GOERGE R. ABNEY, SR. v. COMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED:
SEPTEMBER 21, 2001; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2001-CA-000135-MR
GOERGE R. ABNEY, SR.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM EDMONSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE RONNIE DORTCH, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-CR-00037
v.
COMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUIDUGLI, HUDDLESTON AND JOHNSON, JUDGES.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE.
George Abney, Sr. ("Abney") appeals from an
order of the Edmonson Circuit Court denying his motion for RCr
11.42 relief.
We affirm.
The facts are uncontroverted.
On September 28, 1998,
Abney was indicted by the Edmonson Grand Jury on the charge of
second-degree arson.
It was alleged that Abney hired his son and
another individual to burn down his ex-wife's residence.
On
October 6, 1999, Abney entered a plea of guilty, and was
sentenced to ten (10) years in prison.
It appears from the record that once imprisoned, Abney
undertook a campaign of filing pro se motions.
These motions
are contained in the record and need not be addressed herein.
On February 27, 2001, Abney's court-appointed public defender
sought and received leave of court to withdraw as counsel.
Most lately, Abney moved for RCr 11.42 relief and the
recusal of the trial judge.
Abney argued therein that his trial
counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and/or call
certain witnesses.
He further maintained that the indictment
improperly showed the crime as occurring on May 7, 1998, rather
than May 15, 1998.
As part of the motion, he sought the recusal
of the trial judge and an evidentiary hearing.
Upon considering the matter, the circuit court denied
Abney's request for an evidentiary hearing, recusal, and RCr
11.42 relief.
Thereafter, Abney filed a pro se motion for
findings of fact and conclusions of law on the denial of his RCr
11.42 motion.
This motion was denied as well, and the instant
appeal followed.
Abney now argues that the circuit court's denial of his
RCr 11.42 motion is constitutionally infirm.
As best we can
tell, his primary argument is that the court improperly denied
his motion for findings of fact and conclusions of law.
He also
argues that the court erred in failing to appoint counsel.
He
seeks to have the matter reversed and remanded with instructions
to enter the relief sought.
We have closely examined Abney's argument and find no
error.
The first question is whether a hearing on the motion was
required.
As the parties are well aware, a hearing is only
required where there exists an issue of fact that cannot be
-2-
resolved by reference to the record.
Stanford v. Commonwealth,
Ky., 854 S.W.2d 742 (1993).
In the matter at bar, Abney's broad claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel and failure of the court to
appoint counsel were properly disposed of by reference to the
record.
Abney's ineffective assistance claim is premised on the
argument that counsel improperly failed to investigate certain
witnesses which Abney argues would have supported his claims of
innocence had the matter gone to trial.
In order to prevail on
such a claim, though, Abney must show that trial counsel
committed errors so serious that his performance fell outside the
wide range of professionally competent assistance, and that but
for the errors there is a reasonable likelihood that the outcome
of the trial would have been different. Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).
That is to
say, Abney must show that there is a reasonable likelihood that
counsel's alleged failure to investigate certain witnesses would
have changed the outcome of the proceeding had the matter gone to
trial.
Abney has made no such showing.
It appears from the
record that trial counsel, after adequate investigation,
recommended that Abney enter a plea of guilty.
It can hardly be
said that Abney has offered any evidence that the outcome of the
proceedings would have been different had trial counsel conducted
a more thorough investigation or had pursued any witnesses with
more vigor.
Since this matter was resolved by reference to the
-3-
pleadings and the record, no hearing was required.
Stanford,
supra.
The next question is whether the trial court erred in
denying Abney's motion for findings of fact.
It did not.
Findings are required only if a hearing has been conducted.
RCr
11.42(6); see also, Stanford, supra (stating at p. 743, "[I]f
there is no hearing, then no findings are required.").
Clearly,
since no hearing was required or conducted below, the trial court
was under no due to render findings of fact.
Lastly, Abney notes that the indictment improperly
states that the crime in question occurred on May 7, 1998, rather
than May 15, 1998.
is correct.
The Commonwealth concedes that this assertion
They note, however, that had the matter gone to
trial the indictment would have been amended to conform to the
proof via a proper motion.
If it is Abney's assertion that trial
counsel acted ineffectively in failing to raise this as an issue,
we find this argument unpersuasive.
Similarly, the issues of
recusal and failure to appoint counsel are given little or no
attention in Abney's brief, and do not form a basis for reversal.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the
Edmonson Circuit Court which denied Abney's motion for RCr 11.42
relief.
HUDDLESTON, JUDGE, CONCURS.
JOHNSON, JUDGE, CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT PRO SE:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
George R. Abney, Sr.
West Liberty, KY
A. B. Chandler, III
Attorney General
George G. Seelig
-4-
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, KY
-5-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.