DONNA TAYLOR (RANSOM) v. TYCO INTERNATIONAL (US) INC.
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RENDERED: JUNE 7, 2002; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2000-CA-002539-MR
DONNA TAYLOR (RANSOM)
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM SIMPSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM R. HARRIS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-CI-00278
v.
TYCO INTERNATIONAL (US) INC.
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, EMBERTON, and TACKETT, Judges.
COMBS, JUDGE:
Donna Taylor appeals from a judgment of the
Simpson Circuit Court entered on August 25, 2000, in accordance
with a jury verdict and directed verdict.
We affirm after having
concluded: (1) that the trial court did not err by refusing to
grant Taylor a new trial; (2) that the trial court did not err by
denying relief from the judgment based upon a post-trial
allegation of perjury; and (3) that the trial court did not err
by granting a directed verdict in favor of Taylor's former
employer.
On September 3, 1998, Taylor filed this action against
Tyco, International (US) Inc. ("Tyco"), her former employer.
Taylor alleged that Tyco had unfairly discriminated against her
on the basis of gender.
She alleged that she had been sexually
assaulted by her direct supervisor, Jeff High, on August 3, 1997.
As a result of her failure subsequently "to express any interest
in engaging in sexual relations with [High]," she claimed that
she was given a more difficult job and that she was eventually
terminated from her position.
Complaint at 3.
In an amended
complaint filed in May 1999, Taylor alleged that Tyco's agents
had stalked and intimidated her in a pattern of behavior
amounting to outrageous conduct.
Tyco denied these allegations.
In mid-August 2000, the matter was tried to a jury.
Following Taylor's case-in-chief, the trial court granted Tyco's
motion for a directed verdict with respect to Taylor's claim of
outrage.
The civil rights claim was submitted to the jury.
A
verdict was returned in Tyco's favor, and a judgment was entered
accordingly.
Taylor filed post-trial motions — including a motion
for new trial and a motion to alter, amend, or vacate the
judgment.
Taylor contended that Tyco's counsel made several
improper statements during closing arguments and had improperly
impeached her witness; that the court had abused its discretion
by admitting the testimony of Diane Herrington, a former coworker; that she had been denied a fair trial since a potential
witness had refused to testify on her behalf; and that certain
records provided to her by the BellSouth custodian of records
were incomplete.
The trial court rejected these arguments and
denied the motion.
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However, the court did grant Taylor's motion requesting
authority to conduct a post-judgment deposition.
On October 6,
2000, the director of BellSouth's Subpoena Compliance Center was
deposed.
Based upon information gathered during this proceeding,
Taylor filed a motion requesting relief from the judgment based
upon the alleged perjury of Jeff High.
The motion was denied.
On appeal, Taylor contends that the trial court erred:
by failing to grant her motion for a new trial; by failing to
grant her relief from the judgment based upon High's perjured
testimony; and by granting Tyco's motion for a directed verdict
with respect to the claim of outrage.
We disagree.
Taylor first addresses the failure of the trial court
to grant her motion for a new trial.
She contends that the trial
court abused its discretion by admitting the testimony of her coworker, Diane Herrington.
At trial, Herrington testified that
she had observed Taylor flirting with High at work both before
and after Taylor’s allegation that High had raped her.
Taylor
argues that this evidence violated a pre-trial ruling which
prohibited evidence of Taylor's sexual behavior.
Alternatively,
Taylor argues that the trial court should have applied an
analysis required by Rule 412 of the Federal Rules of Evidence or
that it misapplied the balancing test required by KRE 403.
At trial, Herrington testified that she worked with
Taylor in 1997 and was able to observe Taylor's interaction with
High.
Tyco's counsel asked Herrington to describe what she
observed in 1997.
Taylor's counsel objected when Herrington
began by stating,"well, she was very flirtatious. . . ."
-3-
Herrington testified that Taylor was “pushy” and that she made
frequent visits to Jeff High's office.
She did not observe a
change in Taylor's attitude toward High at any time during 1997.
This evidence was relevant and was not outweighed by undue
prejudice.
Moreover, the evidence did not offend the pre-trial
ruling excluding "any claim by any witness delving into
[Taylor's] prior sexual behavior or predisposition."
The trial
court correctly reasoned that the mere characterization of
Taylor's conduct as flirtatious was — in and of itself — simply
not sufficient to rise to the level of evidence of sexual
behavior.
The trial court did not err by denying Taylor's motion
for a new trial on this ground.
Additionally, as Tyco points out
in its brief, Taylor’s objection at trial as to this question was
based solely on relevancy.
She cannot now offer a different
basis for attacking this testimony.
Miller v. Watts, Ky., 436
S.W.2d 515 (1969).
Next, Taylor argues that the trial court erred by
failing to grant her a new trial based on defense counsel's
improper impeachment of her witness, Anna Mitchell.
We disagree.
Anna Mitchell testified on direct-examination that she
had heard High make vulgar comments to Taylor.
On cross-
examination, Tyco's counsel asked Mitchell whether she had been
arrested for possession of cocaine.
Taylor's counsel objected
and asked that the jury be properly admonished.
The trial court
sustained the objection and cautioned the jury not to consider
the question.
Since Taylor's counsel did not request a mistrial,
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the question of the prejudicial effect of the improper question
has not been preserved for appellate review.
Corp., Ky. App., 19 S.W.3d 671 (1999).
Lewis v. Charolais
Thus, we are precluded
from considering this allegation of error.
Taylor also contends that the trial court erred by
failing to grant her motion for a new trial based on improper
comments made by Tyco's counsel during closing arguments.
Once
again, no objection was raised, and, therefore, that issue has
not been properly preserved for review.
