R.C. v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, CABINET FOR FAMILIES AND CHILDREN; S.C.; AND I.C.
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RENDERED:
JULY 12, 2002; 2:00 p.m.
TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2001-CA-001080-DG
R.C.1
APPELLANT
ON DISCRETIONARY REVIEW FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE SHEILA R. ISAAC, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 00-XX-00045
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY,
CABINET FOR FAMILIES AND CHILDREN;
S.C.; AND I.C.
APPELLEES
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, KNOPF, AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
KNOPF, JUDGE:
review by R.C.
This matter came before the Court on discretionary
R.C. seeks review of an order of the Fayette
Circuit Court affirming an order by the juvenile branch of the
Fayette District Court which concluded that his daughter, I.C.,
is an abused child within the meaning of KRS 600.020.
R.C.
argues that the trial court erred by allowing a licenced clinical
social worker to express an opinion that the child’s symptoms
were indicative of sexual abuse.
1
He further argues that the
In the interest of the parties’ privacy, and in accordance with this Court’s policy, the
parents and children shall be referred to only by their initials.
trial court erred by allowing I.C.’s mother to testify regarding
the child’s out-of-court statements.
arguments.
We agree with both
Hence, we reverse the finding that I.C. is an abused
child, and we remand this matter to the juvenile branch of the
Fayette District Court for a new hearing.
R.C. and S.C. were married in 1992.
Three children
were born of the marriage: a son, L.C. (age 7 at the time of the
hearing); and two daughters, I.C. (age 5 at the time of the
hearing), and A.C. (age 3 at the time of the hearing).
R.C. and
S.C. divorced in 1999 and were awarded joint custody of the
children.
Although S.C. was designated as the children’s
residential custodian, R.C. had frequent visits with them.
On February 18, 2000, S.C. was called to Ashland to
attend to her dying brother.
E.C. to keep I.C. and A.C.
She asked R.C. and his new wife
R.C. and E.C. kept the younger two
children until Friday, February 25, 2000.
On the latter date,
E.C. drove I.C. and A.C. from Lexington to Ashland to return the
children to S.C.
The following day, S.C. and all three children
returned to Lexington.
S.C. testified that during the evening of Sunday,
February 27, 2000, I.C. was very anxious and unwilling to go to
sleep.
S.C. told I.C. that she was going to tuck in L.C., but
that she would return to lay down beside I.C.
out the light and left the room.
S.C. then turned
S.C. testified that when she
returned to the room, I.C. was startled and shouted to her
mother, “you’re not going to spank me, are you?”
S.C.
responded, “no honey, I’m coming to lay with you.
I told you I
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was going to come back and lay with you.”
According to S.C.,
I.C. then told her that she was startled because her father takes
her panties off when he spanks her “goop.”2
S.C. testified that
I.C. further told her that R.C. “feeds on her goop”, “bites her
goop” and “peed on her goop” when playing a “dragon” game.
S.C. contacted R.C. on February 28 and asked him about
I.C.’s statements.
He denied that I.C. had been exposed to any
sexually oriented materials which might explain her statements.
Shortly thereafter, S.C. took I.C. to a psychologist at the
Woodland Group, Bonnie Hall-Polus.
After S.C. told Hall-Polus
what I.C. had said, Hall-Polus told S.C. to report the matter to
the Cabinet for Families and Children (the Cabinet).
On March 3,
2000, S.C. filed a report with the Cabinet, which then proceeded
to investigate the matter.
Thereafter, on April 1, 2000, the Cabinet filed a
petition pursuant to KRS 620.070 in the juvenile branch of
Fayette District Court.
The Cabinet sought a finding that I.C.
was an abused child within the meaning of KRS 600.020(1).
In May
of 2000, S.C. took I.C. to see Kit Andrews, a licenced clinical
social worker.
Andrews saw I.C. on seven occasions between May
and August of 2000.
At the hearing, Andrews testified, over
R.C.’s objection, that I.C. exhibited signs of a sexually abused
child.
She stated that those signs were anxiety, being tense,
bedwetting, nightmares, and depression.
Andrews further
testified that she had observed I.C. act out sexually on one
occasion.
2
S.C also testified that she had observed these
Testimony by both S.C. and E.C. established that “goop” is the child’s word for vagina.
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behaviors on the part of I.C. both before and after February 27,
2000.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial judge found
that the Cabinet had established by a preponderance of the
evidence that I.C. is an abused child.
R.C. appealed from this
determination to the Fayette Circuit Court.
He argued that the
trial court erred by allowing S.C. to testify regarding the outof-court statements made by I.C., and by allowing Andrews to
state her opinion that I.C. had been sexually abused.
