also Tucker
Also, any
argument that the judge “was without authority to preside over
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Appellant’s case could not be raised for the first time on
appeal.”
Brutley v. Commonwealth, Ky., 967 S.W.2d 20, 24 (1998)
(Graves, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
In short, I respectfully dissent for two reasons.
First, I don’t believe that Kemper’s affidavit was filed to
initiate a KRS 26A.020 proceeding; rather, it was filed to
support his KRS 26A.015 motion.
Second, if the affidavit was
filed for that purpose rather than in support of his KRS 26A.015
motion, then I don’t believe Kemper preserved any error because
he failed to cite this as a ground for his CR 59.05 motion to
vacate so that the trial court could address the matter by
vacating the judgment.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, CITY OF
MONTEREY:
Gerald T. Kemper
Owenton, Kentucky
Douglas L. McSwain
Kevin W. Weaver
Lexington, Kentucky
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