RODNEY GRIMES v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED:
DECEMBER 14, 2001; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO. 2001-CA-000512-MR
RODNEY GRIMES
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE GEOFFREY P. MORRIS, JUDGE
INDICTMENT NO. 95-CR-001675
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: GUDGEL, Chief Judge; GUIDUGLI and HUDDLESTON, Judges.
HUDDLESTON, Judge:
Circuit
Court
Rodney Grimes appeals pro se from a Jefferson
order
denying
his
Kentucky
Rules
of
Criminal
Procedure (RCr) 11.42 motion to vacate, set aside or correct his
sentence which was imposed after he reached an agreement with the
Commonwealth pursuant to which he pled guilty to the murder of
Darron
Ellis
imprisonment.
in
exchange
As
for
evidenced
a
by
twenty-five
the
year
discussion
term
below,
of
the
dispositive issue on appeal is whether Grimes’s RCr 11.42 motion
was filed within the applicable time limit.
On May 25, 1994, Grimes, then a juvenile, fatally shot
Ellis one time in the chest with a semi-automatic handgun.
At the
time of the shooting, the two males were engaged in an argument
regarding an attack on Grimes’s brother which allegedly occurred a
few hours earlier. Grimes’s case was transferred to circuit court
because he was classified as a youthful offender due to the fact
that he was over the age of fourteen at the time he engaged in the
commission of a capital offense.
Grimes was represented by the
public defender assigned to his case at
subsequent proceedings.
Following a psychiatric evaluation, hospitalization was recommended
for Grimes and the court granted Grimes’s motion to permit his
hospitalization on September 16, 1994, noting that all treatment
was to be in a secure facility.
At all other times, he was
remanded to the custody of the Jefferson County Youth Center.
On July 12, 1995, Grimes was indicted for murder by the
circuit court grand jury and he subsequently pled not guilty at his
arraignment where he was represented by counsel.
Grimes later
withdrew his plea of not guilty and entered into the plea agreement
referenced above which the court accepted in an order entered on
August
25,
knowingly
1995,
and
after
determining
voluntarily.
Having
that
it
was
reviewed
the
entered
into
pre-sentence
investigation report and considered the nature and circumstances of
the crime and the character and condition of Grimes, the court
denied probation in a judgment and conviction order entered on
September 22, 1995.
In so doing, the court determined that
granting probation would unduly depreciate the seriousness of the
crime and that Grimes could be treated most effectively at a
-2-
correctional institute.
Grimes was then sentenced as a youthful
offender in accordance with Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 640.030
to a term of twenty-five years in the penitentiary.
On the same day, an interim commitment order was entered
by the court, pursuant to which Grimes was committed to the custody
of the Kentucky Cabinet for Human Resources until his eighteenth
birthday (October 11, 1996), with Grimes scheduled to appear before
the court for final sentencing on October 16, 1996.
In addition,
the court ordered the Cabinet to secure appropriate placement for
Grimes outside the youth center in a facility or program operated
by the Cabinet by September 19, 1995.
Grimes was subsequently
placed at the Central Kentucky Treatment Center, a residential
treatment facility operated by the Cabinet in Louisville, Kentucky.
In April 1996, citing his age and claiming that Grimes had
assaulted other juvenile residents at the facility, tested positive
for marijuana and received numerous incident reports for other such
behavior, the Cabinet requested that Grimes be committed to the
Kentucky Department of Corrections prior to his eighteenth birthday
to serve the remainder of his sentence.
Following a hearing at
which Grimes was present and represented by counsel, the Cabinet’s
motion was granted by the court in an order entered on April 23,
1996.
In determining that commitment was appropriate, the court
found, based on a preponderance of the evidence, that Grimes had
engaged in violent behavior which injured or endangered the life or
health
of
another
youthful
offender
or
staff
members
at
the
facility, caused disruption by encouraging other residents to
engage in similar conduct and established a pattern of disruptive
-3-
behavior
in
violation
of
the
policies
and
procedures
of
his
treatment program.
On October 16, 1996, Grimes appeared before the court as
previously ordered and was sentenced to twenty-five years in the
penitentiary with credit for time served. On May 2, 1997, Grimes’s
motion for shock probation was denied. In response to a subsequent
motion by Grimes wherein he requested that the court award him
credit for the one year, ten months and twenty-eight days he spent
at the youth center prior to the commencement of his prison
sentence, the court concluded that Grimes was entitled to credit
for the time he spent in custody prior to being sent to prison on
April 23, 1996, beginning with the day he was sent to the youth
center on May 25, 1994.
Accordingly, the court ordered the
Division of Probation and Parole to recalculate the time.
On January 22, 2001, Grimes filed a RCr 11.42 motion with
the court, sought permission for leave to proceed in forma pauperis
and also requested appointment of counsel.
The court summarily
denied the RCr 11.42 motion in an order entered on February 15,
2001, saying only: “Denied-not filed timely-no [CR] 60.02 issues.”
Likewise, the related motions were denied without elaboration on
January 24, 2001.
Grimes filed a notice of appeal and in an order
entered on March 8, 2001, the court granted Grimes’s motion for
leave to proceed in forma pauperis with an appeal, denied the
motion for appointment of a public defender and waived any court
costs associated with the appeal.
As indicated earlier, the judgment of conviction in
Grimes’s case was entered on September 22, 1995, and his RCr 11.42
-4-
motion was not filed until January 22, 2001.
In relevant part, RCr
11.42 provides that:
(10) Any motion under this rule shall be filed within
three years after the judgment becomes final, unless the
motion alleges and the movant proves either:
(a) that the facts upon which the claim is predicated
were unknown to the movant and could not have been
ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or
(b) that the fundamental constitutional right asserted
was not established within the period provided for herein
and has been held to apply retroactively. (Emphasis
supplied.)
* * *
If the motion qualifies under one of the foregoing
exceptions to the three year time limit, the motion shall
be filed within three years after the event establishing
the exception occurred.
This amendment to the rule became effective on October 1,
1994.
Since Grimes’s conviction became final after the rule was
adopted in the form set forth above, the time constraints therein
necessarily governed his RCr 11.42 motion. Accordingly, Grimes had
until September 22, 1998, to file a motion to vacate, set aside or
correct his sentence.
deadline.
It is undisputed that he failed to meet that
The Kentucky Supreme Court recently addressed the
question of whether deviation from the three-year limitation found
-5-
in RCr 11.42 is permissible and answered in the negative.1
do the same.
We must
As Grimes did not file his RCr 11.42 motion in a
timely manner, we are precluded from addressing the merits of his
argument.
The order denying Grimes’s motion for RCr 11.42 relief
is, therefore, affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Rodney Grimes, pro se
Eddyville, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General
Perry T. Ryan
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
1
See Baze v. Comm., Ky., 23 S.W.3d 619 (2000).
-6-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
