CHERRYWOOD DEVELOPMENT, LLC; GREER DEVELOPMENT, INC.; and FIVE STAR SOUTH, LLC v. JAMES WILLIAM ATKINS, JR.; CLARA E. ATKINS, Individually FRANK ALLEN ATKINS
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RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 27, 2002; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO. 2001-CA-001608-MR
CHERRYWOOD DEVELOPMENT, LLC;
GREER DEVELOPMENT, INC.; and
FIVE STAR SOUTH, LLC
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE GARY D. PAYNE, JUDGE
CIVIL ACTION NO. 00-CI-02139
JAMES WILLIAM ATKINS, JR.;
CLARA E. ATKINS, Individually
and as Trustee of the Trust
created under the will of
FRANK ALLEN ATKINS
and
APPELLEES
NO. 2001-CA-001676-MR
JAMES WILLIAM ATKINS, JR.;
CLARA ATKINS, Individually
and as Trustee of the Trust
created under the will of
FRANK ALLEN ATKINS
v.
CROSS-APPELLANTS
CROSS-APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE GARY D. PAYNE, JUDGE
CIVIL ACTION NO. 00-CI-02139
CHERRYWOOD DEVELOPMENT, LLC
CROSS-APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART,
REVERSING IN PART AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, GUIDUGLI and HUDDLESTON, Judges.
HUDDLESTON, Judge: Cherrywood Development, LLC, Greer Development,
Inc. and Five Star South, LLC appeal from a summary judgment in
favor of James William Atkins and Clara E. Atkins,1 finding that a
deed restriction and vendor’s lien were triggered when the portion
of the Atkins property to which Cherrywood acquired title was
rezoned P-1 (general office use), i.e., became legally available
for
commercial
use,
and
awarding
the
Atkins
an
additional
$50,000.00 per acre pursuant to the terms of those provisions.
In
the same judgment, the circuit court declined to award the Atkinses
prejudgment interest on their award, thus prompting their crossappeal.
The Atkins family owned an 82-acre tract of land located
on Tates Creek Road in Lexington/Fayette County, Kentucky.
On
April 19, 1994, the Atkinses entered into an agreement to sell the
property to Jeffrey C. Ruttenberg, a Lexington developer.
time,
the
property
was
zoned
for
agricultural
uses
At the
but
the
agreement authorized Ruttenberg to seek to have the property
rezoned at his expense prior to the closing.
to
do
so
in
order
to
allow
for
Ruttenberg attempted
residential
development
and
operation of a major retail center called a “hyper-mart,” which is
only permissible in an area zoned B-1 (neighborhood business), B-3
(highway commercial) or B-6P (planned shopping center) under the
1
Individually and as trustee of the trust created under
the will of Frank Allen Atkins.
-2-
Lexington/Fayette Urban County Government’s zoning ordinance.
His
obligation as purchaser and its rationale are acknowledged in the
preamble of the agreement which, in relevant part, provides as
follows:
WHEREAS, the parties hereto stipulate and agree that said
real estate will have a higher market value if zoned for
commercial use; and
WHEREAS, Purchasers herein agree to use all reasonable
and diligent efforts to have as much as thirty-five (35)
acres (more or less) of the said real estate which is
shown as Tract III and labeled “Proposed Commercial
Zoning” on Exhibit “A” rezoned for commercial use . . .
.
Paragraph 2 of the agreement references the contemplated
course of action with the following language: “Zoning: Purchaser
agrees to make all reasonable and diligent efforts to have as much
as thirty-five (35) acres (more or less) of the real estate which
is shown as Tract III and labeled ‘Proposed Commercial Zoning’ on
Exhibit ‘A’, rezoned for commercial use.
Commercial Zoning shall
be defined as B1, B3, or B6-P.”
Paragraph 9 contains the deed restriction at issue which,
in significant part, provides: “None of the property conveyed
herein, nor any portion thereof, shall be used for any commercial
purpose whatsoever without the express written permission of [the
Atkinses] or their heirs . . . .”
By its terms, the section “shall
attach to and run with the land and shall be binding upon the
Grantee, his heirs . . . .”