Next, Taylor argues that she was denied a fair trial
when a potential witness, Judge Wakefield, refused to testify on
her behalf.
We cannot find where or how this issue was preserved
for review on appeal.
While Taylor described telephone
conversations between Judge Wakefield and her counsel, there is
no evidence to suggest that Wakefield was ever properly
subpoenaed to testify in this matter nor did Taylor support her
post-trial motion with any offer of proof.
The trial court did
not err by failing to grant Taylor's motion for a new trial on
this ground.
Taylor also complains that certain telephone records
provided by the BellSouth Subpoena Compliance Center were
incomplete.
She intimates that collusion between Tyco's counsel
and BellSouth agents prevented her counsel from being properly
prepared for trial — thus denying her the opportunity for a fair
trial.
This complaint was waived, however, when counsel failed
to request a continuance, announcing instead that she was ready
to proceed.
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We may not interfere with a decision of the trial court
as to a motion for a new trial absent a showing of an abuse of
discretion.
Williams v. Shepherd, Ky., 452 S.W.2d 406 (1970).
After reviewing the facts and the law with respect to each of
Taylor's arguments, we have found no error in the trial court's
refusal to grant Taylor's motion for a new trial.
Next, Taylor contends that the trial court erred by
failing to grant relief from the judgment based upon her
allegation that the judgment was procured through perjury or
falsified evidence.
We disagree.
Records produced during Taylor's post-judgment
deposition of the BellSouth records custodian indicated that two
telephone calls had been placed from the residence of Jeff High's
parents in Portland, Tennessee, to High's residence on the
morning of August 3, 1997.1
Taylor claimed that this evidence
conclusively demonstrated that High was at his home on this date
— and in the midst of kidnapping and raping her — rather than at
his parents' Tennessee home as he had indicated at trial.
To obtain relief due to perjury or falsified evidence,
an unsuccessful litigant bears the burden of demonstrating a
series of contingencies and
must offer to show and must clearly and
convincingly show (a) that such evidence was
false; (b) that the result was produced
thereby; (c) that the successful party
participated therein; (d) that its
1
BellSouth's representative indicated during her deposition
that the length of a telephone call is always rounded up to the
next minute. The representative indicated that telephone calls
as brief as the two at issue here may have been placed to an
automatic telephone answering machine.
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nonexposure then was not due to negligence of
the unsuccessful party; (e) that ordinary
diligence would not have anticipated it; (f)
that diligence was exercised to expose it
then; (g) that he can expose it now; and (h)
that the means by which it is proposed to
expose it now were not available to him then.
(Emphasis added.)
Benberry v. Cole, Ky., 246 S.W.2d 1020 (1952).
Following a
hearing, the trial court concluded that the newly procured
evidence failed to demonstrate “clearly and convincingly” that
High's trial testimony was false.
Moreover, even if this
evidence had been presented to the jury and High’s testimony had
been successfully impeached, the trial court was not convinced
that a different finding with respect to the employer's liability
would have been likely.
We agree with the trial court's assessment of Taylor's
new evidence.
It does not clearly and convincingly show that
High's trial testimony was perjurious.
While Tyco argues that
the evidence also fails to meet other criteria established by
Benberry, our analysis need go no farther.
The trial court did
not abuse its discretion by denying Taylor the relief she sought.
Finally, Taylor argues that the trial court erred by
directing a verdict in favor of Tyco on her claim of outrage.
Taylor reasons that since the trial court initially denied Tyco's
motion for summary judgment, it could not have later granted the
motion for directed verdict.
This reasoning is fatally flawed
since the standards for granting each of these motions are
distinctive.
Payne v. Chenault, Ky., 343 S.W.2d 129 (1960).
A
motion for summary judgment essentially tests the allegations
against the law itself where there is no dispute as to a material
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CR2 56.03.
fact.
On the other hand, a motion for a directed
verdict tests the sufficiency of the evidence presented. CR
50.01.
The trial court had alerted Taylor during the pretrial
conference that if her proof at trial were no stronger than what
she was forecasting, the court might indeed be persuaded that a
directed verdict would be appropriate.
At trial, Taylor presented evidence that Tyco employed
individuals to track her activities.
She alleged that her
husband had followed a vehicle that had "stalked" her to Tyco's
plant.
She claimed that the stalking had caused her severe
emotional distress.
Under the tort of outrage, liability may be imposed on
"[o]ne who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or
recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another. . . ."
Craft v. Rice, Ky., 671 S.W.2d 247 (1984).
Conduct may be
reprehensible in fact without rising to the level of
outrageousness as a matter of law.
Ky. App., 766 S.W.2d 73 (1989).
Whittington v. Whittington,
To be actionable, the conduct
must be "so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as
to go beyond all possible bounds of decency. . . ."
Cobb, Ky. App., 761 S.W.2d 625 (1988).
Wilhoite v.
It is a formidable legal
standard.
The trial court did not err by concluding that the
allegedly offensive conduct in this case did not amount to
outrageous conduct.
Nor did it err by concluding that the
conduct could not reasonably be linked to Tyco.
2
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
-8-
At best,
Taylor's evidence showed little more than a "plain view"
surveillance of her.
The evidence did not indicate that any
individual ever trespassed upon her property or made physical
contact, approached, or engaged in conversation with her.
She
presented no evidence to suggest that any surveillance of her was
characterized by malice or tortious intent.
As presented, the
facts were insufficient for Taylor to recover on this basis.
We
find no error in the decision of the trial court to enter a
directed verdict in favor of Tyco.
The judgment of the Simpson Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Nancy Oliver Roberts
Bowling Green, Kentucky
Mary E. Sharp
Atlanta, Georgia
George A. Harper
Greenville, South Carolina
D. Gaines Penn
Bowling Green, Kentucky
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