GEORGE DEVORE v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
SEPTEMBER 6, 2002; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2001-CA-001981-MR
GEORGE DEVORE
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE LEWIS G. PAISLEY, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-CR-00495
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUIDUGLI, HUDDLESTON AND KNOPF, JUDGES.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE.
George Devore (“Devore”)appeals from a judgment
of the Fayette Circuit Court reflecting a jury verdict of guilty
on four counts of first-degree sexual abuse.
We affirm.
On May 14, 2001, Devore was indicted by the Fayette
County Grand Jury on four counts of first-degree sexual abuse.
The charges stemmed from a complaint received by the Lexington
Police Department on March 9, 2001, in which Devore’s former
wife, Darla Devore (“Darla”), maintained that Devore had engaged
in unlawful sexual conduct with three of Devore’s minor sons.
An
investigation ensued, during which it was determined that Devore
allegedly showed pornographic videos to the children, fondled
their genitals, and exposed himself to them.
The investigation
included a taped interview with Devore in which he confessed to
the allegations.
A jury trial was held on July 5, 2001, after which a
guilty verdict was returned on all four counts.
Devore received
a sentence of five years in prison on each count, with two of the
counts to be served consecutively and two to be served
concurrently for a total of ten years in prison.
This appeal
followed.
Devore first argues that the trial court committed
reversible error in ruling that the Commonwealth gave reasonable
notice of its intent to introduce prior bad acts testimony
pursuant to KRE 404(B).
Specifically, he maintains that the
trial court erred in permitting the Commonwealth to introduce the
testimony of Devore’s son, N. D., regarding alleged prior bad
acts.
He argues that the remedy for the alleged error is a new
trial.
We have closely examined the record and find no error
on this issue.
As the Commonwealth properly notes, Devore made
no contemporaneous objection to the introduction of N. D.’s
testimony, instead moving for a mistrial after the conclusion of
his testimony.
As such, the claim that the testimony was
improperly admitted is not preserved for appellate review.
9.22.
RCr
Arguendo, even if the alleged error was properly preserved
by a contemporaneous objection, it is clear from the record that
Devore received actual notice of the allegations and of N. D.’s
involvement.
N. D. was one of the alleged victims, and the
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police report, subsequent investigation, Devore’s taped
confession, and indictment address this fact.
Thus, even if the
matter was properly preserved, we find no error in the trial
court’s ruling that Devore was aware of the nature and extent of
N. D.’s testimony.
Similarly, if the issue is framed in terms of
whether Devore was entitled to a mistrial (since Devore moved for
a mistrial after N. D.’s testimony), we also find no error.
Devore also argues that the trial court erred in
improperly failing to allow into evidence the testimony of
Darla’s mother and sister.
He maintains that these witnesses
could have corroborated his assertion at trial that Darla was
mentally unstable and had fabricated the allegations against him.
He maintains that denying him the right to produce this testimony
denied him the right to confront his accuser, Darla, and that as
a result, he is entitled to a new trial.
The testimony of Darla’s mother, Shelia Nagy (“Nagy”),
which was taken by avowal, described a statement allegedly made
by another of Devore’s sons, who had not been sexually abused,
and described his reaction to a statement made by another son, J.
D. relating to the sexual abuse allegations.
Upon the
Commonwealth’s objection, this portion of Nagy’s statement was
excluded as hearsay because it relayed what J. D. said and how he
reacted.
We find no error in this ruling, and Devore cites no
case law or evidentiary rule which would lead us to an opposite
conclusion.
As to the exclusion of the testimony of Darla’s
sister, Luann Askins (“Askins”), she was asked if Darla had made
statements regarding the veracity of the charges against Devore.
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Askins’s testimony was properly excluded either as hearsay.
We
find no basis for disturbing the judgment on appeal on this
issue.
Devore’s third argument is that the trial court
improperly denied his motion for a directed verdict on a count
involving his son, J.D.
He maintains that it was clearly
unreasonable to allow this count to go to the jury because the
indictment alleged two occasions of improper touching even though
J. D. testified that the improper touching occurred only once.
We find no error.
Devore’s taped confession includes an
admission that he improperly touched J. D. on more than one
occasion.
This tape, taken alone, forms a sufficient basis to
overcome Devore’s motion for summary judgment as to this count.
See generally Commonwealth v. Benham, Ky., 816 S.W.2d 186 (1991),
holding, in relevant part, that the trial court must draw all
fair and reasonable inferences in favor of the Commonwealth.
Lastly, Devore argues that the trial court committed
palpable error in failing to determine if his sons were competent
to testify and that their testimony was not tainted by suggestive
questioning or parental prepping.
He maintains that the trial
court should have undertaken this inquiry, and that this failure
constitutes substantial error resulting in manifest injustice.
We are not persuaded by this argument.
First, it is
uncontroverted that this issue was not raised at trial and is not
preserved for appellate review.
As such, we may disregard it.
Hays v. Commonwealth, Ky., 625 S.W.2d 575 (1981).
We are also
not persuaded that it constitutes palpable error, as there is no
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evidence in the record to support such a conclusion and Devore
does not even allege that such evidence exists.
Rather than
directing our attention to portions of the record upon which we
might conclude that the boys were incompetent or that their
testimony was tainted by improper external influence, he merely
argues that the trial court should have undertaken this inquiry
sua sponte.
We have closely studied the record, with special
attention to the boys’ testimony, and find no factual or legal
basis for concluding that the trial court erred in failing to
examine the boys’ competency to testify.
As such, we find no
error.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of
the Fayette Circuit Court.
HUDDLESTON, JUDGE, CONCURS.
KNOPF, JUDGE, CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Matthew W. Boyd
Lexington, KY
A. B. Chandler, III
Attorney General
J. Hamilton Thompson
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, KY
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