MARCEL CORTEZ JOHNSON v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
NOVEMBER 30, 2001; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2001-CA-000598-MR
MARCEL CORTEZ JOHNSON
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE GARY D. PAYNE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 00-CR-01182
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
MCANULTY, MILLER AND TACKETT, JUDGES.
MILLER, JUDGE:
Marcel Cortez Johnson brings this appeal from a
March 6, 2001 judgment of the Fayette Circuit Court.
We affirm.
The Fayette County Grand Jury indicted appellant upon
one count of trafficking in a controlled substance, first degree,
with a firearm, Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 218A.1412, KRS
418A.992.
Pursuant to jury verdict, appellant was found guilty
of the above offense and sentenced to ten years' imprisonment.
This appeal follows.
Appellant contends the circuit court committed
reversible error by denying his motion for directed verdict of
acquittal.
In Commonwealth v. Benham, Ky., 816 S.W.2d 186, 187
(1991), the Supreme Court set forth our standard of review:
On appellate review, the test of a directed
verdict is, if under the evidence as a whole,
it would be clearly unreasonable for a jury
to find guilt, only then the defendant is
entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal.
Appellant specifically argues the Commonwealth failed
to prove that he constructively possessed the cocaine, and that
he had dominion and control over the firearms in the apartment.
Appellant asserts that there was no evidence offered to show that
he leased the apartment where the contraband was found, or that
he was in close proximity to the contraband.
The evidence indicated that there were four grams of
cocaine found in the apartment.
It appears the cocaine and
firearms were found in close proximity to two other individuals
in the apartment, Mark Caldwell and Larry Shepard.
Shepard
testified that he gave money to a man in a gray T-shirt for crack
cocaine.
Upon serving the search warrant, appellant was the only
man in the apartment wearing a gray T-shirt.
Furthermore,
Johnson admitted that one of the guns at the scene was his.
Considering this evidence together, we are of the opinion that it
would not have been clearly unreasonable for the jury to have
found appellant guilty of trafficking in a controlled substance,
first degree, with a firearm.
Id.
Thus, we think the directed
verdict was properly denied.
Appellant also maintains the circuit court committed
reversible error by admitting certain testimony of Sergeant Mark
Simmons.
Appellant believes the circuit court improperly allowed
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Simmons to testify as an expert regarding narcotics and
trafficking in same.
Additionally, appellant asserts a denial of
due process of law as the Commonwealth failed to give advance
notice before trial of Simmons' testimony.
Appellant
specifically objects to the following statements by Simmons:
1.
In his opinion, crack is the biggest
problem in the (urban black) central
sector of Lexington, and that 734 N.
Broadway is in this sector. . . .
2.
That crack sales happen at nighttime
under cover of darkness, just like the
case a (sic) bar. (Footnote omitted).
. . .
3.
That crack dealers often move a lot,
therefore the lack of permanent
indicators of residence is consistent
with trafficking. . . .
4.
That crack dealers often work in pairs,
like Caldwell and the appellant. . . .
5.
That although he has no medical
training, it is his opinion that crack
is very addictive. Simmons goes on to
describe how the crack makes the user
feel, though he does not relate the
basis of this opinion. In fact he
claims that a person is addicted after
the first hit. . . .
6.
That crack is purchased predominantly
with a $20 bill, and the appellant had
a lot of twenties on his person. . . .
7.
That the presence of torn plastic
baggies indicate (sic) trafficking.
. . .
8.
That bigger dealers do not use crack,
which he says shows that Larry Shepard
was a user and the appellant was a
dealer. . . . (Footnote omitted).
9.
Explained that crack on the table at
front door is consistent with
trafficking, even though he said crack
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is ready for sale when placed in a
baggie. . . .
10.
That the presence of a small amount of
cocaine, like this case, indicates that
a person is trafficking at the end of
his cycle and is not indicative of
personal use. . . .
Even if it were error to admit the above testimony, we
cannot say that its admission affected a substantial right of
appellant.
Ky. R. Evid. (KRE) 103.
Simply stated, we do not
believe there exists a reasonable probability that absent the
error the verdict of the jury would have been different. Weaver
v. Commonwealth, Ky., 955 S.W.2d 722 (1997).
Absent Simmons'
testimony, there was ample evidence in the record to support
appellant's conviction.
We cite to the testimony of Shepard that
he gave money to a man in a gray T-shirt, where appellant was the
only man in the apartment wearing a gray T-shirt, and to
appellant's admission that he owned one of the guns in the
apartment.
Upon the whole of the case, we must conclude that any
error in admitting the above testimony of Simmons was merely
harmless.
Appellant contends that the circuit court committed
reversible error by allowing the Commonwealth to strike Juror 818
and Juror 836 in violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79,
106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed. 2d 69 (1986).
In Batson, the United
States Supreme Court held that it was unconstitutional for a
prosecutor to preemptorily challenge a potential juror based
solely upon race.
In the case at hand, appellant maintains the
Commonwealth struck Jurors 818 and 836 solely because they were
African-American.
The Commonwealth contended it struck Juror 836
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because he approached the bench and informed the court and
parties he did not feel comfortable judging others or sending
someone to prison, and he did not want to perform this task
himself.
As to Juror 818, the Commonwealth pointed out that this
juror had written on his juror sheet that he had a problem with
the idea of judging others because he was a child of God.
We are
of the opinion that the above reasons constitute a racially
neutral basis for striking of the above jurors under Batson.
As
such, we conclude that the circuit court did not commit
reversible error upon this issue.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Fayette
Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Matthew W. Boyd
Lexington, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General of Kentucky
Frankfort, Kentucky
Kent T. Young
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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