CONNIE L. RUNNER V. HON. STEPHEN P. RYAN, JUDGE JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT AND COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: APRIL 20, 2001; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO. 2001-CA-000490-OA
CONNIE L. RUNNER
PETITIONER
ORIGINAL ACTION
REGARDING THE JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
V.
HON. STEPHEN P. RYAN, JUDGE
JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
RESPONDENT
AND
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
REAL PARTY IN INTEREST
*** ** ***
OPINION AND ORDER
BEFORE: KNOPF, MILLER, AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
KNOPF, JUDGE: Petitioner seeks relief from this Court pursuant to
CR 76.36 for issuance of a writ of prohibition to prevent her
trial on the charge of tampering with physical evidence.
This
Court previously denied petitioner’s motion for emergency relief
in this matter, and this panel now considers this original action
on the merits.
The petitioner is charged with tampering with physical
evidence based on the Commonwealth’s belief that petitioner
contrived requested handwriting exemplars during her previous
trial for bribery of a public official.
Petitioner was acquitted
on the bribery charge, and thus claims that a trial on the
tampering with evidence charge either violates her Constitutional
protection against double jeopardy or is foreclosed under the
doctrine of collateral estoppel.
The respondent trial court denied motions to dismiss
the tampering charges by orders entered November 14 and November
27, 2000.
The trial was previously scheduled on March 14, 2001,
but has now been rescheduled for July of 2001.
Pursuant to the holding of the Kentucky Supreme Court
in Commonwelath v. Burge, Ky., 947 S.W.2d 805 (1997), cert.
denied sub nom., Effinger v. Kentucky, 522 U.S. 971, 118 S. Ct.
422, 139 L. Ed. 2d. 323 (1997), the key issue for double jeopardy
analysis is whether each of the charged offenses requires proof
of an element that the other offense does not.
Based on that
analysis there is no double jeopardy violation in this case.
The
proof required on a bribery charge involves numerous elements not
required for a tampering with evidence charge, and the proof
required for tampering with evidence is not even necessary in a
bribery charge.
With regard to collateral estoppel, the Kentucky
Supreme Court, in Benton v. Crittenden, Ky., 14 S.W.3d 1 (1999),
adopted a standard from the United States Supreme Court in Ashe
v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 25 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1970).
The test adopted for collateral estoppel involves whether, in
determining the previous verdict, a rational jury could have
relied on an issue other than the one petitioner claims is
foreclosed.
Benton, at 4.
Based on a careful review of the
petition and response in this action, it is clear to this Court
that a rational jury could have relied on evidence other than the
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accuracy and honesty of the handwriting exemplars in delivering a
verdict of acquittal on the bribery charge.
Accordingly, the petition pursuant to CR 76.36 for a
writ of prohibition to prevent her trial on the charge of
tampering with physical evidence is hereby DENIED.
Having considered petitioner’s motion for oral argument
in the above-styled action, and being otherwise sufficiently
advised, this Court ORDERS that this motion be, and it is hereby,
DENIED.
SCHRODER, JUDGE, CONCURS.
MILLER, JUDGE, DISSENTS.
MILLER, JUDGE, DISSENTING: I dissent.
In my opinion
this prosecution violates the fundamental fairness doctrine
implicit in the due process clauses of our federal and state
constitutions.
See Matthews v. Commonwealth, Ky., 997 S.W.2d
449, 455 (1999) (Stephens, J., dissenting, citing Brandy v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963)),
and Burks v. Commonwealth, Ky., 471 S.W.2d 298 (1991).
I am of the opinion that the petition should be
granted.
ENTERED: April 20, 2001
/s/ William L. Knopf
JUDGE, COURT OF APPEALS
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