WILLIAM BENNY MENEAR v. BRENDA SUE MENEAR
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RENDERED: July 19, 2002; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2000-CA-000282-MR
WILLIAM BENNY MENEAR
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM HARDIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE T. STEVEN BLAND, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-CI-00136
v.
BRENDA SUE MENEAR
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUIDUGLI, HUDDLESTON AND JOHNSON, JUDGES.
JOHNSON, JUDGE:
William Benny Menear has appealed from an order
entered by the Hardin Circuit Court on January 10, 2000, which
ordered that he pay his former wife, Brenda Sue Menear,
maintenance in the sum of $300.00 per month and “that said award
shall be permanent.”
Having concluded that the circuit court’s
factual findings were supported by substantial evidence and that
it did not abuse its discretion in setting the amount and the
duration of the maintenance, we affirm.
Benny and Brenda were married on April 29, 1977.
When
Brenda filed her petition for decree of legal separation on
January 28, 1998, she was 38 years of age and Benny was 43.
The
parties’ marriage produced two children, but when they separated
only one minor child remained in the household.
That child
became emancipated for child support purposes in June 1999.1
On June 25, 1998, after considering a motion filed by
Benny seeking a dissolution of the marriage which alleged that
the marriage was irretrievably broken, and after finding that
Brenda had not requested a reconciliation conference, the
Domestic Relations Commissioner (DRC) filed a report recommending
that the circuit court enter a decree of dissolution of marriage
rather than a decree of legal separation.
On July 9, 1998, the
circuit court entered a final decree dissolving the parties’
marriage and ordered them to submit proof on all remaining
issues.
After hearing the parties’ proof, the DRC filed a
report on October 23, 1998.
Neither party filed objections.
The
circuit court entered an order on November 4, 1998, adopting the
DRC’s recommended findings of fact and conclusions of law.
The
circuit court ordered a division of the parties’ marital assets
1
The child turned 18 years of age on September 20, 1998, but
pursuant to Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 403.213(3) child
support continued until her graduation from high school in June
1999.
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and debts and ordered Benny to pay Brenda maintenance of $500.00
per month until the marital residence was sold.2
On August 26, 1999, the marital residence was sold and
each party received the sum of $6,396.42, representing one-half
of the net sales proceeds.
On November 17, 1999, the DRC filed
recommended findings of fact and conclusions of law recommending
that Benny pay Brenda maintenance of $300.00 per month for a
period of 36 months beginning December 1, 1999.
both filed objections to the DRC’s report.
Benny and Brenda
Following a hearing,
the circuit court sustained Brenda’s objections to the DRC’s
report and ordered that Benny pay her permanent maintenance of
$300.00 per month.3
This appeal followed.
In his brief, Benny set forth the following issues: (1)
“The presumption of maintenance for life or until remarriage in
Kentucky should be overturned[;]” and (2) “The January 7th [sic],
2000 order requiring that the appellant pay a permanent
maintenance award should be modified to provide for a
‘rehabilitative maintenance’ award as recommended by the domestic
relations commissioner.”
We do not completely agree with Benny’s
characterization of the status of Kentucky law concerning
maintenance; and we believe the sole issue on appeal can more
accurately be stated as whether the trial court abused its
2
The court allowed Brenda to remain in the marital residence
while the youngest child completed her senior year of high
school.
3
The remainder of the DRC’s recommendations were adopted by
the circuit court and are not at issue on appeal.
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discretion in ordering Benny to pay permanent maintenance to
Brenda instead of following the DRC’s recommendation of
“rehabilitative maintenance” for a period of 36 months.
We begin our legal analysis of this issue with a review
of the applicable law, quoting extensively from this Court’s
decision in Russell v. Russell:4
The amount and duration of maintenance
is within the sound discretion of the trial
court. Gentry v. Gentry, Ky., 798 S.W.2d
928, 937 (1990); Combs v. Combs, Ky.App., 622
S.W.2d 679, 680 (1981), citing KRS 403.200(2)
and Browning v. Browning, Ky.App., 551 S.W.2d
823 (1977). It is within the trial court’s
discretion to terminate a maintenance award
upon the recipient’s “death or remarriage.”
Van Bussum v. Van Bussum, Ky.App., 728 S.W.2d
538, 539 (1987). . . .
KRS 403.200 provides that:
(1) . . . [T]he court may grant a
maintenance order for either spouse
only if it finds that the spouse
seeking maintenance:
(a) Lacks sufficient property,
including marital property
apportioned to him, to provide for
his reasonable needs; and
(b) Is unable to support himself through
appropriate employment or is the
custodian of a child whose condition or
circumstances make it appropriate that
the custodian not be required to seek
employment outside the home.
