BRANDON MARKSBERRY, BY AND THROUGH HIS NATURAL MOTHER AND NEXT FRIEND; MECHELLE MARKSBERRY; AND MECHELLE MARKSBERRY, INDIVIDUALLY v. THE ROPER CORP., A SUBSIDIARY OF GENERAL ELECTRIC CO., INC.; GENERAL ELECTRIC CO., INC.; AND SEARS, ROEBUCK & CO.
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: MAY 3, 2002; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2000-CA-000990-MR
BRANDON MARKSBERRY, BY AND THROUGH
HIS NATURAL MOTHER AND NEXT FRIEND;
MECHELLE MARKSBERRY; AND
MECHELLE MARKSBERRY, INDIVIDUALLY
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM BOONE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DOUGLAS M. STEPHENS, SPECIAL JUDGE
ACTION NOS. 89-CI-00860 & 90-CI-00332
THE ROPER CORP., A SUBSIDIARY
OF GENERAL ELECTRIC CO., INC.;
GENERAL ELECTRIC CO., INC.;
AND SEARS, ROEBUCK & CO.
APPELLEES
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER, GUIDUGLI, AND TACKETT, JUDGES.
BARBER, JUDGE: This appeal is from a summary judgment in favor of
the defendants in a proceeding to enforce a settlement agreement.
The trial court concluded that there was no agreement between the
parties.
For the reasons set forth below, we reverse and remand.
The underlying case was a products liability suit
(riding lawnmower accident) brought by the Appellants, Brandon
Marksberry, by and through his natural mother and next friend,
Mechelle Marksberry, and Mechelle Marksberry, individually (“the
Marksberrys”), against the Appellees, The Roper Corp., a
subsidiary of General Electric Co., Inc., General Electric Co.,
Inc., and Sears, Robebuck & Co. (“the Appellees”).
proceeded to a jury trial in 1998.
The matter
The Marksberrys’ claim that,
at the close of proof, the Appellees offered to settle the case
for $500,000.00, that the offer was accepted prior to the jury’s
verdict being published, and that an enforceable settlement
agreement exists between the parties.
At trial, the Marksberrys
were represented by attorneys Richard Lawrence and Marcus Carey.
Appellees were represented by attorneys Harry D. Rankin and Mark
Hayden.
The trial order, verdict, and judgment entered September
23, 1998, reflects the following:
The jury began their [sic] deliberations in
the case at approximately 1:30 p.m., and then
at approximately 4:15 p.m. announced that
they had reached a verdict. The court
reconvened and before the verdict of the jury
was published, the following discussion
between the respective counsel for the
plaintiff and defendants, and the court
occurred:
MR. CAREY:
Prior to the announcement of
the jury verdict, the
Defendants have made an offer
to the Plaintiffs, which
remained open, it had not been
withdrawn. The Plaintiffs
accepted the Defendants’
offer, and we want the record
to reflect that the Defendants
have now indicated that the
offer is no longer any good.
It had never been withdrawn, I
think they will acknowledge
that.
MR. HAYDEN:
What happened, Your Honor, is
that a five hundred thousand
dollar offer was made. They
came back to us after the
question came out from the
-2-
jury, and asked us whether or
not we would hold that offer
open for another ten minutes.
We were on the phone with our
people asking them that
question, we hadn’t got an
answer back, and then the
word came down that we had a
verdict. My suggestions is,
we take the verdict and then
we discuss it some more,
maybe brief the issue. I
think that is all we can do.
JUDGE BAMBERGER:
I’m going to take the
verdict.
MR. CAREY:
I understand, Judge, but for
the record, I wanted to make
sure the Defendants were
prepared to admit that they
had not yet withdrawn their
offer at the time it was
accepted.
MR. HAYDEN:
Right, I just explained the
circumstances. We made an
offer, we made it about an
hour ago.
JUDGE BAMBERGER:
That’s not an admission.
That’s not an admission
of anything.
MR. HAYDEN:
I’ve explained the
circumstances.
MR. CAREY:
I’m just trying to make
whatever record we can.
JUDGE BAMBERGER:
Oh, yeah, and I’m not
taking issue with that.
MR. CAREY:
I understand.
JUDGE BAMBERGER:
I don’t want to put
words in their mouths.
MR. CAREY:
Okay.
Right. I think we understand
that they’re taking the
position that it is not
accepted.
-3-
MR. HAYDEN:
We’re not taking any position
on this issue right now, Your
Honor, I’m just explaining to
you the situation.
MR. CAREY:
Okay.
MR. HAYDEN:
We think you ought to take
the verdict and then we’ll
discuss it later.
The court then reviewed and published the jury’s verdict,
which was in favor of the Appellees.
The trial court’s order
entered April 1, 1999, outlines subsequent procedural events
which are relevant to the issue on appeal.
This matter proceeded to trial by jury on
August 17, 1999 and concluded August 28, 1999
when the jury announced that they had reached
a verdict.
Prior to accepting the verdict, the exchange
[as outlined above] took place between the
attorneys and the court that is detailed in
the Trial Order and Judgment.
