COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY v. COREY DEMETRIUS HARDIN
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RENDERED: MAY 10, 2002; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2001-CA-000868-MR
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE BARRY WILLETT, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 97-CR-002390
v.
COREY DEMETRIUS HARDIN
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, McANULTY, AND TACKETT, JUDGES.
TACKETT, JUDGE:
The Commonwealth of Kentucky appeals from an
order of the Jefferson Circuit Court vacating Corey Hardin’s
conviction after a guilty plea to second degree assault.
We
reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
Hardin was indicted by a grand jury for first degree
assault and first degree robbery in September 1997.
The charges
followed an incident wherein Hardin pulled a gun on Darrell
Taylor and demanded money.
Taylor, who was in his own residence
at the time of the altercation, refused to give Hardin money and
a struggle ensued.
Taylor broke free and got outside whereupon
Hardin shot him, wounding him in the shoulder.
After Taylor
identified Hardin an arrest warrant was issued.
Hardin was eventually arrested and remained in jail
unable to post bond.
He hired two attorneys to defend him and
they succeeded in negotiating a plea bargain with the
Commonwealth.
Hardin’s case had been scheduled for trial on at
least two prior dates when he appeared in court on May 26, 1998.
At the outset his attorneys announced that a plea agreement had
been reached; however, they requested that the trial court
postpone accepting the plea for ninety days to allow them to
resolve federal charges which were also pending against Hardin.
The trial court refused, stating that it was ready to accept a
plea or preside over a jury trial, but that no more continuances
would be forthcoming.
The trial court then adjourned for one
hour to allow Hardin to discuss these options with his attorneys.
When court resumed Hardin’s attorneys announced that,
in the event the case proceeded to trial, they had a motion to
exclude evidence of prior bad acts under Kentucky Rule of
Evidence (KRE) 404(b).
The trial court heard arguments from
counsel and denied the motion on the basis that the
Commonwealth’s newly discovered evidence was not prior bad act
evidence subject to the notice requirements of KRE 404(c).
Then,
the Commonwealth inquired, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 1.9,
whether one of Hardin’s attorneys, who had previously prosecuted
Taylor for trafficking in a controlled substance, had any special
knowledge about the victim.
After a brief discussion of this
situation revealed no special knowledge, Hardin’s attorneys made
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a new proposal to the trial court.
Hardin would go ahead and
enter a plea of guilty if the trial court would postpone final
sentencing until after his charges in federal court were
resolved.
This request was also declined by trial court;
however, the court did give counsel the remainder of the day to
supplement their arguments regarding any of the issues under
discussion, and ordered court to reconvene the following morning.
The next morning, Hardin moved to withdraw his not
guilty plea and enter a plea of guilty to the amended charge of
second degree assault.
In exchange for his plea, the
Commonwealth recommended dismissal of the first degree robbery
charge and a sentence of ten years’ imprisonment to run
concurrent with any sentence he might receive in federal court.
The trial court accepted Hardin’s plea and, on July 15, 1998,
sentenced him in accordance with the plea bargain.
Hardin waited
over a year before filing a motion for pre-release probation on
October 22, 1999.
In his motion, Hardin acknowledged his guilt
and expressed remorse for his crime and sympathy for Taylor.
The
trial court denied his motion stating that Hardin was ineligible
for pre-release probation due to the nature of the offense.
On April 21, 2000, almost two years after pleading
guilty, Hardin filed a pro se motion to vacate his conviction
pursuant to Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 11.42.
In
this motion, he alleged that he was in fact innocent of the
charges against him and that his attorney, who formerly
prosecuted the victim, provided ineffective assistance of counsel
due to this conflict of interest.
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Hardin also claimed that his
attorneys improperly advised him regarding probable sentencing
outcomes, were unprepared for trial, and failed to hire an
investigator to assist in trial preparation after Hardin gave
them money to do so.
He further contended that the trial court
improperly failed to grant a continuance after deciding to admit
evidence which the Commonwealth did not disclose to his attorneys
until the day of trial.
The original trial judge had retired by the time the
successor trial court granted a hearing on Hardin’s motion.
After reviewing the videotape of the court proceedings held on
May 26, 1998, the new trial court vacated Hardin’s conviction.
In its opinion, the new trial court stated that the predecessor
judge’s demeanor was so combative toward defense counsel that the
attorneys were unable to provide effective assistance of counsel
to Hardin as contemplated by the Sixth Amendment to the United
States Constitution.
The new trial court further determined that
Hardin’s other allegations of his attorneys’ ineffective
representation were moot and did not analyze them further.
This
appeal followed.
In order to demonstrate ineffective assistance of
counsel, Hardin must satisfy a two-prong test:
first, showing
that his attorneys’ performance was deficient and, then, that
their deficiencies caused actual prejudice affecting the outcome
of the case.
Strickland v Washington, 466 U.S. 688, 104 S.Ct.
2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).
On May 26, 1998, Hardin appeared in
court for a scheduled jury trial.
His attorneys immediately
stated that a plea agreement had been reached between their
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client and the Commonwealth and that the papers had been signed.
