WILBURN DAY v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: MAY 3, 2002; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2001-CA-001581-MR
WILBURN DAY
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM LAUREL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE RODERICK MESSER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-CR-00030
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
VACATING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUIDUGLI, MILLER, AND TACKETT, JUDGES.
MILLER, JUDGE:
Wilburn Day brings this appeal from an order
entered June 27, 2001 in the Laurel Circuit Court.
Subsequent
orders were entered July 5, 2001 and July 16, 2001.
We vacate
and remand.
In 1999, appellant was convicted of assault in the
second degree, Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 508.020, resisting
arrest, KRS 520.090, and public intoxication, KRS 525.100.
He
was sentenced to ten years, twelve months and ninety days of
imprisonment.
Appellant took a direct appeal in Appeal No. 99-
CA-001490-MR.
The appeal was dismissed upon appellant's motion.
Thereafter, appellant filed a motion to vacate under Ky. R. Civ.
P. (CR) 60.02.
The motion was denied by order entered by the
Laurel Circuit Court on June 6, 2000.
On December 27, 2000,
appellant filed a motion to vacate under Ky. R. Crim. P. (RCr)
11.42.
Laurel Circuit Court denied the motion without an
evidentiary hearing on June 27, 2001.
Subsequently, appellant
filed a “supplemental motion for RCr. 11.42 relief and for an
evidentiary hearing and appointment of counsel” on June 28, 2001.
This supplemental motion was denied by order of the Laurel
Circuit Court entered July 5, 2001.
Appellant then filed a
motion to alter, amend or vacate under CR 59.05 and 60.02.
Court denied same on July 16, 2001.
The
This appeal follows.
Appellant contends that the circuit court committed
error by summarily denying his December 2000 RCr 11.42 motion.
Specifically, appellant contends that he was entitled to an
evidentiary hearing and appointment of counsel.
To support this
contention, appellant argues that prior to trial the Commonwealth
Attorney presented his trial counsel with an offer of plea
agreement.
Under the plea agreement, appellant was to plead
guilty in exchange for a sentence of one year imprisonment;
however, appellant alleges that neither the prosecutor nor his
trial counsel ever advised him of this plea agreement.
Appellant
maintains that he would have accepted the Commonwealth's plea
offer and, thus, the one year prison sentence.
In his motion, he
claimed that it was only after trial and through another
attorney, Hon. Brenda Popplewell, that he finally learned of the
plea offer.
It appears that Popplewell represented appellant in
his direct appeal to this court.
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In denying appellant's RCr 11.42 motion, the circuit
court cited to the fact that appellant failed to obtain
Popplewell's affidavit.
We, however, believe that appellant has
demonstrated entitlement to an evidentiary hearing and
appointment of counsel.
In the case at hand, the face of the
record does not refute appellant's allegation.
See Hopewell v.
Commonwealth, Ky. App., 687 S.W.2d 153 (1985).
We believe there
remains a material issue of fact concerning whether such plea
agreement was offered to defense counsel without appellant's
knowledge.
We note that the record does not refute appellant's
allegation, and only upon an evidentiary hearing will the matter
be properly determined.
RCr 11.42(5) provides:
Affirmative allegations contained in the
answer shall be treated as controverted or
avoided of record. If the answer raises a
material issue of fact that cannot be
determined on the face of the record the
court shall grant a prompt hearing and, if
the movant is without counsel of record and
if financially unable to employ counsel,
shall upon specific written request by the
movant appoint counsel to represent the
movant in the proceeding, including appeal.
(Emphasis added).
If appellant's allegations are proved true, we are of the opinion
that he would be entitled to RCr 11.42 relief.
See Osborne v.
Commonwealth, Ky. App., 992 S.W.2d 860 (1998).
Appellant also contends that the trial court committed
error by not considering his supplemental RCr 11.42 motion.
Upon
remand, we believe the circuit court should address appellant's
supplemental RCr 11.42 motion upon the merits.
We note that
appellant mailed his supplemental RCr 11.42 motion from the
Eastern Kentucky Correctional Facility days before the circuit
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court's denial of his original 11.42 motion.
Considering the
unique circumstances of this case, we believe that justice would
be served by the circuit court addressing the merits of
appellant's supplemental RCr 11.42 motion upon remand.
We view appellant's remaining arguments as moot or
without merit.
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Laurel
Circuit Court is vacated and this cause is remanded for
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Wilburn Day, Pro Se
West Liberty, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General of Kentucky
Frankfort, Kentucky
Kent T. Young
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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