DANIEL REYES-GARCIA v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
NOVEMBER 30, 2001; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2001-CA-000283-MR
DANIEL REYES-GARCIA
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE MARY C. NOBLE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 00-CR-00182
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUIDUGLI, MILLER, AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
SCHRODER, JUDGE:
This is an appeal from a judgment convicting
appellant of reckless homicide.
Appellant argues that the trial
court erred when it refused to allow the prior inconsistent
statement of a defense witness to be admitted and when it allowed
certain irrelevant testimony to be admitted.
Upon reviewing
these arguments in light of the facts and applicable law, we do
not see that the court abused its discretion with regard to these
rulings.
Hence, we affirm.
This case arose from the stabbing death of Ricky Pitts
on December 15, 1999.
On that date, Fernando Sierra, Elias Wong,
Miguel Campos, Arturo Rodriguez, Freddy Montoya, David de la
Santos, and appellant, Daniel Reyes-Garcia, all of whom were of
Hispanic origin, were residing in rooms at the Horseshoe Motel in
Lexington.
At around 7:00 or 8:00 p.m., all the men except de la
Santos, went to Wong’s room.
At some point Pitts, who had also
recently rented a room in the hotel, came into Wong’s room with
crack cocaine.
One of the men present took rocks of cocaine from
Pitts without paying for them, although it was in dispute who
this person was.
Pitts then expressed that he wanted his money
for the cocaine.
After Pitts left, the men, all except
appellant, went to Sierra’s room and smoked the crack cocaine.
Sierra left the room and encountered Pitts who was disturbed
about not being paid for the cocaine.
Pitts then pulls Sierra
into his (Pitts’s) room and closes the door.
Campos discovers
that Pitts has pulled Sierra into his room and tells the others.
Wong then goes into the room to get Sierra and sees that Pitts is
holding Sierra by the arm and left shoulder.
Wong and two other
African-American men in the room tell Pitts to let Sierra go and
just then a window breaks.
Wong then attempts to pull Sierra out
of the room and Pitts finally lets go of Sierra.
As the Hispanic
men were about to leave, appellant entered the room and stabbed
Pitts.
Appellant then gave the knife to Wong.
Much of the testimony at trial was confusing, in part,
due to the fact that some of the witnesses either spoke very
little or no English and certain testimony had to be translated.
However, the above stated facts were generally undisputed among
the witnesses, although there were some differences in the
testimony.
Sierra testified that it was Montoya who took the
crack from Pitts when they were in Wong’s room.
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Sierra also
testified that when he was pulled into Pitts’s room, there was no
physical altercation and he was not afraid for his life.
Wong’s testimony varied in that he testified that
Montoya was the one who took the crack from Pitts.
Wong also
testified that when he went to the door of Pitts’s room when
Pitts was holding Sierra, he heard Sierra say that Pitts wanted
to beat him up.
Appellant’s version of the events was far different
from any other account.
Appellant stated that on the evening in
question, he went to Wong’s room where he and his Hispanic
friends were smoking crack.
Pitts came to the room to sell crack
and Wong told him that he wanted crack but that he did not have
any money.
Whereupon Pitts gave Wong some crack and told him he
could pay him when he got the money.
Subsequently, Sierra took
more crack from Pitts with the assistance of Montoya and Campos,
and they all began smoking it.
Pitts told them he wanted to be
paid for the crack, whereupon Montoya, Sierra, and Campos began
hitting Pitts.
Appellant claims he then took a screwdriver away
from Montoya and asked Pitts to leave.
Some minutes later, Pitts
returned with an African-American man demanding money for the
crack.
Appellant contends he then left the room to get
cigarettes with de la Santos, and it was during that time that
Sierra was pulled into Pitts’s room.
Appellant went to see what
was going on in the room and heard Sierra yelling for help.
When
the door opened, appellant saw Pitts and Sierra hitting each
other.
Appellant tried to break up the fight and Pitts hit him.
Sierra ran out of the room.
Pitts.