However, that provision is immediately
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followed by section 9A which sets forth the conditions under which
the restriction will be released:
Release of Restriction:
Sellers agree to Release the
Restriction above immediately upon payment by Purchaser
to
Sellers
of
the
additional
sum
of
FIFTY-THOUSAND
DOLLARS ([$]50,000) per acre (for a total payment of
$100,000 per acre) for an acre which is rezoned for
commercial use or becomes legally available for any
commercial use whatsoever.2
As with the restriction itself, the release provision explicitly
runs with the land: “The terms and conditions of this paragraph
survive the closing of the purchase of all the properties.”
Section
9A
also
includes
a
vendor’s
lien
which
is
retained by the Atkinses, pursuant to which the Atkinses secure the
“bonus payment” of $50,000.00 per acre “[i]n the event that all or
any portion of the property conveyed herein shall be used for any
commercial purpose whatsoever . . . on all such property used for
any commercial purpose whatsoever to [the Atkinses], their heirs
. . . .”
The lien “shall attach to and run with the land and shall
be binding upon the Grantee, his heirs, executors, administrators
or assigns as the case may be, and all persons and entities
claiming under them.” Upon receipt of an additional $50,000.00 per
“each acre or fraction thereof which is rezoned for commercial use
2
Both paragraph 5 (purchase price) and paragraph 7
(payment after closing) provide that, in the event that any portion
of the real estate which is the subject of the agreement is
“rezoned for commercial use or becomes legally available for any
commercial use whatsoever” within five years of the closing date,
the “bonus payment” provision applies.
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or becomes legally available for any commercial use whatsoever,”
the lien “shall be released by the aforementioned.”
Ruttenberg was unsuccessful in his attempt to obtain
“commercial zoning” for a portion of the property prior to the
closing.
Thus, when he took title to the property on August 18,
1997, it was zoned only for residential uses, specifically, R-3
(multifamily
residential),
$50,000.00 per acre.
and
he
purchased
the
property
for
Each of the deeds by which the Atkinses
transferred title to Ruttenberg contains a restriction and vendor’s
lien identical to those found in the agreement.
On August 19, 1997, Ruttenberg conveyed all of the
property to Ball Homes, Inc. which, in turn, contracted to sell the
15.66 acre tract in question here to Cherrywood on August 19, 1999.
Both transfers were effectuated by general warranty deeds with the
former
being
subject
to
the
same
restriction
and
expressly
referencing the vendor’s lien retained by the Atkinses and the
latter subject to restrictions of record.
In February 1998, Cherrywood succeeded in having 14.12
acres of the subject property rezoned as P-1 (general office use).
Contemporaneously with the rezoning of the property, the Lexington
Public Library announced that it would acquire a portion of the
land (1.81 acres) for use as a branch library; that conveyance took
place on September 13, 1999.
Cherrywood’s approved development
plan reflected that allocation along with the designation of other
portions of the property for types of development consistent with
the P-1
categorization.
According to the plan, specifically
identified sections of the property were reserved as dedicated
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public
rights-of-way,
designated
sinkhole
areas
and
tree
preservation areas.3
After the zoning change was finalized, the Atkinses
claimed entitlement to an additional $50,000.00 per acre for all
property which was zoned P-1, with the exception of the public
library site, on the theory that the permitted uses constitute
“commercial use” under the terms of the Ruttenberg agreement and
the deeds which followed.
When Cherrywood refused to accede to
this demand, the Atkinses filed suit seeking a declaration of
rights establishing their entitlement to the claimed amount.
In time, both parties filed motions for summary judgment.
On March 13, 2001, the court granted the Atkinses’ motion but
rejected their demand for prejudgment interest on the sum owed. In
so doing, the court held that the provisions of the restriction and
vendor’s lien are clear and unambiguous, emphasizing that the
critical phase is “used for any commercial purpose whatsoever.”
The court interpreted “commercial use or purpose,” agreeing that it
is defined as one that “exists in an activity with an emphasis on
‘salability, profits or success’ when applying the ordinary meaning
to the terms.”
“such
a
In reaching that conclusion, the court said that
determination
depends
on
3
the
use
of
the
property,”
On September 15, 1998, Cherrywood obtained a conditional
use permit from the Lexington Fayette Urban-County Government Board
of Adjustment by virtue of which it constructed and operates two
parking lots in an R-3 zone on portions of the former Atkins
property for the benefit of the adjoining restaurant and pharmacy
which are Greer and Five Star South’s tenants. First Security Bank
of Lexington, Inc. is presently operating a branch bank on a lot
that is part of the subject property.