The
circuit court rejected both arguments, finding as follows:
The Court finds that the evidence in question
was properly admitted. The statements made
by the child to the mother fall within the
excited utterance exception to the hearsay
rule. Further, the admission of the opinion
testimony of the licenced clinical social
worker is supported by statutory changes in
KRS 600.020 and the holding in Stringer v.
Commonwealth, KY., 956 S.W.2d 883 (1997).
Consequently, the circuit court affirmed the trial
court’s finding of abuse.
On July 24, 2001, this Court granted
R.C.’s motion for discretionary review.
First, R.C. again argues that Andrews was not qualified
to express an opinion regarding I.C.’s psychological symptoms or
diagnoses.
We agree.
In Hellstrom v. Commonwealth,3 our Supreme
Court held that it was improper for a social worker to vouch for
the truth of a victim's account because social workers are not
experts qualified to testify to the credibility of a child's
statement made during evaluation.
The Court further noted that a
social worker who is neither a physician, a psychiatrist, nor a
3
Ky., 825 S.W.2d 612, 614 (1992).
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psychologist trained in diagnosing the cause of a child’s mental
distress is not qualified to express an opinion that the child’s
symptoms were indicative of sexual abuse.
The Cabinet responds, and the circuit court agreed that
the rule in Hellstrom has been modified by the subsequent Supreme
Court decision in Stringer v. Commonwealth,4 and by the 1996
amendment of KRS 600.020(1).
convincing.
We find neither argument
In Stringer v. Commonwealth, our Supreme Court
resolved conflicting authority concerning the admissibility of an
expert’s opinion as to the ultimate issue.
The Court held that,
under KRE 702, the pertinent question is whether the opinion will
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue.5
Nevertheless, the Court did not alter the rule that the
expert witness must be qualified to express an opinion on the
issue.
Expert opinion evidence is admissible so long as: (1) the
witness is qualified to render an opinion on the subject matter;
(2) the subject matter satisfies the requirements of Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.;6 (3) the subject matter
satisfies the test of relevancy set forth in KRE 401, subject to
the balancing of probativeness against prejudice required by KRE
403; and (4) the opinion will assist the trier of fact per KRE
4
Supra.
5
Id. at 889.
6
509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1993).
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702.7
Under this test, the expert still must be qualified to
express an opinion on the subject matter.
In 1996, the General Assembly amended the definition of
“qualified mental health professional” which is currently set out
in KRS 600.020(47).8
For purposes of the Unified Juvenile Code,
the statute now defines “qualified mental health professional” to
mean: (a) a physician; (b) a psychiatrist; (c) a Ph.D.-level
psychologist or certified master’s level psychologist; (d) a
registered nurse with a master’s degree in psychiatric nursing;
or
(e) A licensed clinical social worker
licensed under the provisions of KRS 335.100,
or a certified social worker licenced under
the provisions of KRS 335.080 with three (3)
years of inpatient or outpatient clinical
experience in psychiatric social work and
currently employed by a hospital or forensic
psychiatric facility licensed by the
Commonwealth or a psychiatric unit of a
general hospital or a regional comprehensive
care center.
The Cabinet argues that this amendment demonstrates the
General Assembly’s intention to overrule Hellstrom and to allow a
licenced clinical social worker to express an opinion regarding
sexual abuse.
However, there are a number of factors which
militate against such an interpretation of the statute.
First,
the definition of “qualified mental health professional” which
was in effect when Hellstrom was decided included “a certified
clinical social worker” or a “certified social worker” with the
same qualifications as set out in the current version of KRS
7
Stringer, 956 S.W.2d at 891.
8
1996 Ky. Acts 369, § 21.
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600.020(47).
Nevertheless, the Court in Hellstrom did not
consider that this section qualified the clinical social worker
to express an opinion that the child in that case had been
sexually abused.
Second, the chapter of the 1996 legislation containing
the amendment9 relates to the regulation of social workers.
Other sections of that chapter modified the training and
licensing requirements for social workers set out in KRS Chapter
335.
In particular, § 12 of that chapter authorizes the Kentucky
Board of Social Work to issue a license for a “licensed clinical
social worker” to an applicant who has met the requirements set
out in KRS 335.100.
The 1996 amendment to the definition of
“qualified mental health professional” in KRS 600.020 merely
modified the existing definition to include this new category of
social worker.
Third, there is nothing in KRS Chapter 620 which
suggests that the testimony of a qualified mental health
professional is necessary to a finding that a child has been
abused, neglected, or dependent.
Indeed, the only reference to
this term in KRS Chapter 620 is contained in KRS 620.023(1)(a),
which states that in determining the best interests of a child,
the court shall consider evidence of mental illness or mental
retardation, as attested to by a qualified mental health
professional, insofar as it renders a parent unable to care for
the immediate and ongoing needs of the child.
