ELEANOR POIGNARD v. JEFFERSON COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, DEAN HITE, AND LINDA ROBINSON
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED:
APRIL 26, 2002; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2001-CA-000915-MR
ELEANOR POIGNARD
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE BARRY WILLETT, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 99-CI-002523
v.
JEFFERSON COUNTY BOARD
OF EDUCATION, DEAN HITE,
AND LINDA ROBINSON
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
DYCHE, MILLER, AND TACKETT, JUDGES.
TACKETT, JUDGE: Eleanor Poignard (Ms. Poignard) appeals from the
entry of summary judgment by the Jefferson Circuit Court in favor
of the Jefferson County Board of Education (Board), Dean Hite,
and Linda Robinson.
Ms. Poignard argues on appeal that the
circuit court’s entry of summary judgment was improper, alleging
she had set forth a prima facie case of discrimination on the
basis of race and had overcome the Board’s proferred nondiscriminatory reason for transferring her from her position as
an Exceptional Children Education (E.C.E.) teacher at Western
Middle School.
The court also entered summary judgment on claims
of breach of contract and intentional infliction of emotional
distress.
After a careful and thorough review, we affirm.
Ms. Poignard was involved in several incidents with a
student at Western Middle in February 1999, wherein she was
alleged to have forcefully grabbed and angrily raised her voice
to a sixth-grade student with a learning disability.
In the
first alleged incident, Ms. Poignard raised her voice
inappropriately to the child in an argument over a math problem.
The child and other students who were witnesses to the incident
stated that Ms. Poignard called the child “stupid” and made other
demeaning comments to the child.
The next day, the child’s
mother came to school to confront Ms. Poignard about the
incident.
Allegedly, Ms. Poignard grabbed the student in
question by the arm and dragged him out of another teacher’s
class.
During the meeting with the child’s mother, Ms. Poignard
allegedly grabbed the child by the arm several times, roughly,
and said that he was a problem child, and that she, as the
teacher, could do whatever she wanted with him.
Ms. Poignard
acknowledged that she had raised her voice to the child in the
first incident, but denied improperly touching the child or
calling him stupid.
In any event, the child’s mother complained
to the school’s principal, Dean Hite.
Hite removed the child
from Ms. Poignard’s class and placed him in another class.
Also,
Child Protective Services was notified, and an investigation was
conducted.
The investigator, Carolyn Muse, concluded that
“although there were witnesses that verified the teacher does
yell and holler at the kids, Christopher doesn’t seem to have
-2-
sustained any actual mental injury from this.”
The investigator
closed the case with a finding of unsubstantiated mental injury.
Nevertheless, the child was, in fact, transferred to another
class with another team of teachers.
On March 2, 1999, another incident occurred.
Ms.
Poignard entered a classroom to see if another teacher, Paula
Giddens, was in the room.
As it happened, the same child,
Christopher, was in the classroom, and allegedly Ms. Poignard
stared at him.
Ms. Poignard denied being aware that the child
was in the classroom.
The child reported the incident to his
mother, and his mother reported it to Principal Hite.
The next
day, Principal Hite called Ms. Poignard into her office and
requested an explanation for Ms. Poignard’s presence in the
classroom.
Principal Hite ordered Ms. Poignard to have no
further contact with the child, and this order was placed in
writing, signed by Ms. Poignard to acknowledge that she was aware
of the order.
On March 12, 1999, Ms. Poignard entered teacher Shirley
Erickson’s classroom, allegedly in search of food.
Poignard stated in her deposition:
As Ms.
“So I was on the third floor,
and it was about 8:30 in the morning, and I had a hunger attack,
— another teacher and I had this hunger attack, so we knew that
Shirley Erickson had food.
So, I flew down to Shirley’s room and
told Shirley . . . give me a sandwich.
So, I go back there to
the refrigerator, get the sandwich, and I leave.”
Poignard’s Deposition at 67-68).
(Ms.