-6-
rejecting
the
notion
that
it
depends
on
specific
zoning
classifications as argued by Cherrywood.
Inasmuch
as
the
court
viewed
the
definition
of
“commercial use” found in Paragraph 2 of the Ruttenberg agreement
to be in conflict with the unambiguous terms of the deed, it
determined that the parol evidence rule was applicable and operated
to bar any reference to the agreement.
With respect to the
vendor’s lien, the court concluded that the doctrine of merger by
deed does not apply as the parties’ intent to have Paragraph 9A
survive the deed is evidenced by its “survival language” which is
absent from Paragraph 2.
As a result of the P-1 zoning for
commercial use, the court found that “all of the property has
become legally available for commercial use,” and therefore, the
vendor’s lien has attached and the amounts secured by that lien are
now
due
and
payable.
On
appeal,
Cherrywood
contends
that
substantial portions of the property that the court determined is
subject to the vendor’s lien due to being zoned for “commercial
use” cannot be developed and, consequently, an evidentiary hearing
is warranted to ascertain “the precise P-1/R-3 boundary, the acres
in the P-1 lots, and the acres and zoning of the rights-of-way,
tree reservation areas and sinkholes.”
The
Atkinses
cross-appeal
asserting
that
they
are
entitled to prejudgment interest at the rate of 8% per annum,
compounded
annually,
from
March
26,
1998,
the
date
that
the
rezoning was approved, until the date of judgment, and to postjudgment
interest
at
the
rate
of
12%
per
annum,
compounded
annually, on both the award itself and prejudgment interest.
-7-
As
support
for
this
contention,
the
Atkinses
assert
that
the
“$50,000.00 per acre specified in the vendor’s lien and the 10.76
acres are liquidated amounts that became fixed upon the approval of
the rezoning on February 19, 1998.”
* * * * *
Summary judgment is only proper “where the movant shows
that the adverse party could not prevail under any circumstances.”4
However, “a party opposing a properly supported summary judgment
motion cannot defeat that motion without presenting at least some
affirmative evidence demonstrating that there is a genuine issue of
material fact requiring trial.”5
The circuit court must view the
record “in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion
for summary judgment and all doubts are to be resolved in his
favor.”6
“The trial judge must examine the evidence, not to decide
any issue of fact, but to discover if a real issue exists.”7
On appeal, we review a summary judgment to determine
“whether the trial court correctly found that there were no genuine
issues as to any material fact and that the moving party was
4
Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Ctr., Ky., 807
S.W.2d 476, 480 (1991).
5
Hubble v. Johnson, Ky., 841 S.W.2d 169, 171 (1992).
6
Steelvest, supra, n. 4.
7
Id.
-8-
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”8
No deference to the
trial court is required since factual findings are not at issue.9
In the present case, the outcome turns on the intended
meaning of the critical phrase, “used for any commercial purpose
whatsoever,”10 as the language was used to define the scope of both
the restriction and the vendor’s lien, the applicability of which
is the dispositive issue.
It is axiomatic that words will be construed in the sense
that they are employed by the parties, and unless a contrary
intention appears, they will be assigned their ordinary meaning.11
Kentucky’s highest court has said that “[n]on-technical words
generally are to be understood in their ordinary and popular sense,
unless the intent of the parties to use them otherwise is shown
clearly from the context.”12
However, by way of clarifying these
principles of construction, the Court has also said that “when the
parties have made an express contract which will admit of but one
interpretation, the court must give effect to it, since courts
8
Scifres v. Kraft,
(1996)(citations omitted).
9
Ky.
App.,
916
S.W.2d 779, 781
Id.
10
As previously noted, the vendor’s lien also contains
another variation of the language in question, that being, “which
is re[-]zoned for any commercial use whatsoever or becomes legally
available for any commercial use whatsoever.”
For present
purposes, “commercial use” is the common thread and remains the
operative phrase.
11
Black Star Coal Corp. v. Napier, 303 Ky. 778, 199 S.W.2d
449, 451 (1947).
12
Bradford v. Billington, Ky., 299 S.W.2d 601, 604 (1957).