The mere inclusion
of a licensed clinical social worker within the definition of
9
Chapter 369 of 1996 Kentucky Acts.
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qualified mental health professional does not lead us to conclude
that the General Assembly intended that such a person be
considered qualified as an expert for all purposes.
And finally, even if we could conclude that the General
Assembly intended to allow licensed clinical social workers to
express an opinion regarding a psychological diagnosis or
symptoms, then such an enactment would be a violation of the
separation of powers doctrine and hence unconstitutional.
KRE
702 vests the trial court with broad discretion to determine
whether a witness is qualified to express an opinion in a matter
which requires expert knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education.
Likewise, the rule requires the trial court to
determine if such expert testimony will assist the trier of fact
to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.10
The Cabinet’s interpretation of KRS 600.020(47) would transgress
established procedure relating to the qualification and admission
of expert testimony, and would usurp the power of the judiciary
to control the rules of evidence.11
In the absence of any
indication that the General Assembly intended such a result, we
will not interpret a statute in a manner which would render it
unconstitutional.
Therefore, we find no basis for concluding
that the 1996 amendment to KRS 600.020(47) permits a licensed
clinical social worker to express an opinion regarding a
diagnosis of sexual abuse, or that Andrews’s testimony was
admissible under Stringer v. Commonwealth.
Consequently, we
10
Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. v. Thompson, Ky., 11 S.W.3d 575, 577-79 (2000).
11
Drumm v. Commonwealth, Ky., 783 S.W.2d 380, 382 (1990).
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conclude the district court erred by allowing Andrews to express
an opinion that I.C. exhibited signs of being a sexually abused
child.
Since we are remanding this matter for a new hearing,
we must also address R.C.’s argument that the trial court erred
by allowing S.C. to testify regarding the statements allegedly
made by I.C.
The central issue is whether the statements were
admissible under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay
rule.
Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by the Rules
of Evidence.12
However, a statement relating to a startling
event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress
of excitement caused by the event or condition is not excluded by
the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a
witness.13
This is commonly known as the “excited utterance”
exception.
In Souder v. Commonwealth,14 our Supreme Court set out
the factors to be weighed in determining whether an out-of-court
statement is admissible under KRE 803(2):
(i) lapse of time between the main act and
the declaration, (ii) the opportunity or
likelihood of fabrication, (iii) the
inducement to fabrication, (iv) the actual
excitement of the declarant, (v) the place of
the declaration, (vi) the presence there of
visible results of the act or occurrence to
which the utterance relates, (vii) whether
the utterance was made in response to a
12
KRE 802.
13
KRE 803(2).
14
Ky., 719 S.W.2d 730, 733 (1986).
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question, and (viii) whether the declaration
was against interest or self-serving.15
However, these criteria do not pose a true-false test
for admissibility, but rather act only as guidelines to be
considered in determining admissibility.16
Whether a particular
statement qualifies as an excited utterance depends on the
circumstances of each case and is often an arguable point; and
"when this is so the trial court's decision to admit or exclude
the evidence is entitled to deference."17
This determination
depends upon the resolution of a preliminary question of fact on
the basis of a preponderance of the evidence.
The trial court’s
resolution of the issue will not be overturned unless clearly
erroneous, i.e., unless unsupported by substantial evidence.18
The Cabinet argues that I.C.’s statements were “excited
utterances” because she made them after being startled by S.C.
returning to her darkened room.
However, KRE 803(2) makes it
clear that the out-of-court statement must relate to a startling
event or condition, and must be made while the declarant was
under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition.
Clearly, the “startling event” was not the actual abuse.
It
could be argued that I.C. associated her mother’s return to the
darkened room with the alleged acts of abuse.
15
Thus, the
Id. at 733; (quoting R. Lawson, The Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook § 8.60(B) (2d
ed. Michie 1984)).
16
Smith v. Commonwealth, Ky., 788 S.W.2d 266, 268 (1990).
17
Souder, supra, at 733.
18
Young v. Commonwealth, Ky., 50 S.W.3d 148, 167 (2001).
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startling event would be a trigger for I.C.’s decision to recount
the abuse.
The trial court obviously struggled with this problem,
stating in its conclusions that at least one of the incidents of
abuse appeared to have occurred during the most recent period
when I.C. was in R.C.’s possession.
Thus, the court concluded
that I.C.’s statements were not too remote from the original
startling event (the actual acts of abuse) as opposed to the
“triggering” startling event (S.C.’s return to the darkened
room).
