MARSHA TOLER v. JACKSON COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, HONORABLE LANDON J. OVERFIELD, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
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RENDERED: April 19, 2002; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2001-CA-001908-WC
MARSHA TOLER
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. WC-91-48000
v.
JACKSON COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION,
HONORABLE LANDON J. OVERFIELD,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND
WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, EMBERTON, AND TACKETT, JUDGES.
TACKETT, JUDGE:
Marsha Toler appeals from an order of the
Workers’ Compensation Board (Board) denying her motion to reopen
her claim.
We affirm.
Toler, an employee for the Rockcastle County Board of
Education, was injured in 1991 when a handicapped bus on which
she was a passenger overturned.
After receiving temporary total
disability benefits for a substantial period, she filed a claim
which was assigned to an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ).
made a finding that Toler had sustained a twenty-percent
The ALJ
occupational disability due to her injuries.
She appealed the
ALJ’s decision asserting that she was suffering ongoing physical
and psychological problems which made her totally disabled.
In
1995 and 1996 respectively, the Board and this Court affirmed the
ALJ’s decision.
In October 1999, Toler filed a motion to reopen
alleging a worsening of her disability.
The ALJ considered the
evidence she presented and concluded, in an opinion dated October
28, 2000, that Toler had failed to establish a worsening of her
occupational disability.
the Board.
Toler then filed a notice of appeal to
While her appeal was pending, Toler filed an
additional motion to reopen her claim on the grounds of newly
discovered evidence.
The Board affirmed the ALJ’s decision
denying Toler’s first motion to reopen her claim, and Toler did
not take any further appeal to our Court regarding that motion.
Toler’s newly discovered evidence, which was presented
in support of her second motion to reopen, consists of an MRI
report written on October 16, 2000, just two days before the
ALJ’s decision denying her first motion to reopen.
Consequently,
the ALJ denied her second motion to reopen her claim stating that
the MRI did not constitute newly discovered evidence which could
not have not have been discovered by due diligence.
Rather, the
MRI was characterized as evidence of Toler’s physical condition
as it existed prior to the ALJ’s decision denying her first
motion to reopen in which the ALJ found that Toler had not met
her burden of proving a worsening in her disability.
The Board
affirmed the ALJ’s decision denying Toler’s second motion to
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reopen and this appeal followed.
We believe that it would be
difficult to improve on the Board’s well-reasoned opinion and,
therefore, adopt the following portion:
Newly discovered evidence,
according to KRS 342.125(1)(b), is “evidence
which could not have been discovered with the
exercise of due diligence.” This statutory
definition is similar to case law discussions
concerning what is newly discovered evidence.
See, for example, Durham vs. Copely, Ky., 919
S.W.2d 610 (1991).
Toler, on appeal, argues there is
no way she could have known about this
evidence since the MRI was done only two days
prior to the ALJ’s October 18, 2000 opinion.
She further states she was unaware an MRI had
been ordered. First, presumably since Toler
herself underwent the MRI, we find it
difficult to understand how she could be
unaware it had been ordered. Additionally,
Dr. Muckenhausen, who had the MRI performed,
stated in her report of June 1, 1999 that an
MRI of the cervical and lumbosacral spine
should be conducted. We believe the ALJ
aptly and correctly interpreted the
circumstances surrounding this MRI. First,
it is difficult to understand how Toler
believes the MRI could alter the ALJ’s
ultimate conclusions since Dr. Muckenhausen,
even without the benefit of this MRI,
assigned a 53% impairment to the body as a
whole. This took into consideration
significant impairment to the cervical spine.
The MRI itself establishes the existence of
bulges in the cervical spine and the
possibility of some neurological compression
in that area.
Although frequently argued as such,
simply because there is “new” evidence does
not equate to the statutory terminology of
“newly discovered evidence”. In virtually
every reopening upon an allegation of a
change of occupational disability there is
and should be “new” evidence. It
occasionally is in the form of an MRI, x-ray
or other specialized testing that lends
support to either a physician’s testimony or
to an individual’s subjective symptomatology.