However, Erickson’s account
differs from Ms. Poignard’s in one important respect in that she
-3-
places the time that Ms. Poignard entered her room at 7:45, and
states that she left at 8:50.
The child was in the classroom
during the time that Ms. Poignard was present, and after class
was dismissed, the child ran to his mother who happened to be at
the school in the youth service center and told her that Ms.
Poignard had been in his classroom again.
The child’s mother
again complained to Principal Hite, who contacted Minor Daniels,
the Executive Director of Business Affairs for Jefferson County
Public Schools regarding the matter.
Daniels stated in his
deposition that he went to Western Middle that day and remained
there all day to make sure that Principal Hite handled the
situation properly.
When he arrived, the principal showed him
the previous incident report and the previous order for Ms.
Poignard to have no further contact with the child.
Daniels then
interviewed the child, the child’s mother, and Erickson, to
determine what happened.
The child stated that Ms. Poignard had
“walked back there where he was sitting and terrified him.”
(Daniels’ Deposition at 15).
The child did not say that Ms.
Poignard said anything to him or touched him, just that her
presence frightened him.
After Daniels conducted his interviews,
he contacted the following two people from his department:
Rick
Layman, Coordinator for Security for Jefferson County Public
Schools, and Joe Burden, an investigator with the security
office.
The school security personnel asked Ms. Poignard if she
had been in Erickson’s class that morning and whether she
understood that she was to have no contact with the child, and
thereupon informed her that she needed to turn in her keys and
-4-
report to the office of Carolyn Meredith, Director of Employee
Relations, on the next Monday, March 15.
She was then
escorted
by school security to her classroom to retrieve her coat, and
then out of the building.
Classes were in session and no
teachers or students were in the hall to witness Ms. Poignard’s
being escorted out of the building.
The only people that were
present to observe this were two custodians in the hall on the
first floor.
Daniels specifically stated that he was concerned
that Ms. Poignard be escorted out quietly and quickly, without
making a scene.
On Monday, March 15, Ms. Poignard was informed by
Meredith that she was being “temporarily reassigned” from Western
Middle to the C.B. Young, Jr. Service Center.
Subsequently, Ms.
Poignard received a written reprimand, and was informed that she
would be transferred to a different school for the 1999-2000
school year, which ultimately was determined to be Frost Middle,
where Ms. Poignard still works.
Ms. Poignard’s salary has also
been increased since the transfer, a fact the circuit court noted
in its opinion.
Ms. Poignard filed this action in the Jefferson Circuit
Court, alleging that she was discriminated against on the basis
of race, that the school had breached its contract with her, and
that the school had defamed her and subjected her to the
intentional infliction of emotional distress.
In granting
summary judgment, the circuit court held that Ms. Poignard could
not maintain an action for discrimination, as she had suffered no
“adverse employment action” within the meaning of Dobbs-Weinstein
-5-
v. Vanderbilt University, 185 F.3d 542 (6th Cir. 1999).
The court
also held that Ms. Poignard could not maintain an action for
intentional infliction of emotional distress, even viewing all
the facts in the light most favorable to her, nor could she
maintain an action for defamation, as the action taken by the
school board did not constitute publication for purposes of
defamation.
Lastly, the court held that Ms. Poignard received
all due process to which she was entitled under her contract and
the applicable statute, Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS)
161.760(2).
This appeal followed.
Turning first to the question of whether Ms. Poignard
suffered an “adverse employment action” under Dobbs-Weinstein, we
must agree with the circuit court that she did not.
In order to
show a prima facie case of discrimination, Ms. Poignard would
have to show that (1) she was a member of a protected class, (2)
that she was qualified for the position, and (3) that she
suffered an adverse employment action due to her membership in
the protected class.
Dobbs-Weinstein at 544.
The school Board
could then rebut the prima facie case by showing a legitimate,
non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action,
which Ms. Poignard would then have to demonstrate was a mere
pretext for discrimination.
Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,255 (1981).