In finding that the statements were trustworthy and
reliable, the trial court was particularly convinced that I.C.’s
description of R.C.’s alleged actions was consistent with a
child’s limited understanding of sexual conduct, and was beyond
the likely range of imagination of a four-to-five year old child.
However, the credibility of an out-of-court statement
involves a somewhat different issue than the question of whether
an out-of-court statement is admissible under the excited
utterance exception to the hearsay rule.
The mere lapse of time
between the actual startling event and the out-of-court
statement, although relevant, is not dispositive in the
application of KRE 803(2).19
The focus of the inquiry should be
on whether the statements were made as a result of an agitated
state of mind not based on any reflection or deliberations.20
Thus, in Souder, a three-year-old child's statements,
given more than twenty-four hours after the alleged incident
19
McClure v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 686 S.W.2d 469, 470 (1985).
20
Robey v. Commonwealth, Ky., 943 S.W.2d 616, 619 (1997).
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occurred, and in response to the grandmother's persistent
questioning of the child regarding what had happened to her, were
too remote and unreliable to qualify under the excited utterance
exception to the hearsay rule.21
Likewise, in Jarvis v.
Commonwealth,22 a child’s out-of-court statements, made less than
fifteen minutes after she witnessed her mother’s murder, were not
admissible because there was no evidence that the child was still
under the stress of the startling event when she made the
statements.23
However, in Robey v. Commonwealth,24 the rape victim’s
statement was uttered under the stress of nervous excitement; the
incident was so recent that the victim had no opportunity to
reflect upon or fabricate her statement.
Consequently, the
statement was trustworthy because the stress stilled her
reflective faculties and removed her control so that her
utterance was a spontaneous and sincere response to the actual
sensations and perceptions produced by the rape.25
Similarly, in
Davis v. Commonwealth,26 a co-defendant's out-of-court statements
that the defendant killed her baby and that she should never have
left on the night of murder, made at the hospital shortly after
21
Souder, 719 S.W.2d at 734.
22
Ky., 960 S.W.2d 466 (1998).
23
Id. at 470. See also Young v. Commonwealth, 50 S.W.3d at 166-67.
24
Supra.
25
Robey, 943 S.W.2d at 619.
26
Ky., 967 S.W.2d 574 (1998).
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the child’s death, qualified for exception to the hearsay rule as
excited utterances because she was still under the stress of
learning of her child’s death.27
In this case, I.C.’s initial statement to S.C., “You’re
not going to spank me, are you?”, could be considered to have
been made under the stress of nervous excitement, although not
directly related to the original startling event.
However, there
was no evidence of I.C.’s state of mind when she made her
subsequent statements which implicated R.C. in the acts of sexual
abuse.
Given the remoteness of the original startling event, we
cannot find that I.C.’s statements were clearly the product of
her agitated state rather than reflection or deliberation.
Although we are reluctant to reverse the trial court’s finding on
this matter, we must conclude I.C.’s out-of-court statements were
not admissible under the excited utterance exception, and that
the trial court and the circuit court erred in so finding.
Because the trial court based its finding that I.C. is
an abused child upon inadmissible evidence, that finding must be
set aside, and this matter remanded for a new hearing.
At any
subsequent hearing, the testimony in question shall not be
admitted.
The trial court shall make a finding of whether I.C.
27
Id. at 578-79. See also Clark v. Hauck Manufacturing Co., Ky., 910 S.W.2d 247
(1995) (Statements made to medical personnel by an injured worker who had suffered severe
burns during the course of treatment were admissible as an excited utterance because the worker
made them as a result of a highly agitated state of mind based on what he saw happen to him and
not based on any reflection or deliberations); and Wells v. Commonwealth, Ky., 892 S.W.2d 299
(1995) (A victim's statements that it was defendant who stabbed him, made to 911 operator and
paramedic, while the knife was still in his back and to police officer at hospital immediately
after being told that his situation was extremely critical and he could die at any moment, were
admissible as an excited utterance and a dying declaration).
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is an abused child based upon the admissible evidence presented
at the new hearing.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Fayette Circuit Court
which affirmed the finding of the juvenile branch of the Fayette
District Court that I.C. is an abused child is reversed, and this
matter is remanded to the Fayette District Court for a new
hearing consistent with this opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
Natalie S. Wilson
Elizabeth S. Hughes
Gess Mattingly & Atchison, PSC
Lexington, Kentucky
Duane F. Osborne
Assistant Fayette County
Attorney
Lexington, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLANT:
Stephen D. Milner
Hughes, Lowry, Milner &
Hayworth
Lexington, Kentucky
Elizabeth S. Hughes
Lexington, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEES:
Duane F. Osborne
Lexington, Kentucky
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