DEON LEE HUNT v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
DECEMBER 14, 2001; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2001-CA-000059-MR
DEON LEE HUNT
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE REBECCA M. OVERSTREET, JUDGE
ACTION NOS. 00-CR-01000 & 00-CR-01162
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, JOHNSON, and SCHRODER, Judges.
COMBS, JUDGE:
Appellant, Deon Hunt, appeals from a judgment
based on a jury verdict finding him guilty of possession of a
simulated controlled substance, tampering with physical evidence,
and possession of drug paraphernalia, for which he received
concurrent sentences of twelve months in jail and two fines of
$250.00.
We affirm.
The events leading to Hunt's indictment and conviction
occurred in the early morning hours of August 2, 2000.
Working
undercover, Detective Byron Smoot of the Lexington Police
Department encountered Hunt and asked him for a "twenty" -- a
twenty-dollar piece of crack cocaine.
Hunt responded, "I got it.
It's tight.
Come on up."
The two men talked only briefly before
Hunt recognized the narcotic squad's back-up team and fled.
During the melee that followed, Hunt appeared to swallow what
police believed was contraband.
Hunt was arrested and searched.
Under the insole of his left shoe, Hunt carried $795.00 in cash,
consisting mostly of twenty-dollar bills.
He told police that
the money came from the sale of his car.
Plastic sandwich bags
and razor blades were recovered from his apartment.
While Hunt
gave his correct name to police, he originally gave his address
as Cincinnati, Ohio.
He later said that he was from Detroit.
Hunt was tried in Fayette Circuit Court on November 9,
2000.
noted.
The jury found him guilty of the three charges previously
This appeal followed.
Hunt contends that the trial court erred by failing to
grant his motions in limine.
In a motion filed on November 2,
2000, Hunt argued that information linking him to Detroit was
irrelevant and unduly prejudicial.
He requested that the court
prohibit the Commonwealth and its witnesses from:
making any reference to Detroit, Michigan at
the trial of this action including - but not
limited to - the conspicuously incorrect and
implicitly derogatory pronunciation "DEEtroit," the habits and customs of persons especially black males - with Detroit area
origins, and the use of Detroit origins as a
factor which implies drug use or drug
trafficking.
Defendant's Motion at 1.
In his brief, Hunt reports that frequent references to
Detroit were made during the Commonwealth's voir dire, that
Detective Smoot testified that Hunt was from Detroit, that the
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Commonwealth sarcastically referred to him as a "scared little
kid from Detroit," and that it mentioned "the Motor City" during
its closing argument.
He contends that these comments were
irrelevant and unduly prejudicial.
We note preliminarily that Hunt has failed to comply
with CR1 76.12(4)(c)(iv), which requires a statement referencing
to the record to show whether and where this issue was properly
preserved for review and, if so, in what manner.
Error on appeal
cannot be considered in the absence of a proper objection to
preserve the error for appellate review.
Ky., 716 S.W.2d 242 (1986).
Todd v. Commonwealth,
It is true that motions in limine
have been used as a proper means of obtaining pre-trial rulings
concerning the admissibility and exclusion of evidence.
However,
the rule requiring contemporaneous objections has not been
repealed.
Tucker v. Commonwealth, 916 S.W.2d 181 (1996).
In
order to raise an error on appeal, a litigant may not rely on a
broad pre-trial ruling and then omit at trial to object
specifically to the matter complained of.
Id.
If trial counsel
is aware of an issue and fails to request appropriate relief in a
timely fashion, the matter will not be treated as plain error for
consideration on appeal.
Id.
Nonetheless, despite the procedural flaw, we believe
that the statements which Hunt attacks were admissible.
It is
undisputed that Hunt misled police about his background upon
arrest.
A comparison of the information that he initially
provided with information later confirmed to be correct (that he
1
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure
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was, in fact, from Detroit rather than Cincinnati) was certainly
relevant to the criminal proceedings.
This evidence tended to
show that as soon as Hunt realized that he was dealing with the
police, he set out on a course of deception, corroborating the
Commonwealth's contention that he had possessed a controlled
substance (either real or simulated) and that he destroyed
evidence of that crime.