-9-
cannot make a new contract between the parties but must enforce the
one the parties have made.”13
Here, the circuit court properly applied these tenets in
determining that the language of the restriction and vendor’s lien
at issue is clear and unambiguous and adopting the definition of
“commercial use or purpose” offered by the Atkinses.
agreed
with
the
Atkinses
that:
“[Commercial
is
The court
defined]
as
‘pertaining to or characteristic of commerce, engaged in commerce
or prepared, done or acting with emphasis on salability, profit or
success.’14
The term ‘commerce’ is defined as ‘the exchange or the
buying of goods, commodities, property or services.’”15
These
definitions reflect the common or ordinary meaning attributed to
the terms.
Citing Berry v. Hemlepp,16 the circuit court concluded
that the question of whether a use is commercial depends on the
purpose for which the property is being used rather than zoning
classifications.
appropriate:
The approach adopted in Berry is particularly
“It does not appear necessary to become too deeply
immersed in legal refinements and subtle meanings or words or
omissions . . . .
All that is needed in the present case is a fair
and common-sense approach to the objective sought by the language
13
Schwartz Amusement Co. v. Independent Order of Odd
Fellows, Howard Lodge, No. 15, 278 Ky. 563, 128 S.W.2d 965, 968
(1939).
14
The Random House College Dictionary (1st ed.
15
Merriam-Webster Dictionary of Law (1996).
16
Ky., 460 S.W.2d 352 (1970).
-10-
1973).
used.”17
Applying that logic here, the definition of “commercial
use or purpose” adopted by the court is both fair and consistent
with the overall scheme evidenced in the documents at issue.
Contrary to Cherrywood’s assertion, it is unnecessary to
consult the zoning categories in order to determine the meaning of
the words in the present context.
The Atkinses could have easily
limited the imposed restriction to specific zoning categories just
as they required Ruttenberg to seek particular categories of zoning
in Paragraph 2 of the initial agreement. Instead, they declined to
reference zoning categories, opting to employ the broad concept of
“any commercial purpose whatsoever.”
Such a deliberate choice is
susceptible to but one interpretation, that the Atkinses were aware
of the potential implications, i.e., increase in value, that would
result from their former property being used for a commercial
purpose and, as such, used the most liberal terms possible to
ensure that they shared in the wealth.
Further evidence of this
reasoning is found in the triggering phrase of the vendor’s lien,
“or becomes legally available for any commercial use whatsoever.”
By consistently using expansive language, the Atkinses left no
doubt as to their intention to have the lien attach in the event
that the property became available for such use, regardless of
whether
it
was
actually
being
so
used.
Again,
the
zoning
categories are not mentioned.
According to Cherrywood, the phrase “commercial use”
cannot be accurately defined without consulting the Ruttenberg
agreement.
17
Under
the
parol
evidence
Id. at 353.
-11-
rule,
consideration
of
extraneous evidence is impermissible when interpreting a contract
or deed if said evidence varies with or contradicts the agreed upon
terms as memorialized in the written document being interpreted.18
Such is the case here.
Paragraph 2 of the agreement implicitly
defines “commercial” by referencing three zoning classifications,
namely,
what
constitutes
“commercial zoning” for purposes of the agreement.
Noticeably
absent
B-1,
from
B-3
and
Paragraph
B6-P,
2,
in
however,
clarifying
is
the
requisite
survival
language of the release provision encompassed in Paragraph 9A,
i.e., “[t]he terms and conditions of this paragraph survive the
closing of the purchase of all the properties,” as is the similar
language
contained
in
the
restriction
itself,
i.e.,
“This
restriction shall be binding upon the Grantee . . . .”
Those
omissions, coupled with the lack of ambiguity in the language of
the deed render the parol evidence rule applicable, and it operates
to bar introduction of this conflicting version of the terminology
in question.
In sum, the terms of both the restriction and the
18
The Supreme Court, quoting from Bryant v. Troutman, Ky.,
287 S.W.2d 918, 920 (1956), has said that;
The rule is that parol testimony is not admissible to
vary the terms of a writing. When the negotiations are
completed by the execution of the contract, the
transaction, so far as it rests on the contract, is
merged in the writing.
But false and fraudulent
representations made by one of the parties to induce the
other to enter into the contract, are not merged in the
contract. Parol evidence is admissible to show that the
making of the contract was procured by fraudulent
representations. This does not vary the terms of the
contract.
Hanson v. American National Bank & Trust Co., Ky., 865 S.W.2d 302,
308 (1993). There is no allegation of fraud in the instant case.
