ROY GENE HENSLEY v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: September 13, 2002; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NOS.
2000-CA-001255-MR & 2001-CA-000665-MR
ROY GENE HENSLEY
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM LAUREL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE LEWIS B. HOPPER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 2000-CR-00019
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
KNOPF, MILLER, AND TACKETT, JUDGES.
KNOPF, JUDGE:
Roy Gene Hensley appeals from a judgment of the
Laurel Circuit Court, entered May 12, 2000, convicting him of
trafficking in marijuana1 and sentencing him as a second-degree
persistent felony offender2 to a maximum term of ten years in
prison.
Hensley maintains that the Commonwealth’s evidence at
trial showed no more than that he was present in a car where
1
KRS 218A.1421(2).
2
KRS 532.080.
marijuana was found and that his “mere presence” in the car was
insufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict.
Hensley
also appeals from a separate order of the same court, entered
February 28, 2001, denying his motion for a new trial.
A new
trial is warranted, he contends, because the owner of the car,
Hensley’s sister, has come forward with an affidavit in which she
swears that Hensley is innocent.
We affirm.
The arresting officer, a narcotics detective with the
London, Kentucky, police force, testified that at about 1:00 A.M.
on November 8, 1999, he stopped a west-bound car on the Daniel
Boone Parkway in Laurel County because it was being driven
erratically.
He suspected the driver of being under the
influence, and his suspicion became stronger when he approached
the car and smelled a powerful odor of marijuana.
The driver and
owner of the car was Glenna Brewer, Hensley’s sister.
Her
boyfriend was in the front passenger seat; Hensley was in the
back seat behind Brewer.
Having obtained Brewer’s consent, the officer conducted
a canine search of the car.
The dog alerted near the fender
above the left rear wheel and again in the back seat.
In the
trunk, concealed above the left rear wheel-well, an assisting
officer found five baggies containing what proved to be about
thirteen ounces of marijuana.
In the back seat, the dog
uncovered another baggie containing marijuana, and the detective
found a seventh, smaller baggie of marijuana in the pocket of a
jacket upon which, the detective testified, Hensley had been
sitting.
The detective charged the three occupants of the
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vehicle with trafficking in marijuana, arrested them, and
transported them to the police post in London.
There, during
processing and after he had been warned as required by Miranda v.
Arizona,3 Hensley stated, according to the testimony of two
officers, that no one would give him a job and he therefore “had
to do something to supplement my income.”
At trial Hensley denied any knowledge of the marijuana,
denied that the jacket was his and that he had been sitting on
it, and denied that he had made the statement about supplementing
his income.
The jury nevertheless found him guilty.
He
contends that constructive possession of the marijuana should
have been attributed to the car’s owner and driver, not to him, a
mere passenger, and that accordingly he was entitled to a
directed verdict of acquittal.
We disagree.
Hensley correctly notes that constructive possession of
contraband contained in a vehicle may be attributed to anyone
with dominion and control over the vehicle.4
It may also be
attributed, however, to anyone within the vehicle in a position
to exercise control over the contraband itself.5
It was not
unreasonable in this case for the jury to attribute possession of
the marijuana found in the back seat to Hensley and for it to
believe that he possessed it with the intent to sell.
He
admitted as much to the officers at the police station; at least
3
384 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966).
4
Leavell v. Commonwealth, Ky., 737 S.W.2d 695 (1987); Paul v. Commonwealth, Ky.
App., 765 S.W.2d 24 (1988).
5
Burnett v. Commonwealth, Ky., 31 S.W.3d 878 (2000).
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the jury was entitled to so find.
The trial court, accordingly,
did not err by denying Hensley’s motions for a directed verdict.6
Nor did the court abuse its discretion by denying
Hensley’s motion for a new trial.
At the time of trial, in April
2000, Hensley’s sister, Brewer, was a fugitive from justice and
so was not available to testify.
She subsequently pled guilty to
marijuana trafficking and was sentenced to five years’ probation
in lieu of two years’ imprisonment.
Following her sentencing,
Brewer provided Hensley with an affidavit in which she swore that
all of the marijuana in her car the night of the arrest had been
hers and that Hensley had had no knowledge of it.
On the basis
of this affidavit, which Hensley characterizes as newly
discovered evidence, he contends that the trial court should have
granted him a new trial.
Again, we disagree.
RCr 10.02 authorizes a trial court to grant a new trial
“if required in the interest of justice.”
To determine whether
newly discovered evidence requires a new trial, courts must
consider the following factors:
(a) Is the evidence in fact
newly discovered, that is, discovered since trial?7 (b) Have the
movant and his attorney sworn to facts from which the court may
infer a diligent effort on their parts to discover the evidence
before the first trial.8 (c) Is the new evidence more than merely
6
Commonwealth v. Benham, Ky., 816 S.W.2d 186 (1991).
7
Anderson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 63 S.W.3d 135 (2001).
8
Collins v. Commonwealth, Ky., 951 S.W.2d 569 (1997); Wheeler v. Commonwealth,
Ky., 395 S.W.2d 569 (1965).
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cumulative or impeaching?9 (d) Is the new evidence of such
decisive value or force that it would, with reasonable certainty,
change the result if a new trial were granted?10
A negative
answer to any of these questions defeats the new-trial motion.
Here, although Brewer’s testimony may not have been
available to Hensley at the time of his trial, it is not clear
that her testimony was undiscovered.
After-the-fact testimony by
a previously unavailable codefendant is frequently characterized
as not newly discovered.11
Furthermore, although an assurance of
diligence is required, neither Hensley nor his counsel submitted
affidavits attesting to their diligence in obtaining Brewer’s
testimony.
And it is far from reasonably certain that Brewer’s
testimony at a new trial would change the result.
As the trial
court noted, Brewer is an obviously biased witness who now has
nothing to lose by assuming responsibility for the crime.
is apt to give her testimony little credence.
A jury
The trial court
did not abuse its discretion, therefore, when it denied Hensley’s
motion for a new trial.
In sum, there was sufficient evidence to submit the
question of Hensley’s alleged marijuana trafficking to the jury,
and there was too little showing of newly discovered evidence to
9
Foley v. Commonwealth, Ky., 55 S.W.3d 809 (2000).
10
Anderson v. Commonwealth, supra; Dolan v. Commonwealth, Ky., 468 S.W.2d 277
(1971).
11
Carwile v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 694 S.W.2d 469 (1985). Cf. United States v.
Jasin, 280 F.3d 355 (3rd Cir. 2002) (That codefendant evidence was unavailable does not suffice
to show that it was undiscovered); United States v. Montilla-Rivera, 115 F. 3d 1060 (1st Cir.
1997) (That codefendant evidence was unavailable will rarely suffice to establish that it was
undiscovered).
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justify a new trial.
Accordingly, we affirm the May 12, 2000,
judgment and the February 28, 2001, order of the Laurel Circuit
Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEFS FOR APPELLEE:
Irvin J. Halbleib
Appellate Public Advocate
Louisville, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General
Tami Allen Stetler
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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