Having determined that the evidence was relevant, we
must next consider whether its probative value was substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
KRE2 403.
Hunt
characterizes the Commonwealth's references to Detroit as an
inflammatory appeal to local prejudice.
We are not persuaded —
and he has not established — that a prevailing pervasive bias
against the residents of Detroit characterized the geographic
area in which he was charged.
Despite his complaints to the
contrary, the Commonwealth's references to Hunt's ties to Detroit
were not "demeaning comments" — nor did they amount to an
"assault upon his character."
Brief at 8.
The probative value
of the statements was not substantially outweighed by the danger
of undue prejudice.
We find no abuse of discretion by the court.
In a motion filed on November 8, 2000, Hunt argued that
any "expert" testimony offered by Detective Smoot or Detective
Mark Simmons should be excluded from evidence.
On appeal, Hunt
contends that their testimony at trial should have been excluded
from the proof since the Commonwealth had failed to provide
sufficient information to allow him to defend against the
2
Kentucky Rules of Evidence
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opinions and because the "expert" testimony amounted to "junk
science."
We disagree.
The trial court did not err by refusing to exclude
police testimony based upon Hunt's objection to the alleged
insufficiency of discovery information provided by the
Commonwealth.
By announcing “ready for trial,” Hunt waived any
alleged deficiency in the Commonwealth's response to his request
for information.
See Sargent v. Commonwealth, Ky., 813 S.W.2d
801 (1991).
Nor did the trial court err by refusing to strike the
testimony of Detective Simmons based upon Hunt's contention that
it failed to satisfy the factors enunciated in Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125
L.Ed.2d 469 (1993); Mitchell v. Commonwealth, Ky., 908 S.W.2d 100
(1995), overruled on other grounds, Fugate v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
993 S.W.2d 931 (1999); and Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. v.
Thompson, Ky., 11 S.W.3d 575 (2000).
Simmons testified generally
about the drug trade in Lexington and about its lingo.
He also
testified about a specific connection between Lexington and
Detroit, indicating that Detroit is a source-city for drugs
integral to street-level dealing and drug trafficking in
Lexington.
KRE 104 provides that the trial court shall determine
preliminary questions regarding the qualification of a witness.
KRE 702 governs the admissibility of the testimony of an expert
witness.
A trial court's ruling on the admission of expert
testimony is reviewed under the same standard as its ruling on
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any other evidentiary matter:
discretion.
whether there was an abuse of
See Tumey v. Richardson, Ky., 437 S.W.2d 201 (1969).
In Daubert, the U.S. Supreme Court held that Rule 702
requires the trial judge to act as a "gatekeeper" to ensure that
"any and all [expert] testimony or evidence admitted is not only
relevant, but reliable."
509 U.S. at 589, 113 S.Ct. at 2795.
The court's gatekeeping function does not replace the traditional
adversary system and the role of the jury within that system.
See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596, 113 S.Ct. at 2798.
As the Supreme
Court noted in Daubert, "vigorous cross-examination, presentation
of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of
proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking
shaky but admissible evidence."
Id.
When faced with a proffer of expert testimony, the
trial judge must determine "whether the expert is proposing to
testify to (1) scientific [technical, or other specialized]
knowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact to understand or
determine a fact in issue."
at 2796.
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592, 113 S.Ct.
In order to meet the standard, the expert testimony,
which is based on "scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge," must be both relevant and reliable.
Id. at 589, 113
S.Ct. at 2795.
Hunt argues that Simmons's testimony should have been
deemed unreliable because it does not satisfy the factors set
forth in Daubert, which include:
(1) whether a theory or
technique can be and has been tested; (2) whether the theory or
technique has been subjected to peer review and publication; (3)
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whether, with respect to a particular technique, there is a high
known or potential rate of error and whether there are standards
controlling the technique's operation; and (4) whether the theory
or technique enjoys general acceptance within the relevant
scientific, technical, or other specialized community.
509 U.S. at 592-94, 113 S.Ct. at 2796-97.
Daubert,
In adopting the
Supreme Court's reasoning in Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael,
526 U.S. 137, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999), the
Kentucky Supreme Court agreed, however, that "the test of
reliability is 'flexible,' and Daubert's [and Mitchell's] list of
specific factors neither necessarily nor exclusively applies to
all experts or in every case."
Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. v.
Thompson, Ky., 11 S.W.3d 575, 577 (2000).
The reliability inquiry requires the court to assess
whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the expert's
testimony is valid.
2795.
See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589, 113 S.Ct. at
The aim is to prevent expert testimony based merely on
subjective belief or unsupported speculation.
S.Ct. at 2795.
Id. at 590, 113
"[T]he factors identified in Daubert may or may
not be pertinent in assessing reliability, depending on the
nature of the issue, the expert's particular expertise, and the
subject of his testimony."
Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. 137, 119 S.Ct.
at 1175 (quoting with approval Brief for United States as Amicus
Curiae 19).
The goal "is to make certain that an expert, whether
basing testimony upon professional studies or personal
experience, employs in the courtroom the same level of
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intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert
in the relevant field."
Id.
The relevancy prong of the Daubert analysis requires
the trial court to determine whether the expert's methodology
"fits" the facts of the case and whether it will thereby assist
the trier of fact to understand the evidence.
See Daubert, 509
U.S. at 591, 113 S.Ct. at 2795-96; Goodyear Tire, 11 S.W.3d 575,
578; KRE 702.
KRE 401 defines "relevant evidence" as "evidence
having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or
less probable than it would be without the evidence."
We have upheld the qualification of adequately trained
and experienced police officers as experts as to the methods and
operations of drug-dealers.
Sargent, 813 S.W.2d at 802.
In this
case, Detective Simmons indicated that he had fourteen years of
experience on the police force.
Seven of these years had been
focused on specialized training and experience in narcotics
trafficking operations.
He worked undercover to support or
supervise investigations relating to the illegal transportation
and distribution of narcotics in the Lexington area.
He assisted
with a hundred or more investigations, discovering a unique
pattern among Detroit-based drug-traders.
In light of that
extensive and particularized experience, we cannot conclude that
the trial court abused its discretion by determining that Simmons
was qualified to testify about “the Detroit connection”: that it
is a source-city for illegal drugs sold in Lexington and that
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street-level vendors from the area have specific, identifiable
methods of operation in Lexington.
We are persuaded that an experienced, adequately
trained police officer may testify about the significance of
certain conduct or methods of operation unique to the drug trade
because such testimony can assist the trier of fact to assess and
properly evaluate the evidence presented.
Federal courts have
admitted expert testimony that certain cities are source areas
for drugs.
1995).
See United States v. Nobles, 69 F.3d 172 (7th Cir.
Based on this analysis, we cannot conclude that the trial
court abused its discretion by determining that Simmons was
qualified to offer the challenged testimony.
Simmons's testimony
concerned an area of specialized knowledge outside the
understanding of the average juror.
The testimony could have
been expected to help the jury to determine whether Hunt was
intentionally in possession of illegal drugs (real or simulated);
whether he disposed of the contraband once he realized that he
was dealing with authorities; and whether the items recovered
from his apartment amounted to drug paraphernalia.
elements of the charged offenses.
These are all
The testimony was relevant,
reliable, and admissible at trial.
Finally, Hunt contends that the trial court erred by
failing to grant a mistrial when the Commonwealth introduced
"other crimes" evidence during its closing argument.3
3
The
Hunt has not characterized the comments as amounting to
prosecutorial misconduct. Reversal of Hunt's conviction on these
grounds would require misconduct so serious as to render the
entire trial fundamentally unfair. Partin v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
(continued...)
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Commonwealth maintains that the prosecutor's comments amounted to
reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence presented.
It
emphasizes that the comments constituted a proper scope of
argument and that they were not evidence governed by the
procedural and substantive requirements of KRE 404(b).
Hunt has
failed to identify the specific comment to which he objected at
trial.
Nonetheless, after reviewing the entirety of the
prosecutor's closing statements, we are not persuaded that a
mistrial was required.
The judgment of conviction is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Bobby L. Amburgey
Lexington, KY
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General of Kentucky
Dennis W. Shepherd
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, KY
3
(...continued)
918 S.W.2d 219 (1996).
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