BONNIE CRAWFORD v. GRINDMASTER; JOHN B. COLEMAN, Administrative Law Judge; and WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
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RENDERED:
November 2, 2001; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2001-CA-001230-WC
BONNIE CRAWFORD
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. WC-00-00623
v.
GRINDMASTER; JOHN B. COLEMAN,
Administrative Law Judge; and
WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, COMBS, and DYCHE, Judges.
COMBS, JUDGE:
Bonnie Crawford appeals an opinion of the Workers'
Compensation Board (Board) rendered May 9, 2001.
Revised Statutes (KRS) 342.290.
Kentucky
After our review, we affirm.
Crawford began her employment with Grindmaster in 1994.
Within months, she began to experience pain and numbness in her
upper extremities.
Crawford attributed her symptoms to her work
and received regular medical treatment for bilateral carpal
tunnel syndrome.
Her treatment was covered by Grindmaster's
workers' compensation carrier until 1997.
In May 2000, Crawford
sought workers' compensation benefits for two separate workrelated injuries, which were alleged to have occurred on specific
dates in January 1998 and December 1999.1
benefits for the repetitive motion injury.
She also sought
Following a hearing,
the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissed Crawford's claim for
benefits.
The ALJ specifically stated as follows:
1. The first issue to be discussed is the
issue of whether the plaintiff gave due and
timely notice of her alleged September 1998
cervical spine injury. When the plaintiff
first filed her claim Form 101 she alleged
the injury occurred in January 1998.
However, during the course of the litigation
she remembered the incident occurred toward
the end of summer and freely admitted that
she was embarrassed over the incident and did
not tell her supervisor until about a month
after the incident occurred. From the
medical records we can ascertain that she did
not seek medical treatment for that event
until November 1998. The only excuse offered
by the plaintiff for failing to give notice
was that of her embarrassment. This is so
even though she indicated that she
immediately began having cervical spine pain,
headaches as well as cramping and numbness in
her feet. As indicated above, notice must be
given as soon as practicable under the
circumstances. In this particular instance
the plaintiff has failed to offer adequate
excuses for failing to give her employer
notice for more than a month following the
event. In this particular instance, I
believe the notice to be inadequate and her
claim for a September 1998 cervical spine
injury must fail.
2. The plaintiff also claims a cervical
spine injury occurred in December 1999. Dr.
Petruska's records clearly indicate that
incident was an exacerbation of her already
present condition. Exacerbations to active
conditions are not compensable as a new
injury. There is not medical testimony which
would indicate that event in December 1999
was sufficient in and of itself to cause
plaintiff's injury. As the plaintiff has the
1
Crawford later amended her application to indicate that the
first injury had occurred on an unspecified date in September
1998 rather than on January 18, 1998.
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burden of proof to prove each and every
element of her claim in this particular
instance she has failed to prove that the
December 1999 event was in any way the
proximate cause of her cervical spine
condition. Therefore, her claim for benefits
for the December 1999 incident must also be
dismissed.
Opinion and Order at 6-7.
The ALJ concluded that Crawford's
claim for the repetitive motion injury was time-barred.
Her
subsequent petition for reconsideration was rejected.
Crawford appealed the ALJ's dismissal to the Board.
The Board affirmed.
Crawford asks us to review that decision.
As her sole issue on appeal, Crawford contends that the
Board erred by concluding that the ALJ's decision to dismiss her
claim for lack of notice was based on substantial evidence of
record.
According to Crawford:
[While she] first alleged in her Form 101
that her first injury occurred in January
1998, . . . it was determined that the
incident occurred in September 1998. She
told her supervisor about one month after the
injury, when she became symptomatic. This
incident occurred when she hit a wall while
driving a forklift.
The second injury occurred, which everyone
agrees upon, when she was struck by a dock
door in December 1999.
Contrary to the finding of the ALJ, the
evidence was not that Bonnie Crawford failed
to report the first injury to her supervisor
because "she felt embarrassed", but she did
not report the injury to her supervisor
because she did not begin having symptoms
until approximately one month later.
Crawford testified in both her deposition and
at her hearing that she was embarrassed in
the second incident when she was struck in
the head by the dock door.
* * * * *
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It appears that ALJ Coleman simply got
confused on the dates of the injuries, the
mechanics of each of the two injuries.
It is clear from the evidence that Crawford
talked about being "embarrassed" after the
second incident, not the first incident. In
his findings, ALJ Coleman refers to
Crawford's testimony that she was embarrassed
after the first injury, and did not report
it.
Appellant's brief at 7 - 9.
We begin our analysis with the observation that
Crawford's contentions before this court differ somewhat from the
argument advanced at the administrative level.
In her petition
for reconsideration to the ALJ and in her brief to the Board,
Crawford never mentioned the ALJ's supposed confusion over when
her embarrassment prevented her from providing adequate notice to
Grindmaster.
Moreover, her assertions are not substantiated by
the record before us.
In her deposition of August 11, 2000, Crawford related
the following with respect to her September 1998 injury:
Q. You think that this incident that you
described when you hit a wall occurred
sometime in September of '98?
* * * *
A.
Yes.
Because it was hot. . . .
Q.
All right.
Tell me what happened.
A. I was in the warehouse and usually there
is a -- supposed to be one of the guys back
there, you know, doing the forklifting. And
in this particular day it wasn't. A lot of
days when there is nobody back there I had to
move things. People asked me.
So this particular day I had gotten on the
forklift and I guess not paying attention. .
. . and before I knew it, I didn't know I
-4-
was that close to the wall and I just hit it
with the forks straight on.
Q. And you experienced some type of problems
some symptom at that point?
A. At that point when I hit the wall, you
know, like I say, I was unaware that I was
running into it and it shook me up, you know,
it just hit me and then I just -- I guess I
got real dizzy like, you know, I didn't faint
or fall off of it, but I just sat there, you
know, to gather myself.
* * * *
Q.
Did you go see a doctor?
A. No, not at that time. You know, I got
off like I said. I was sort of feeling
embarrassed and silly. And I thought I was
okay. It was like a month later when I
complained . . . .
Deposition at 18 - 20.
Where the disabling effect of a work-related accident
is not immediately apparent, the determination of whether the
employer has been given timely notice of an injury involves a
two-step process: (1) timely notice of the specific injury which
is alleged to have resulted from the accident and (2) timely
notification of occurrence of the accident itself.
See Reliance
Diecasting Co. v. Freeman, Ky., 471 S.W.2d 311 (1971).
While
Crawford may have given notice of her disabling injury as soon as
was practicable, she undeniably failed to give timely notice of
the incident of the accident itself because — in her own words —
she was "sort of feeling embarrassed and silly."
The ALJ was not
persuaded that Crawford's feelings of embarrassment justified a
significant delay in giving the required notice.
-5-
The Board concluded that the ALJ's decision to dismiss
the claim was based upon substantial evidence and that it was in
accord with the law.
We are persuaded that the Board did not
overlook or misapply controlling law or commit an error in
assessing the evidence so flagrantly as to cause gross injustice.
Western Baptist Hosp. v. Kelly, Ky., 827 S.W.2d 685 (1992).
Consequently, the opinion of the Workers' Compensation Board is
affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Edward A. Mayer
Louisville, KY
Ronald J. Pohl
Lexington, KY
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