(2) The maintenance order shall be
in such amounts and for such
periods of time as the court deems
just, and after considering all
relevant factors including:
(a) The financial resources of the
party seeking maintenance,
including marital property
4
Ky.App., 878 S.W.2d 24, 26 (1994).
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apportioned to him, and his ability
to meet his needs independently,
including the extent to which a
provision for support of a child
living with the party includes a
sum for the party as custodian;
(b) The time necessary to acquire
sufficient education or training to
enable the party seeking
maintenance to find appropriate
employment;
(c)The standard of living
established during the marriage;
(d) The duration of the marriage;
(e)The age, and physical and
emotional condition of the spouse
seeking maintenance; and
(f) The ability of the spouse from
whom maintenance is sought to meet
his needs while meeting those of
the spouse seeking maintenance.
In Perrine v. Christine, Ky., 833 S.W.2d 825
(1992), the Supreme Court stated:
Under this statute, the trial court
has dual responsibilities: one, to
make relevant findings of fact; and
two, to exercise its discretion in
making a determination on
maintenance in light of those
facts. In order to reverse the
trial court’s decision, a reviewing
court must find either that the
findings of fact are clearly
erroneous or that the trial court
has abused its discretion. 833
S.W.2d at 826.
It is appropriate to award maintenance
when a party is not able to support
themselves in accord with the same standard
of living which they enjoyed during marriage
and the property awarded to them is not
sufficient to provide for their reasonable
needs. Robbins v. Robbins, Ky.App., 849
S.W.2d 571, 572 (1993); and Atwood v. Atwood,
Ky.App., 643 S.W.2d 263, 265-66 (1982).
Furthermore, where a former spouse is not
able to produce enough income to meet their
reasonable needs, it is appropriate to award
maintenance. Id.[;] and Calloway v.
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Calloway, Ky.App., 832 S.W.2d 890, 894
(1992).
A circuit court’s authority to modify an open-end award
of maintenance is limited by KRS 403.250 to “a showing of changed
circumstances so substantial and continuing as to make the terms
unconscionable.”
In cases involving a fixed and determinable
award of maintenance, the award is viewed as “alimony in gross
and has the finality of a judgment, and thus, is not subject to
modification on the basis of a change in circumstances. . . .”5
In Low v. Low,6 our Supreme Court stated that its “decision
should not be read as a significant departure from Dame[; and
that] [i]n ordinary circumstances parties may continue to rely
upon the finality of a lump sum maintenance award.”
The Supreme
Court continued by stating that “upon the occurrence . . . of an
event causing manifest inequity, Dame may not be used as a shield
to prevent restoration of the underlying purpose of the decree.”
Thus, the duration of the “permanent” maintenance in the case sub
judice does have limits.
Pursuant to KRS 403.250(2), “the
obligation to pay future maintenance is terminated upon the death
of either party or the remarriage of the party receiving
maintenance.”
Furthermore, under KRS 403.250(1), an open-end
award of maintenance “may be modified upon a showing of changed
circumstances so substantial and continuing as to make the terms
unconscionable.”
5
Dame v. Dame, Ky., 628 S.W.2d 625, 627 (1982)(quoting In Re
Marriage of Gallegos, Colo.App., 580 P.2d 838 (1978)).
6
Ky., 777 S.W.2d 936, 938 (1989).
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In the case sub judice, the DRC recommended in part the
following factual findings:
The parties were married on April 29,
1977. Brenda quit high school to stay at
home with the parties’ first child. The
parties enjoyed a comfortable lifestyle
during their marriage. They raised their two
children in a nice three-bedroom home located
in a quiet neighborhood. . . .
Brenda currently resides in an
efficiency apartment on Illinois Road in
Radcliff, Kentucky, which is owned by her
church. She pays no rent in exchange for her
cleaning the church two times each week.
Brenda has been employed by the Hardin
County Board of Education for the last three
years. Her annual contract salary is
$7,785.96, which calculates to a gross
monthly income of $648.83. After deductions
for tax withholdings and insurance, Brenda
has a net monthly income of $512 from that
employment [citation to record omitted].
Brenda also cleans houses for people and
earns an additional $150 per month. She will
receive approximately $498 as her share of
military retirement benefits, for a total
disposable monthly income of $1,160. As
mentioned, Brenda also received $6,397 from
the sale of the marital residence, but she
spent this money on furniture and outstanding
bills. She also receives in-kind income
equal to the value of her apartment.
