ERIC IRVIN, SR. v. JOHN AUBREY, SHERIFF OF JEFFERSON COUNTY, KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
December 28, 2001; 2:00 p.m.
TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2000-CA-002824-MR
ERIC IRVIN, SR.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS J. KNOPF, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 97-CI-003507
v.
JOHN AUBREY,
SHERIFF OF JEFFERSON COUNTY,
KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, SCHRODER, and TACKETT, JUDGES.
BUCKINGHAM, JUDGE: Eric Irvin, Sr., appeals from a summary
judgment entered by the Jefferson Circuit Court dismissing his
religious and racial discrimination claims against the Jefferson
County Sheriff’s Office (JCSO).
We affirm.
Irvin, an African-American male, was hired by the JCSO
as a deputy sheriff in October 1995.
When first hired, he was
assigned to the metal detectors at the entrance of the
courthouse.
At his request, he was transferred to the
transportation unit.
That job required him to transport
prisoners between the jail and the courthouse.
Again at his
request, Irvin was transferred to the position of bailiff for the
courtroom of Jefferson Circuit Judge Edwin Schroering.
Irvin was also a Baptist minister, and adherence to his
faith and position as a minister required him to be in church
every Sunday morning.
This posed no conflict with his duties as
a deputy sheriff as his first three positions involved no
scheduled work on Sundays.
The conflict did not arise until the
summer of 1996 when Irvin made yet another request for a
transfer.
In his request, he asked to be assigned to the
“criminal unit.”
The only criminal unit in the JCSO is the
emergency protective order (EPO) division.
This unit, which has
responsibility for serving all emergency protective orders issued
in Jefferson County, operates twenty-four hours a day, seven days
a week.
Irvin’s request to transfer to the EPO unit was granted,
but he subsequently declined the transfer because he was not
guaranteed Sunday mornings off.
In October 1996, Irvin filed complaints with the
Kentucky Commission on Human Rights and the federal Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission.
These complaints were
eventually withdrawn, and on June 24, 1997, Irvin filed suit in
the Jefferson Circuit Court against Jim Vaughn in his capacity as
the Jefferson County sheriff.1
In his complaint, Irvin alleged
both religious and racial discrimination.
On November 2, 2000,
the trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the JCSO,
and this appeal by Irvin followed.
1
John Aubrey succeeded Vaughn as Jefferson County sheriff
and was substituted as the party defendant in Vaughn’s place.
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KRS2 344.040 prohibits religious discrimination by
employers.
The elements of a prima facie case of religious
discrimination were set forth by this court in Kentucky Comm’n on
Human Rights v. Lesco, Ky. App., 736 S.W.2d 361 (1987).
Therein,
the court held that “one must prove that (1) he has a bona fide
belief that compliance with an employment requirement is contrary
to his religious faith; (2) he informed his employer about the
conflict; and (3) he was discharged because of his refusal to
comply with the employment requirement.”
Id. at 363.
While the trial court elected to resolve Irvin’s
religious discrimination claim on the basis of “reasonable
accommodation,” we note that Irvin appears to have failed to
establish a prima facie case.
he suffer a demotion.
granted.
Irvin was not discharged nor did
In fact, his request for transfer was
Irvin has attempted to rely on a claim that his refusal
to accept the transfer operated to deny him a position which he
felt was more preferential.
Yet, he has been unable to cite, nor
have we found, any precedent which would indicate that these
circumstances support a prima facie case for religious
discrimination.
Be that as it may, we will now turn to the trial
court’s “reasonable accommodation” conclusion.
Employers such as
the JCSO are required to make reasonable accommodations to the
religious needs of employees where such accommodations can be
made without undue hardship.
2
Kentucky Comm’n on Human Rights v.
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
-3-
Dept. For Human Resources, Hazelwood Hosp., Ky. App., 564 S.W.2d
38, 39 (1978).
There must be more than a de minimis cost in the
form of either lost efficiency or wages in order to constitute
undue hardship which will relieve an employer of its duty to
accommodate the religious beliefs of its employees.
Lesco, 736
S.W.2d at 364.
The real issue in determining if the trial court
properly granted summary judgment in favor of the JCSO on Irvin’s
religious discrimination claim is whether there was a genuine
issue of material fact concerning whether the JCSO provided
reasonable accommodation for Irvin’s religious practices.
The
trial court relied on Kentucky Comm’n on Human Rights v. Kerns
Bakery, Inc., Ky. App., 644 S.W.2d 350 (1982).
In Kerns, this
court upheld a finding by the Kentucky Commission on Human Rights
that the employer could have easily accommodated the employee
without undue hardship to its business by either transferring him
to an available non-Sunday job or simply excusing him from Sunday
work.
Id. at 351.
The court in the case sub judice held that
Irvin “had multiple opportunities to switch to other assignments
which did not require Sunday work.”
The facts here are that Irvin held a position as a
deputy sheriff of the JCSO which did not require him to work on
Sundays, but he requested a lateral transfer to a position that
required Sunday work.
In other words, Irvin requested to go from
a position that did not interfere with his religious practices to
one that did.
When the transfer was granted, he rejected it
because it would require him to work on Sundays.
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Irvin was
allowed to continue working in his initial position which held
the same rank and the same rate of pay.
