FLYNN ENTERPRISES, INC. v. RAYETTA M. SETTLE; HON. W. DOUGLAS MYERS; THOMAS A. NANNEY, Administrative Law Judge;
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RENDERED:
DECEMBER 28, 2001; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2001-CA-001838-WC
FLYNN ENTERPRISES, INC.
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. WC-96-75240
v.
RAYETTA M. SETTLE; HON. W. DOUGLAS MYERS;
THOMAS A. NANNEY, Administrative Law Judge;
and WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
REVERSING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, EMBERTON, and HUDDLESTON, Judges.
COMBS, JUDGE:
Flynn Enterprises, Inc., has appealed from an
opinion rendered by the Workers' Compensation Board on August 1,
2001, that affirmed an award of attorney's fees to the claimant's
attorney pursuant to KRS 342.320(2)(c).
In light of the Kentucky
Supreme Court's recent holding in City of Louisville v. Slack,
Ky., 39 S.W.3d 809 (2001), we are compelled to reverse.
On October 9, 1997, Rayetta M. Settle filed a claim for
workers' compensation benefits against her employer, Flynn
Enterprises, Inc. ("Flynn"), alleging that she suffered with
carpal tunnel syndrome and deQuervain's syndrome as a result of
her employment.
The claim was assigned to an arbitrator, who
eventually awarded Settle temporary total disability benefits.
Flynn appealed to an administrative law judge ("ALJ"),
requesting a de novo review of the award.
The ALJ determined
that the appeal was interlocutory in nature and dismissed the
matter.
Flynn then filed an appeal to the Workers' Compensation
Board ("Board").
The Board affirmed and remanded the claim to
the arbitrator for further proceedings.
Ultimately, the arbitrator system was abolished and the
claim was reassigned to an ALJ for consideration on the merits.
Following a hearing, the ALJ concluded that Settle had failed to
establish a permanent occupational disability and determined that
her employer was not responsible for surgery as proposed by one
of her physicians.
The ALJ confirmed, however, the period of
temporary total disability benefits as previously paid.
Following the ALJ's order, Settle's attorney, Douglas
Myers, filed a motion requesting an attorney's fee of some
$17,000.00.
According to the motion, a portion of this amount
was to be paid from the proceeds of Settle's award pursuant to
KRS 342.320(2)(b).
The remaining $10,000.00, however, was to be
paid by Flynn pursuant to KRS 342.320(2)(c), providing that in
the event an employer appeals an award and "does not prevail upon
appeal," then up to $5,000, per level of appellate review may be
awarded as a penalty.
The ALJ agreed with Myers and awarded an attorney's fee
of slightly more than $13,000.00 — $10,000.00 of which was to be
paid directly by Flynn and/or its insurer pursuant to KRS
-2-
342.320(2)(c).
affirmed.
Flynn appealed this order to the Board, which
In this petition for review, Flynn contends that the
Board erred by failing to apply the law as established by the
Kentucky Supreme Court in City of Louisville v. Slack, Ky., 39
S.W.3d 809 (2001).
We agree.
At the time of Settle's injury, KRS 342.320(2)(c)
provided as follows:
Upon an appeal by an employer or carrier from
a written determination of an arbitrator or
an award or order of an administrative law
judge, if the employer or carrier does not
prevail upon appeal, the administrative law
judge shall fix an attorney's fee to be paid
by the employer or carrier for the employee's
attorney upon consideration of the extent,
quality, and complexity of the services
rendered not to exceed five thousand dollars
($5,000) per level of appeal. This
attorney's fee shall be in addition to any
fee awarded under paragraphs (a) and (b) of
this subsection.
(Emphasis added).
The ALJ's decision to award an attorney's fee
pursuant to this provision was entered approximately one week
before the Kentucky Supreme Court determined that KRS
342.320(2)(c) was unconstitutional.
In City of Louisville v.
Slack, 39 S.W.3d at 813, the Supreme Court opined that the
attorney's fee statute was improperly and unconstitutionally
motivated -- "to punish an employer who brings an appeal in good
faith."
Reversing this court's opinion in Earthgrains v. Cranz,
Ky. App, 999 S.W.2d 218 (1999), the Kentucky Supreme Court held
the statute to be both arbitrary and violative of an employer's
right to procedural due process.
Flynn's claim was still pending at the administrative
level prior to the final word on the issue from the Supreme
-3-
Court.
Application of the Supreme Court's holding to this claim
does not violate our rule against unrestricted retroactive
application of new decisions holding statutes unconstitutional.
See Burns v. Level, Ky., 957 S.W.2d 218 (1998).
Consequently, the opinion of the Board affirming the
award of an attorney's fee of $10,000 to the appellant, attorney
Myers, pursuant to KRS 342.320(2)(c), must be reversed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Ben S. Fletcher III
Hopkinsville, KY
W. Douglas Myers
Hopkinsville, KY
-4-
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