It is offered for the purpose of credibility
enhancement. New evidence is not newly
discovered evidence. Newly discovered
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evidence is evidence that is in existence and
which could not have been accessed even
through the exercise of due diligence. It is
evidence that tends to establish that the
original decision was made based upon faulty
information, erroneous diagnoses and would
without the consideration of this information
constitute an egregious error and manifest
injustice. See, for example, Durham vs.
Copely, supra.
In reviewing Dr. Muckenhusen’s June
1999 report, she assessed significant
functional impairment to the cervical spine
and offered this based upon her clinical
examination. While she then recommends an
MRI, there is no explanation in the record of
what it might establish nor why it was not
conducted for some 16 months after this
recommendation. The MRI itself offers some
support for the rejected testimony of Dr.
Muckenhausen, but does not offer an
implication that there has ever been a
misdiagnosis or a mistaken impression of what
Toler and Dr. Muckenhausen believed her
condition to be. In essence, what Toler
presents as newly discovered evidence is
cumulative medical testing that is offered in
an effort to bolster the testimony of a
physician upon whom the ALJ chose to not
rely. Such cumulative evidence does not
constitute newly discovered evidence as that
is contemplated by KRS 342.125(1)(b).
For the forgoing reasons, the order of the Worker’s
Compensation Board denying Toler’s motion to reopen her claim
based on newly discovered evidence is affirmed.
EMBERTON, JUDGE, CONCURS.
COMBS, JUDGE, DISSENTS BY SEPARATE OPINION.
COMBS, JUDGE, DISSENTING:
I dissent because I agree
with the appellant that the MRI performed on October 16, 2000,
was new material evidence that should have been evaluated and
considered by the fact-finder.
Instead, it was summarily
rejected based on essentially semantic exercises as to the
nuances distinguishing “new evidence” from “newly discovered
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evidence.”
The Board’s reasoning is interesting and perhaps even
persuasive on paper:
New evidence is not newly discovered
evidence. Newly discovered evidence is
evidence that is in existence and which could
not have been accessed even through the
exercise of due diligence.
However, this academic analysis is meaningless as a
matter of fact and reality to the injured appellant.
Perhaps the
four herniated discs could have been discovered sooner had the
medical test been ordered in a more timely fashion.
Whether the
delay in ordering the test was attributable to the vagaries of
insurance or merely the vicissitudes underlying medical
diagnostics, the fact remains that appellant had a devastating
injury all the while.
The extent of that injury was not revealed
to her counsel until after the MRI results came back — after the
Opinion of October 18, 2000, had been rendered.
The Board’s opinion cites the statutory definition of
newly discovered evidence as “evidence which could not have been
discovered with the exercise of due diligence.”
342.125(1)(b).
Whose diligence?
KRS
That of the patient?
Ms. Toler had no means of dictating her treatment.
physician?
Surely
That of the
Surely we must accord discretion to a physician to
practice a medical case and to order whatever additional tests
may become manifestly necessary to render a complete diagnosis —
regardless of the sequence and timing of legal paperwork
inevitably involved in such a claim for injury.
The Board’s opinion belabors the fact that Toler was
unaware that an MRI had been ordered by observing: “. . .
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presumably since Toler herself underwent the MRI, we find it
difficult to understand how she could be unaware it had been
ordered.”
The legally significant fact is that her counsel was
unaware of the test (performed on October 16, 2000) until after
the Opinion was issued (a mere two days later on October 18,
2000).
I would submit that this case is the very kind of newly
discovered evidence that the spirit underlying Durham, supra,
intended be allowed as the basis for a re-opening in order to
prevent manifest injustice.
discovered.
It was actually both new and newly
Semantics should not pre-empt common sense and fair
play.
I would also note before concluding that a disturbingly
abrasive tone characterizes the appellee’s brief, one that
amounts to an ad hominem attack upon the appellant.
Such
negativity — indeed hostility — is both unnecessary and
inappropriate.
Regrettably, it seems to be part and parcel of
the “manifest injustice” suffered throughout these proceedings by
Ms. Toler, adding insult to her injury.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Edmond Collett
John Hunt Morgan
Monica Jo Rice Smith
Hyden, Kentucky
Douglas W. Gott
Bell, Orr, Ayers and Moore
Bowling Green, Kentucky
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