Brenda is not opposed to looking for
more suitable employment. She maintains that
her time spent in church activities does not
preclude her from finding a job. Brenda has
attempted to obtain her GED and failed the
test three times during the parties’
marriage. Brenda has a problem with
comprehension and retention. Before her job
with the Hardin County School Board, she
worked at K-Mart Department Store for 13
years. She left that job when Benny was
assigned to an unaccompanied tour of duty in
Korea because she did not want to leave the
children at home alone at night. Brenda
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earned between $80 and $120 per week while
working at K-Mart.
Brenda tendered a list of her monthly
expenses totaling $1,974. Of these expenses,
the health insurance and payroll taxes are
deducted as monthly withholdings. These
expenses have already been considered when
calculating Brenda’s net monthly income.
Although Brenda does not pay rent at the
present time, she does not intend to forever
remain in her current efficiency apartment.
Brenda also pays a monthly storage rental fee
of $70. Therefore, after reviewing Brenda’s
Exhibit P-1 and her testimony, this
Commissioner finds that Brenda has reasonable
monthly expenses of $1,500.
This Commissioner finds that Brenda is
unable to support herself through her present
employment. It is obvious that she needs to
find a better job. This Commissioner finds
that Brenda is in need of maintenance for a
period of time to allow her to find suitable
employment.
. . .
Benny is residing in an apartment at 106
Virgil Court, Radcliff, Kentucky with his
daughter and a girlfriend. He is employed by
the U.S. Postal Service. His pay stubs show
year-to-date earnings of $27,688.17 through
October 1, 1999. This computes to a gross
monthly income of $3,076.46. This
Commissioner has deducted his tax
withholdings and finds that Benny has a net
monthly income of approximately $2,403
[citation to record omitted]. Benny will
receive monthly military benefits of
approximately $638 after Brenda’s share has
been deducted. This gives Benny a total net
monthly income of $3,041.
Benny has approximately $1,640 remaining
from his share of the sale of the marital
residence. He used the bulk of the proceeds
to purchase a car for his daughter, to pay
for tuition and books for his daughter, to
purchase a new bed and to rebuild his truck
motor.
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Benny tendered a list of his monthly
living expenses totaling $2,420. He also
listed the amounts he contributes to his
daughter’s support and education [citation to
record omitted]. The $110 monthly lawyer fee
itemized in his list of expenses has now been
paid in full. The parties’ daughter, who is
now emancipated, has been living with Benny
since July 1999. Benny’s girlfriend, Cindy,
who also resides in the home, contributes to
the rent, utilities and food expenses. The
Commissioner finds that Benny has no legal
obligation to support his daughter, who is
now emancipated. The Commissioner further
finds that Benny’s monthly living expenses
are shared with his girlfriend.
The circuit court adopted these factual findings as
recommended by the DRC, and there is no claim that the findings
were not supported by substantial evidence.
Benny’s contention
on appeal is that the circuit court abused its discretion in
ordering the maintenance to be “permanent” as opposed to being
fixed for a period of 36 months as recommended by the DRC.
The
maintenance order indicates that in making the award the circuit
court properly considered the standard of living established
during this 21-year marriage, the disparity in the parties’
earnings potential, the property awarded to each party and their
ability to meet their basic living expenses.
We hold that the
circuit court properly exercised its discretion in making an
open-end maintenance award to Brenda at $300.00 per month.7
While the DRC accepted Benny’s argument that Brenda was entitled
7
“‘Abuse of discretion in relation to the exercise of
judicial power implies arbitrary action or capricious disposition
under the circumstances, at least an unreasonable and unfair
decision.’” . . . “The exercise of discretion must be legally
sound.” Kuprion v. Fitzgerald, Ky., 888 S.W.2d 679, 684 (1994).
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only to “rehabilitative maintenance,” the circuit court
disagreed.
While the circuit court did cite Combs, supra, for
the “holding that there is a presumption of maintenance for life
or until remarriage[,]” we do not read the circuit court’s order
as indicating that it did not have the discretion to set the
maintenance for a term of years had it chosen to do so.
We
believe the circuit court correctly weighed the various factors
and properly exercised its discretion in setting the amount and
the duration of the maintenance.
Accordingly, the order of the Hardin Circuit Court is
affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
David T. Wilson, II
Radcliff, Kentucky
Russell L. Crusott
Radcliff, Kentucky
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