AND BENJAMIN JONES, JR. v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
APRIL 12, 2002; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
NO.
2000-CA-002324-MR
AND
2000-CA-002624-MR
BENJAMIN JONES, JR.
v.
APPELLANT/APPELLEE
APPEAL FROM ROCKCASTLE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DANIEL J. VENTERS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 99-CR-00051
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE/APPELLANT
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, McANULTY, AND TACKETT, JUDGES.
McANULTY, JUDGE: Benjamin Jones (hereinafter appellant) appeals
his conviction in the Rockcastle Circuit Court following a jury
trial.
The facts of the case are as follows:
On Sunday, August
15, 1999, appellant had been riding a four-wheeler for most of
the day with his former father-in-law, Glen.
He returned to the
home he shared with his ex-wife, Nell Jones, and their daughter
Amanda.
Ms. Jones was preparing dinner.
When appellant walked
in the door, Ms. Jones noted that he was angry.
tell that he had been drinking.
She could also
She questioned appellant about
his drinking, and they argued about it.
Ms. Jones asked
appellant where her father, Glen, was.
he was at someone else's house.
Appellant answered that
Ms. Jones responded that her
sister had called and said that her father wanted to come home,
and that appellant needed to go get him.
of food.
Appellant threw a plate
Ms. Jones said that she would leave until appellant
sobered up, and appellant responded that she would not have to,
he would leave.
Appellant went to the bedroom, and Ms. Jones called her
sister.
Appellant emerged from the bedroom with a rifle and
asserted that he was going to kill himself.
in his mouth.
He placed the rifle
Amanda ran screaming to the bathroom.
Ms. Jones
got off the phone and went to get Amanda from the bathroom.
Appellant messed up the living room, then grabbed Ms. Jones by
the hair and dragged her outside.
wheeler.
He forced her onto the four-
Amanda came running out the door and got onto the four-
wheeler with them on her own.
Appellant drove off, still
carrying the rifle, with Ms. Jones and Amanda on the fourwheeler.
By this time, it had grown dark and the only light
available to them was the light on the four-wheeler.
Appellant
drove a mile or two to Cut Gap, an isolated area in the woods
where only four-wheel drive vehicles were used.
On the way to
Cut Gap, appellant asked Ms. Jones how she wanted to die.
Once
they were in the woods, appellant dragged Ms. Jones off the fourwheeler by her hair and face, and told her that she was going to
have to die.
rifle.
Appellant beat her with his hand and with the
Amanda jumped in front of him and begged him not to shoot
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her mother.
Appellant knocked Ms. Jones down, and proceeded to
hit Amanda on her backside and tell her that Ms. Jones had to
die.
Appellant then seated Amanda on the four-wheeler.
While in
the woods, appellant would ask Ms. Jones who he was, and when she
would say his name, he would say no, that he was Glen, and for
her to address him as that.
After some time passed, the light from the four-wheeler
went out.
Ms. Jones and Amanda tried backing away from appellant
into the woods.
Appellant demanded that they return, and began
shooting the rifle.
Ms. Jones stated that he was shooting
“everywhere,” while Amanda believed that appellant only fired
into the air.
Ms. Jones yelled to appellant that if he stopped
firing, they would return to him.
They walked back, and
appellant grabbed and beat Ms. Jones again.
At various times during this ordeal, appellant would
tell them that he was taking them home and tell them to get on
the four-wheeler.
Yet after they drove a few feet, he would
stop, drag Ms. Jones off, and resume beating her.
Eventually by
doing this, however, appellant edged them out of the woods.
they were back on the road, they saw headlights.
When
Ms. Jones
realized it was her sister's husband who was looking for them,
and she screamed to him for help.
off the four-wheeler.
Appellant told them to jump
They did, and ran to the truck.
drove off, threatening to kill himself.
Appellant
By then, it was after
midnight; they had been in the woods for several hours.
On May 17 and 18, 2000, appellant was tried by a jury,
which found him guilty of one count of assault in the second
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degree, two counts of unlawful imprisonment in the first degree
and two counts of menacing.
On appeal, appellant first argues that the trial court
erred in failing to instruct the jury on the lesser included
offense of assault under extreme emotional disturbance.
“Extreme
emotional disturbance” has been defined in this Commonwealth as
follows:
Extreme emotional disturbance is a temporary
state of mind so enraged, inflamed, or
disturbed as to overcome one's judgment, and
to cause one to act uncontrollably from the
impelling force of the extreme emotional
disturbance rather than from evil or
malicious purposes. It is not a mental
disease in itself, and an enraged, inflamed,
or disturbed emotional state does not
constitute an extreme emotional disturbance
unless there is a reasonable explanation or
excuse therefor, the reasonableness of which
is to be determined from the viewpoint of a
person in the defendant's situation under
circumstances as defendant believed them to
be. McClellan v. Commonwealth, Ky., 715
S.W.2d 464, 468-9 (1986).