See also, Department of Revenue v. McIlvain, 302 Ky. 558,
195 S.W.2d 63 (1946).
-12-
vendor’s lien - ”any commercial use whatsoever” - were expressed
with clarity and must therefore be enforced in accordance with
their plain meaning and without regard to an unrelated provision of
the Ruttenberg agreement which failed to survive the conveyance of
the property.
In a related argument, Cherrywood contends that the court
erred in determining that the doctrine of merger by deed does not
apply in the present context, arguing that there is a conflict
between the terms of the restriction, i.e., “shall be used for any
commercial purpose whatsoever,” and the language contained in the
vendor’s lien itself, i.e., the lien will be released upon payment
of an additional $50,000.00 per acre for any portion which is
“rezoned for commercial use or becomes legally available for any
commercial
use
whatsoever.”
According
to
Cherrywood,
“[t]he
conflict in these provisions is obvious and remains unresolved
unless the key phrases are defined by reference to Paragraph 2 of
the agreement.”
Cherrywood misunderstands the implications of the
doctrine in the instant case.
The “merger doctrine” has been defined as follows:
In the absence of fraud or mistake, and in the absence of
collateral contractual provisions or agreements which are
not intended to be merged in the deed, the acceptance of
a deed tendered in performance of an agreement to convey
merges the written or oral agreement to convey in the
deed, and thereafter the deed regulates the rights and
liabilities of the parties.
* * *
-13-
Evidence of contemporaneous or antecedent agreements
between the parties is inadmissible to vary or contradict
the terms of the deed.
Where there is no mistake or
fraud, a deed executed subsequent to the making of an
executory contract for the sale of land is generally
regarded
as
conclusive
evidence
of
a
previous
modification of the executory contract.19
There is language in the restriction at issue which
explicitly provides that it is to run with the land.
Likewise, the
language of the release provision unequivocally expresses the
parties’ intent to have the “terms and conditions” of Paragraph 9
“survive the closing of the purchase of all the properties.”
credible
argument
can
be
made
that
the
deed
restriction
No
and
vendor’s lien contained in Paragraph 9 of the Ruttenberg agreement
were merged into the deeds. Had the parties intended for Paragraph
2 to be read in conjunction with the deeds, they would have
inserted similar language; they did not.
That being the case, the
court properly held that Paragraph 2 of the agreement, in defining
commercial by reference to zoning categories, contradicts the
unambiguous terms of the deeds and not only fails to survive the
closing, i.e., it was not merged into the deeds, but was not
intended to be as evidenced by the lack of survival language.
Under Paragraph 2, Ruttenberg was required to “make all reasonable
and diligent efforts” to have as much as 35 acres rezoned for
“commercial use” as defined in that section; he fulfilled his
19
77 Am Jur 2d Vendor and Purchaser § 286 (1997)(citation
omitted).
-14-
obligation and is not a party to this action.
relevancy
beyond
that
circumstance.
Paragraph 2 has no
Consistent
with
that
reasoning, the court also properly found that the doctrine of
merger by deed is not applicable to Paragraph 9, with the necessary
implication being that the deed must be construed in light of its
provisions, giving ordinary meaning to its terms and conditions.
In Humana Inc. v. Metts,20 this Court applied the doctrine
of merger by deed to bar the application of a provision in a
purchase contract which permitted the developer to “change, relieve
or lift the use restriction.”
We said that:
ascertain the intent of the parties.
“The objective is to
What did the parties mean by
what they said? The terms, conditions, provisions and restrictions
of
the
contract
conveyance.
for
purchase
professional
merged
into
the
deed
for
Any conflict between the two must be construed in
favor of the latter.”21
In
were
That is what the circuit court did.
distinguishing
office
use
for
between
the
mercantile
purpose
of
business
and
interpreting
the
restrictive covenant at issue, the Court in Metts said:
The phrase “professional office use” means just what it
says,
office
use
by
a
commercial undertaking.
professional
person,
not
a
The evidence discloses that the
pharmacy is being operated with very little difference
from the usual and ordinary pharmacy or drug store
prevalent throughout this area.
Ostertag and Southern
Optical, although possibly having a professional person
20
Ky. App., 571 S.W.2d 622 (1978).
21
Id. at 625.