Under these
circumstances, we conclude that the trial court was correct in
holding that the JCSO provided reasonable accommodation for
Irvin’s religious practices and that there was no fact issue in
this regard.
Irvin nevertheless argues that he should have been
allowed to make the transfer to the EPO unit and that other
accommodations should have been made so that he would not have
had to work on Sundays.
In Pinsker and Aurora Educ. Ass’n v.
Joint Dist. No. 28J of Adams and Arapahoe Counties, 735 F.2d 388
(10th Cir. 1984), the court held that Title VII of the federal
Civil Rights Act of 1964 “does not require employers to
accommodate the religious practices of an employee in exactly the
way the employee would like to be accommodated.”
Id. at 390.3
Further, Title VII “requires only ‘reasonable accommodation,’ not
satisfaction of an employee’s every desire.”
F.3d 214, 217 (7th Cir. 1993).
Wright v. Runyon, 2
Also, the U.S. Supreme Court
stated in Ansonia Bd. Of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 93
L.Ed. 2d 305, 107 S.Ct. 367 (1986), that “where the employer has
already reasonably accommodated the employee’s religious needs,
the statutory inquiry is at an end.
The employer need not
further show that each of the employee’s alternative
3
Because the Kentucky Civil Rights Act mirrors Title VII of
the federal Civil Rights Act, federal standards are used in
evaluating discrimination claims under the Kentucky act. See
Smith v. Leggett Wire Co., 220 F.3d 752 (6th Cir. 2000). See
also Kentucky Comm’n on Human Rights v. Comm., Dept. Of Justice,
Ky. App., 586 S.W.2d 270, 271 (1979).
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accommodations would result in undue hardship.”
479 U.S. at 68.
Therefore, since the JCSO allowed Irvin to remain in his original
position, which reasonably accommodated his religious practices,
it was not required to make special provision to accommodate him
in the position he desired.
Finally, we note that Irvin made no suggestions to the
JCSO as to alternative reasonable accommodations once it became
apparent he would not work in the EPO unit due to his religious
practices.
In the Hazelwood Hospital case, the court held that
“the employee cannot sit idly by and shift all the responsibility
for accommodation to the employer.”
564 S.W.2d at 40.
In short,
we hold that Irvin had no valid claim for religious
discrimination when he voluntarily requested a transfer from one
position that did not interfere with his religious practices to
another which did and subsequently refused it.4
Irvin’s second argument is that the trial court erred
in awarding summary judgment to the JCSO on his racial
discrimination claim.
KRS 344.040 prohibits discrimination by
employers on the basis of race.
Irvin contends that another
deputy sheriff, who was a white Baptist minister, was placed in
4
The U.S. Supreme Court addressed a similar fact situation
in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 53 L.Ed.
2d 113, 97 S.Ct. 2264 (1977). As in the case sub judice, the
employee requested and received a transfer to a different job
with his employer. The employee was called upon to work on
Saturdays at his new job. When he refused to do so for religious
reasons, he was discharged. In that case, the U.S. Supreme Court
held that the employer made reasonable efforts to accommodate the
employee and that the suggested alternatives would have been an
undue hardship on the employer. 432 U.S. at 77. The Court also
held that the employer’s conduct did not violate Title VII
provisions. Id. at 70.
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an assignment where no Sunday work was required as an
accommodation to his religious beliefs.
That deputy sheriff
worked in the civil process unit which had no Sunday morning
shift.5
A prima facie case of race discrimination normally
requires a showing that the person did not receive the position.
See Turner v. Pendennis Club, Ky. App., 19 S.W.3d 117 (2000).
In
this case, rather than being denied the position, Irvin’s request
was granted.
Unable to establish a prima facie case in this way,
Irvin has instead attempted to show that a similarly situated
individual of another race received more favorable treatment.
In Kirkwood v. Courier-Journal, Ky. App., 858 S.W.2d
194 (1993), the court held that “[a] prima facie case of
discriminatory treatment based on race may further be established
by showing that similarly situated individuals of another race
are accorded more favorable treatment than the plaintiff.”
at 198.
Id.
Because Irvin had admitted that no Sunday work was
required in the assignment of the other deputy, the trial court
held that “there appears to be no factual predicate upon which to
base a claim of racial discrimination.”
Thus, the trial court
granted summary judgment in favor of the JCSO on this claim as
well.
We agree with the trial court.
There are factual
distinctions between Irvin’s situation and that of the other
deputy.
First, Irvin did not request to be transferred to the
5
Irvin later requested transfer to the civil process unit
and was granted his request.
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civil process unit.
Rather, he requested to be transferred to
the EPO unit which required Sunday work.
Second, the other
deputy did not work in the EPO unit but held a position in the
civil process unit which had no shift duty whatsoever for Sunday
mornings.
Finally, Irvin failed to demonstrate any facts which
would indicate the other deputy had been similarly situated,
i.e., that he had originally sought a position in the EPO unit
and was accommodated through an alternative transfer to the civil
process unit.
In short, we conclude that the trial court
correctly granted summary judgment to the JCSO on Irvin’s racial
discrimination claim.
The judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court is
affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENTS FOR
APPELLANT:
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE:
Kenneth L. Sales
Louisville, Kentucky
David Leightty
Louisville, Kentucky
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