ANTHONY ESTELL TAYLOR v. ANGELA MARIE DELL
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RENDERED:
DECEMBER 28, 2001; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2000-CA-002595-MR
ANTHONY ESTELL TAYLOR
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM SHELBY CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM F. STEWART, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 97-CI-00410
v.
ANGELA MARIE DELL
(NOW GOLLAR)
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
DYCHE, GUIDUGLI, AND KNOPF, JUDGES.
KNOPF, JUDGE:
Anthony Taylor appeals from an order of the Shelby
Circuit Court, entered September 20, 2000, awarding custody of
his then six-year-old son, Matthew, to Angela Gollar (formerly
Angela Dell), Matthew’s mother and the appellee herein.
Anthony
contends that the trial court applied the wrong standard in
determining that an award of joint custody was not in Matthew’s
best interest.
He also contends that the trial court awarded him
insufficient visitation, inexplicably reducing the visitation he
had been awarded during the pendency of this action.
Because we
are not persuaded that the trial court erred in the ways Anthony
alleges or otherwise abused its discretion, we affirm.
Matthew was born to Angela and Anthony in August 1994,
after the couple had been dating for the better part of two
years.
Matthew was Angela’s third child, Angela having had a
daughter during both of two prior marriages, and he was Anthony’s
second child, Anthony having a son from a prior marriage.
The
couple made marriage plans, but during the year following
Matthew’s birth changed their minds.
There was a final parting,
apparently, in late 1995 or early 1996.
Angela married her
present husband in the fall of the latter year, at about which
point, apparently, Anthony lost contact with Matthew until
October 1997 when he filed the current action seeking an award of
joint custody.
In November 1997, the trial court entered a
temporary order granting Anthony visitation with Matthew from
Thursday afternoon until Sunday evening every other week and from
Thursday afternoon until Saturday morning during the alternate
weeks.
After other issues had been resolved, a trial
commissioner heard the custody case in May 2000.
He recommended
that Angela be awarded sole custody of Matthew and that Anthony
have visitation no less than on alternate weekends from 5:30 p.m.
Friday to 5:30 p.m. Sunday and from 5:30 p.m. to 9:00 p.m. on
Thursdays following weekend visits, the guideline visitation
schedule employed in Shelby County.
Anthony filed exceptions to
these recommendations, but in its September 20, 2000, order noted
above, the trial court overruled his exceptions and adopted the
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commissioner’s report in its entirety.
It is from that order
that Anthony has appealed.
As Anthony correctly notes, the parties to a custody
dispute under KRS 403.270 are entitled to a thorough and
thoughtful assessment of their situations and to a resolution
responsive to the particular facts in their case.
The trial
court’s primary concern is to “determine custody in accordance
with the best interest of the child.”1
The court is accorded
broad discretion to make that determination, but in doing so it
must give equal consideration to both parents, must be mindful of
numerous factors bearing on the child’s interest, and must at
least consider an award of joint custody.2
There is no statutory
presumption favoring either sole or joint custody, but our
Supreme Court has cautioned against conditioning joint custody on
an unrealistic level of parental cooperation.
Custody disputes
are often heated, of course, the Court has noted, but a former
couple’s hostile relationship in the immediate aftermath of the
divorce or separation is not necessarily an accurate indicator of
what the relationship will become.3
Anthony contends that the
commissioner and trial court inappropriately regarded parental
cooperation as a condition precedent to joint custody and thus
did not give him the full benefit of joint custody’s statutory
recognition.
We disagree.
1
KRS 403.270 (2).
2
KRS 403.270(2) and (5).
3
Squires v. Squires, Ky., 854 S.W.2d 765 (1993).
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True enough, among the commissioner’s conclusions is
the statement that “[f]or the Court to find that joint custody is
appropriate, it must conclude that the parties are capable of
good faith cooperation in making decisions effecting the
upbringing of their child.”
We do not understand this statement,
as Anthony does, as meaning that the parties must be presently
cooperating, but rather that they must seem reasonably likely to
move beyond their immediate pain and anger and to focus
meaningfully and realistically on the needs and well being of
their child.
Such a requirement strikes us as utterly consistent
with the statute and with our Supreme Court’s interpretation of
it.
Nor can we fault the trial court’s conclusion in this case
that the requirement was not met.
At the time of the hearing, in
May 2000, more than four years after their parting, Anthony and
Angela were still at loggerheads over simple details of
visitation, and they betrayed a deep and abiding disagreement
about how Matthew was to be educated.
We agree with the trial
court that joint custody in these circumstances would simply be a
recipe for continued conflict and would not be in Matthew’s best
interest.
Nor can we fault the award of sole custody to Angela
rather than to Anthony.
Although Anthony seems to have done a
fine job raising his older son and would doubtless be a suitable
custodian, the court properly gave substantial weight to the fact
that Matthew’s life would be less disrupted by allowing him to
continue along the course he had been pursuing--a course not at
all shown to be detrimental to him.
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In this way, his
reattachment to Anthony can occur as a new part of his normal
life, rather than necessitating the overthrow of that life.
Anthony also contends that the trial court should have
continued the temporary visitation regime, under which he had
visitation with Matthew from Thursday to Saturday or from
Thursday to Sunday every week.
He complains that the court did
not adequately explain why his visitation should be reduced to
every other weekend and every other Thursday evening.
Under KRS
403.320, a noncustodial parent is entitled to reasonable
visitation unless the court finds substantial reason to preclude
it.
Here, too, the parties are entitled to an individual
assessment of their situations.
In particular the court must
take care not to allow the convenience of a standard visitation
schedule to displace such an individual assessment.4
The court’s order in this case established Anthony’s
minimum visitation right, but left the actual details of the
visitation regime to the parties’ agreement.
The parties live
far enough apart--either Bardstown and Shelbyville or Louisville
and Shelbyville--to make transportation a significant factor.
Matthew’s starting to school makes a relatively stable schoolweek schedule more important than it was before his involvement
in school.
It also gives a premium to the weekends, Matthew’s
only consecutive free days.
These considerations, all of which
were noted in the trial court’s findings, amply justify the
court’s order.
Under a continuation of the temporary regime,
Matthew’s school week would have been interrupted every Thursday,
4
Drury v. Drury, Ky. App., 32 S.W.3d 521 (2000).
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his time in transit to and from school would have been
significantly increased, and Angela would have had no opportunity
to be with Matthew for an entire weekend.
Under the new regime,
these problems are lessened or avoided, while Anthony is still
afforded sufficient time with Matthew to forge a loving
relationship.
It may be hoped, furthermore, that with time the
parties will become better able to agree on mutually satisfactory
adjustments.
In sum, we believe the trial court’s custody and
visitation orders were well within its proper discretion.
Accordingly, we affirm the September 20, 2000, order of the
Shelby Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
James W. Dunn
Connelly, Kaercher & Stamper
Louisville, Kentucky
Daniel R. Meyer
Louisville, Kentucky
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