The evidence must establish an event triggering the explosion of
violence on the part of the defendant which is sudden and
uninterrupted.
Foster v. Commonwealth, Ky., 827 S.W.2d 670, 678
(1992), cert. den. 113 S. Ct. 337, 121 L. Ed. 2d 254 (1992).
Evidence of extreme emotional disturbance must be definite and
nonspeculative.
(1981).
Henley v. Commonwealth, Ky., 621 S.W.2d 906, 909
The burden of proving the mitigating factor of extreme
emotional disturbance is on the defendant.
Engler v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 627 S.W.2d 582 (1982).
We do not find that the evidence in this case
established that appellant was acting under extreme emotional
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disturbance.
Appellant did not testify at trial.
The only
evidence as to appellant's mental state from the beginning was
the testimony of Ms. Jones and Amanda.
Ms. Jones testified that
appellant was angry as soon as he entered the house.
Amanda
testified that her parents began arguing after Ms. Jones asked
where her father was.
We agree with the trial court that there
was no triggering event to establish extreme emotional
disturbance.
The defense provided no evidence to show why an
apparently ordinary domestic disagreement brought on such
violence and abuse.
Furthermore, there was nothing which
provided a “reasonable explanation or excuse” for appellant's
violent actions.
Appellant asserts that it was Ms. Jones' demand that
appellant go get her father, whom appellant describes on appeal
as his “nemesis,” that triggered appellant's actions.
Appellant
argues that it was the prospect of having to see his ex-fatherin-law again that brought on his behavior.
First, we find these assertions to be more speculative
than definite as required to establish extreme emotional
disturbance.
Further, we note that extreme emotional disturbance
is not proved by mere hurt or anger.
Ky., 968 S.W.2d 76 (1998).
Talbott v. Commonwealth,
Additionally, the evidence of
appellant's relationship with Glen did not show sudden
provocation.
Rather, the witnesses described appellant's
relationship with Glen as an ongoing source of aggravation.
Amanda said that her grandfather would pick on appellant and hit
him on the head, which would get on appellant's nerves.
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Ms.
Jones testified that in the days and weeks before the incident,
appellant had become frustrated with her father, as well as other
people.
Her brother-in-law agreed “somewhat” that around this
time appellant and Ms. Jones' father had had their problems.
Moreover, there was no indication that appellant feared Glen.
Ms. Jones testified that her father was of slight build, weighed
about eighty pounds, had suffered a debilitating brain infection,
and was crippled by one leg being shorter than the other.
It is insufficient for the defendant to claim extreme
emotional disturbance based on duress or a gradual victimization
from his environment, unless the additional proof of a triggering
event is sufficiently shown.
Id.
Since there was no showing of
a triggering event for appellant's explosion of violence, we
agree with the trial court that appellant failed to establish
that he was acting pursuant to extreme emotional disturbance.
The trial court correctly denied an instruction to appellant on
the lesser offense.
Second, appellant argues that the trial court erred in
instructing the jury on the offense of unlawful imprisonment in
the first degree of Amanda, because the statute is
unconstitutionally overbroad as applied to the parent-child
relationship.
Appellant contends that his constitutional right
to parent and control his child, citing Troxel v. Granville, 530
U.S. 57, 120 S. Ct. 2054, 147 L. Ed. 2d 49 (2000), prevents the
state from criminalizing a parent's restraint on that child.
A statute is overbroad when it prohibits conduct that is
impermissible as well as conduct that is constitutionally
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protected and therefore permissible.
Commonwealth v. Foley, Ky.,
798 S.W.2d 947 (1990).
It is necessary to examine the offense as a whole to
determine whether the conduct which is prohibited is
constitutionally protected.
In doing so, we indulge a
presumption that the statutory scheme is constitutional.
v. Commonwealth, Ky., 485 S.W.2d 897, 904 (1972).
Sasaki
Courts must
construe statutes in a manner that saves their constitutionality
whenever possible, consistent with reason and common sense.
Commonwealth v. Kash, Ky. App., 967 S.W.2d 37, 44 (1997).
A person is guilty of unlawful imprisonment in the
first degree when he knowingly and unlawfully restrains another
person under circumstances which expose that person to a risk of
serious physical injury.
KRS 509.020(1).
Restrain is defined in
KRS 509.010(2) as follows:
"Restrain" means to restrict another person's
movements in such a manner as to cause a
substantial interference with his liberty by
moving him from one place to another or by
confining him either in the place where the
restriction commences or in a place to which
he has been moved without consent. A person
is moved or confined "without consent" when
the movement or confinement is accomplished
by physical force, intimidation, or
deception, or by any means, including
acquiescence of a victim, if he is under the
age of sixteen (16) years, or is
substantially incapable of appraising or
controlling his own behavior.