However, defense counsel requested that the trial court delay the
guilty plea for ninety days in order to allow them to resolve
charges against Hardin in federal court.
Hardin had already had
the benefit of at least two continued trial dates, and the trial
court’s opinion granting Hardin’s RCr 11.42 motion is accurate
when it states that the predecessor judge “became enraged and
stated that he didn’t care about the federal courts.”
In support
of its decision, the trial court cites the Code of Judicial
Conduct, Canon (3)(B)(4) which states as follows:
A judge shall be patient, dignified and
courteous to litigants, jurors, witnesses,
lawyers and others with whom the judge deals
in an official capacity . . .
After a careful review of the proceedings before the predecessor
judge, we believe that his demeanor, which may have violated
Canon (3)(B)(4), did not, in fact, render Hardin’s attorneys
ineffective.
The videotaped hearing simply does not reveal
attorneys who were cowed by the trial court’s abrupt and
combative behavior, but instead calm and composed professionals
who continued to argue diligently for Hardin in obtaining the
desired postponement of his plea.
Hardin next argues that he was forced to enter a plea
because the original trial court failed to exclude evidence of
prior bad acts which the Commonwealth did not disclose in a
timely fashion as required by KRE 404(c).
Although, he had come
to court on May 26, 1998, with the intention of entering a guilty
plea, Hardin now maintains that he decided to go forward with a
jury trial after the trial court refused to postpone his guilty
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plea for ninety days.
The Commonwealth had informed Hardin’s
attorneys that morning that, if the case proceeded to trial,
it
planned to introduce evidence that Hardin fled from his mother’s
residence when police officers attempted to execute a warrant for
his arrest.
KRE 404, which governs the admissibility of
character evidence, states as follows:
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence
of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a
person in order to show action in
conformity therewith. It may, however,
be admissible:
(1) If offered for some other purpose,
such as proof of motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, or absence of mistake or
accident; or
(2) If so inextricably intertwined with
other evidence essential to the case
that separation of the two (2) could
not be accomplished without serious
adverse effect on the offering party.
(c) Notice requirement. In a criminal
case, if the prosecution intends to
introduce evidence pursuant to
subdivision (b) of this rule as a part of
its case in chief, it shall give
reasonable pretrial notice to the
defendant of its intention to offer such
evidence. Upon failure of the
prosecution to give such notice the court
may exclude the evidence offered under
subdivision (b) or for good cause shown
may excuse the failure to give such
notice and grant the defendant a
continuance or such other remedy as is
necessary to avoid unfair prejudice
caused by such failure.
In its opinion granting Hardin’s motion to vacate his
conviction, the new trial court refers to its predecessor’s
“interpretive debate with [Hardin’s attorneys] as to the real
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meaning of [KRE] 404(b).”
Hardin’s attorneys contended that they
were entitled to a continuance because the original trial court
would not exclude the evidence of Hardin’s flight to avoid
arrest.
However, we believe that the original trial court
correctly interpreted KRE 404(b) as having no bearing on the
evidence of Hardin’s flight.
Simply put, the Commonwealth was
not offering evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts;
therefore, the trial court committed no error in refusing to
grant Hardin yet another continuance.
Moreover, even if Hardin
had been entitled to a continuance on the basis of this new
evidence, the proper remedy would have been to proceed with the
trial or enter a conditional guilty plea and raise the issue on a
direct appeal.
Finally, we turn to Hardin’s complaint that one of his
attorneys had a conflict of interest with the victim.
The
attorney in question stated on the record that he had prosecuted
Taylor for trafficking in a controlled substance and knew that
Taylor had been convicted of a felony and was on probation at the
time of the scheduled trial.
The attorney denied having any
other knowledge regarding Taylor.
It is undisputed that Hardin’s
attorney had previously had only an adversarial relationship with
the victim which in no way created a conflict of interest with
his representation of Hardin.
In summary, Hardin was originally charged with two
violent felonies and was facing a possible sentence of forty
years’ imprisonment if convicted.
After numerous jury trial
dates had been rescheduled, Hardin appeared in court on May 26,
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1998, represented by two attorneys whom he retained, and
expressed a desire to plead guilty.
The Commonwealth’s plea
offer allowed him to plead guilty to only one amended felony
charge and serve a term of ten years’ imprisonment.
We believe
that the evidence does not support the successor trial court’s
decision that Hardin was forced to plead guilty due to the
predecessor judge’s harsh demeanor.
Hardin has failed to
demonstrate how his guilty plea was unknowing, involuntary or
unintelligent.
Consequently, the successor trial court erred in
vacating his conviction.
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Jefferson
Circuit Court vacating Hardin’s conviction is reversed and this
case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Albert B. Chandler, III
Attorney General of Kentucky
Brian Thomas Ruff
Assistant Public Advocates
LaGrange, Kentucky
Todd D. Ferguson
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
Dennis Stutsman
Assistant Public Advocates
Frankfort, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLANT:
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLANT:
Todd D. Ferguson
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
Brian Thomas Ruff
Assistant Public Advocates
LaGrange, Kentucky
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