Subsequent to the Trial Order and Judgment
being entered, Plaintiffs moved the court to
resolve the issue as to whether a settlement
between the parties had occurred prior to
accepting the jury verdict. The Defendants
argue that the court has no authority to make
such a determination.
This court was of the opinion that whatever
it could do just prior to receiving the
verdict it could do later. This court was
also of the opinion that the attorneys were
in agreement that the matter would be
addressed at a later date. In fact, Mr.
Hayden’s last statement was “(W)e think that
you ought to take the verdict and then we’ll
discuss it further.” Even absent such an
agreement this court finds that it does have
the authority to determine whether there had
been a settlement between the parties prior
to the verdict being accepted [Citations
omitted.]
. . . .
-4-
THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the
court will conduct a hearing, and pursuant to
CR 39.03, use an advisory jury, should the
court determine that an advisory jury is
appropriate, to determine whether or not in
fact a settlement had been reached between
the parties before the jury verdict was
accepted. (Emphasis original.)
By order entered June 9, 1999, a special judge was
designated to preside in the matter.
By order entered December
22, 1999, it was stipulated and agreed by the parties, and
ordered, inter alia, that the dispute respecting an alleged
agreed settlement shall proceed to be adjudicated on the merits;
further, that the Marksberrys may proceed to prosecute the claims
set out in their amended complaint and pursuant to the court’s
prior orders.
In their amended complaint, the Marksberrys sought
to enforce the settlement agreement, and alleged breach of
contract, as well as common law bad faith for the Appellees’
failure to comply with the terms of the contract without
reasonable basis in law or fact, and violation of the Consumer
Protection Act.
The Appellees filed a motion for summary judgment,
arguing that there was no settlement agreement, as a matter of
law.
The trial court agreed and entered judgment in their favor,
dismissing the amended complaint with prejudice.
On appeal, the
Marksberrys contend that the judgment must be reversed because
the evidence establishes the existence of a binding contract, or
at least, creates a genuine issue of material fact for the jury.
The Appellees contend that the trial court did not err, because
-5-
the Marksberrys had rejected the offer and the undisputed
evidence showed there was no meeting of the minds.
We review summary judgment de novo.
The standard of
review on appeal is whether the trial court correctly found that
there were no genuine issues as to any material fact and that the
moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 56.03.
There is no
requirement that we defer to the trial court since factual
findings are not at issue.
Goldsmith v. Allied Building
Components, Inc., Ky., 833 S.W.2d 378, 381 (1992).
“The record
must be viewed in a light most favorable to the party opposing
the motion for summary judgment and all doubts are to be resolved
in his favor.”
Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center,
Inc., Ky., 807 S.W.2d 476, 480 (1991).
Summary judgment is only
proper where the moving party shows that the adverse party could
not prevail under any circumstances.
Id.
The Marksberrys contend that the trial court
essentially resolved the disputed facts in favor of the Appellees
and decided inferences from undisputed facts in favor of the
Appellees.
We agree.
The trial court’s reasons for granting the
motion for summary judgment were incorporated by reference into
the order.
The videotaped transcript reflects, in pertinent
part, that:
There’s two ways to look at this case. Let
me start by saying, when we had the first
conference on this case, I suggested to you
that I was antagonistic towards these kinds
of negotiations, when the jury is walking out
of the jury room, but I promised you that,
not withstanding, my feelings about
abrogating what we entrust [to] the juries, I
-6-
would look at this with an open mind, and I
have endeavored to do that . . . . We can
look at this case in two ways. We can
flyspeck this. We can miniaturize each
little interaction, each little discussion,
each little conversation, each little aspect
of this case, or we can look at the whole
picture . . . .
. . . .
The best that could be said in the
plaintiffs’ view, the best that could be said
in support of the plaintiffs relative to the
defendants’ position in that regarding
contract or not contract was that they were
equivocal. I mean that was the best that you
could say about Hayden’s response to Marc
Carey’s solicitation. That he was equivocal,
and we don’t base contractual relations upon
equivocal positions. Is this a soured
relationship created by the defendants, no.
It’s a soured relationship created by the
jury’s verdict, which everybody recognized
was going to be zero. It’s a soured
relationship created by the plaintiffs who
saw this case which was worth a million or a
million and half two, three, or four minutes
ago, and is now worth nothing. I am not at
all convinced looking at the big picture that
this is a contractual relationship as we know
it and understand it under the law of the
Commonwealth. If we flyspeck this a little
more closely, when Mr. Hayden offered
$500,000 and Mr. Lawrence said, well how
about a million or a million and a half
structured, and he talks to his client and
his client says, no, that’s a refusal. That
has to be a refusal. That’s a denial. It’s
an equivocal denial by Mr. Lawrence, but an
unequivocal denial by the client . . . . The
client, I think we all acknowledge, that the
client under the laws of the Commonwealth
determines whether there is a contract or
not.
. . . .
So I’m not too sure there was even an offer,
a contractual foundation at the very
beginning stages of this and I suspect,
although obviously I can’t say with any
certainty, but I suspect that’s what in Mr.