A parent's restraint of a child, in and of itself, is not a
criminal act.
The statutes prohibit unlawful restraint which
places a child at risk.
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While the Constitution recognizes the right of parents
to rear their children without undue governmental influence,
Kentucky courts have instructed that the right is not inviolate.
King v. King, Ky., 828 S.W.2d 630, 631 (1992).
Parents have a
duty to insure the safety, education, and physical and emotional
welfare of their children.
Id.
Chapter 620 of the Kentucky
Revised Statutes, dealing with dependency, neglect, and abuse,
states in part that children have “fundamental rights” which must
be protected and preserved, including “the right to be free from
physical, sexual or emotional injury[.]”
KRS 620.010.
This
statement of a child's rights creates an affirmative duty in
parents and guardians to prevent physical injury.
Commonwealth, Ky., 956 S.W.2d 874, 875 (1997).
Lane v.
The use of
physical force upon a child is justifiable only when the
defendant is a parent or guardian or other person entrusted with
the care and supervision of a child and believes that the force
used is necessary to promote the welfare of the child.
KRS
503.110.
Therefore, we conclude that although a parent has a
right of control over a child, a parent's restraint of a child
may be unlawful in some circumstances.
Certainly, a parent may
not abuse their privilege of control over a child to subject that
child to felonious acts.
If the elements of the offense are met,
then the crime of unlawful imprisonment may rightly be brought
against a parent.
Appellant contends on appeal that the statute is
overbroad because it would make it a crime any time a parent
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exercised control over a child in a situation where the child
might be injured.
Appellant cites as examples of situations
which could be criminalized: a mother taking a child on a roller
coaster and the child suffering a broken nose, or a father taking
a child rock-climbing and the child becoming seriously injured in
a fall.
The trial court addressed these concerns in its order.
The court found that the statute did not criminalize such conduct
as a parent teaching a child to ski or requiring a child to mow a
lawn.
The trial court correctly viewed the offense within the
entire statutory scheme of the criminal code.
We agree with the
trial court that when the unlawful imprisonment statute is read
in context with KRS 503.110 and Chapter 620, it is not overbroad
in that it does not criminalize legitimate parental activity.
Taking a child to an amusement park or hiking seeks to promote
the welfare and enjoyment of the child, yet exposes a child to a
minimal risk of injury.
The trial court correctly found that the
statute was not unconstitutionally overbroad as applied to the
parent-child relationship.
The incidents in this case could not be considered to
be in the interests of Amanda's welfare, and appellant's actions
exposed her to a risk of serious physical injury as found by the
jury in this case.
In this case, appellant exceeded his lawful
authority to control his child, and so his restraint of her was
unlawful.
The charge against appellant was proper.
Therefore, we affirm the judgment of conviction of the
Rockcastle Circuit Court.
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*
*
*
*
*
NO. 2000-CA-002624-MR
The Commonwealth appeals from the trial court's grant
of an appeal bond in this case.
The Commonwealth complains that
the trial court erred in not allowing the Commonwealth an
opportunity to respond.
The court stated at the sentencing
hearing that once appellant tendered a motion for release on
appeal bond, the court would not set it for a hearing but would
give the Commonwealth an opportunity to make a response to it.
However, appellant tendered the motion for appeal bond on a
Friday and the motion was granted on a Monday without the
Commonwealth having responded to the motion.
The day after it
was granted, the Commonwealth filed a motion to reconsider the
order which the court denied.
The Commonwealth further argues that the court erred in
not holding a hearing to determine the appropriateness of
granting bond in this case.
The Commonwealth cites Commonwealth
v. Peacock, Ky., 701 S.W.2d 397 (1985) as establishing the
Commonwealth's right to a hearing.
Peacock states, “In all cases
involving bail pending appeal, the court shall conduct an
appropriate adversary hearing to determine the propriety of such
a request.”
Id. at 398.
We find that the Commonwealth did not specifically
request a hearing.
Therefore, we do not find that the
Commonwealth's argument regarding its right to a hearing was
preserved.
Additionally, we do not find a denial of due process
since the Commonwealth was permitted to argue before the trial
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court its request and reasons for denial of the appeal bond,
albeit not in the form of a written motion.
Accordingly, we
conclude that the court acted within its discretion in granting
the appeal bond in this case.
Peacock, 701 S.W.2d at 398.
BUCKINGHAM, JUDGE, CONCURS.
TACKETT, JUDGE, CONCURS AS TO NO. 2000-CA-002324-MR;
AND DISSENTS AS TO NO. 2000-CA-002624-MR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT/APPELLEE:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE/APPELLANT:
Joanne Lynch
Louisville, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General of Kentucky
Louis F. Mathias, Jr.
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
Christopher M. Brown
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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