Appellant was left fighting with
Appellant claims he saw Pitts take a pocket knife from
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his pocket.
When Pitts dropped the knife, appellant grabbed it
and stabbed Pitts in self-defense.
Pitts died from the knife
wound.
Appellant was thereafter indicted for murder.
At
trial, the jury was instructed on murder, first-degree
manslaughter, second-degree manslaughter, and reckless homicide.
Appellant was convicted of reckless homicide and sentenced to
five years’ imprisonment.
This appeal followed.
Appellant’s first assignment of error is that the trial
court erred when it refused to allow appellant to admit the prior
inconsistent statement of Sierra.
The prior inconsistent
statement at issue was Sierra’s first statement to police to the
effect that three African-American men in Pitts’s room were
responsible for Pitts’s death.
At trial, Sierra admitted lying to police during his
first statement to them, but claimed he could not remember the
substance of the lie.
On cross-examination of Detective Billy
Richmond who took that statement from Sierra, appellant attempted
to elicit the substance of the prior inconsistent statement.
Appellant maintained he wanted to admit this prior inconsistent
statement to impeach Sierra’s testimony by showing that he was a
liar and that he could make up a story on the spot to fit the
situation.
The trial court denied the admission of the prior
inconsistent statement on grounds that appellant freely admitted
he lied in the prior statement to police and appellant was not
attempting to prove the truth of said statement.
Hence, the
substance of the prior inconsistent statement would serve no
further purpose.
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In Jett v. Commonwealth, Ky., 436 S.W.2d 788 (1969), it
was held that a prior out-of-court statement may be admitted not
only for impeachment purposes, but also as substantive evidence
if it is relevant to the merits of the case, as opposed to being
a collateral matter.
It has also been held that the admission of
a contradictory statement is within the trial court’s discretion.
Wise v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 600 S.W.2d 470 (1978).
In the
instant case, appellant claims he sought to admit Sierra’s prior
statement to show the witness was a liar.
As noted by the trial
court, the witness accomplished this himself by admitting he lied
to police in the prior statement.
The prior statement that the
two African-American men were responsible for the death of Pitts
was inconsistent with both the defense and prosecution theories
of the case.
Hence, it was not relevant to the merits of the
case and would have served only to confuse the issues in this
already confusing trial.
Appellant argues that the trial court was required to
admit the prior statement under the dictates of Wise v.
Commonwealth, Ky. App., 600 S.W.2d 470 (1978) and Commonwealth v.
Manning, Ky., 23 S.W.3d 610 (2000).
We disagree.
Those cases
can be distinguished by the fact that the prior statements in
those cases were sought by the Commonwealth, not to show that the
witnesses were lying, but to prove the truth of those statements.
Accordingly, the trial court in the present case did not abuse
its discretion in refusing to admit Sierra’s prior statement to
police.
Appellant’s remaining argument is that the trial court
erred in admitting evidence that appellant was upset over his
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girlfriend on the day in question.
During the direct examination
of Sierra and Wong, the Commonwealth brought out evidence that
appellant was upset with Miguel Campos over his girlfriend on
that day.
Appellant objected, contending that this evidence was
irrelevant since it did not make it any more or less probable
that he killed Pitts.
See KRE 401.
Again, we disagree.
Wong
testified that appellant was upset with Pitts because he kept
approaching the door where appellant and his girlfriend, Jessica,
were and asking Jessica to come out.
Appellant claimed he killed
Pitts in self-defense or in defense of Sierra.
If his motive for
killing Pitts was because he was angry about Pitts’s interest in
Jessica, that would negate appellant’s claims of self-defense or
defense of another.
Determinations of relevancy are within the
trial court’s discretion.
S.W.2d 219 (1996).
Partin v. Commonwealth, Ky., 918
The trial court did not abuse its discretion
in allowing this evidence.
For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the
Fayette Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Alicia A. Sneed
Lexington, Kentucky
A. B. Chandler, III
Attorney General
Courtney J. Hightower
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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