The circuit court, in holding
that Ms. Poignard had not demonstrated a prima facie case of
discrimination, stated:
As an African American female, Ms. Poignard
satisfies the first prong of the test for
discrimination. Additionally, Ms. Poignard
was qualified for her position as an E. C. E.
-6-
teacher at Western. However, Ms. Poignard
fails the third prong of the prima facie test
in that she has not suffered an adverse
employment action. Due to the incidents
involving [the child], Ms. Poignard was
temporarily reassigned to C.B. Young. She
was permanently transferred to Frost Middle
School for the 1999-2000 school year.
Additionally, Ms. Poignard has benefitted
[sic] from the transfer as her salary has
increased from $49,650 to $54,738, and there
has been no evidence that she lost any
benefits. Thus, Ms. Poignard has suffered no
adverse employment action.
The court went on to hold that even if Ms. Poignard had
established a prima facie case of discrimination, the school
Board had articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for
her transfer, specifically the incident with the child.
The
court found that the school Board had conducted a proper
investigation of the incidents, and acted within its authority in
transferring Ms. Poignard as a result of those incidents.
The
court also noted that Ms. Poignard had a history of similar
incidents, and concluded that the Board’s action was not
unreasonable.
We must agree with the circuit court that Ms. Poignard
did not suffer an adverse employment action.
A transfer without
a loss of benefits or which does not amount to a constructive
discharge does not constitute an adverse employment action under
the guiding precedent.
Darnell v. Campbell County Fiscal Court,
731 F.Supp. 1309, 1313 (E.D. Ky. 1990), aff’d, 924 F.2d 1057 (6th
Cir. 1991).
A constructive discharge is a transfer to a new
position that is so difficult or unpleasant that a reasonable
person in the employee’s situation would be forced to resign.
Yates v. AVCO Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 636-37 (6th Cir. 1987).
-7-
Even
though Ms. Poignard states that she was at Western Middle for
many years and that Frost Middle is further away from her home,
resulting in a longer commute, we cannot hold that this is
sufficient to constitute an adverse employment action.
Likewise,
we cannot agree with Ms. Poignard that because the Kentucky Civil
Rights Act authorizes recovery of damages for emotional distress,
embarrassment and humiliation, that an adverse employment action
therefore occurred because she claims those damages.
The fact
that a remedy is provided for those damages does not change the
requirement that an adverse employment action must be proven;
those are damages that flow from an adverse employment action and
not the adverse employment action itself.
While perhaps unique,
we do not find Ms. Poignard’s argument persuasive.
We need not
address whether the school board articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, as we hold that Ms. Poignard failed to
first establish a prima facie case of discrimination.
Next, we address the argument that the school board
breached its contract with Ms. Poignard by transferring her to
Frost Middle School.
The circuit court held that the school
board had not violated the collective bargaining agreement by
transferring her, as it had given adequate notice of the transfer
under KRS 161.760(2).
The court noted that “[a] teacher does not
have a right to a particular teaching assignment.
Pursuant to
KRS 161.720(4), a teacher is employed by the school district only
and ‘not in a particular position or school.’”
We agree that
under the applicable statute, adequate notice of the transfer was
given.
The statute requires notification of a transfer by July
-8-
15 of the new school year.
given on June 17.
Notice of the permanent transfer was
Therefore, Ms. Poignard’s argument that the
school board gave inadequate notice of the transfer is without
merit.
Ms. Poignard also argues that the school board breached
the collective bargaining agreement by disciplining her without
an adequate investigation.
We disagree.
Article IX of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement states that an employee may not
be disciplined without “just cause,” which is defined as follows:
1.
The employee has had opportunity to have
foreknowledge of the possible or probable
disciplinary consequences of the conduct
or performance.
2.
The rule or order is reasonably related
to the efficient and safe operation of
the district.
3.
Before administrating discipline, the
employer did make an effort to discover
whether the employee did, in fact,
violate a rule, regulation or order of
management.
4.
The employer’s investigation was
conducted fairly and objectively.
5.
