NINA SPARROW (now HALL) v. RICHARD SPARROW II
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RENDERED: OCTOBER 18, 2002; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2001-CA-002497-MR
NINA SPARROW (now HALL)
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MERCER CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DARREN W. PECKLER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-CI-00142
v.
RICHARD SPARROW II
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, GUIDUGLI, and SCHRODER, Judges.
COMBS, JUDGE:
Nina Hall appeals from a decree of divorce and
order that amends the birth certificate of her daughter,
Makinleigh Kate Hall, by substituting "Hall" as her middle name
and "Sparrow" as her surname.
We reverse.
Nina Hall and Richard Sparrow were married October 6,
2000.
They separated six months later, in April 2001, and Nina
petitioned for divorce.
August 17, 2001.
Their daughter, Makinleigh, was born
The application for her birth certificate
indicated that the baby's name was Makinleigh Kate Hall, that
Nina Leigh-Ann Hall was her mother, and that Richard Leon Sparrow
II was her father.
The State Registrar of Vital Statistics
accepted the application submitted by Nina Hall and issued a
proper certificate of live birth on September 19, 2001.
In conjunction with the divorce petition, an
evidentiary hearing was held before the Domestic Relations
Commissioner (the DRC) of Mercer Circuit Court in September 2001.
During that hearing, Richard Sparrow requested that the child's
surname be changed from Hall to Sparrow.
resisted.
Makinleigh's mother
Nina Hall felt that the baby's father had shown little
or no interest in the child and that, therefore, the child had no
parental relationship with him that would be worthy of her
bearing his surname.
Additionally, Nina had moved from Mercer
County to Madison County and wanted her daughter's surname to
reflect her association with her daughter.
Nina's counsel
questioned the jurisdiction of the court to address the issue.
The DRC viewed this issue as critical in the life of the child
and asked the parties to negotiate an acceptable surname.
were unable to reach an agreement.
They
The Commissioner's report was
duly filed, and the parties then filed exceptions.
At a hearing before the circuit court regarding the
exceptions, the issue of the name change was addressed.
Once
again, Nina's counsel contended that the circuit court lacked
jurisdiction to consider the issue.
In the alternative, counsel
argued that the court would be required to find that a name
change served the best interests of the child.
In that event,
she suggested, the parties' last names should be hyphenated to
effect a new surname for the child.
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The court summarily rejected
the contentions as to hyphenation and addressed counsel as
follows:
You [the mother] may get the middle name.
The child's mother's maiden name will be the
child's middle name; the father's last name
will be the child's last name. . . .That's
pretty basic and elemental, I believe.
The court's order incorporating this result followed.
On appeal, Nina argues that the circuit court erred by
ordering the name change.
She contends that 401.020 vests
exclusive jurisdiction for the change of name of a child in the
district court.
We agree.
In Blasi v. Blasi, Ky., 648 S.W.2d 80 (1983), the
Kentucky Supreme Court rejected the respondent's contention that
the Jefferson Circuit Court, pursuant to its continuing
jurisdiction over custody matters, could order a divorced parent
to petition the district court for a name change.
The court held
as follows:
The Kentucky General Assembly has made it
clear that the change of name of a child by a
parent is not a "custody matter" for the
purposes of KRS 403.270. Exclusive
jurisdiction for the change of name of a
child is placed by statute in the district
court. KRS 401.020.
Had the General Assembly intended for the
circuit court to have jurisdiction to effect
a name change it would have specifically
granted such jurisdiction. Indeed, such is
the case regarding the restoration of the
maiden name of a litigant in a dissolution of
marriage proceedings. KRS 403.230. To that
extent the circuit court's jurisdiction in
concurrent with the district court as
expressed in KRS Chapter 401. In all other
respects the jurisdiction of the district
court granted by KRS Chapter 401 is
exclusive. (Emphasis added.)
-3-
Id. at 81.
We specifically acknowledged this holding in Ash v.
Thompkins, Ky. App., 914 S.W.2d 788 (1996).
See also Likins v.
Logsdon, Ky. 793 S.W.2d 118 (1990) and Leadingham v. Smith, Ky.
App., 56 S.W.3d 420 (2001).
We are not at liberty to alter the directive of our
legislature.
KRS 24A.020 provides that "[w]hen jurisdiction over
any matter is granted to District Court by statute, such
jurisdiction shall be deemed to be exclusive unless the statute
specifically states that the jurisdiction shall be concurrent."
We believe that the statute dictates the reversal of the decision
of the trial court.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Boyle Circuit Court is
reversed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Lois T. Matl
Lexington, Kentucky
Larry D. Catlett
Harrodsburg, Kentucky
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