Hayden’s mind when he is telling the Judge,
-7-
Judge these things are happening, this
happens, all of this has occurred in five
minutes, let’s take the verdict. Let’s sort
out of the mess later on. Here we are doing
that. So, I just don’t see this as a
contract. It’s evident in the activities of
Mr. Carey that he wasn’t even sure there was
a contract. It was obvious in Mr. Lawrence’s
dealings with this that he wasn’t sure that
it was a contract, or it was a contract that
could be entered into or resurrected because
everybody is saying, hey, is it still there,
is it still there. That certainly doesn’t
demonstrate any sense of expectation or
reliance upon a fixed position. Here’s the
$500,000 and it’s there forever. I just
don’t see it as a contract. Again, to step
back and look at the big picture, I’m not
sure it’s appropriate that we impose upon
parties contractual relations under these
kinds of circumstances. I think it’s bad
public policy.
. . . .
I think a summary judgment is appropriate.
You can argue well where’s the harm in
letting an advisory jury set the facts, but
I’m not too sure that this picture is one
that needs the jury’s view. I think that for
all of these reasons, I’ve said that summary
judgment should be granted for the defendants
dismissing the complaint . . . .
“State of mind issues such as intent and expectation
are generally inappropriate for determination at the summary
judgment stage because their resolution depends on weighing all
the evidence and drawing permissible but not required
inferences.”
James Graham Brown Foundation, Inc. v. St. Paul
Fire & Marine, Ky., 814 S.W.2d 273, 281 (1991).
Even where the
basic facts are not in dispute, summary judgment is inappropriate
where the parties in good faith disagree upon the inferences to
be drawn from such facts.
10 (D.C. Ky. 1968).
Pessin v. Keeneland Assn., 45 F.K.D.
“If a dispute exists as to whether an oral
-8-
agreement was reached, the issue is to be resolved by a jury.
[Citation omitted.]” Motorists Mutual Ins. Co. v. Glass, Ky., 996
S.W.2d 437, 445 (1999).
CR 56 does not authorize the
adjudication of factual issues; it only authorizes the court “by
a pretrial sifting to penetrate the allegations of fact” and
discover whether there is an issue of fact to be tried.
Rowland
v. Miller’s Adm’r., Ky., 307 S.W.2d 3,5 (1956).
We conclude from our review of the record that there
were genuine issues of fact to be tried.
Mark Modlin’s testimony
established that after Mr. Lawrence asked about more money by way
of a structured settlement, Mark Hayden made a call.
Mr. Hayden
then said “$500,000 is all we have, we are not going to be able
to get anymore, that’s it.”
Mr. Lawrence’s testimony established
that he did not reject the $500,000, by asking if Appellees could
pay more; further, that the $500,000 was “re-offered.”
Appellees’ characterization of Mechelle Marksberry’s
having unequivocally rejected the $500,000, as too low,
demonstrates a disturbing lack of candor to this court.
We fully
agree with the Marksberrys that Mechelle’s private and privileged
communications with her counsel are irrelevant, because they were
not relayed to defense counsel.1
Mr. Carey testified he told Mr. Hayden, “we accept the
offer.”
Mr. Hayden responded he did not know whether they had a
settlement or not.
offer.
Mr. Carey said “wait a minute you made us an
It was never withdrawn, was it?
1
He said no.
I said then
The trial court acknowledged that Mechelle Marksberry’s
“refusal” was never communicated to Mr. Hayden, but considered it
nonetheless.
-9-
we accept.”
Mr. Hayden said he didn’t know, that they would have
to talk about it.
Clearly, there was a dispute as to whether an
oral agreement was reached.
The trial court appears to have improperly evaluated
the evidence and determined that there was no contract.
Sufficient issues of material fact — and inferences to be drawn
from the facts — exist that it was error to grant the motion for
summary judgment.
Appellees contend that the Marksberrys did not address
their ex delicto claims and their claim arising under the
Kentucky Consumer Protection Act on appeal; thus, Appellees argue
that entry of summary judgment on those claims cannot be
reversed.
The Marksberrys did address their claim for punitive
damages arising out of an alleged breach of contract accompanied
by wrongful conduct; they appear to have abandoned only their
claim under the Consumer Protection Act.
The trial court did not “see” any deceit or duplicity
or any tortious conduct on Mr. Hayden’s part.
The trial court
again appears to have evaluated the evidence, instead of
determining if there were any genuine issues of material fact.
The trial court also appears to have considered Mr. Hayden’s
state of mind, an issue inappropriate for summary judgment where
inferences must be drawn.
Thus, we reverse the order and judgment of the Boone
Circuit Court and remand this case for further proceedings
consistent with this Opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
-10-
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, THE ROPER
CORPORATION:
Mark G. Arnzen
Beverly R. Storm
Covington, Kentucky
Gerald F. Dusing
Mary Ann Stewart
Adams, Stepner, Woltermann &
Dusing, PLLC
Covington, Kentucky
-11-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.