The investigation produced substantial
evidence of proof that the employee was
guilty as charged.
6.
The district applied its rules, orders
and penalties without discrimination.
7.
The degree of discipline administered in
the particular case is reasonably related
to (a) the seriousness of the employee’s
proven offense, and (b) the employee’s
record of district service.
We agree with the circuit court that the school board followed
these criteria in disciplining Ms. Poignard.
-9-
The action of the
Board was supported by substantial evidence upon which it could
base its decision.
Therefore, the Board clearly was entitled to
summary judgment on this issue as well.
With respect to Ms. Poignard’s claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress, on review it is apparent that
the school board was also entitled to summary judgment on this
issue.
The elements of the tort of
intentional infliction of
emotional distress are set forth in Humana of Kentucky v. Seitz,
Ky., 796 S.W.2d 1 (1990), and Kroger Co. v. Willgruber, Ky., 920
S.W.2d 61 (1996).
In order to recover damages for intentional
infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must show:
(1)
that the wrongdoer’s conduct was intentional or reckless; (2) the
conduct was so outrageous and intolerable that it offends the
generally accepted standards of decency and morality; (3) there
is a causal connection between the wrongdoer’s conduct and the
plaintiff’s emotional distress; and finally (4) the emotional
distress must be severe.
Humana at 2-3, Kroger at 65.
Further,
the plaintiff’s belief that the wrongdoer acted intentionally or
recklessly will not of itself create a genuine issue of material
fact.
Humana at 3.
Ms. Poignard alleges that being escorted
from the building by school security was outrageous and
humiliating, and therefore caused her severe emotional distress.
Here, even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
her, Ms. Poignard has not established either that the school
board’s conduct violated the generally accepted standards of
decency and morality, nor that she has suffered severe emotional
distress as a result.
Indeed, rather than deliberately
-10-
subjecting Ms. Poignard to scorn and ridicule, it appears that
both Daniels and Hite did everything in their power to resolve
the situation without creating a scene.
Ms. Poignard cannot name
even a single witness who saw her being escorted from the
building, only that two custodians on the first floor saw what
happened.
This is, on its face, not enough to satisfy the
requirement that the conduct complained of violates the generally
accepted standards of decency and morality in the community.
Further, Ms. Poignard has not sufficiently demonstrated that her
emotional distress was severe.
She has provided no records of
treatment for health problems, physical or mental, resulting from
severe emotional distress, nor has she provided any other
evidence beyond her feelings of humiliation resulting from being
escorted from the school.
On these grounds, as a matter of law,
this is insufficient to establish severe emotional distress under
controlling case law.
Accordingly, the circuit court’s grant of
summary judgment was proper.
Finally, we address Ms. Poignard’s claim for
defamation.
She alleges that the child’s mother, defamed her by
falsely alleging to school authorities that Ms. Poignard abused
her child, that Hite defamed her by reporting those allegations
to Child Protective Services, and that the school board defamed
her during the course of the investigation.
We disagree, and
note, as did the circuit court, that KRS 620.030(1) imposes a
duty upon “any person who knows or has reasonable cause to
believe that a child is . . . abused” to “immediately cause an
oral or written report to be made to a local law enforcement
-11-
agency . . . .”
We believe that the child’s mother reported the
allegations made by her son in good faith to Hite, and that Hite
acted in good faith and in accordance with the law in referring
the matter to Child Protective Services.
Further, there is no
evidence that in the course of the investigation and disciplinary
action against Ms. Poignard that the school board in any way
publicized any reports concerning the investigation, as it
appears that all communications regarding the matter were
internal.
Therefore, we also affirm the circuit court’s grant of
summary judgment on this issue.
Based on the entire record and our careful review
thereof, the judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Aubrey Williams
Louisville, Kentucky
Steven L. Snyder
Clarence A. Wilbon
David A. Calhoun
Kenneth W. Brown
Wyatt, Tarrant & Combs
Louisville, Kentucky
-12-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.