-15-
in attendance, present themselves to the general public
as retail merchandisers. The sale of merchandise can and
usually is made by any clerk without any specialized
training or professional ability.22
Ultimately, we found that the restrictive covenant in the
deed had been violated by Humana, Inc. and permanently enjoined it
from
operating
“optical
dispensing
and
similar
business
operations,” a drug store and pharmacy and “any and all other uses,
specifically including the exercise club presently in operation.”23
Relying
on
the
foregoing
definition,
Cherrywood
argues
that,
because none of the property in question has been zoned to permit
retail sales of merchandise, it is not being nor can it be used for
a “commercial undertaking” as defined in Metts.
We are unpersuaded by this application of the Metts
decision. In determining that the uses listed above did not comply
with the restrictive covenant mandating that the property conveyed
be
used
strictly
for
“hospital,
extended
care
nursing
home
facilities and for professional office use only,” we interpreted
the latter phrase to exclude commercial undertakings, determining
that the businesses in question qualified as commercial in nature
rather than professional.
Such an interpretation is consistent
with the conclusion that the uses for which the property at issue
here is being utilized constitute "commercial" uses/undertakings.
This case requires construction of the inclusive phrase "any
22
Id. at 626.
23
Id. at 626-627.
-16-
commercial purpose whatsoever," as opposed to the restrictive
phrase "for professional office use only.”
While the two phrases
were intended to accomplish opposite results, the definition of
commercial remains unchanged.
Cherrywood next argues that even if we find in favor of
the Atkinses as to the substantive issue, it is entitled to an
evidentiary hearing because there are genuine issues of material
fact as to the actual location of the P-1 zoning line and the exact
amount of acreage which is being used for or is legally available
for any type of commercial use.
We, however, agree with the
circuit court which said that:
Cherrywood
Development,
LLC
(“Cherrywood”)
acquired 15.66 acres (“Former Atkins Property”) as shown
on
the
Non-Building
Minor
Subdivision
Plat,
Atkins
Property, 3711 Tates Creek Road of record in Plat Cabinet
K, Slide 82 of the Fayette County Clerk’s Office subject
to a deed restriction and a vendor’s lien in favor of the
Plaintiffs as more fully set forth in the court’s prior
opinions. At Cherrywood’s request, the Lexington Fayette
Urban-County Government approved the rezoning of portions
of the Former Atkins Property from R-3 (multifamily
housing) to P-1 (professional office use).
is
reflected
Subsequently,
in
Ordinance
Cherrywood
No.
conveyed
49-98
1.81
The rezoning
and
acres
50-98.
of
the
Former Atkins Property to the Lexington Public Library by
virtue of the Corrected Minor Amended Subdivision Plat of
the Atkins Property Unit 2-A of record in Plat Cabinet K,
-17-
Slide 974 of the Fayette County Clerk’s Office.
The
Court determines that Lots 3, 6 and 8 of the Former
Atkins Property, comprising 3.09 acres, are zoned R-3 and
shown as being unbuildable on the Final Record Plat
Atkins Property Unit 2B, Section 1 of record in Plat
Cabinet L, Slide 244 of the Fayette County Clerk’s
Office.
The remainder of the Former Atkins Property,
consisting of 10.76 acres, is being used or is available
for commercial use. Thus, in accordance with the Court’s
prior decisions, the Atkins[es] are entitled to judgment
against
Cherrywood
in
the
amount
of
$538,000.00
representing the remainder of the Former Atkins Property,
consisting of the 10.76 acres that is either actually
being used or is available for commercial use multiplied
by the $50,000.00 per acre set forth in the vendor’s lien
in the deeds to the Former Atkins Property.
All 15.66 acres conveyed by the Atkinses to Cherrywood
are
subject
to
the
deed
restriction
and
vendor’s
lien.
Cherrywood’s argument ignores the fact that most lots have areas
that are not “useable” because of easements, rights-of-way, tree
reservations, sinkholes, set-back lines, open space requirements
and other conditions.
Although restricted, many such areas can
still be used in the literal sense and in reality, are often
necessary components of the property which benefit the “useable”
portions and enhance the overall value of the land.
At worst, they
are necessary evils which accompany land development.
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In
essence,
Cherrywood
is
advocating
a
piecemeal
application of the lien which is not supported by its terms.
If
the
so
parties
had
intended
such
a
result,
they
could
have
provided.
