DARRYL T. OWENS AND CAROL LUMPKINS v. MOTION FOR RELIEF UNDER CR 65.07 HONORABLE THOMAS B. WINE JEFFERSON COUNTY FISCAL COURT AND REBECCA JACKSON, INTERVENING JEFFERSON COUNTY JUDGE EXECUTIVE
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RENDERED: AUGUST 7, 2001
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO. 2001-CA-001555-I
DARRYL T. OWENS AND CAROL LUMPKINS
v.
MOVANTS
MOTION FOR RELIEF UNDER CR 65.07
FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS B. WINE
ACTION NO. 01-CI-005027
JEFFERSON COUNTY FISCAL COURT
AND
REBECCA JACKSON,
JEFFERSON COUNTY JUDGE EXECUTIVE
RESPONDENT
INTERVENING RESPONDENT
** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** **
OPINION AND ORDER
DENYING CR 65.07 RELIEF
BEFORE: EMBERTON, JOHNSON, AND KNOPF, JUDGES.
EMBERTON, JUDGE: The movants are before the Court seeking relief
under CR 65.07 from a circuit court denial of a temporary
injunction which would have prevented the Jefferson Fiscal Court
from approving legislative council districts for the merged
government of Louisville and Jefferson County which comes into
existence in January 2003.
The districts have been drawn “by
representatives of a department of geography from the largest
public university that exists within the county.”
KRS 67C135(2).
The county fiscal court is required to “approve the plan within
thirty (30) days as submitted and without amendment.”
KRS
67C.135(3).
The requirement that the fiscal court approve the
proposed districts without amendment is at the center of this
litigation.
One of the movants is a member of the fiscal court, and
the other is a registered voter of Jefferson County.
They argue
that the statutory scheme of KRS 67C.135 constitutes an
unconstitutional delegation of authority and improperly
“commandeers elected officials’ votes” by requiring the fiscal
court to approve the proposed districts without “exercising any
judgment or discretion.”
For that reason, the movants, as
plaintiffs in circuit court, sought an injunction to prevent the
fiscal court from acting on the proposed districts until the
circuit court had fully considered their constitutional
challenge.
The circuit court denied the requested injunction,
and the movants have sought relief in this Court.
Since the matter under review here is denial of a
temporary injunction, the Court applies the standards of Maupin
v. Stansbury, Ky. App., 575 S.W.2d 695 (1978), and Oscar Ewing,
Inc. v. Melton, Ky., 309 S.W.2d 760 (1958), to review the
question of the status to be observed while the constitutional
questions are litigated in circuit court.
In assessing the injury that would occur to the movants
if the injunction did not issue, we must first note that the
fiscal court has no inherent authority in this matter.
fiscal court has such power as the legislature assigns.
The
Bruner
v. Jefferson County Fiscal Court, 239 Ky. 613, 40 S.W.2d 271, 272
-2-
(1931).
It appears from the language used that the legislature
may have chosen fiscal court’s “approval” as a convenient point
to finalize the formation of districts as defined by those chosen
by the legislature to do so.
There is no essential requirement
that the composition of the districts of the new merged
government be addressed to the fiscal court.
Movant Owens has
failed to show how some fundamental right will be harmed by the
legislative denial of discretion to fiscal court.
The statutory intent to deny discretion to the fiscal
court is clear.
The requirement of KRS 67C.135(3) that “the
fiscal court shall approve the plan within thirty (30) days as
submitted and without amendment” appears in the early drafts of
the statute.
Review of the amendments proposed as the bill
proceeded through the legislature indicates repeated rejection of
changes to that concept.
The ministerial function that has been
assigned to the fiscal court is to accept the districts as drawn
by the professional geographers under the guidelines provided by
the legislature.
The movants allege that they have raised a substantial
question on the merits of their claim of unconstitutional
delegation by the legislature to the University of Louisville
Geography Department.
It may appear difficult to address this
issue without resolving the claim itself.
However, to succeed in
their claim the movants must overcome significant precedent.
Prior opinions of our appellate courts have approved delegation
allowing local school boards to close or consolidate schools in
-3-
Coppage v. Ohio County Board of Education, Ky. App., 860 S.W.2d
779 (1992), allowing the governor to allocate surplus funds to
state agencies for certain purposes in Hopkins v. Ford, Ky., 534
S.W.2d 792 (1976), allowing the state board of education to
approve schools and programs for receipt of state funds to
educate exceptional children in Butler v. United Cerebral Palsy
of Northern Kentucky, Inc., Ky., 352 S.W.2d 203 (1961), and
allowing a panel appointed by legislative leadership to select
the locations of the new colleges in Craig v. O’Rear, 199 Ky.
553, 251 S.W. 828 (1923).
In the case currently before the Court
the legislature did provide standards and safeguards in KRS
67C.135(4)and(8).
It may be that movants will eventually
overcome these precedents, but, for purposes of the temporary
injunction, we cannot say the movants have demonstrated such a
substantial question as to justify the issuance of an injunction.
The public interest in this matter is significant.
The
legislature offered to the citizens of Louisville and Jefferson
County the opportunity to merge their governments.
The process
for drawing new districts for electing the council for merged
government set out in KRS 67C.135 was included within that plan
as submitted to the voters. A majority of the voters of Jefferson
County approved this plan.
The process of drawing the districts
under the scheme approved by the voters has reached a crucial
point of acceptance by the fiscal court.
It is in the public
interest to finalize this stage so that candidates may carefully
assess the possibility of filing for office before the statutory
-4-
deadline.
In view of the discussion above, the equities clearly
favor denial of the injunction.
The voters of Jefferson County
have expressed their desire for merged government.
The plan
which the voters approved contained provisions for the transition
to the new system.
The Court should not interfere with that
process except in the most severe and exceptional circumstances
impacting the concrete rights of citizens.
No such threat has
been shown here.
Accordingly, the Court ORDERS that the motion for CR
65.07 relief be, and it is hereby, DENIED.
Because of the urgent nature of this matter, the Court
ORDERS that this Opinion and Order be rendered immediately upon
signature.
ALL CONCUR.
ENTERED:
August 7, 2001
/s/ Thomas D. Emberton
JUDGE, COURT OF APPEALS
MOTION AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
THE MOVANTS:
RESPONSE FOR JEFFERSON FISCAL
COURT:
David A. Friedman
Louisville, Ky.
Irv Maze
Jefferson County Attorney
N. Scott Lilly
Assistant County Attorney
Louisville, Ky.
-5-
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR JEFFERSON
FISCAL COURT:
Irv Maze
Jefferson County Attorney
Louisville, Ky.
RESPONSE AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
REBECCA JACKSON:
Sheryl G. Snyder
Louisville, Ky.
-6-
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