“It is not for the Court to make a contract for the
parties.
It is not for the Court to ascertain what the parties
meant to say.
It is for the Court to determine what the parties
meant by what they did say.”24
Here, there is no question that the
Atkinses contemplated the “bonus payment” provision being triggered
with
respect
to
any
of
the
property
that
was
“rezoned
for
commercial use or became legally available for any commercial use
whatsoever”; there is no mention of it being selectively applied.
We agree with the circuit court’s assessment of this issue:
“The
individual Lots cannot be divided without materially impairing the
value of same or the value of the interest of the parties.”
Because the final record plats reviewed by the court are the best
evidence of what acreage is available for commercial use and those
plats clearly show the number of acres that are available, there is
no genuine issue of material fact as to how much land is properly
subject to the lien.
An evidentiary hearing is not warranted.
In their cross-appeal, the Atkinses claim that they are
entitled to prejudgment interest on the award pursuant to Kentucky
Revised Statutes (KRS) 360.010 and 360.040.
Prejudgment interest
may be awarded “where justified by the facts of a particular
case.”25
“If an item of damages is fixed or ascertainable with
24
Metts, supra, n. 20, at 626.
25
State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Reeder, Ky., 763 S.W.2d
(continued...)
-19-
reasonable certainty and is not contested and the defendant fails
or refuses to timely pay it unconditionally, or at least tender it
into court where it may be withdrawn unconditionally, he should be
charged with interest on that item in the judgment.”26
Here, there
is no genuine dispute as to the number of acres to which the “bonus
payment” provision applies or the dollar amount ($50,000.00) by
which it is to multiplied once the restriction has been implicated,
nor is there any question as to the time period involved (the date
on which the rezoning became effective).
In the event that the
claim is “definite as to both time and amount,” or a liquidated
demand, interest runs as a matter of right,27 while in the case of
an
unliquidated
claim,
the
responsibility
for
balancing
the
“undisputed facts and equities and deciding whether to award
interest” is a discretionary matter left to the court.28
present
claim
is
liquidated,
foregoing guidelines.
the
result
is
dictated
As the
by
the
Accordingly, the Atkinses shall be awarded
prejudgment interest at the statutory rate in accordance with KRS
360.010 from the effective date of the rezoning, February 19, 1998.
That portion of the judgment which denies recovery of
prejudgment interest is reversed and this case is remanded to
Fayette Circuit Court to award such interest at the rate of 8% per
25
(...continued)
116, 119 (1988).
26
Id.
27
Middleton v. Middleton, 287 Ky. 1, 152 S.W.2d 266, 268
(1941).
28
Nucor Corp. v. General Elec. Co., Ky., 812 S.W.2d 136,
144 (1991).
-20-
annum (simple interest, not compounded) as hereinabove set forth.
In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
BUCKINGHAM, Judge, CONCURS.
GUIDUGLI, Judge, CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN PART.
GUIDUGLI, Judge, CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN
PART.
I concur with the majority in all aspects except as to the
cross-appeal and the awarding of prejudgment interest.
I do not
believe that the damages in the case can be deemed “liquidated” in
that there was no certainty as to the amount of damages to be
awarded.
The majority states that there “is no genuine dispute as
to the number of acres to which the ‘bonus payment’ provision
applies.”
I disagree.
The number of acres to which the “bonus
payment” applied was a primary issue in dispute and ultimately
determined by the trial court to be less than originally bargained
for.
I
do
not
believe
the
Atkins
family
was
entitled
to
prejudgment interest and as such, would have affirmed the Fayette
Circuit Court’s judgment in its entirety.
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT IN NO. 2001-CA001608-MR AND CROSS-APPELLEE
IN NO.2001-CA-001676-MR
CHERRYWOOD DEVELOPMENT, LLC,
AND APPELLANTS IN NO. 2001-CA001608-MR GREER DEVELOPMENT,
INC. AND FIVE STAR SOUTH, LLC:
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEES IN NO. 2001-CA001608-MR AND CROSS-APPELLANTS
IN NO. 2001-CA-001676-MR:
John S. Talbott, III
WILSON, DECAMP & TALBOTT, PSC
Lexington, Kentucky
William M. Lear, Jr.
STOLL, KEENON & PARK, LLP
Lexington, Kentucky
ON BRIEF:
Steven B. Loy
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